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Accessorial liability is part of the doctrine of criminal complicity which provides a
set of general legal rules that govern partnership in crime. This well-established type
of criminal liability, which is considered to be one of the more important features of
criminal law, focuses on the liability of secondary parties who either encourage, help
or conspire with a principal who brings about the conduct element of a crime.
Accessorial liability, which in this regard, is derivative in nature, requires the
principal to commit or at least attempt to commit the crime. It is also subsidiary or
ancillary in nature, and thus is often assumed to be less serious than the liability of
the principal. One might think that the concept of accessorial liability is stable; in
fact it is not. The discussion of the general concept of accessorial liability is useful
not only in resolving problems that arise in individual cases but also in terms of
clarifying how legislation, concerning crimes such as money-laundering or drug
trafficking, might deal with the problem ofmultiple offenders.
In this thesis I shall examine accessorial liability from the general viewpoint without
connecting it to a particular crime in both English and United Arab Emirates criminal
law. The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first examines the required conduct
element of accessorial liability. The second discusses the ambit of causation and
omission in accessorial liability. The third chapter examines the general requirements
of criminal mens rea; the mens rea requirements for accessorial liability and other
related and important issues to elaborate the circumstances that make a person a
I
secondary party. These include: the debate as to intention against knowledge or
recklessness, the issue of knowledge of the principal offender's future crime, and the
problem of interpreting the Federal Penal Code of the United Arab Emirates (F.P.C.)
Finally, a view is developed as to what approach the law should follow in this area.
Chapter four discusses accessorial liability for an additional crime committed by the
principal (the doctrine of common purpose), while chapter five examines certain
important issues related to accessorial liability such as the liability of the principal
offender, the derivative theory, the English Law Commission Paper No. 131 on the
new offence of assisting and encouraging crimes, and the doctrine of innocent
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This thesis is an examination of accessorial liability, as an aspect of the general
doctrine of criminal complicity, in English and UAE criminal law.1 The study
focuses on this long-established form of criminal liability, often referred to as
criminal complicity, which has been described as one of the worst features of English
criminal law because of the enormous uncertainty that surrounds nearly almost every
aspect of it, something that has not yet been reflected in Arabic jurisprudence. This
thesis examines the facts and the problems, and questions how reform might prevent
the doctrine being considered as imposing too wide a net of liability. Before
proceeding with this examination, two topics are covered: first, the origin of the UAE
Federal Penal Code (No. 3 of 1987) which is the substantial criminal code in the
UAE; second, the definition of accessorial liability. English law has been chosen for
the comparison, rather than Scots law, for the following reasons: the UAE Federal
Penal Code, in this area, is closely linked with English law; and there is also a rather
larger body of case law and doctrinal writing in this area in relation to English law
than there is in relation to Scots law.
The UAE Federal Penal Code (No.3 of 1987)
The F.P.C. was issued on December 8th 1987 and came into force on March 8th,
1988. Many assume that it is based on other Arabic penal codes that have been
2
derived from the Egyptian Penal Code of 1937 and its subsequent drafts, which were
derived in turn from the French Penal Code. In fact, the Egyptian Penal Code is not
the sole historical source of the F.P.C. The latter includes numerous articles not to be
found in the Egyptian Penal Code and indeed in other Arabic codes. Moreover, the
F.P.C. was formulated and drafted with attention to Islamic Shciria texts.
In spite of the fact that the F.P.C. came into force in 1988, its basic structure was laid
ten or fifteen years earlier. The Ministry of Justice was working upon a penal code
under the name of the 'Jzaa' Code (penal or retribution code) whose source,
apparently, was unknown, as was the identity of the committee members who drafted
it; nor are we able to trace its draft memorandum which explains the draft code; but
even if there were such a memorandum it is likely to have been unofficial. It is
important to note that at that time the UAE Cabinet passed a federal decree (decree
No.5/1978). The aim of this decree was to establish a Higher Committee for Islamic
Legislation (H.C.I.L.) to bring UAE codes closer to Islamic jurisprudence.
Surprisingly, the decree was not published in the Union's Official Gazette. As a
matter of fact it was only a year later, in 1979, that the Minister of Justice issued the
relevant executive order establishing the modus operandi of the Committee.3
1
English law in this regard refers to England and Wales. By contrast Scottish law is a separate legal
system, and beyond the discussion of this thesis.
2 Al- Muhairi, B.S., Conflict and Continuity: Islamization and Modernization within the U.A.E. Penal
Law, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Kent at Canterbury, January 1994. pp. 179-180. It is
possible to say that Butti Al-Muhairi was the first researcher to report the work of the H.C.I.L. In fact
many legal academics in the UAE are neither aware of the work of the above committee, nor fully
trained in Islamic Sharia in criminal matters.
3 The executive order issued by the Ministry of Justice included orders Nos. 27, 30, 31 and 32 which
had been published in the UAE Official Journal No. 69 (02/01/ 1979) pp. 27-36. See Al-Muhairi, B.S.,
op. cit., p. 179 and note 13.
3
The main duty of the H.C.I.L. was to eradicate the contradictions between the Sharia
and the secular conception of the federal codes that either had been issued or drafted
by the government and only in the light of what had been reported to the H.C.I.L.
The review board was composed of a superior committee in addition to two sub¬
committees: (i) a committee for penal legislation and its corresponding procedures;
(ii) a committee for civil, commercial and maritime laws. The H.C.I.L. immediately
embarked on the examination and preparation of 16 draft federal codes, which
included, for example, the draft penal code and the draft personal affairs code. Most
of these codes failed to be enacted as planned for reasons that I will later consider. It
is important to note in this connection that the Federal Civil Transactions Code
(Code No. 5 of 1985) was the only code with an Islamic overtone that the H.C.I.L.
was able to legislate.
It has been mentioned that the H.I.C.L. worked on a secular draft 'Jzaa' Code
provided by the Ministry of Justice instead of drafting an entirely new penal code.
However, instead of removing the contradicted articles which are against Sharia, the
H.I.C.L. moved to codify the Islamic Sharia crimes ofHudoud, (prescribed penalties
for some serious crimes as laid down in the Quran and Sunna), Qisas (Retaliation)
and Diyyah (compensation or blood money). It also changed the shape and the
structure of other articles to accommodate the terminology of Islamic Sharia,
establishing, in addition, that it should be the main source of understanding the draft
Federal Penal Code. As a result the H.I.C.L. had prepared a draft penal code
4
consisting of 583 articles, divided into two parts: the first part is general and included
197 articles, while the second is a special part and included 386 articles.4
This draft code, however, did not succeed in becoming a full code. Butti Al-Muhairi
argues that the reason for the failure lies in the fact that the formulation of the federal
decree No.5 / 1978, concerning the work of the H.C.I.L., was intended to eradicate
any contradictions between the Sharia principles and the federal codes. In other
words the federal decree did not aim at a full reformulation of the code, nor at the
codification of Islamic Sharia. Such codification, as Al-Muhairri argues, was a
violation of both the federal decree and the executive orders of the Ministry of
Justice, which were intended only to remove objectionable clauses, and were
restricted to those codes presented to the H.C.I.L., not covering other codes related to
commerce and banking.5 On that basis, the amendment of the F.P.C. included the
deletion ofmajor proposals, which included Sharia crimes, and the reduction of the
number of articles from 583 to 434, dividing them into two parts.6 The general part
4
Ministry of Justice & Islamic Affairs, Allgnah Aloulia le Altashriat: Almiidakera Aledahia le
Mashru 'a Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. The Higher Committee ofLegislation: Draft Memorandum of the
Draft Federal Penal Code) (nd.), Unofficial Draft Memorandum.
3 Al- Muhairi, B.S., op. cit., pp. 172-4.
6 The F.P.C. classification of crimes is similar to other civil law systems in that it classifies crimes into
three categories: felonies, misdemeanours, and contraventions: Article (26) indicates that: "Crimes are
divided into the following: (1) Hudoud, (2) Qisas and Diyah crimes, (3) Tazia'ar crimes are of three
types: felonies, misdemeanours, and contraventions. This classification is determined in accordance
with the punishment mentioned by the Code..." Article (28) defines felonies as: "A felony is a crime
punishable by any of the following: (1) any punishment ofHudoud crimes, and Qisas crimes except of
Shurb al-Khamr (drinking alcohol) and al-Qadhf (accusation of illicit sexual intercourse), (2) death
penalty, (3) life imprisonment, (4) temporary imprisonment (imprisonment of not less than three years
and not exceeding fifteen years)." By contrast, article (29) states that: "A misdemeanour is a crime
punishable by one or more of the following: (1) detention (of not less than one month and not
exceeding three years), (2) a fine exceeding 1000 Dirhams, (3) Diyah, (4) lashes (whipping) for Shurb
al-Khamr (drinking alcohol) and al-Qadhf (false accusation of illicit sexual intercourse)."
Contraventions is mentioned by article (30) when it states that: "A contravention is any act or
omission punishable by the codes or regulations by one or both of the following: (1) custody for a
period not less than 24 hours and not exceeding 10 days in any of the places designated for that
purpose, (2) a fine not exceeding 1000 Dirhams." A child under seven years of age is incapable of
5
consists of 148 articles; the special part is composed of 284 articles. Sharia crimes,
were summed all under one article of the F.P.C., Article (1), which states that:
"Islamic Sharia shall apply to the crimes of Hudoud, Qisas, and Diyah.
Tazia 'ar crimes and its punishments shall be determined in accordance with
the provisions of this code and other penal codes".
This means that Sharia crimes and their elements are governed by Islamic Sharia and
not by the general provision of the F.P.C., a position similar in a sense to English
law, where some crimes are governed by the common law while some are governed
by statute. It must be noted that any further discussion of Sharia, in this respect, is
beyond this thesis, our main concern being the F.P.C. in relation to accessorial
liability.7 Flowever, for the ease of understanding of Sharia, the following outline is
provided: Sharia in Arabic is 'the road to the watering hole' or 'the straight path to
be followed'. In general, Sharia, refers to (a) acts of faith and relation with God (b) a
moral code of self-discipline and improvement of character (c) human actions (that
have a legal impact) and their relationship with God and other fellow human beings.
In relation to criminal law, Sharia is connected to Hudoud, Qisas, Diyah, and
Tazia 'ar. The term Tazia 'ar (Discretionary) is an Islamic term referring to all other
committing a crime, while defendants between seven to eighteen years of age are governed by Federal
Juvenile Code No. 9 for 1976. See articles: (62 and 63).
7 To find more about Islamic Sharia, see for example: Hussain, J., Islamic Law and Society: An
Introduction (1999), Sydney (Australia): The Federation Press, pp. 134-145; Mahmood, J.M., Aldoula
Alislamia Almuasera: Alfekra wa Altatbek, (Arabic. The Contemporary Islamic State: The Idea &
Practice) (1992), Egypt: Dar Alkitab Almassri. 245-6; Dutton, Y., The Origins of Islamic Law: The
Quran, the 'Muwatta and Madinan Amal' (1999), UK: Curzon Press; Ahmad, I.M.I., The Testimony
of Witnesses and Its Role in Islamic Criminal Jurisprudence, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, The
University of Edinburgh 1992; Al-Mawardi, Abu'l-Hasan., Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah: The Laws of
Islamic Governance, trans. Yate., A., (1996), London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd; Darsh, S. M., "The
Islamic Sharia and its Significance for the Islamic Society" (1996) 'Inter Alia' University ofDurham
Student Law Journal vol.1 issue 5, p. 30; Lombardi, C. B., "Islamic law as Source of Constitutional
Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modem Arab State" (1998) Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 81; Wiechman, D, Kendall J, and Azarian, M.,
"Islamic Law: Myths and Realities" www.urnmah.net/bicnews/articles/law.htm.
6
crimes created by the State (similar to the legislation role nowadays), which are not
classified as Hudoud, or Qisas crimes. By contrast, 'hadd' (in a singular form of
Hudoud) means a prescribed penalty for a serious crime as laid down in the Quran
and Sunna. Thus, hudoud crimes are those specifically mentioned in the Quran and
explained by the Sunna (tradition of the Prophet) as a violation of the limits that God
has placed on human behaviour. These crimes and their punishments, if proved, must
be enforced if they come before the court and no one, then, has the right to stop the
application of the law. This is emphasised by the direct words of the Quran. For
example, it is mentioned in the Quran that: "Such are God's limits, so do not exceed
them; who exceed God's limits are wrongdoers." (The Cow 2: 229), and also it is
mentioned that: "Those who do not judge by what God has sent down are
disbelivers...wrongdoers...perverse." (The Table 5: 44,45,47). Muslim jurists agree
that Hudoud crimes are five: al-Sariqa (larceny): stealing property from lockfast
places is punishable by amputation of the hand of the principal. al-Hirabah (highway
robbery): the punishment of robbery with violence varies according whether there is
a death, injury or merely a robbery (death, crucifixion, cutting off the hand and the
foot on opposite sides, and exile). Shurb al-Khamr (drinking alcohol): is punished
by 40 lashes. al-Zina (illicit sexual intercourse): is punishable by 100 lashes for
fornication, and by death penalty for adultery. al-Qadhf (accusation of illicit sexual
intercourse): false accusation of illicit sexual intercourse is punishable by 80 lashes
and the defendant testimony, in a future cases, will be considered worthless. Most
jurists include the following two crimes as Hudoud crimes: al-Ridah (Apostasy: a
Muslim's rejection of Islam as religion), and al-Baghy (armed rebellion), which
might lead to death punishment. Hudoud crimes are governed by very strict rules of
7
proof which means that if there is a single surrounding doubt, it must not be applied.
The concept of Qisas (equality in retaliation, or retaliation) which might also be
refereed as 'an eye for an eye and tooth for tooth' is the second related concept of
Islamic Sharia in criminal matters. This type of liability gives the victim the right,
through the State, to inflict the same amount of harm he suffered from the action of
the defendant or instead, he/she or his/her heirs, ask for Diyah (compensation). It
must be emphasised that Qisas is not enforced when there is a doubt that Qisas on
the defendant might cause more harm than the actual harm he had inflected on the
victim. Thus, the victim in almost all examples can ask only for Diyah
(compensation).
The general shape of the F.P.C. somewhat resembles, with some clear exceptions, the
Arabic penal codes that were formulated along the lines of the Egyptian Penal Code
of 1937. The F.P.C. also shares similarities, but with apparent differences, to the
codes of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and Kuwait; all these codes are somehow closer
to the French Penal Code. Nevertheless it is important to point out (due to the special
circumstances under which the F.P.C. was passed and the way its clauses and articles
were formulated) that it is difficult to establish its direct historical source. In reality
the F.P.C. is a combination of Sharia, even if most of this had been deleted at the
draft stage, and the above mentioned Arabic codes. In addition the F.P.C. was
affected by the Indian Penal Code of 1860 through the Egyptian Penal Code of 1937,
by which the federal code was in some ways affected. The main problem of the
F.P.C. is one of interpretation because firstly, there is no recognisable official
memorandum explaining the code, and secondly, it is difficult to identify a specific
8
Arabic criminal code as the historical source of the F.P.C. This is a matter that
compels some people mistakenly to resort to Egyptian jurisprudence and wrongly to
consider the Egyptian Penal Code of 1937 as a primary source for interpretation of
the F.P.C. (I shall examine this issue in detail in chapter 3). It is my view that the
interpretation of the F.P.C. is to be based on the endorsement of the rule of 'narrow
interpretation' that will be applied through this study.
At this stage one should indicate that as a concomitant to the federal system of the
UAE there are two judicial systems within the UAE. The federal judicial system and
its federal Supreme Court (F.S.C), based in the capital Abu-Dhabi, has jurisdiction
over civil and criminal federal matters in the UAE, except in relation to the emirate
of Dubai, which has its own similar three-stage courts with its Cassation Court,
which is the final stage of civil, and criminal matters in Dubai. Moreover, as sign of
independence, Dubai has its own public prosecution system that is not administrated
8 It is true to say that the F.S.C. considers article (1), mentioned above, as a authority to apply Islamic
law. See: UAE University., Mgmuat Alhakam Algazaiah le Almhakamat Alittihadia Alulia (Arabic.
Criminal Rulings of the Federal Supreme Court), (1989-1997) UAE: UAE University. However, it is
not known whether all the federal courts apply all Sharia crimes. By contrast, Dubai Cassation Court
has a different understanding towards the interpretation of article (1) of the F.P.C. The Dubai Court
holds that Sharia in criminal matters, as suggested by the F.P.C and the F.S.C., does not apply in
Dubai by reference to the above article. Establishing that the aim of article (1) is, rather, an act of
encouragement by the federal legislation to adopt Sharia as the main source of law and to codify it in
a special criminal code apart from the F.P.C. See: Dubai Cassation Court. Ruling Nos. 43,53,56,57 for
1997, unpublished decision. In fact, the opinion of Dubai Cassation Court is neither just nor correct.
The F.P.C. is, rather, plain in this respect, and the formulation of other articles, within the framework
of the F.P.C., itself is an indication to the obligatory application of Sharia relating to Hudoud, Qisas,
and Diyah. This ruling suggests that the Dubai Cassation Court shows clear unwillingness to apply
Sharia despite the fact that this is contrary to the general principle which confirms that "La ijtihad
ma 'a wugoud al na 'as" (an additional interpretation is not allowed when the legal rule is clear and
understandable). This controversy is also extended to law teaching in universities. Presumably, only in
the UAE University in Alain city, Sharia is comprehensively taught besides the secular law. Other
universities concentrates on secular law and provide minor teaching of Sharia in relation to civil
matters ofmarriage, divorce, child care...etc, but not according to Sharia criminal law. The problem is
that when the UAE law considers Islamic Sharia as essential part of the law, most of law graduates
are not totally familiar with it, because comprehensive teaching of Sharia is not part of their
education, nor their practice especially in Dubai.
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by the federal public prosecution, which operates in all other Emirates members of
the UAE.9
A significant number of judges who are currently serving in all judicial stages in the
UAE in both the federal and local judiciary are foreigners originating from various
Arab countries, mainly from Egypt. Although no reliable figure is available as to the
total number of UAE and non-UAE judges, it is indisputable that the overwhelming
majority of judges who are appointed by the federal judiciary are from Arab
countries such as Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Mauritania and Jordan.
Likewise the judiciary of the state of Dubai appoints judges from Sudan, Jordan,
Palestine and, in greatest number, from Egypt. On the other hand, the state of Rasl-
alkhima gives priority to the appointment of Saudi judges even though they are not
familiar with the culture and the law of the UAE. Many legal academics would be
astonished by this unusual diversity in the UAE legal system on account of the fact
that the judiciary is a prerequisite constituent of any independent state, and judges
should normally be members of the community of that state. In order to overcome
this problem, both the federal and the state government should concentrate to a
greater extent on training and developing the skills of local judges and encouraging
qualified and competent citizens to join the judiciary. In addition, UAE legal
commentators should focus on discussing and writing materials relevant to the UAE
law.
9 A1 Mansoori, A.E.M., The Law of Arrest and Similar Procedures: A Comparative Study,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Edinburgh 1997. pp. 13-42; Al-Owais, H., The Role of the
10
It is worth noting that before the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), each
of the seven members of the union enjoyed sovereignty in accordance with the rules
of international law, which allowed them to exercise their own territorial jurisdiction
in relation to domestic law. Foreign representation was retained in the hands of the
British government, according to the Exclusive Agreement of 1892 between what
was called the Trucial States and the British government.10
Internal jurisdiction on penal matters in the Trucial States was exercised in the
enactment of their own domestic and regional codes. Thus there was the Abu-Dhabi
Penal Code of 1970, the Dubai Penal Code of 1970, the Sharjah Criminal Code of
1970, based on the first two codes, and the Penal Codes of Aum-alquain and Ras-
alkhima of 1971. The framework of these domestic codes was mostly based on the
Anglo-Saxon model derived from Indian Criminal Codes." Currently, the Federal
Penal Code No 3 of 1987 (the F.P.C.) is applied in all of the members of the UAE.
Some Emirates still apply certain parts of their earlier codes, a situation which is
legally permitted as the constitution of the UAE allows members to have legal
12
jurisdiction on regional matters. For example, the Emirate of Dubai exercises this
option by having two criminal codes on penal law matters, namely the F.P.C. and
some retained parts of its old Penal Code of 1970. This contrasts with the situation in
Supreme Court in the Constitutional System of the UAE: A Comparative Study, unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Durham 1989.
10 A1 Mansoori, A.E.M., op. cit., p. 8; Al-Bharna, H., The Arab Gulf States: Their Political, Legal
Status and Their International Problems (1975), Beirut: Librairie du Liban. p. 5; Al- Alkim, H., The
Foreign Policy of the U.A.E., (1989), London: Saqi Books, p. 4.
"
Mahdi, A., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat: Dirash Muqarana bean Qanon Alemarat
Alarbia Almutheda (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, wa Mashrua Alqanon Alithadi) wa Alqanon Almassri (Arabic.
Explanation of the General Rules of the Penal Law: A Comparative Study between UAE Laws (Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, and the Draft Federal Penal Code) and the Egyptian Law) (1983), Cairo: Atlas
Publication, p. 53.
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other Emirates which have transferred final appeal functions to the Federal Supreme
Court (F.S.C), based in the capital Abu-Dhabi.
There has been a certain degree of confusion over the extent of jurisdiction of the
Federal Court in each Emirate. One view is that the Federal Code abolished all other
pre-1987 domestic codes. However, a recent ruling by the F.S.C in 1988, held that
domestic codes are still applicable only if they do not dissent from provisions of the
F. P. C. This ailing was based on the rereading of the provision of the F.P.C. itself.13
The articles referred to are:
1- The Presidential Order to issue the F.P.C. in article (1) stating that:
" The law attached here on crimes and penalties shall be enforced, and any
provision contrary to its provision shall be repealed"
2- Article (1) of the F.P.C states that:
" ...Crimes and chastisement punishments shall be determined in accordance
with the provision of this law and other penal codes."
The above articles lead us to the conclusion that the F.P.C ultimately has a position
of supremacy in relation to criminal liability, which does not allow domestic laws to
be applied contrary to its provisions. Moreover, this means that the provisions of the
domestic codes that govern partnership in crime are abolished and that the F.P.C. is
the governing code for criminal complicity.
12 Articles: 99; 104; 116; 120; 121 and 122 of the 1971 UAE Constitution.
13 F.S.C Ruling No. 88 for 1988 UAE University., Mgmuat Alhakam Algazaiah le Almhakamat
Alittihadia Alulia (Arabic. Criminal Rulings of the Federal Supreme Court), UAE: UAE University.
Issue No. 13 for 1997, pp. 217-219; Cf. Dubai Cassation Court Ruling No. 6 for 1990, (10 /ll/ 1990).
Dubai Cassation Court., Majalt Alqda wa Altashria (Arabic. Court & Legislation Journal), Dubai.
January 1992 p. 661.
12
Accessorial liability
Accessorial liability is the general body of rules, located in the general part of a
criminal law, that captures the criminal responsibility of a person (the accessory)
who acts or omits to act (provided that there is a legal duty to act), by a prior or
concurrent secondary performance associates himself in the offence committed by
another person (the principal offender) who brings about the physical act of the
offence and whose liability is normally explicitly provided for in the definition of the
offence in question.14
Secondary criminal partnership, in both English and UAE criminal law, is not an
offence in itself, but, rather, a mode of association in the offence of another person,
who commits the required actus reus. This suggests that accessorial liability is
conditional upon the commission of an offence by the principal offender. The
derivative nature of this liability underlines the fact that the violation of the criminal
law is carried out by the principal offender, who produces the criminal consequences,
14 Peter Gillies defines this type of liability as: "the law that governs partnership in crime...or the
principles of criminal law that governs the joint implication of each of two or more persons in the
commission of a given crime." Gillies, P., The Law of Criminal Complicity (1980), Australia: The
Law Book Company Ltd. p. 1; By contrast, Keith Smith indicates that complicity is: "the general body
of concepts and rules that determines the circumstances when one party (the accessory) by virtue of
prior or simultaneous activity or association will be held criminally responsible for another's (the
perpetrator) wrongful behaviour." Smith, K.J., A Modern Treatise on the Law ofCriminal Complicity
(1991), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-2; Glanville Williams indicates that: "Complicity in
crime extends beyond the perpetrator to accessories. Both the perpetrator and the accessory are
regarded by the law as participants in the crime, and are called accomplices. The perpetrator is an
accomplice of the accessories, and they are accomplices of the perpetrator and of each other."
Williams, G., Textbook ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), London: Stevens and Sons. p. 329. According
to the ordinary meaning of the term, an accessory is a person who is a party to a crime that is actually
committed by someone else (the perpetrator). An accessory is one who either successfully incites
someone to commit a crime (counsels or procures) or helps him to do so (aids and abets). An
accomplice is a party to a crime, either as a perpetrator or as an accessory. Furthermore, the term
principal is applied to a person who actually carries out a crime himself or through an innocent agent,
or under vicarious liability. Oxford University., 'Oxford Reference-shelf CD-ROM: Law Dictionary'
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13
and not by the accessory, who is only involved by subsidiary association. However,
in some situations such participation might be viewed as dangerous or more
dangerous than the liability of the principal, but this is not the case in every crime.
Accessorial liability occupies intermediate ground between inchoate and principal
liability (although that the F.P.C. does not adopt a general form of liability for
incitement and conspiracy, except where it stated otherwise). It is generally assumed
that the action of the principal offender is the main violation of the criminal law
while accessorial behaviour is considered to be less harmful. Because of this,
accessorial liability follows upon the commission of the principal offence. If the
principal does not commit the offence, with which he is associated, there is no
complicity but, rather, an inchoate liability where the criminal law imposes such
liability.
The term 'accessory' will be used throughout this study to refer to a secondary party
who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of the principal offences, as in
English law, and for a party who instigates, conspires or assists the principal in
committing the offence, as in the F.P.C. of the UAE. Consequently, accessorial
liability is the term used to refer to this type of culpability. By contrast, the term
'accomplice' will be used to refer to a participant in a crime, who may be either a
principal or an accessory. A principal, or a perpetrator, then, is the one who commits
the actus reus of the offence himself or though an innocent agent, (or vicarious
liability as in English law) and his liability is located in the definition of the offence
that he brings about or attempt to. It is important to note that this type of criminal
14
liability under English law does not have a recognised name. Various terms may be
used to describe it, including complicity, secondary partnership, liability of
accessories, and aiding and abetting.16 But even if a single term is used, the other
terms tend to be employed as synonymous for this subsidiary and ancillary type of
liability.16 Because of the theoretical and legal distinction between the principal
offender and the accessory, the term complicity should be adopted to refer to the
discussion of the joint liability of the principal offender, the co-principal and the
accessory. By contrast, accessorial liability should be used, in English law, to
describe the liability of a person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the principal
in committing the offence, and in the case of the F.P.C for those who instigate,
conspire or assist the commission of the principal offence.
15 For example English Draft Criminal Code 1989 uses the terms: secondary parties, instead of
complicity, accessories for ancillary activities and principal for the main offender. Law Commission
Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code For England and Wales (1989); a similar terms used
by LC. No. 43 but adding the term accomplice. Law Commission Working Paper No. 43, Parties,
Complicity and Liability for the Act ofAnother (1972); Smith, J.C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law,
(18lh ed. 1996), London: Butterworths, who also uses the term accomplices and divides them to
principals and secondary parties and sometimes accessories (perhaps the opinions of the above three
sources are a reflection of the situation of English case law in this regard); a similar terms is used by
Ashworth, A., Principles of Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1999), Oxford: Oxford University Press. In
Clarkson C. Keating, H., Criminal Law: Texts and Materials (4th ed. 1998), London: Sweet &
Maxwell, the term secondary parties is used to refer to principals and accessories, and accessorial
liability for the second. By contrast, George Fletcher describes this liability under the headline of
perpetration versus complicity. Fletcher, G., Basic Concepts ofCriminal Law (1998), Oxford: Oxford
University Press; the term accomplice was used by Glanville Williams, who divides them into
perpetrator and accessory. Williams, G., Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), London: Stevens
and Sons. Historical background of criminal liability of accomplices in English law is beyond the
reach of this study. A rare source of this is in Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 2 at note 4. Presumably
the Arabic jurisprudence translation of these terms use criminal complicity or accomplices for all
parties, principal for the perpetrator and the accessorial or secondary liability for the liability of an
accessory.
16 Peter Gilles for example, used the term complicity as a title for his book and the term accessory
within it to describe the liability of secondary parties. Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit. Similar
situation adopted in Smith, K.J., MTLCC, op. cit. The team of LC. No. 131 used the terms: complicity,
accessoryship, and secondary liability as a general description and reference. Law Commission
Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime, (1993). p. 3.
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The thesis has five chapters. Chapter one starts with the situation of the accessorial
liability under English law, and proceeds to a consideration of the UAE Criminal law
and Arabic jurisprudence. It examines the conduct element of this liability (the actus
reus) that makes a person an accessory to an offence. Chapter 2 examines two related
and important issues to accessorial liability, namely, causation and omission in order
to ascertain whether they accord or contradict with the liability of the principal
offender. Chapter 3 examines the mens rea requirements for accessorial liability. In
this chapter I shall discuss the general requirements of criminal mens rea. Following
this, there is a discussion of how a person can become guilty of a criminal offence as
an accessory, and other related and important issues in order to elaborate the
circumstances that make a person a secondary party to an offence. This includes the
debate as to intention as against knowledge or recklessness, and the issue of
knowledge of the principal offender's future crime. Finally, a view is expressed as to
what approach English law should follow in this area. Finally in this chapter there is
an evaluation of the doctrine of general requirements of mens rea and of accessorial
liability under UAE criminal law with a view to seeing how the issue is settled in that
legal tradition and also to pointing out the status of the concept under the F.P.C.
Accordingly, certain important questions shall be asked, including: Is the F.P.C. in
this area intelligible to the layman? Should the F.P.C. be interpreted in the light of
other sources, such as legal commentary? What approach should the F.P.C. take to
mens rea in respect of accessorial liability?
Chapter 4 deals with accessorial liability for an additional crime committed by the
principal (the doctrine of common purpose). This doctrine of common purpose has
16
generally been employed in the theory of criminal complicity to resolve the liability
of an accessory for an additional or collateral offence committed by the principal. In
this chapter I shall examine which factors decide accessorial liability for the
additional crimes and how English law in the past has treated this subject. One
reason for carefully examining this doctrine is that the culpability of the accessory,
unlike the principal, is realised only on the basis of his mens rea because in the
majority of cases the accessory's attitude may be described as "negative". In other
words, the accessory does not commit the collateral offence, nor does he possess the
mens rea required of the principal. These are, therefore, a number of problematic
issues which arise from this doctrine.
Chapter 5 discusses miscellaneous aspects of accessorial liability. These include: the
liability of the principal offender in the light of the definition of this category; the
legal distinctions between those who are principals and those who are merely
accessories; the derivative theory and some of its problems that led the English Law
Commission to introduce a new proposal to change the shape of accessorial liability
to a new concept based on inchoate liability; and the doctrine of innocent agency,
which is a legal fiction that has emerged to deal with the negative consequences of
derivative liability, which considers and treats an accessory as a principal offender.
Finally there is a discussion of selected defences available to accessories such as the
general defences and the defence ofwithdrawal.
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Chapter 1
The actus reus requirements for accessorial
liability
Chapter 1
The actus reus requirements for accessorial
liability
Criminal liability is discussed under two headings: the actus reus which refers to the
conduct element, and mens rea which addresses the mental element. The aim of this
chapter is to examine and analyse the prohibited conduct from the point of view of
the liability of the secondary offender, starting with English law, and then proceeding
to an examination of the situation under the United Arab Emirates law, and in
particular, under the F.P.C.
It is very important at this early stage to state that both systems, English and UAE
law, agree on the following general requirements of accessorial liability: accessories
must perform the incriminating act, and have the required mens rea, and that
accessorial liability is conditional upon the committing of an offence by the principal
offender. Thus this derivative nature of accessorial liability underlines the fact that
the violation of the criminal law is carried out by the principal offender who
produces the criminal consequences, and not the accessory who is only involved by




Modes of Accessorial Liability
The situation prior to the Criminal Law Act 1967:
The subject of secondary participation in criminal liability is an issue, which has long
concerned commentators on the common law. The Criminal Law Act 1967 was a
turning point in the history of this ancient doctrine. The situation before this
legislation was as follows:
In the case of a felony there were four modes of participation:
a) Principals in the first degree: The actual perpetrator of the offence if acting alone
or the joint principals if there was more than one; both cause the commission of the
offence.
b) The principals in the second degree: Those secondary offenders or aiders and
abettors who are present at the commission of the offence.
c) Accessories before the fact. Those who counsel or procure the offence but are not
present at its commission.
d) Accessories after the fact An accessory after the fact was one who 'knowing a
felony to have been committed by another: receives, relieves, comforts or assists the
felon.'1 It is clearly understood from this definition that to be an accessory after the
1
Smith, K.J., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 7.
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fact was a form of complicity related only to felonies; as such it was not applicable to
misdemeanours. The reason was that the assistance given after the fact to felons was
regarded as seriously as committing the principal offence.
2) In the case ofmisdemeanour: All accomplices were regarded principals.
The situation after the Criminal Law Act 1967:
The Criminal Law Act 1967 abolished the distinction between felony and
misdemeanour, and as result the accessory after the fact has disappeared, except in
the case of treason, in which pre-1967 categories remain.2 The 1967 Act created a
new offence of assisting offenders, which applies to assisting offenders who commit
an arrestable offence. One of the important changes brought by the 1967 Act was the
abandonment of the distinction between felony and misdemeanour in relation to
accessorial liability.
The subject of secondary participation is governed for the most part by common law
but there is an important legislative contribution to the doctrine in the shape of s. 8 of
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (as amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977)
which states:
"Whoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any
indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by
virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted,
and punished as a principal offender."
The Magistrates Courts Act 1980 in s. 44 (1) extends the ambit of accessorial
liability to cover summary offences. Clearly from the reading of section 8 of the
2
Curzon, L.B., Criminal Lav/ (8th ed. 1997) M&E Pitman Publishing, p. 61.
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1861 Act, English law seems to use four terms to describe the conduct element of
complicity: to aid, abet, counsel and procure. The 1861 Act does not give further
explanation of the exact meaning of those four terms. However one of the drafters of
that Act indicated that this was intended to follow the common law approach to the
*5
subject." But what do these terms mean? It is well known that both aiding and
abetting address the state of accessories who are present at the committing of the
offence while the absent accessories are those who counsel and procure the offence.
Should this be the only distinction?
It seems that the distinction is not rigidly followed now. Cases on accessorial liability
take differing views. Du Cross v. Lombourne (1907) and Attorney General v. Able
(1984) are cases where the courts did not follow this ground of distinction.4 The
court in Able, described the provision of a book on suicide as abetting, while in terms
of the above distinction it should be called counselling as it was before the fact.
Further, a leading authority on criminal law, John Smith (1996) expresses the view
that the present distinction has no effect of the liability of accessories.5 Another
ground of distinction has been proposed, based on the notion that 'aid' refers to the
actus reus and 'abet' refers to mens rea, but this distinction is unhelpful and it does
C. G. Greaves, mentioned in Smith, J. C., "Aid, Abet Counsel, or Procure" in Glazebrook, P. R.,
(ed.) Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 120 at p. 125. Also it seems
that this is supported by the case law as it was in Benford v. Sims [ 18981 ] 2 Q. B. 641; Du Cross v.
Lombourne [ 1907 ] 1 K. B. 40; Carter Paterson and Pickford Ltd v. Wessel [1947] K.B. 849. See:
Smith, J. C., ibid. p. 125 at note 20.
4 Du Cross v. Lombourne [1907] 1 K.B. 40; Attorney General v. Able [1984] 1 Q.B. 795.
3
Smith, J.C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (18th ed. 1996), London: Butterworths. pp. 129-132;
Gillies, P., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1993), Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd. p.150, where he
says that the presence rule is sophisticated and archaic which means very little. This clearly suggests
that the four words that describes accessorial actus reus should be reduced to three: encouragement,
assistance and procurement.
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not establish the difference between counselling and procuring.6 The essential
difficulty in fact, is that the language used in this doctrine is ancient and complex.7
One might assume that the four words: aid, abet, counsel and procure, used by the
1861 Act, had no particular meaning and that they could be employed
interchangeably. This view was abandoned after Attorney General Reference No. 1
for 197'5 8 According to Lord Widgery:
"We approach section 8 of the 1861 Act on the basis that the words should be
given their ordinary meaning, if possible. We approach the section on the
basis that if four words are employed here 'aid, abet, counsel or procure', the
probability is that there is a difference between each of four words... Because
if there were no difference, Parliament would be wasting time in using four
words where two or three would do... Each word must be given its ordinary
meaning."9
This points to the conclusion that the four modes of accessorial liability are not
synonyms but are four separate forms. It was pointed out in that case that the four
words must be given their ordinary meanings, but what was this ordinary meaning?
There was no explanation. It is not clear whether reference was to legal or everyday
language. The legislation itself does not offer any help on this point.
Against this, K. Smith suggests that the words have a legal meaning. He points out
that one of the early authorities is Coke's Commentary on the Statute of Westminster
6 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime, (1993). p. 17 (LC.
No. 131 thereafter) where it is also mentioned that it would be difficult to find an authority to that
effect.
7
Smith, K., MTLCC, op cit., p. 80.
8
Attorney General Reference No. 1 for 1975, [1975] Q.B, 773, 780.
9 ibid.
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I, Cap. XIV (1272-1273) which states that the conduct required to be accessories
before the fact comes under three headings: Commandment, Force, Aid.
Commandment: According to Coke, this refers to all those who incite, procure, set
on, or steer up any other to do the act, and are not present when the fact is
committed.
Force: This refers to providing a weapon of force to do the act without being present.
Aid: The giving of aid involves all persons counselling, abetting, plotting, assisting,
and encouraging the act but who are not actually present. If a person commits one of
the three acts and is present, he is a principal.10 This seems to be the view of Foster
who points out that the modes of accessorial liability should not be governed by the
ordinary meaning but by the legal import of the words. Therefore, terms used in this
area have a technical but not literal meaning.11 The Accessories and Abettors Act
1861, in section 2 uses the terms counsel, procure, and command, but in section 8,
12
uses the four terms of aid, abet, counsel and procure.
J.C. Smith concludes by saying:
"the actual words used are of no significance once it is clear that they were
intended to incorporate the common law concept of secondary
participation...It was recognised by Coke, Hale and the subsequent writers of
authority that it was not necessary for a statute to provide for the liability of
secondary participation...Yet, for some reason, Parliament sometimes made
express provision and sometimes did not. When express provision was made
there was no consistency in the terminology used: but whatever the words,
the same concept of the common law applied." 13
10
Smith, K., MTLCC, op cit., P. 30 at note: 58. Also see: Smith, J. C., "Aid, Abet Counsel, or
Procure" op. cit., pp. 122-125.
"
Smith, J. C., ibid. pp. 124-5, summary ofFoster, J., Crown Law ( Oxford 1762) p. 121
12 ibid. p. 123.
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However, later in the same article he puts this another way by saying:
"Assuming that the above arguments are correct and that secondary
participation is a common law concept indicated by certain terms of art, it
remains necessary to use the words in their ordinary sense to define the nature
of the activity which amounts to secondary participation. The law must be
expounded to juries and to students. Do the four words, in their ordinary
sense, adequately describe the modes of participation recognised by the
law?"14
Unlike K. Smith, he refers to the Oxford English Dictionary to illuminate the
meaning of the four terms.'3 This seems to be a move from the position he has
adopted above. This issue is very complex and there is no direct answer to the
question. Commentators on this point either support the view that the four terms have
a technical meaning or gloss over or ignore the point without discussing it. Others
state that there is nothing to be gained by attempting to distinguish the meaning of
the different words used to describe accessorial liability. This, however, offends the
well-known principle that criminal liability requires fair labelling, which means that
offences are to be labelled so as to represent the nature and the magnitude of the law
breaking.16
The natural meaning of the term aid is to give help, support, or assistance to the
1 "7
principal whether before or at the time of the committing of an offence. This covers
a wide variety of actions. It could for example, be very minor assistance, such as
selling a knife in the knowledge that it might be used in an offence. Another example
13 ibid. p. 125.
14 ibid. p. 131.
13 ibid. p. 130.
16
Ashworth, A., Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1995), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 86-
89.
17
Smith, J.C., "Aid, Abet Counsel, or Procure" op. cit., pp. 130-131.
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is to act as a look out to while the principal commits the offence. Aid might also be
considered serious in the following examples: providing information relating to the
daily movement of a public figure in order to assassinate him. Aid could also be
illustrated in relation to an offence like kidnapping. The principal here might wish to
escape the country, and may need another accomplice to arrange this; the assistance
of such person may be considered vital if the offence is to succeed. Aid may also be
given in money laundering offences where a bank manager might advise or assist on
how to transfer funds. Again without this assistance the principal may not be able to
act.
By contrast, abetting covers the activities of persons who incite, encourage, or
instigate the principal offender to bring the crime about.18 This is used to describe the
activity of accessories during the commission of the act but since the question of
presence has no particular consequence in English law,19 this can exist before or
during the offence. However, this brings us to another unsettled point, namely, the
meaning of counsel. What does this form of accessorial liability mean? Counselling
is used to describe the activities of accessories who offer counsel or advice, or who
make recommendation, and usually occurs before the commission of the offence.20
What distinguishes abetting from counselling if presence is immaterial? Can it be
that abetting involves causation and counsel does not? Although it is too early to
discuss the causal link here, it might be pointed out that English law does not
18 Wilcox v. Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464; Smith, J., "Aid, Abet, Counsel, or Procure", op. cit., p.130;
Allen, M., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1995, ), London: Blackstone Press Ltd. . p. 180.
l9Ashworth, A., PCL (1995) op. cit., p.431 where he cites Howe [1987] AC 417 as supportive
authority.
20
Smith, J.C. "Aid, Abet, Counsel, or Procure", op. cit., p.130.
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recognise such requirement. The common law defines the ordinary meaning of
71
counselling as:" Advise, solicit, or something of that sort..." Andrew Ashworth
defines counsel as:
" The ordinary meaning of counselling of may fall well short of inciting or
instigating an offence, and cover such conduct as advising on an offence and
22
giving information required for the offence."
Should this suggest that the distinction is in the mens rea? In other words does 'abet'
refer to accessories who harbour the purpose that the crime should be committed and
'counsel' for those who only have knowledge? This is also not clear. The three
English law proposals on the subject of accessorial liability, did not include 'counsel'
in their refining form of accessorial liability which suggests that 'counsel' is a form
of abetting since there is no further application of the presence rule in English law.23
The fourth term of accessorial liability used in English law is procure. The natural
meaning of procurement as John Smith describes it is: 'to bring about by care or
pains, cause, effect, produce, induce, or persuade a person to do something.'24 In
Attorney General's Reference No. 1 for 1975, the accused A, had laced the drink of
his friend B with alcohol. B was thereafter charged with a drink driving offence,
based on absolute liability and not requiring mens rea for conviction. The court
described the action ofA as 'procuring' which meant to the court as: 'to produce by
21 Calhaem (1985) 1 Q.B. 808 at 813.
22
Ashworth, A, PCL (1995) op. cit.„ pp. 421.
2j Law Commission Working Paper No. 43, Parties, Complicity and Liability for the Act ofAnother
(1972); Law Commission Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code For England And Wales
(1989); Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime (1993).
24 Smith, J.C., "Aid, Abet, Counsel, or Procure" op. cit.,. p. 130; The commentator here takes this
meaning from Oxford English Dictionary.
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endeavour.'25 A clear feature of this term is that there is an element of causation
which is not found in the other three forms. Also, the facts of the case let us assume
that it is restricted to cases where the principal is not aware of the accessory's
action.26 This is not the view of Andrew Ashworth, who extends the term to cover
other acts of instigation such as shaming someone into committing an offence by
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taunts of cowardice. By contrast, the late Glanville Williams would call such a
person as an abettor, which seems to be correct. He says:
"My objection to this word are, first, that it is vague. According to my
dictionary, "procuring" traditionally means "bringing about" a sense that the
dictionary labels as archaic, since the modern meaning of the word (outside
the legal context of complicity) "getting someone or something." such as a
messenger to carry a letter; in law it is used for the procurement (getting) of
women for prostitution. No question of complicity need arise in such
instance." 28
Also, Williams indicates that cases of procuring can be covered by using the term aid
or abet.29 Because of the troubling terminology of the actus reus of the liability of
accessories, commentary in English law suggests a movement to other clear terms. It
is seen in three proposals: first, the Law Commission Working Paper 43, which
TO
selects only two forms of incitement and help. Second, the Law Commission
Working Paper No. 177 (The English Draft Code for 1989) uses the terms procure
23
Attorney General Reference No. I for 1975, [1975] Q.B. 773.
26 In fact this is not true, as I shall point in chapter 5, that this term is used under the concept of
innocent agency.
27
Ashworth., PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 422.
28
Williams, G., " Letters to the Editor: Criminal Complicity" [1991] Crim. LR 930-1.
29 ibid.
3° The LC. No. 43 defines incitement so as to include encouragement and authorisation. Help, would
include assistance given of which the principal was unaware and conduct of a person which leads the
principal to believe when committing the offence that he is being helped, or will be helped if
necessary, by that person in its commission. See proposition 6.
28
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assist and encourage. Thirdly, the latest proposal in the Law Commission
Consultation Paper No. 131 uses only assistance and encouragement (it is worth
noting at this early stage that the Paper No. 131 supports abandoning the derivative
nature which is still in force at the moment).
The extent of the scope of accessorial liability is defined well by K. Smith:
"All form of behaviour having the potential to either encourage or to
influence the perpetrator or help him carry out the offence can form the basis
of complicity, something to be borne firmly in mind when selecting or
devising verbal formulae for any codifying effort. Help...may be encouraging
as well as facilitative. Encouragement can stretch from advice to persuading
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or directing a party to act."
The prosecution in England tends to charge accessories with aid, abet, counsel or
procure an offence.33 This might be taken as an evidence of the uncertainty of the
complicity's conduct terminology.
Accessorial liability and Inchoate Offences
Accessorial liability occupies intermediate ground between the inchoate and
principal liability.34 This is because in relation to the latter it would occur following
the commission of the actual offence. If the principal does not commit the offence in
question, there is no accessorial liability (unless then actions amounts to incitement
or conspiracy). Also, the main violation of criminal law values occurs in the action
by the principal, while the behaviour of the accessory is considered to be less
31 The major task of the report was to put common law authorities in statutory shape, which means a
codification. However, the drafters were very careful with interpreting criminal complicity and
decided not to define the actus reus and leave the matter to its ordinary meaning. See Ashworth, A.,
"The Draft Code, Complicity and Inchoate Offences" [1986] Crim. LR 303 at 305.
j2
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 33.
33
Wilson, W., Criminal Law (1998), London: Longman, p. 584.
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harmful: this is a key issue. In relation to inchoate offences, (a term used in English
law to refer to incitement, conspiracy, attempt.) Offenders are incriminated not for
the harm caused but because of the danger of such behaviour.
It is a common law offence to instigate intentionally another person to commit a
criminal offence, whether the incitement is successful or not. It can take various
forms such as: suggestion, proposal, request, encouragement, persuasion, threats, or
pressure.33 The incitement must reach the mind of the person incited,36 and this is
also required in accessorial liability when it is based on abetting or counselling.
There are some differences between accessorial liability and incitements, namely:
Incitement is not part of accessorial liability but it is a separate offence which comes
under the doctrine of inchoate offences and the prosecution in England uses
incitement to close the gaps left by complicity and conspiracy.3* Accessorial liability
is not an offence in itself but it requires the committing of an offence by the
principal. Thus there is no question of accessorial liability unless there is proof that
the principal offence is actually committed, whether it was completed or attempted.
An example would be: A encourages B to kill C. If B does what he had been told by
A, both are accomplices: B is a principal and A is an accessory. But, if B does not
commit the offence, only A is liable, not as an accessory but as a principal offender
in relation to an offence of incitement. The offence of incitement requires an element
,4
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 9.
35 Race Relation Board v. Applin [1973] Q.B. 815.
36 Krause (1920) 18 TLR 238 at 243. However, in the case of failure of communication such action
might constitute attempted incitement: R v. Ransford [1874] 13 Cox CC 9. See Card, R., Card, Cross
and Jones Criminal Law (13th ed. 1995), London: Butterworths.
37 See Attorney General Reference No. 1 for 1975, [1975] Q.B, 773.
38
Ashworth., PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 463; LC. No. 131 p. 6.
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of persuasion which is expressed in Race Relations Board v. Applin (1973) as
follows: 'to incite means to urge or spur on by advice, encouragement and
persuasion.' It is not the case in complicity that advice or counselling would be
enough to establish accessorial liability.40
The other inchoate offence, which has close connection with accessorial liability is
the offence of conspiracy. Statutory conspiracy is governed by s.l (1) of the Criminal
Law Act 1977 which is restricted to conspiracy to commit a criminal offence, and
common law conspiracy (conspiracy to: defraud,41 corrupt public morals,42 outrage
public decency43). Both accessorial liability and conspiracy are based more on the
idea of danger than that of harm. 44 Also, it can be said that conspirators encourage
each other. Although the direct authorities are not clear,43 there are some factors
which distinguish these inchoate offences from accessorial liability:
Conspiracy is either statutory or a common law offence. In other words, it is an
offence in itself, prohibited in terms by the criminal law. Complicity as it applies to
the behaviour of accessories does not constitute a substantive offence. To put it
another way, criminal law does not consider accessorial action worthy of target but
j9 Race Relation Board v. Applin [1973] Q.B. 815at p.825; Hendricksen and Tichner [1977] Crim. LR.
356. Cf. Buxton, R. J., "Complicity in the Criminal Code" (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 252 at 256 which is also
adopted by L.C. No. 131 paper pp. 65-72. To note, R. Buxton was a member of the group of that Law
Commission.
40
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 277.
41 Scott v. Metropolitan Police [1974] 3 All ER 1032.
42 Show v. Director ofPublic Prosecution [1961] 2 All ER 446.
43
Mayling [1963] 1 All ER 687; Knuller [1972] 2 All ER 748.
44 For more details on conspiracy see Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit. pp. 442-470; The Law
Commission Report on Conspiracy No. 76 for 1976; The Criminal Law Act 1977 Part I.
45
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 48.
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only in one case when the principal offence is committed. This derivative nature of
accessorial liability finds no application in the free-standing basis of conspiracy.46
The major distinctive element is the requirement of agreement in conspiracy,47 which
is not the case in accessorial liability,48 also, when one considers the occurrence of
both doctrines it is found that conspiracy was established 300 years after
complicity.49
It is important to mention that it possible for accessories to aid, abet, counsel, or
procure an offence of incitement, conspiracy, and attempt because they are criminal
offences. While there is no criminal charge for incitement, conspiracy and attempting
the action of accessorial liability simply because it not a criminal offence to aid, abet,
counsel, and procure alone, but these four types of conduct will lead to the
commission of a criminal offence.50
46
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 9.
47
Mulcahy v. R [1868] LR 3 HL 306; Wallker [1962] Crim. LR 458, both cited in Smith, J.C.,
Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 303; Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit. p. 457; Orchard, G.,
"Agreement in Criminal Conspiracy", [1977] Crim. LR 297.
48
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p.48 where he cites Attorney General Reference No. I for 1975, [1975]
Q.B. 773, as an authority for this.
49
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 47 where he states that conspiracy was not established until the 16th
century.
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UAE Law
Modes of Accessorial Liability
Historical background:
In relation to the domestic codes (these codes are still applicable only if they do not
dissent from provisions of the F. P.C.), I shall take the example of the Emirate of
Dubai's domestic criminal law to illustrate the position of other domestic codes
(because these are very similar).51 Chapter Four of the Code contains 6 articles
dealing directly with criminal complicity. It is more effective than the Abu-Dhabi
1970 Penal Code which surprisingly contains only one general article.
Article (30) of the Dubai Code, relating the issue of accessorial liability, states:
"The term crime in this chapter does not include any offence punished by
imprisonment for the period of not more than one week, or a fine not more
than 100 Riyal."
This indicates that the scope of the liability of accessories is limited only to felonies
and misdemeanours, which leaves minor contravention outside the ambit of
accessorial liability. Article (31) expressly describes all parties as principal offenders
and states that:
1- "When a crime is committed, all persons mentioned below, are considered
as accomplices to its committing, as if acted alone, and they can be charged
with it:
51 The reason for this is obvious. Dubai, politically and financially is the most important emirate of the
union of the UAE and also a centre of trade and commerce in the Middle East. The Dubai Penal Code
for 1970 was considered better drafted in comparison with the other domestic laws.
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a) Whoever commits a crime or any part of its committing, or fails to do
anything to prevent the crime,
b) Whoever commits or fails to prevent the crime with the purpose of letting,
assisting another in the committing of an crime,
c) Whoever assists another in the committing of a crime whether or not he/
she is present at its committing. A person is considered an assisting party if
he is present at the commission of the offence with the purpose of: terrorising
the opponents, strengthening the principal or ensuring that the offence is
committed,
d) Whoever urges, solicits, or instigates another to commit an offence
whether or not he is present at its committing."
There is no express mention of punishment, which indicates that accessories would
be liable to the same punishment as the principal offender. Moreover, the Dubai
Code makes being an accessory after the fact a separate form of liability in article
(34). However, in relation to the current situation, the Dubai Code's provision on
complicity has been abandoned, as it is inconsistent with the F.P.C. rules governing
complicity.
The ignorance of UAE domestic codes during the drafting of the F.P.C.:
One might ask why the drafters of the F.P.C. did not take domestic codes into
consideration. One commentator points to several reasons, including the fact that the
Federal Committee on laws favoured Islamic law and the Egyptian view of criminal
liability and that it was therefore easier for them to adopt written codes, such as the
Egyptian Penal Code, instead of applying common law. Moreover, the majority of
the committee members were from Egypt and might be expected to have been
influenced by Arabic Nationalism; this might have disinclined them to emulate the
common law. Relations between the U.K. and Egypt were clouded by antagonism
52
Al-Muhairi, B.S., Conflict and Continuity: Islamization and Modernization within the U.A.E. Penal
Law, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Kent at Canterbury, January 1994. pp. 180-4.
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especially among Egyptians, and this was reflected in the legal context, in which
Britain achieved only slight modifications of the Egyptian legal system during its
occupation of Egypt. For example, William Brunyate, a leading member of the
British legal commission to examine capitulatory and mixed courts in Egypt,
proposed a plan described as 'a more or less openly avowed Anglicization of the law
and the legal institutions ofEgypt' by increasing the British judges; officially using
the English language; and by changing the Egyptian preference for French
jurisprudence in favour of British legal idea. Egyptian leaders resisted such attempts,
which were not accomplished. This is the view Nathan Brown expresses in his study
of court and legal matters in Egypt and the Gulf States.53 He provides another
example of the British-Egyptian battle to control legal matters, stating:
"Indeed, the introduction of British judges who had often served in India
insured that periodic proposals would be made to 'indianize' or 'Anglicize'
throughout the history of the occupation. In 1883, even before the National
Courts began operation, Benson Maxwell, the British official hired to head
the niyaba (public prosecution) endeavored to convince Egyptian and British
to change course, complaining that he could not operate with the French-style
code of criminal procedure. The Egyptian minister of justice replied that 'it is
more easy for one legal officer to master the foreign system than for the
eighty judges who are employed in the new courts to administer a justice the
rules of which are foreign to their whole legal education'. While Maxwell's
efforts in 1883 met with no success, limited forays in the direction of
Anglicization Egyptian legal justice were made in the following decades.
Modifications to the Egyptian law codes under the occupation were often
based on British expertise and advice, though changes were relatively
minor."54
Similarly, Arab judges in the UAE, especially the Egyptians, would support the
allegation made by the Egyptian minister of justice in the above example to limit any
English method of interpreting the domestic codes.
53
Brown, J., The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (1997), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 40.
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In relation to inchoate offences, the F.P.C. does not adopt this type of liability as a
matter of general responsibility, but only does this in relation to selective offences,
mostly crimes against the state. However, the Dubai Penal Code of 1970 still applies
inchoate offences of incitement, and conspiracy, as found in Indian codes or more
closely in English law.
The current situation:
The prevailing position in relation to complicity is found in the F.P.C in 9 articles
[44-52], Article (45) gives the definition of secondary offenders as follows:
"A person shall be considered as an accessory to a crime by causation:
First: if he instigates a crime, and it occurs in accordance with such
instigation.
Second: if he conspires with others to commit a crime, and it occurs in
accordance with such conspiracy.
Third: if he gives the perpetrator a weapon, tools or any other item which he
knows will be used in committing the crime, or if he wilfully aids the
perpetrator by any other means or actions which can pave the way for the
committing or completion of a crime."
An 'accessory after the fact' is not treated as accessory to a crime under the above
articles, but as a principal offender subject to separate liability elsewhere in the
F.P.C. (crimes against administrating justice, articles: 281-287). The F.P.C., thus,
selects only three forms of accessorial liability, namely: instigation, conspiracy and
assistance. The term accessory by causation is taken from Islamic law to represent
the notion of causation, which is not favoured in English law.
54 ibid. p. 38.
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Instigation:
This is the first form of secondary participation liability in the F.P.C. However, the
Code does not offer clear guidelines on the meaning of the term 'instigation'. The
issue remains largely one of judicial interpretation. However, the courts of the UAE
have not made any attempt to interpret this. One of the sources of law available to the
courts is legal commentary, which is discussed below.
There are two schools of thought in Arabic legal commentary regarding instigation
as a form of accessorial liability, the disagreement between them being related to the
proper definition of 'instigation' or other words corresponding to it.55
The first school of thought defines instigation as:
"Creating the origin of the idea for the crime, then, confirming it, so that the
principal has the resolution to commit the crime."56
According to this analysis, the instigator needs to be the initiator, or the prime mover
behind the principal offence, and it appears that counsel, countenance, and advice are
not part of their interpretation of the meaning of instigation, which is seen in the
requirement of putting the idea for a crime into the hitherto 'empty' head of the
principal offender. Also, according to this school, any instigation after the decision of
the principal to commit the crime, is not a form of accessorial liability and might
only be punished if there is a liability for it, as a separate offence in its own right.
55 The view summarised by Mhabis,Abed J., Almohared Alsoury, (Arabic. The Agent Provocateur)
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, the University of Cairo. 1989. pp. 60-64.
36 The view of Husni M, Soroor A and Obaid R. in Mhabis, ibid. p. 60 at note 1.
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This view is supported by current leading commentators on criminal law. However,
although there is no supporting authority, there are some convincing arguments
against such a view. First, it seems that the above definition addresses only one
example of secondary liability based on instigation, namely an individual act of
incitement, but it does not address the issue of collective instigation, whether through
joint or separate action. For example, A and B both separately instigate P to commit
an offence, A being the first to do so. Should A be convicted because he was the
first, and as such is the initiator of the offence, or should they convict B, who might
have confirmed the idea of the crime more effectively than the former? No clear
answer is found in relation to this in the first school of thought, which shrouds the
matter in considerable doubt. Secondly, there is the problem of proving who was the
prime mover behind the offence. No one could know for certain which one A, or B
swayed the mind of P to carrying out the offence, and in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, only P could know whose instigation was more influential. Is it safe to
leave the matter in the hands of the actual offender? Also, it might be true to say that
in some cases the principal might be reluctant to commit the offence. He could
follow either's instructions and either go ahead or not go ahead with the offence. In
this example any instigation coming at this stage might be much important than the
instigation which actually turns the principal mind.
The other school of thought suggests that instigation does not necessarily have to be
the prime element of principal liability. It can be established when the instigator
supports the idea of the crime, which means that it is a strengthening of resolve to
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commit it rather than actually creating the offence.37 This seems to be much more
practical than the first, as it avoids the complication of the notion of determining who
actually caused the offence to be committed. Also, this view makes more sense and
is more relevant to the issue.
In spite of this disagreement, both schools require an element of urgency or
persuasion on the part of the instigator, which causally leads to the committing of the
offence by the principal. Arabic commentary uses the term power, to emphasise the
nature of the persuasion in the words or actions of the instigator. Why is the matter of
instigation so important? This is because legal commentary does not include advice
within instigation. For example, AbdulraufMahdi says:
" Instigation is an activity against the private will of another, and is done with
the purpose to effect that free will, and cause the committing of an offence.
This occurs either in initiative or a supportive way but must have an element
CO
ofpower which is not found in advice."
As is seen above, Mahdi distinguishes between instigation and advice by using the
word power. What does it mean? He does not answer this. It might be true to say
that the manner in which instigation is effected reflects the person's mental
disposition that the offence should be committed. It is also safe to say that advice of a
very general nature does not equal instigation, and that is because it is very common
in the Arabic language to use expressions which include advice.
The F.P.C. does not state what instigation means. Thus, liability might be attached to
accessories if they have instigated an offence by making a gift, promise, threat, abuse
57 The view of Salama, M. and Abu Amair, M. in Mhabis, A. ibid. p. 60 at note 2.
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ofpower, used their authority, tricks, issued instructions or given advice if it is strong
enough to be instigation. A. Hummad points out that:
"The law does not require an exact form of instigation. Only, it requires that
the offence must be committed in accordance with the instigation. This gives
the court a wide jurisdiction of the matter."59
What is the position of the F.P.C. on the views mentioned above? Must instigation
be initiative as the former school of thought argues? Or it is enough to be supportive
as the second view indicates? This is not clear. The Code, however, addresses the
liability of accessories as accessories by causation, which indicates that the offence
must occur in accordance with such instigation. This might be more in line with the
first school of thought, mentioned above, but it would depend on the view of the
court as to which definition is most suitable. It might be true to say that the orthodox
view of instigation might be avoided in assistance where such a broad range of
activities might be sufficient for securing conviction.
Elements of instigation by reference to Arabic commentators:
Arabic commentators require certain constituents in instigation such as:60
Instigation must be intentional actions (thus excluding recklessness). Instigation also
has to be relevant to certain offences, which excludes the example of inciting hatred
between groups or people, lead to the committing of an offence. Furthermore,
instigation has to be communicated and passed on to certain known persons, which
excludes public instigation from the doctrine of complicity. Flowever, it would
38
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Hummad, A., Alwaseet fee Sharh Qanon Algaza Al Kuwaiti: Alkesm Alam (Arabic. Explanation of
Kuwait Penal Law: The General Pari) (3rd ed. 1983), Kuwait: Kuwait University Publication, p. 194.
60 Mhabis. Abed J., op. cit., pp. 60-64.
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appear that whoever publicly instigates others to commit a criminal offence is much
more dangerous than one who incites privately. Why is such a distinction made? The
answer could be that Arabic commentators emphasise the necessity for actual
communication between the parties and treat public instigation as a separate offence
not within the scope of criminal complicity. The F.P.C does not give a clear answer
to this, which leaves the matter in the hands of the courts.61
The time factor: Another requirement according to Arabic commentary is that
instigation must occur before the commission of principal offence. In other words,
the act of instigating during the actual committing of the offence does not necessarily
lead to one being punished as an accessory. This is totally different to the view taken
by English law. Is there any reliable evidence to support such a view? One
commentator, A. Mhaibs attempts to provide arguments in support of this by saying
that the nature of instigation requires the instigator to be the mastermind, the driving
force behind the principal offence. Moreover, he says that the Egyptian Cassation
Court has ruled on two occasions that liability for both instigation and conspiracy as
an accessory must occur before the principal commits the offence.62
Against this, with regard to the first point, there is no universal acceptance that being
the main driving force represents the true nature of instigation. It is either to be the
driving force behind the offence or one who plays a supportive role. Common to both
61
Cf. Rabia, H., who indicates that public instigation is sufficient to be regarded as an accessorial
form of instigation. Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Okobat Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda: Algaza
Alawal, Almbadee Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of the General Part of UAE Penal Code:
Part One, The General Principles ofCrime) (1993), Dubai: Albayan Press, p. 410.
62 Mhabis. Abed J., op. citpp. 71-72.
41
is the idea that they are dangerous forms of behaviour, which infringe the criminal
law. Moreover, the empirical evidence leads us to conclude that it is a difficult matter
to prove in the question of instigation to determine who is the driving force behind
the principal. This is especially true where there is more than one instigator, and
where both act differently. Would it be the first, or the second who incites twice, or
the third that perhaps has a closer relationship with the principal? Why then is any
act other than instigating the crime excluded from the doctrine of complicity,
especially when the F.P.C. does not generally adopt incitement liability? As for the
latter argument, it is enough to say that neither Egyptian court decisions nor their
commentators have any binding force on legal matters in the UAE (I shall examine
this topic in chapter 3).
It must be emphasised, however, that in spite of these arguments, it is true to say that
the (probable) current position of the F.P.C. in the UAE follows Mhabis's point of
view. This is understood from the terms of article (45), which states:
"A person shall be considered accessory to a crime by causation: First: if he
instigates a crime, and it occurs in accordance with such instigation."
But, is it appropriate that only the 'brains' behind a crime is punished as an
instigator? Should any secondary supporting role be left out of the doctrine of
criminal complicity? Is there a solution to this? I shall consider this in dealing with
the liability for providing assistance as form of accessorial liability.
Conspiracy:
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The nature of conspiracy always causes a lively debate with regard to its full
applicability in criminal law doctrine. This is because not only conspiracy, but also
incitement, plays a pivotal role between the actual idea for the crime and its
commission, which constitutes dangerous behaviour, even though no actual harm is
done. Jones and Christie (1996) offer some argument in support of this view.6j The
charge of conspiracy is a useful instrument, which encompasses dangerous and
undesirable behaviour and the intent behind such behaviour. At the same time, it
prevents the committing of the agreed crime and, importantly, conspiracy provides a
back up to the law at an early stage of incrimination when the prosecution cannot
establish the latter. In other words, conspiracy gives an advantage to the prosecutor
when dealing with such a case. However, criminal liability is not only seen from the
prosecution's point of view. It is influenced by other considerations such as the
actual harm caused by the behaviour in question, and to a lesser extent, by
constructive harm in that risks causing harm to society. Thus the commentators
referred to above indicate that through conspiracy extreme precursory activities can
lead to punishment even if they might not result in the actus reus of a crime if
committed by one of the parties. Moreover, such liability is based on the party's
mens rea and here criminal law penalises behaviour by relying more on the mental
state of the accused than on actus reus.
It might be true to say that the UAE Federal Penal Code adopts a more balanced
view to matter. As with instigation there is no general liability for conspiracy under
the F.P.C: liability only arises within the doctrine of criminal complicity and also as
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separate liability stated expressly in some offences, mostly offences against the state.
This position differs from that taken by English law, discussed above. However,
domestic criminal codes such as the Dubai Penal Code of 1970 still adopt general
liability for incitement and conspiracy, taking an approach very close to that of the
Indian codes and of English law. Having said that, our primary concern here is the
Federal Penal Code.
Conspiracy is the second form of accessorial liability under the F.P.C., article (45) of
which states:
"A person shall be considered accessory to a crime by causation:
Second: if he conspires with others to commit a crime, and it occurs in
accordance with such a conspiracy."
Apart from the causal link required by the above article, no additional information is
furnished by the F.P.C. on the definition of conspiracy. Thus it is left up to the courts
and commentators to establish the definition and elements of conspiracy. It must be
noted here that the doctrine of conspiracy entered the Arab criminal codes in 1904,
firstly in Egypt, then being introduced into other Arab legal systems. This legal
concept originated in English criminal law, which is often a frequent source for UAE
domestic codes through the Indian Penal Code of 1861. This give rise to the




There are grounds for answering this question in the negative. This is because firstly,
the UAE legal system has, in general, moved closer towards the Islamic and
Egyptian legal system. Islamic law, of course, does not speak in as much detail about
conspiracy as Egyptian law does. Secondly, this move to adopt a legal definition
would not succeed in practice because most members of the judicial system in the
UAE are from Egypt and they might be expected to resist common law authorities
and might well protest at the difficulties of tracing common law authorities on
conspiracy.
In Egypt, conspiracy takes three forms in the Criminal Code: general liability for
felonies and misdemeanours, a form of accessorial liability, and, where expressly
created a separate offence. The Egyptian Court of Cassation ruled in 1933 that both
general liability for conspiracy, and conspiracy as form of accessorial liability are
identical in meaning.64 In the F.P.C. there is no general liability for conspiracy but
rather, a form of accessorial liability or a separate offence for a specified activity.
Should the Egyptian model always be the one to followed on this point? This seems
to be true in other Arabic codes, but this fact need not be binding.
I will now shift the focus to the issue of how Arab commentators understand the
concept of conspiracy as a form of liability for secondary participation.
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M. Husni defines conspiracy as "An agreement between two or more to commit a
crime".00 Others offer a more specific definition of conspiracy by indicating that it
is: "A determinative agreement between two or more to commit a crime".66 The
reading of this last definition leads us to conclude that there must be an element of
insistence or urgency between the parties to a conspiracy, which at the same time
tries to avoid the futility of using remote examples,67 which do not come to the
attention of the penal law system. For example, A agrees with B to steal D's car,
which B does. A is not a conspirator to the crime if he was not determinative
although it may constitute instigation. Furthermore, such an element of determination
can be established by express or tacit agreement but this has to be before the
committing of the principal offence.68 As Mustafa indicates, there are two major
requirements for of conspiracy:
1) An agreement between the parties, 2) the crime must occur in accordance with
such conspiracy, which means causal connection.69
An important point to mention is that conspiracy is established or fixed the moment
when the agreement is made, and it is not important whether or not there was any
discussion as to who would actually commit the offence.70
One might ask what form of conspiracy is required? There is no answer in the F.P.C.
nor from Arabic commentary. What is required is that each conspirator must hold the
63
Husni, M., Almushraka Aligramia fee Altashreat Alarabia, (Arabic. Criminal Complicity in Arab
Codes) (2nd ed. 1992), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. p. 296.
66
Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 411; Sorror, A., op. cit., p. 477.
67
Sorror, A., ibid. p. 450.
68
Mustafa, M.M., Sharh Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of the Penal Code: The
General Part) (10th ed.1983), Cairo: Cairo University Press, p. 395.
69
Mustafa, M.M., ibid. pp. 351-352.
70
Mahdi, A., op. cit. p. 420; Sororr, A., op cit., p. 449.
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same level or position as any other party. In other words, the wheel form of
conspiracy is not counted as a conspiracy from the point of view the Arabic
jurisprudence, especially when the ringleader, who is the hub of the wheel, issues
other parties with instructions regarding the main offence. In such a case, his liability
might be for instigation rather than conspiracy, because unlike the former, the latter
views the parties as being equally culpable.71
Should this suggest that each conspirator must be aware of the other parties? Some
might argue that there should be a direct connection between the parties to show a
close or solid relationship to the criminal enterprise, and which is also to make the
matter of proof an easy task to the courts. However, most Arabic commentators,
supported by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, take an opposing view of this, by
indicating that there is no direct rule of the codes to follow such a view, and it is
enough to secure the general requirements of accessorial liability such as causation.
Furthermore, accessories are punished for their involvement in the crime, not
72because of their relationship with other accomplices. This view is also true for
instigation and assistance. The F.P.C. supports such a view in article (45), which
indicates:
" ...An accessory shall be equally liable for the crime whether he contacts the
principal directly or though an intermediary."73
Assistance:
This is the third and the last form of involvement in crime identified by the F.P.C. as
a basis of liability in cases of secondary participation. Article (45) of the F.P.C.:
71
Mustafa, M., (1983) op cit., p. 351.
12
Mustafa, M., ibid. pp. 358-359.
73
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit.. pp. 340-341.
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" A person shall be considered an accessory by causation to a crime:
Third: If he provide the principal with weapon, tools or any other thing which
he knowingly uses in committing the crime, or if he wilfully aids the
principal by any other means of preparing, facilitating or completing the acts
of crime."
As usual the F.P.C. does not provides further details of the meaning of aid or
assistance. A similar approach is taken in instigation and conspiracy, as mentioned
above. Therefore, the matter should be in the hands of courts, but because of
restriction on the extent to which the courts may be creative, it is left to
commentators to play a major part in defining the conduct element of accessorial
liability.74
Arab commentary is largely unanimous on the meaning of assistance. This is
particularly evident in Egyptian commentary. For example, Flusni indicates that
assistance means:
" giving help in any form to the committing of an offence by the principal."
Others, like, Soroor, share the same view, pointing out that assistance is:
" established by any subsidiary subvention provided to the principal in order
that he commits the crime."76
There is a clear consensus that aid, help, assistance or any form of conduct, which
has the aim of supporting a criminal act, is the third form of accessorial liability.
74
Usually the meaning of accessorial forms is a factual issue and it is for the courts to decide in each
case.
73
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., p. 302.
76
Sororr, A., op. cit., p. 451. Thus, the conduct element of assistance must not amount to the physical
element required for the principal offender, which means either committing the actus reus of the crime
or attempting to commit it. If it happens, then, accessories would be treated as principals.
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Moreover this form of liability requires an intention to help the principal offender,
and although the legislation does not restrict it to a special form, it has to occur in the
. . . 77
preparing, facilitating, or the completion of the principal crime. Thus aid at the
stage of preparation would be imaginable in cases where the accessory provides
information to the principal on how to commit the crime, and in many other
examples of supplying aid or help prior to the commission of the crime by the
principal. Assistance may take the form of providing tools, or weapons to be used in
the principal offence, whether before or during its commission. The stage of
completion is the final boundary of accessorial liability by assistance in the view of
Arabic commentary. It may be established in a wide variety of activities, such as
providing a car, aeroplane or ship to transfer the proceeds of an offence, or transport
accomplices, or to act as look out for the crime. Further example might be where
obstruction is provided to stop the police, ambulance or fire brigade from dealing
with the crime.78
The relation between assistance and instigation:
It has been stated earlier that instigation under the F.P.C., is understood as:
"Creating of the idea of the crime, then, confirming it, so that the principal
• 7Q
have a resolution to commit the crime."
77
Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 415. The broad terminology used in the form of assistance might be due to the
legislative lack of control of the wider forms that might be considered as an accessorial form of aid.
See: Sidki, A., Alwageez fee Al Qanon Aljenai, (Arabic. Criminal Law) (1986), Egypt: Dar Almarif.
pp. 358-389; Mohammed A. Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The General Part)
(nd.), Egypt: Dar Almatboaat Algamaia. p. 372.
78
Assistance, or the words corresponding it, is difficult to cite in one clear form or category. It differs
from a crime to another and depends on the way accomplices provide. See for example Husni, M.,
(Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., pp. 302- 305. The liability of accessories after the fact is
beyond the scope of the doctrine of criminal complicity as it attracts a separate liability under article
(284) of the F.P.C.
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This was the point of view of the first school of thought, mentioned above, which
leaves many inciting activities outside the original requirements of accessorial
instigation. The question, then, is: should those activities be regarded as
psychological assistance?
The question is answered by the Lebanon Criminal Code of 1943, article (219/ 2) of
which states:
" An intervening party to a felony or misdemeanour is:
1)" Who...,
2) Who strengthen the principal intention in any form."
According to this article some forms of instigation, which are not penalised as
instigation, are included within this form of accessorial liability. To put it in another
way, the aim of this article is to capture those activities of secondary parties which
do not constitute instigation, as Arabic codes and commentators understand
instigation to be, and also to hold accessories responsible for supportive or
psychological actions done either before or during the committing of the principal
o 1
offence. This is something not dealt with in Egyptian jurisprudence but covered
here in an express provision in the Lebanon Code. The words used in article (45) of
the F.P.C. address the question of physical assistance although any other form of
assistance might be sufficient to be regarded as accessorial assistance. Why did the
drafters of the F.P.C. not consider the Lebanon provision as a possible means of
covering the gaps of accessorial liability?
79 The view of Husni M. Soroor A. and Obaid R. cited in Mhabis, A., op. cit., p. 60 at note 1.
80
Alia, S., Shark Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam (Arabic. Explanation of the Penal Code: The
General Part) (1998), Beirut, pp. 317-318.
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Almost all the commentators, especially the Egyptians, are silent on this issue.
However, one of the leading authorities points out that above article of the Lebanon
Code is classified as psychological assistance which is also covered by the general
82
provision of assistance in Arabic penal codes. This view is reasonable and perhaps
would be accepted by the UAE courts as it comes from a leading legal commentary,
and the wording of article (45) is stated in general terms which would allow
psychological assistance to be regarded as accessorial assistance. However, the most
important thing is the terminology of the F.P.C. itself. In other words, courts could
favour this commentator's view, but it must be borne in mind that the role of
interpretation is limited and that only an express legislative provision would settle
the argument as to whether or not psychological assistance is a form of accessorial
assistance.
One might assume that accessorial assistance spread a wide net for offenders because
the numerous ways in which it can be provided. This may be so but it should be kept
in mind of the general requirements in the UAE of establishing accessorial liability
that both parties often share knowledge and intention linked by the causal
requirement. This is different from the English law situation where the absence of a
causal connection indicates that any degree of assistance is sufficient to establish
accessorial liability.
81 It was mentioned that instigation under F.P.C. requires the activity to take place before the
commission of the crime as it understood from the language of the F.P.C. regarding causation.
82
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., p. 325.
It is important to note, regarding all the three forms, that the first rule to be
established in a case involving accessories is that there must be proof of committing
one or more of the three forms indicated by article (45) of the F.P.C. namely;
instigation, conspiracy, and assistance. Failure to lead such evidence of this would be
for the benefit of the accused. For example, in the Dubai Cassation Court case No 45
For 1994, both the Court of first instance and the Appeal Court ruled out that A is an
accessory to fraud by assistance and conspiracy, although that the evidence were not
enough to make A responsible as accessory for a crime. At the Cassation Court, the
appeal was rejected. The Cassation Court saying:
" In conspiracy, as a form of accessorial liability, the parties must intend to
commit the agreed crime, and there must be an evidence that the form was a
conspiracy. Although, it is accepted that implicit proof of instigation,
conspiracy and assistance is sufficient but this must be taken from of it... in
this case both courts failed to establish that the accused guilt was based on the
form of assistance or any form indicated by the Code and the both courts did
not allow such defence to the accused. ...The case is rejected."83
This case illustrate the following points:
Firstly the Prosecution must clearly indicate in the list of charges one or more forms
of accessorial liability, depending on the accessory's action, before bringing the case
to court. By contrast, there cannot be a general charge using all the forms unless the
accessorial actions fulfil such forms.
Sj Dubai Cassation Court Ruling No: 45 For 1994, Dubai Cassation Court., Mcijalt Alqda wa Altashria
(Arabic. Court & Legislation Journal), Dubai. Feb 1997, p. 1175; See also the Federal Supreme Court
(F.S.C.) Ruling No. 26 for 1993. UAE University, (Arabic. Criminal Rulings of the Federal Supreme
Court), UAE: UAE University. Issue No. 15 for 1996, pp. 214-7.
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Second, courts regard the absence of specification as to which form of accessorial
liability is involved as a ground of appeal. This is in contrast to the view of English
law, as described byWilliam Wilson, who writes:
" In practice, a defendant is likely to be charged using all four words. This is
sensible because as long as prosecution show the offence to have been
committed in one of the ways, a conviction may be secured. If only one way
is used, however, and its clearly the wrong word, theoretically the indictment
must fail."84
Although there is no confirming authority for this, Wilson indicates that the
procedures of English law use all forms in cases involving accessories. This is
possibly because all parties are regarded as principal offenders and would receive the
same punishment. Also it might be due to the principle of 'social defence' which
means that some vagueness in criminal law is socially beneficial for law enforcement
in order to deal flexibly with new examples of criminal behaviour without waiting
for clarification from the legislature. However, the approach in UAE perhaps acts
o/r
in line with the principles 'fair labelling' and 'maximum certainty'.
These principles adopted by the UAE courts in accessorial liability stress that it is
important to act in line with well-known principles, which presumably control
codified criminal codes, especially where the liability of secondary parties is
conditional upon the committing of the principal crime. So if the principal commits
Wilson, W., Criminal Law (1998), op. cit., p. 584.
83
Ashworth, A., PCL (1995) op. cit., p. 75.
86 Andrew Ashworth describes the principle of fair labelling by indicating:
" It concerns to see that widely felt distinction between kinds of offences and the degrees of
wrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law, and that offences are sub-divided and labelled so
as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law breaking. ..., it is worth noting that this
proposal would have strained the principle of maximum certainty, since one consequence of moving
towards broader definition of offences is that they might give wide discretionary powers to the police
in enforcement and to the courts in sentencing." Ashworth, A., PCL (1995) op. cit., pp. 86-87.
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no crime, accessorial actions are merely normal behaviour and not punished by
criminal law unless they constitute a separate offence. Moreover these principles are
for the benefit of the accused and would require the prosecution to be much more
careful in accessory cases and bring to court only those whose actions are actually
being punishable under the doctrine of criminal complicity (however, should this be






In this chapter I shall examine two related and important issues of accessorial
liability, namely, causation and omission in both English and F.P.C. of the UAE.
First, I shall examine the concept of causation, or the but-for formula. Causation is
viewed as a link between a criminal action and its consequences. This concept is
considered as a major element in criminal responsibility in deciding the liability of
the principal offender but is not, as I shall discuss, an element of accessorial liability.
I shall discuss whether causation has any role in English law, a situation rather
different than of the F.P.C. In section two I shall examine the concept of omission.
Usually omission is not considered as a crime unless there is a duty on the defendant
to act. However, although a homcide can be committed by omission some other
crimes such as assault requires an action rather than a failure to act. This shows that
the criminal law does not regard omission as the same way it regards actions. This
rule is related to the liability of the principal offender while accessorial liability, as I




The requirements of accessorial liability is that the accessory must 'aid, abet, counsel
or procure' the commission of the offence. At this stage it is necessary to indicate
that article (45) of the F.P.C., regarding causation in the accessory's actus reus,
points to the conclusion that a causal link is required between the actus reus and the
crime committed. I shall discuss whether causation has any role in English law, and
the reasons why accessorial liability does not consider causation as a deciding
element. Clearly, a great number of questions arises in relation to accessorial
liability. It is a subject that has the reputation of being one of the most difficult
features of common law, which might led one to suggest that this challenging
concept, somehow, has only two clear points; derivative theory and equal
punishment for the parties involved. In fact, in this area, there is hardly a settled
point at all, even in relation to the definition of accessorial liability by means of
counselling. There are arguments in favour of conceding that giving advice could
lead to the advisor being an accomplice.
Generally speaking, crimes in which the principal offender is being prosecuted, to
establish causation it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that it was the
offender's act or omission, which caused the prohibited consequence. An example of
this is in murder, where there must be proof that the accused caused the death of the
victim. In criminal damage, the defendant must damage the property of another. If
some other causes intervene, then there may be no liability at all or that there might
be a liability for a lesser offence.
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It is obvious that the issue of conviction is for the jury to decide. They have to be
directed on two principles of causation: that the accused was both the factual and
legal cause of the prohibited consequence. Factual causation is sometimes called
'sine qua non' causation, which means that the consequence would not have
occurred as it did but-for the accused's conduct. In White (1910),' the accused put
poison in his mother's drink. The next morning she was found dead. At first, the son
was charged with murder, but then it was found that the mother had drunk very little
of the poison and she had died of natural causes during the night. The son was
subsequently found guilty of attempted murder. However the but-for test, another
name for factual cause, does not mean that the accused will be held guilty on the
basis of this test only. A legal cause is needed to complete the causation link.
Consider the following example: P asks C if he may drive his car. While P is driving
he crashes and C is killed. Can we say here that P caused C's death by driving C's
car? A legal cause is established if there is proof that P's driving was a risk to C's
life. Sometimes there may be collective causes of one consequence. In Hennigan
(1971) the accused argued that he did not cause the death of the victim by his
dangerous driving because another driver deserved to be considered the cause of the
death. The Court of Appeal, however, rejected his arguments because the accused's
contribution was significant enough to justify his being blamed for the event.3
1 White (1910) 2 KB 124.
2
Hennigan {1971)3 All ER 133.
Penny Childs provides a summary of causation in law under English law by referring to the
following cases: "R v. Pagett (1983): the conduct does not necessarily have to be the main cause of
the result, but it must more than minimally contribute to it. R v. Jordan (1956): if an event intervenes
between the defendants conduct and the result, it may be a novus actus interveniens - a new operative
cause-breaking the chain of causation. R v. Smith (1959): An intervening event will not break the
chain of causation if the defendant's conduct is still an operative and substantial cause of the result. R
v. Cheshire (1991): To break the chain of causation, the intervening event must be independent and
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In returning to the subject of accessorial liability, it would be useful to investigate the
causation rule in accessorial liability. In spite of the fact that case law has a major
role to play in common law systems, investigating the causation role in complicity,
or in other words accessorial liability, gives us the answer that there are a limited
number of cases dealing with this important feature of actus reus. Nevertheless, one
must analyse these cases with the aim of having a clear picture of the English law
approach. For example, R v. Anderson and Morris (1966) was a case that was
concerned with liability of the accessory for acts which went beyond the partners'
common purpose. Lord Chief Justice Parker, however, expressed a view on the
problematic causation issue:
"Considered as a matter of causation there may well be an overwhelming
supervening event which is of such a character that it will relegate into
history matters which would otherwise be looked upon as causative factors." 4
What kind of conclusion may be reached from the above view? Must one infer that
the causal link for accessories is the same or similar to the one required for the
principal offender? There is no clear answer for the real meaning of Lord Parker's
statement. For example, K.J.M. Smith commented on this statement in the following
way:
"Although not completely unambiguous, the burden of these comments is
reasonably clear: actions performed by the principal in furtherance of the
common purpose incriminate the accomplice because his association with the
principal is a cause of or a reason for the principal's conduct. If this causal
relationship were not essential then it would be a logical irrelevance to
unforeseeable." Childs, P., Nutcases: Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1999), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 6-
9.
4
R v. Anderson andMorris (1966) 2 Q.B. 110 at 120.
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exculpate the accomplice on the grounds of lack of causation where the
principal acted beyond the scope of the common purpose."5
National Coal Board v. Gamble (1959), a leading case that played a major role in
determining the mens rea of the accessory, seemed to follow Anderson andMorrison
in applying the but-for test.6 Devlin J. said:
"A person who supplies the instrument for a crime or anything essential to its
commission aids in the commission of it, and if he does so knowingly and
with intent to aid he abets it."7
It seems from Lord Devlin's statement that there should be a causal link, otherwise
the breach of causation would lead to acquittal . However, there is a need for clear
authority to answer the question: does causation, according to its general theory, play
a major role in determining the liability of accessories in English law?
In Attorney General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), an answer was provided to the
above question in relation to one of the accessorial forms of liability, 'procuring'. 9 In
this case, the Court ofAppeal held that:
"Since the lacing of the motorist's drinks was surreptitiously done so that he
was unaware of what had happened and there was a causal link between the
defendant's act and the offence by the motorist who would not have
committed it otherwise, the defendant had procured the commission of the
motorist's offence; and that, therefore, there was a case to answer so that the
defendant was not entitled to the ruling."10
3
Smith, K., "Complicity and Causation" [1986] Crim. LR 663 at 664. It might be true to say that
Lord Parker mixed the issue of causation as part of the actus reus with the theory of common purpose
which should be dealt with in discussing the mens rea requirements.
6 Gamble {1959) 1 Q.B. 11.
7 ibid. p. 20.
8 K.J. Smith, says: "the reference to 'essential' could be taken to suggest that a prerequisite of liability
is the provision of aid without which the principal offence would not have occurred when or in the
manner it did." Smith, K.J., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991), Oxford:
Oxford University Press, p. 162. Does this amount to a but-for causation?
9
Attorney General Reference No. I for 1975, [1975] Q.B, 773 at 780.
10 ibid. pp. 773-774.
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As it transpired, the Court of Appeal held that C had procured P's offence, Lord
Widgery saying:
"You cannot procure an offence unless there is a causal link between what
you do and the commission of the offence."11
According to Lord Widgery, procuring the principal offence requires a causal link, in
other words causation, but again has the question been answered, namely, is
causation required in all forms of accessorial liability? There is doubt in Lord
Widgery's view, as to whether aiding, abetting and counselling require a causal link.
As it has been mentioned, Lord Widgery emphasises that the ordinary meaning of the
12
four terms suggest that there is a difference between each of them. This phrase of
'ordinary meaning' therefore will play a major role in determining accessorial
liability in English criminal law, and this was the issue of Calhaem (1985). In this
case, C counselled P to kill V. 13 P claimed that when he went to V's house, he had
no intention to kill, he had only the intention of faking an attempted murder but
following to V's reaction he had gone berserk and had killed V. C was convicted as
accessory to the murder. C appealed against the conviction on the grounds that
counselling required 'a substantial causal connection between the acts of the
secondary party and the commission of the offence.' C claimed that there was no
substantial causal connection linking his action with the crime committed. The
appeal was dismissed on the grounds of Lord Widgery's views (Attorney General's
Reference No. 1 for 1975), that, of giving accessorial forms their ordinary meaning
and the Court was satisfied that the ordinary meaning of counselling is:
" ibid. p. 780.
12 ibid. p. 779; Millward (1994) Crim. LR. 527.
13 Calhaem (1985) 1 Q.B. 808 at 813.
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"Advise, solicit, or something of that sort. There is no implication in the word
itself that there should be any causal connection between counselling and the
offence.. .there must clearly be, first, contact between the parties, and second,
a connection between the counselling and the murder. The act must be done
within the scope of the authority or advice and not accidentally when the
mind of the final murderer did not go with his action."14
Surprisingly, K. Smith commented on this decision:
"At one point the court seemed to be suggesting that although in counselling,
unlike procuring, there was no need to for 'substantial causal connection',
there was still a need for some cause albeit less than 'substantial."15
In fact, the Court of Appeal in Calhaem did not use the term 'less substantial
causation'. It directly said that there is no causal connection is assumed from the
normal meaning of the accessorial from of counsel.
However, K Smith continues to say:
"It appears that the Court believed that it was sufficient if the principal's
actions coincided with what counselled rather than being caused by the
counselling. Disappointingly...no principled examination of the problems
involved in such a view was undertaken by the court."16
Because there is little authority on causation, J.C. Smith argues that the discussion of
causation is irrelevant. Moreover, he indicates that:
"the fact of many cases where D2 has been held liable suggests that, the
offence would have been committed whether he had participated or not and
no one seems to have suggested that this should be a defence."17
Why does causation not have a grounding in case law? K Smith for example is a
strong supporter of a modified form of causation in accessorial liability but he makes
a reference to three reasons beyond the paucity of case law: the doctrine of common
14 Calhaem (1985) 1 Q.B. p. 813.
"
Smith, K., "Complicity and Causation" op. cit., p. 665 at note 10.
16 ibid. pp. 665-6.
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purposes, prosecution policy, and the problem of proof. Firstly, the doctrine of
common purpose, or in other words, unforeseen consequence (I will deal with this
issue in full examination later) means that each party in criminal joint enterprise is
liable for acts done in pursuance of that common design, provided that he
contemplates the additional crime of the primary crime. An example of this is where
C instigates P to rob V's house. While P robs the house, V is heard screaming for
help; therefore P takes a knife and kills V. C might be convicted for P's crime under
the concept of common purpose. In fact under this concept there is hardly any kind
of actus reus from the accessory and the perhaps the only important element is the
mens rea which is based on knowledge or contemplation therefore there is no need to
require causation. Moreover, even the language used to express such a concept or
theory of common purpose, is vague and obscure, even as to the issues of
contemplation, which suggest that causation does not have an accommodation in this
theory.
Secondly, prosecution policy can be viewed as another reason for limited authority in
relation to causation in accessorial liability. On this point K Smith writes:
"it could be expected that those cases where the effect of an alleged
secondary party's activities was not reasonably clear (or could not be easily
assumed) were least likely to be prosecuted: again reducing the possible
occasion when causal questions are likely to surface at a trial."19
17
Smith, J.C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (18th ed. 1996), London: Butterworths. p. 131.
18
Smith, K., "Complicity and Causation" op. cit., pp. 667-675; MTLCC, op. cit., pp. 63-81.
19
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 63.
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Thirdly, the last reason K. Smith refers to is the evidential problem that involves the
proof of causation in many situations of accessorial liability. He assumes that this is
a strong rejection for the court to search for a causal role.
Clear authority in case law, both in Attorney General Reference (No. I of 1975) and
Calhaem, insists that causation is only required in the form of procurement, while the
other form of aiding, abetting and counselling does not imply any causal link
between accessory's act and the offence committed (Should the prosecution,
therefore, clearly indicate which form in charging a person as accessory? This will be
considered in chapter 5). It might be pointed out that apart form K Smith, legal
commentators are extremely reluctant to attribute any role to causation in the liability
of accessories. K Smith's main interest is to establish causal connection but this
seems to be a hard task because the theoretical objection, the courts and the legal
commentary, are against such approach. Kadish, for example, says:
"Our law has developed two separate bodies of doctrine to determine
responsibility for result. Causation for the realm of nature, and complicity for
the realm of will. Causation deals with results of person's action that happens
in the physical world. Complicity deals with results that take the form of
another person's voluntary actions."20
By contrast, G. Williams says:
"neither incitement nor effective help need to be proved by the prosecution,
such requirement would present the prosecution with an impossible task."21
20
Kadish, S., "Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine" (1985) 73
California Law Review 324 at p.405.
21
Williams, G., Textbook ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), London: Stevens and Sons. p. 339.
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The question then is: why do legal commentators deny any need for causation in
accessorial liability? Why, by contrast, is it important in respect of the liability of a
principal?
One argument against the causal element is that causation involves the idea of sine
qua non, the but-for test, which means that the result will not occur but-for the
accused's action. This formulation is appropriate in respect of the liability of the
perpetrator, which speaks, somehow, of certainty in focusing on the person who
commits the actus reus offence described by the law. Causation here distinguishes
between perpetrators and accessories, the but-for test is applied to the actus reus of
the person who is the most immediate cause of the offence, the direct cause is the
cause that produces the outcome. This test cannot be said to govern the forms of
accessorial liability, which is considered as indirect cause, a form of conduct that
does not actually cause the actus reus of the offence.22
Another point to support the distinguishable role of causation is that the perpetrator
can be said to be the key figure in bringing about the criminal result; accessorial
liability depends on his actions. Suppose that C helps P to commit a burglary or
instigates him to do so. If P changes his mind and decides not to commit the offence,
C cannot be charged with burglary. He might be convicted of conspiracy or
incitement and it is still true to say that the occurrence of the perpetrator's offence
brings accessorial liability. Incitement or help given to the perpetrator of the offence
does not mean that the person inciting or helping causes the result, since such a
22
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 133.
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person does not engage in the prohibited action. Causation, therefore, is not an
appropriate concept to be applied in accessorial liability. As Kadish observes:
"The reason why complicity emerges as a separate ground of liability is that
causation doctrine generally cannot deal satisfactorily with results that take
the form of another person's voluntary action. This is because of the
voluntary action of a primary party cannot appropriately be said to have been
caused (in the physical sense of cause) by the action of the secondary
party."23
Obviously, causation covers the exact occurrence of an event including time, place,
extent and type of harm, all of which cannot be referred to the accessory. However,
it is true to say that in some cases the accessory's help can be viewed as a sine qua
non factor, that is to say that without this influence or help the perpetrator would not
have committed the offence. For example: C hires P to kill his mother, V, with the
motive of inheriting her estate. This example shows us that P would not commit the
murder if C did not hire him. He has no motive to do what he has done. One can
agree that this would satisfy the but-for test, even if P was acting fully voluntarily
and he was in full control of his actions.24 Having said that, in fact not every
accessorial action would fit the but-for test such as the accessory who just play a look
out role for a crime. Insisting that there must be causation might lead many examples
to escape conviction, a result that will not be welcomed by many.
Another strong argument against giving causation a role in accessorial liability is the
concept of proof. It could be said that the burden of proof in accessorial liability is
the major practical reason for rejecting a role for causation. The proof of the but-for
test in criminal law must be beyond reasonable doubt. If we accept the fact that the
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proof of the perpetrator's liability is one of the major problems of criminal law
enforcement, especially when discussing simultaneous causation, then it is more
problematic to require proof of successful influence or help by an accessory. The
principle of sine qua non as a test for proof will leave the prosecution with an
impossible task and at the same time it will give the accused an undue opportunity to
escape conviction on the ground of lack of causation.
Consider the case of influence 'encouragement.' This is a form of non-physical
assistance. It is a connection between two minds, where the words of influence
contribute in bringing the idea of the crime to the perpetrator's attention. It is very
difficult to prove and would be more difficult if there were more than one instigator
or inciter. For example, on two different occasions CI and C2 encouraged P to rob
V (neither CI nor C2 knows that each of them encouraged V). How can the
prosecution apply the but-for test? Should CI only be responsible because he was
the first? It might be that P, the perpetrator, ignored Cl's encouragement. Or could
C2 be blamed because he managed to influence P's mind? The same approach can be
applied to help provided by the accessory where his action merely facilitates the
offence or where the evidence shows us that the perpetrator would commit the
offence anyway. There is no need for causation, it is enough that the accessory action
creates a possibility of success.
2"'
Kadish., S., "Complicity, Cause and Blame"(1985) op. cit., p. 405.
24 The principal offender still has the final decision on his voluntary action.
23
Smith, K., "Complicity and Causation" op. cit., p. 675.
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Both case law and commentators offer a hazy and conflicting view in relation to
causation in accessorial liability.26 If causation in the but-for sense is rejected, there
should be a minimum causal contribution to establish accessorial liability. This gives
rise to the question: what is the lower boundary of the accessory's involvement in the
perpetrator's offence? Should the answer be: did the accessory's action matter? Did
he make any difference? Sometimes the influence can strengthen the perpetrator's
resolve, even if it does not amount to a sine qua non. The same can be said of the
accessory's help, that he merely facilitated the commission of offence by the
perpetrator. There is no authority for this and I do not know how it works and
whether this test is appropriate to solve the problem of causal link. Currently, the
prosecution does not have to prove causation; only to prove that what the accessory
did amounted to one of the forms of accessorial liability identified by the law (except
in procurement). One might suggest, then, that the accessory's action needs only to
be more than trivial or not de minimis to establish accessorial liability. However,
there is no clear authority for this in relation to accessorial liability or how such a
principle might operate. The above-mentioned causal formulation gives rise to
another question in relation to the causal contribution of accessorial. How can the
accessory escape conviction by reason of the defence of causation (if there is one)?
Under the current situation the defendant will be wasting time in arguing his
innocence that he or she did not cause the principal's offence. This might lead one to
insist that the required mens rea must be higher and based on intention in order to
introduce some kind of justice and bring about a balance between the power of the
prosecution to prove the crime and the ability of the accessory to deny his charge.
26 ibid. p. 665.
However, under English law, apart from procurement, the required mens rea is very
low and with no such importance attributed to causation, the ability of accessories to
escape conviction is limited. In general, apart from procurement, causation does not
have any role in deciding the actus reus of accessorial liability. A clear confirmation
of this is understood from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Giannetto (1997),
that a merely saying 'oh goody' by a husband to the suggestion that his wife should
27be killed, will amount to accessorial liability for murder if committed.
27 Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1 at 13.
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UAE Law
Looking first at the actus reus requirement, this is generally the external element
proscribed by the definition of the offence which must be proved. In other words, it
is human conduct, either an act or omission prohibited by the law. Another way of
putting this is that the actus reus involves the conduct of the accused, its results,
surrounding circumstances and consequences. In relation to accessorial liability, the
actus reus of accessorial liability is prescribed by the F.P.C., in article (45), which
mentions three forms of accessory liability: incitement, conspiracy, and assistance.
The commonly accepted formulation in Arab jurisdictions in relation to the unity of
actus reus in accessorial liability is contained in the following formula: Accessorial
liability includes various activities played by each party. However, these activities
must join or meet together in two concepts which constitute the unity of actus reus:
criminal result and causation.
Firstly, for a criminal result, such activities arising from the joint enterprise must be
presented in the criminal result or, in other words, the crime's outcome. Consider, for
example, murder (as a result offence), where a group of offenders intend to kill V.
One party, CI drives the group to the scene of the crime, C2 provides a lethal
weapon, C3 keeps watch while C4 finally kills V. All these activities meet together
in the result, which in this case is the death of V. Secondly, the establishment of
complicity requires proof that there is a causal link or causal relationship between the
acts of each party of the joint enterprise and the criminal result. In other words, there
must be proof that each party has caused the offence in question. The importance of
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the causation rule in this respect is that it is an exploration of the unity of actus reus
in the case of complicity. For example, M. Husni, indicates:
"The importance of causation between accomplice action and the crime is
that the causal link is an element in the accessory actus reus, without it there
28is no actus reus and there is no complicity."
Moreover he states that:
"There would be a causal relationship between the accomplice's action and
the crime where it is proved that (without the incitement) the perpetrator
would not have had the idea of committing the crime, that (without the
conspiracy) the perpetrator have not had the courage to commit the crime, or
(without the assistance) the perpetrator would not have committed the
crime."29
It seems that this view of attributing importance to causation was supported by the
Egyptian Cassation Court in its judgement No. 221 for 1968, where it was held that:
"to convict an offender as accessory to a crime, the court must prove
TO
causation relationship between the accomplice's action and the offence."
It seems here in this respect that accomplice's act must be a sine qua non, which
means that without the act the result would not have happened as it did. As already
has been suggested this view is ignored in English law basically because of practical
difficulties. The question is what does causation mean? Cause is something that
produces an effect: a cause is therefore a person, a thing or an event that makes
T1
something happen. Consequently, cause is something that has the power to produce
a change, motion or action in other things. In criminal law in order to convict a
28
Husni, M., Almushraka Aligramia fee Altashreat Alarabia, (Arabic. Criminal Complicity in Arab
Codes) (2nd ed. 1992), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. p. 332.
29 ibid. p. 334.
30
Egyptian Cassation Court, Case No. 221, 16 December 1968, Y.19, p. 1080. Egyptian Cassation
Court, Majmuat Ahka 'am Mahkama 'at Alnaqad (Arabic. Decisions of the Egyptian Cassation Court),
Egypt.
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person who has performed an act which constitutes an offence it must be shown that
the result has been caused effectively or, in other words, beyond reasonable doubt by
the accused's conduct. Therefore the accused will not be held accountable or guilty
unless it is possible to establish a sufficiently direct link between the conduct and the
result.
What position does the F.P.C. takes in relation to this? In fact there is only a general
theory of causation according to the F.P.C. mentioned in article (32):
"A person shall not be responsible for a crime if it is not a result of his own
criminal activity: however, he may be responsible for a crime even if his
criminal activity and another preceding, contemporary or subsequent cause
have contributed to its occurrence, where such a cause is expected or likely to
happen in the ordinary course of things. However, if such cause is sufficient
to produce the result of the crime, the person shall in this case be responsible
only for the act he has committed."
Accordingly, the prosecution has to prove causation beyond reasonable doubt to
convict the accused. However, the article does not distinguish between accomplices.
Does this suggest that the general theory of causation is applied both to principals
and accessories or that it is linked only to the first? There is no clear answer. Thus
one must ask does accessorial liability require causation?
The F.P.C. in article (45), expressly use the term accessory by causation when it
says:
"A person shall be considered accessory to a crime by causation:
First: if he instigates a crime, and it occurs in accordance with such
instigation.
Second: if he conspires with others to commit a crime, and it occurs in
accordance with such a conspiracy.
Third: If he provide the principal with weapon, tools or any other thing which
he knowingly uses in committing the crime, or if he wilfully aids the
31
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, (1992) England: Longman, p. 152.
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principal by any other means of preparing, facilitating or completing the acts
of crime."
It seems clear from the above article that the F.P.C. requires some sort of causal link
between the accessory's action and the offence. It is also true to say that the general
theory of causation, which is mentioned in article (32), appears to suggest that it
should be applied when the doctrine of complicity is needed for conviction since
there is no separate causation theory in the F.P.C.32 This is what appears from an
examination of the F.P.C., which might lead one to assume that this approach of the
general theory of causation is the only one possible approach since the rule of
legality plays a protective role in criminal law. Having said that, under this approach
many accessories, if not all, will escape conviction if the literal to causation is
applied, unless the UAE courts interpret the above article. I shall discuss below an
uncompleted attempt made by legal commentators to avoid the problem, while UAE
courts are still far away from even noticing that there is a problem.
As has already been said, there is a strong view that causation plays a major role in
accessorial liability. For example, as mentioned, Husni supports a causal role.
However, after such support, he complicates the situation by expressing the view that
causation in complicity is treated in a different way from causation in single offender
crimes or crimes other than accessorial liability.33 It seems Husni's latter views may
be cleared by a Lebanese Professor, M. Alojy, even though the latter's views might
not remove all the vagueness of the situation. Alojy says:
"'2
Rabia, H., Shark Alquaed Alama le Qanon Okobat Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda: Alguza Alawal,
Almbadee Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of the General Part of UAE Penal Code: Part
One, The General Principles ofCrime) (1993), Dubai: Albayan Press, p. 371.
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"courts do not spend much time analysing causation in relation to accessorial
liability, only general expressions are used which would give an impression
that there is a causal relationship."34
Moreover, he continues to say:
"It is often that legal commentary requires an objective principle to establish
causation between accessory's action and the result, this objective principle is
based on the idea of 'potential influence' in spite of the fact that it is not
35
expressly mentioned by the scholars."
The view of Alojy represents the opinions of most Arabic legal commentary
regarding the role of causation in accessorial liability. In fact, there is no serious
attempt by legal commentary to clarify what the above requirement of 'potential
influence' means (it might be possible that it is similar to the notion of 'making the
difference' mentioned earlier by K. Smith which also is not fully expressed. This can
lead someone to presume that causation is not an issue because of the problems that
it causes). It must be pointed out that under the F.P.C. the term accessory by
causation is perhaps the only express term used by an Arabic penal code which
insists that causation must be investigated, otherwise an accessorial case must
collapse. Unfortunately, neither Arabic commentary nor domestic judicial opinion
offers any answer on how causation operates. Even legal commentators such as
Husni, suggest that causation means: did the accessory's action matter? Did he make
any difference? If so, then there is a causal link even if it does not amount to a sine
qua non, and this differs from case to case. It is not totally clear how the F.P.C. treats
causation as an element of accessorial liability. However, I believe that since the
33
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 334.
34
Alojy, M., Alqanon Aljenai Alam: Alguza Althani, Almasulia Aljenaia, (Arabic. Public Criminal
Law: Part Two, Criminal Responsibility) (2nd ed. 1992), Lebanon: Nofal Publication, p. 125.
35 ibid. p. 127.
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F.P.C. does not include any such terminology, (of potential influence or making the
deference), the concept of causation is governed by article (32) and similarly applied
on both the principal offender and the accessory. I suggest this in spite of the fact that
this might lead many apparent accessories to escape conviction because of a causal
defence but the rule of legality forces one to provide such an opinion regarding the
current situation of the F.P.C. of causation in accessorial liability. I think that the
F.P.C. is rather different, in this regard, from other Arabic criminal codes by
implicitly indicating that causation, in accessorial liability, is based on the notion of
sine qua non, which seems to be the required test under the general provision of
causation in article (32).
Having said that, I believe that causation should not be regarded as element of
accessorial liability, and any future amendment of the F.P.C. should take this into
consideration. Currently a defendant should rely on causation as defence if he
believes that his action fails short of what is required in article (32) to avoid liability,
unless UAE courts explain the law on this point.
Section 2: Doing nothing: 'accessorial liability
through inaction'
This section examines the scope of omission in accessorial liability with the aim of
exploring the minimum standard required for accessorial liability. The issue is
approached from the point of view of clarifying the actus reus in such a case. The
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discussion below deals with the circumstances in which an accessory becomes liable
without doing any positive act.
English Law
The issue of inaction in aiding and abetting has been discussed in many cases and
academic commentary. It comes under two headings: mere presence and omission
based on duty and control.
Mere Presence:
If a person is merely present at the commission of an offence and is doing nothing,
but his presence follows on an agreement to afford assistance if necessary, he is an
accessory to that offence.36 The effect of presence even if doing nothing, is to lend a
type of encouragement to the principal, indicating perhaps that because of the
presence of another the offence may be committed more easily. In other words it
offers moral support which can also create fear on the victim to such an extent that
37
he cannot respond as he otherwise might to avoid the crime. But should every kind
of presence be sufficient to give rise to culpability?
36
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 36, citing Foster, J., Crown Law (1762), Oxford, p. 350.
j7
Smith, K., ibid. p. 25 at note 32 where he cites the opinion of Bromley CJ in Griffith (1553) who
indicates that presence has a power to suspend the courage of the victim to respond or at least to
escape.
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Suppose that A is going about his business and suddenly realises that there is a
gathering nearby. His curiosity leads him to find out what is going on. Is he an
accessory if the gathering proves to be illegal? Would his presence amount to an
aiding and abetting of the offence? There is no doubt that accidental presence is not
sufficient to render a person an accomplice to the offence, which has taken place.
Foster points out that:
"therefore if A happening to be present at murder for instance, and taken no
part in it, nor endeavoreth to prevent it, nor apprehendeth the murderer, nor
levyeth hue and cry against him, this strange behaviour of his though highly
TR
criminal, will not of itself render him either principal or accessory."
On this point, Cave, J. in R v. Coney (1882) says:
"Where presence may be entirely accidental, it is not even evidence of aiding
and abetting."39
It is difficult to accept that accidental presence is a way of becoming an accessory, as
this would create on citizens a duty to report the offence and would be also constitute
a limitation on freedom ofmovement which is neither the aim of criminal law, nor it
is accepted in modern life. In short, extending accessorial liability provisions to
accidental presence cases would be too wide application of penal law.40
This gives rise to the question: is non-accidental presence a conclusive evidence of
participation? For example, A sees an advertisement on a wall that there is to be a car
race between some youths, and he attends this. Should he become an accessory by
Foster, J., Crown Law p. 350.
39 R v. Coney [1882] 8 Q.B. 534 at p. 540.
40
Law Commission No. 43 indicates that "a person does not become an accessory to an offence if the
offence is so defined that his conduct in it is inevitably incidental to its commission and such conduct
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virtue of this non- accidental presence? English law recognises some authorities for
this proposition.
In R v. Coney, (1882)41 the defendant and others were present together with large
crowds which had gathered to see an illegal fight. It did not appear that they took any
part in any administration of the fight, nor did they do or say anything. The jury were
directed that all persons who were not passing by but were present were guilty of
assault through encouragement. Because of this, the jury found them guilty but
added, that they would not have found them aiders or abettors if the judge had not
directed them to do so.
Three of the eleven members of the court assumed that a jury was bound to presume
intentional encouragement as a consequence of intentional presence at a prize fight
unless there was cogent evidence to the contrary.42 However the conviction was
quashed by eight members who stated that presence is no more than prima-facie
evidence from which the jury could infer encouragement, that is to say, that
deliberate presence is not conclusive evidence allowing conviction as an accessory, it
is only one piece of evidence and it should be left to the jury to consider.
Hawkins J., said:
"
some active steps must be taken by word or action with intent to instigate
the principal or principals. Encouragement does not of necessity amount to
aiding and abetting, it may be intentional or unintentional, a man may
unwittingly encourage another in fact by his presence by misinterpreted
words or gestures, or by his silence or non-interference or may encourage
is not expressly penalised." Law Commission Working Paper No. 43, Parties, Complicity and
Liability for the Act ofAnother (1972). Proposition 8. p. 65.
41 Rv. Coney [1882] 8 Q.B. 534.
42
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 37 at note 82.
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intentionally by expression, gestures or actions intended to signify approval.
In the latter case he aid and abets." 43
In Wilcox v. Jeffrey (1951),44 the defendant was present at a concert given by an
American professor of saxophone who was performing illegally in contravention of
the Aliens Order 1920 which did not allow a foreigner to take any employment, paid
or unpaid, without permission. It was held that his presence was sufficient evidence
of encouragement to establish accessorial liability. An analysis of the facts of this
case leads us to the conclusion that:
a) deliberate presence , although prima-facie, it would strengthen the verdict since
he attended the concert and made payment; an act which he knew for certain that it
was illegal, and also the fact that he reported the concert latter in the newspaper in
which explored his interest in the performance (thus, one can suggest that this case
was more based on action rather than omission). Lord Goddard CJ. said on this point:
"It might have been entirely different, as I say, if he had gone there and
protested, saying: 'the musicians' union do not take you foreigners coming
here and you ought to get out of the stage..., it might been some evidence
that he was not aiding and abetting. If he had gone as a member of a claque to
try to drown noise of the saxophone, he might very likely be found not guilty
of aiding and abetting, in this case it seems clear hat he was there, not only to
approve and encourage what was done, but to take advantage of it by getting
copy for his paper." 45
b) In a sense, the facts in this case are different from those in Coney. The defendant
knew of the musician's arrival and went to the airport to greet him, which expresses
an interest in the commission of the illegal performance and this would also increase
the sale of the paper after the publication of the concert of the musician.
43 Hawkins J. in R v. Coney [1882] 8 Q.B. 534 at 557.
44 Wilcox v. Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464.
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In Allan (1963)46 the defendant was present when some of his friends got into an
affray. He did not do anything but nursed a desire to help if his help were needed.
However, his assistance was not required. The trial judge directed the jury to convict
the accused if it was proved that he had decided to help if his help was needed even
if he was totally passive and did not do anything. The accused appealed on the
ground of misdirection. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the conviction and
allowed the appeal. The Court held, following Coney, that there was misdirection by
the trial judge because he had said that the holding of an intention to help was
conclusive evidence of aiding and abetting. Therefore, the defendant was not guilty
ofmaking an affray in the absence of any evidence of encouragement. Presence was
onlyprima-facie evidence and should be left to the jury to decide upon.
It is clear from this case that there must be active steps on the part of the accused;
deliberate presence alone would not be sufficient to convict a person of accessorial
liability. In this case the Court did not convict the accused because if it did there
would be a new principle which would lead to convict people upon their thoughts,
which would be a huge departure from the accepted policy of English criminal law in
this matter.
45 ibid, cited in Smith, J.C. & Hogan, B., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, (6th ed.
1996) London: Butterworths. p. 230.
46 R v. Allan [1963] 2 All ER 897.
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In R v. Clarkson and Carroll (1971 )47 A1 and A2, soldiers, heard a German girl
being raped by another, in a military camp, entered the room and remained there but
did not give any direct physical or verbal encouragement. However, they were
charged with aiding and abetting rape. The Martial Appeal Court allowed their
appeal and held that A1 and A2 were not guilty of aiding and abetting the rape.
Megaw LJ said:
"The jury has to be told by the judge, or in this case the court-martial has to
be told by the judge-advocate, in clear terms what it is of which the jury or
the court-martial, as the case may be, must be sure as matters of inference
before they can convict of aiding and abetting in such a case where the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is limited to non accidental presence.. .It
is not enough, then that the presence of the accused has, in fact, given
encouragement. It must be proved that that the accused intended to give
48
encouragement; that he wilfully encouraged."
It appears that deliberate presence or attendance during an offence is not conclusive
proof of encouragement, it is only prima facie evidence and it is for the jury to
decide.49
It would be true to say that a verdict of aiding and abetting differs from case to case
and depends on the circumstances present in the case in question.30 For instance,
Wilcox v. Jeffery is a clear example of a case in which the accused showed through
his assent or consent that he wanted the offence to take place. This differs from
47 R v. Clarkson and Carroll [1971] 3 All ER 344.
48 ibid. p. 347.
49 To hold otherwise, this would estimate a general duty to take a reasonable step to prevent the
offence from happening, which is not the case in English law. See Ashworth, A., Principles of
Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1995), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 416.
50Cf. Glanville Williams argues of what might be such circumstances. He says: " What is the point of
saying that presence is evidence, if it cannot be taken to be enough evidence? If it is enough evidence
in some circumstances, what are those circumstances?" A valuable point but without a clear answer.
Williams, G., "Which of You Did it?" (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 179 at 189.
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Coney in which there was no approval of the offence.51 All in all, the question of
what amounts to encouragement by mere presence should be a question of fact in
52each case for the jury, and is not one of law.
Omission:
The second related area of inaction in secondary party liability is failure to act where
there is duty to intervene or where a right of control exists.53 In general, English
criminal law favours action as a mode of committing an offence but occasionally
extends incrimination from acts to omissions.54 This accords with the conventional
view principle, which restricts liability for omission to a minimum. It conflicts,
however, with social responsibility theory, which equals action with omission in
committing an offence. Thus, English law has tended to restrict criminal liability for
omission to the range of situations in which a duty to act can be identified.55 For
example, if a stranger watches a child drown in a shallow pool from which he could
easily rescue him, he commits no offence because there was no duty to rescue.56
5'Suppose that there was an applause, countenance or cheering in Coney's case, would this amount to
encouragement? Hawkins J. In Coney, op. cit., at 557 said "...or he may encourage intentionally by
expression, gestures or action intended to signify approval" Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 37 at note
82, believes that applause according to this would amount to be classified as aiding and abetting;
Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 416.
32 Huddleston, B. in Coney, op. cit., at 561. This leaves us with an unclear answer. What is the
sufficient mens rea of mere presence? Should we adopt the language of intention said in the previous
cases to assume that the mens rea required is either purpose or oblique intent, or should we presume
mens rea on knowledge that presence or attendance might encourage the offender?
33 See: Smith, J.C., " Liability for Omission in Criminal Law" [1984] 4 Legal Studies 88; Ashworth,
A., " The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions" (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 424; Williams, G., "Criminal
Omissions- The Conventional View" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 86.
34
Ashworth, A., " The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions" op. cit., 424 at 426.
33
Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 47.
36
Card, R., Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (13th ed. 1995), London: Butterworths. p. 54.
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A person becomes an accessory to an offence by omission to act, provided that the
person was under a duty to act recognised by the criminal law, which he failed to
fulfil.57 These duties may arise under statute but more commonly they arise under
common law.58 Although this principle relates to the liability of a perpetrator, it is
applicable to the liability of an accomplice.59 Examples of situations in which a duty
to act will exist include: holding a public office which requires a duty of care to
others,60 parents towards their children,61 voluntarily undertaking the care of another
who is unable to care for himself,62 and situation in which there is a contractual duty
r- 63of care.
In Du Cross v. Lambourne (1907)64 the defendant was charged with driving his car at
a dangerous speed, contrary to section 8 of the Motor Car Act 1903. It could not be
proved whether the defendant was actually driving or another person was the driver
at the time. Some witnesses said that the defendant was the driver, others stated that
37 ibid. p. 54.
58 ibid. p. 55.
59 ibid. p. 555.
60
Dytham [1979] Q.B. 722. A police officer was convicted of the common law offence of misconduct
in a public office when he failed to intervene to stop a man being kicked to death. Under clause 27 (3)
of English draft Criminal Code 1989 (which takes very broad understanding that omission could be
found in every duty case) the police officer might be convicted of murder as an accessory instead of
that simple offence.
61
A parent's duty to ensure the health and safety of their children is governed by Children and Young
Persons Act 1933, in s.l. However, there is no English authority under common law on this effect. See
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996) op. cit., p. 51. Some commentators tend to extend such duty beyond
family scope to cover members of the same household. See: McCall Smith, R.A. & Sheldon, D., Scots
Criminal Law (1992), Edinburgh: Butterworths. p. 30. Others indicate that it is possible to extend this
duty to cover a close relationship such as other relatives, domestic, business and children above the
age of responsibility. Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996) op. cit., p. 51. For example, in R v. Russell
[1933] VLR 59, (an Australian Case) a father was convicted ofmanslaughter to his wife suicide, who
also killed his children, on the ground that he failed to stop the wife to do so. He was convicted as
principal although that there was an opinion that he should be convicted as an accessory.
62 Nicholls [1874] 13 Cox CC 75., Stone and Dobinson [1977] Q.B. 354.
63
In Pittwood [1902] 19 TLR 37, the accused, a level crossing keeper, failed to close the gate when a
train was approaching and because of this a person was killed. He was convicted with manslaughter
on the basis that he omitted to act where his contract required a duty to do so.
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the car was driven by another. It was immaterial to the court whether the accused
was driving or not, he knew that the speed was dangerous and had done nothing to
prevent the offence from happening. Alverstone LCJ said:
"It is impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the court was
satisfied that the appellant was doing acts which would amount to aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring."65
The other judge of the divisional court, Darling J, said:
".. .was precisely the same thing as if he did it himself. He had authority and
power to interfere but he did not do so although he knew the car was being
driven at excessive speed."66
It is made clear in this case that the owner's failure to exercise control over the
driver of a car may be sufficient grounds of incrimination.67 However, it is said that
this is a contradictory or ambiguous case.68 For example, Glanville Williams refuses
to consider Du Cross v. Lambourne as a reliable authority because it merits certain
serious theoretical objections, namely: the decision extends the liability of omission
by encouragement where there is no proof of both encouragement and direct
intention to encourage. Also he points out that many people are reluctant to criticise
others to their face and in such a case and although it may be said that the owner did
not discourage the driving, does that equals encouragement?69 When the person is
not the owner or the possessor of the vehicle but a mere passenger, his omission to
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Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 40.
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Williams, G., " Letting Offences Happen" [1990] Crim. LR 780 at 785.
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prevent the criminal driving will not make him an accessory.70 Glanville Williams
comments on the duty of ownership in these terms:
" An owner who is not sitting in the car is not a special target of the law (he is
presumably not implicated if he lends his car to a person whom he knows to
be a careless driver); neither is a passenger in most instances; but a person
1 jwho is both owner and passenger can be convicted."
79
In Ruble v. Faulkner (1940) a driving instructor failed to act to prevent a learner
driver from committing an offence of careless driving in which the driver collided
with a motor lorry. The instructor was convicted of aiding and abetting. He appealed
on the ground that he had no control over the car and did not tell the driver to
perform the manoeuvre which led to the accident and also he had no time to correct
the mistake. However, the conviction of aiding and abetting was upheld, Hilbery J.
saying:
" In this case it was found that the supervisor could see the driver was about
to do the unlawful act of which he was convicted and the magistrates found
that the supervisor reminded passive ...for him to refrain from doing anything
when he could see that unlawful act was about to be done, and his duty was to
73
prevent an unlawful act, if he could, was for him to aid and abet."
This decision was an interpretation of the Road Traffic Act and its regulations, and is
not an authority for the whole field of English criminal law.74
70 In D v. Pearsons [1960] 2 All ER 493, D 1 aged 15 stole a motor cycle and offered A, a lift. A was
charged with aiding and abetting D in driving without insurance. The divisional Court held that a mere
passenger could not be held liable to D's offence. Lanham D., " Drivers, Control And Accomplices"
[1982] Crim. LR 419 at 421.
71
Williams, G., " Letting Offences Happen" op. cit., p. 180.
12 Faulkner [1940] 1 KB 571.
7j ibid. p. 575. Also Lord Hewart L.C.J, ibid, at p. 288. Cf. G. Williams "Letting Offences Happen"
op.cit., p. 783.
74
Williams, G., "Letting Offences Happen" op. cit., p. 784.
85
In Tuck v. Robson (1970)7;> the accused, a licensee of a public house, whose licence
prohibits the drinking of alcohol after 11:10 p.m. was found guilty as an accomplice
to his customers' breach of the Liquor Act. In fact, he called 'Time' at 11:00 p.m.,
and switched off some lights. Moreover, he asked the customers to leave but the
police arrived at 11:23 p.m., and found some customers were still consuming drinks.
His appeal was quashed and the court did not consider his asking customers to leave
as an effort to avoid conviction holding that he had failed to exercise his right of
control.76 Lord Parker said:
"The question as it seems to me, is whether the magistrate as a reasonable
tribunal was entitled in all the circumstances to draw the inference that there
was passive assistance in the sense of presence with no steps being taken by
the licensee to enforce his right either to eject the customers or at any rate to
revoke their licence to be upon the premises. In my judgement the magistrate
was entitled to draw that inference, and accordingly I would dismiss this
appeal."77
The above three cases were considered authorities by the English Draft Criminal
Code (1989) which indicates in clause 27(3):
"Assistance or encouragement includes assistance or encouragement arising
from a failure by a person to take a reasonable steps to exercise any authority
or to discharge any duty he has to control the relevant acts of the principal in
order to prevent the commission of the offence." 78
This is in complete contrast to the view of LC. No. 43 which indicates that:
75 Tuck v. Robson [1970] 1 W.L.R. 741; [1970] 1 All ER 1171.
76
Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op.cit., p. 555.
77
Lord Parker in Tuck v. Robson [1970] 1 WLR 741 pp.746-747.
78 Law Commission Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code For England And Wales (1989).
Cf. Law Commission Report No. 131 suggests that omission, under accessorial liability, should be
based on criminal intention, and knowledge is to be considered as a prima-facie evidence from which
the jury could infer intention of accessorial liability in omission. Law Commission Consultation Paper
No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime, (1993). pp. 22, 105, 131.
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"A person who is in a position to prevent an offence, because he is in control
of property or for some other reason, is not to be taken to be an accessory
79
merely because he fails to prevent an offence."
G. Williams, who was an author of LC. No. 43, says:
"What is there in case law to have caused the commission to suppose that
their proposal about authority to control merely restate the present law?
So far as the decided cases show, an authority to control is supposed to arise
in certain cases either from a) the interpretation of a statute (the supervision
example) or b) the ownership of property, c) with one dubious exception
(control arising from status or contract), no other application has to my
knowledge been made of the idea that an authority to control can produce
OA
liability for complicity; but the Draft Code sets no limits to it."
Liability for aiding and abetting by an omission is one of the most difficult subjects
in accessorial liability. The problem is not only in the actus reus, it also touches the
issue of the mental element. There is a lack of precision in determining when a
81*
person is under an obligation to intervene. Keith Smith summarises the issue of
omission:
"Discrimination between what might be considered deserving and
undeserving cases for criminalization may, it has been suggested be
approached in two ways: by declaring that failure to exercise a civil right to
control, in itself, is insufficient basis for liability, though it may be sufficient
when coupled with an 'additional factor', or by affirming that simple failure
to exercise 'authority or discharge a duty' may incriminate. But for both
judicial creativity would determine what the additional factor or cases of
authority were... the need remains for a conceptional basis capable of
selecting appropriate cases for punishment."82
19 LC No. 43, proposition 8. p. 9 and 65, which is an adoption of section 2. 06 (6) (b) of the American
M.P.C.
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Williams, G., "Letting Offences Happen" op. cit., pp.782-3.
8lFinn, J., "Culpable Non-Intervention: Reconsidering the Basis For Party Liability by Omission"
(1994) Criminal Law Journal Vol. 18, p. 106. Moreover, it is possible to say that omission creates a
problem in establishing the defence of withdrawal. For example, the accused in Tuck v. Robson called
'time' and switched off some of the lights but the Court found that this was insufficient to avoid being
an accomplice. What might the Court have expected the accused to do? Was it sufficient to hire two
large bodyguards to throw the customers out? (as an example of requiring a physical intervening).
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Smith, K., MTLCC, op.cit., p. 46.
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He goes further to suggest that two factors should be acknowledged: a) relationship
between the parties and that the accessory have a dominant role over the principal, b)
OT
The likelihood of substantial risk. However, both factors could be easily used in
wide terms by court and thus the only solution is to have certain measures for the
courts to follow and this is the responsibility of the legislature which, for issues of
04
English law, in the UK is the Westminster parliament. Or as suggested by LC. No.
131, accessorial liability in omission should be based criminal intention rather than
knowledge which, at the same time, should be considered only as a prima-facie
evidence from which the jury could infer intention of accessorial liability in
omission.85
83 ibid. p. 47.
84
Williams, G., " Letting Offences Happen" op. cit., p.787. Cf. Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity,
op.cit., p. 136.
83 LC. No. 131, op. cit., pp. 22, 105, 131.
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UAELaw
It is worth mentioning that judicial decisions are not binding authority in the UAE. It
is probably the case that only a decision of the F.S.C. is a binding precedent in future
similar cases,86 where the court has jurisdiction.87 Thus, case law in the UAE
criminal system does not play a similar role to the English precedent. However, the
decision may be useful when interpreting the F.P.C. In relation to the scope of
inaction in accessorial liability, there is no reported case of mere presence nor
omission under a duty to act. It is advisable to examine the issue in the F.P.C.
articles.88
Article (31) states that:
86 A1 Mansoori, A.E.M., The Law of Arrest and Similar Procedures: A Comparative Study,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Edinburgh 1997. p. 20. Cf. Butti Al-Muhairi who argues
that there is no written legal rule that makes the decision of the F.S.C. binding and that courts, in
general, tend not to follow its ruling. He calls the legislature to expressly state that the decisions of the
F.S.C. are binding. Al-Muhairi, B.S., " Conclusion to the Series of Articles on The UAE Penal
Law"[1997] Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.12, Part 4. p. 386.
87 Two of the seven emirates has a domestic judicial jurisdiction, Dubai and Ras-alkhima, but also
apply the F.P.C. In Dubai there is a Court of Cassation for civil and criminal matters. Is possibly true
to say that this Court plays strong role as of the F.S.C. and in more than one occasion it did not follow
the F.S.C. on matters related to the Federal Cods. For the role of the F.S.C. and Dubai Cassation Court
of see: A1 Mansoori, A., op.cit., pp. 10-20.
88 In relation to the domestic penal codes of the UAE, it is worth mentioning that the Dubai 1970
Penal Code expressly states certain duties regarding omission liability in the following articles (It is
not clear whether the following duties are taken to represent accessorial liability of omission under the
F.P.C. in the jurisdiction of Dubai):
Article (223) imposes a duty on a person who takes the care of another by contract or in accordance
with the law. Article (224) states that the head of a family has a duty of care regarding a child under
14 years old and that he is responsible for the child's life or health. Article (225) imposes a duty on a
master in respect of a servant who is under 16 years old, namely that he must provides him with food,
clothes and an accommodation. If he omits to do so and that affects the health or the life of the
servant, he is responsible. Also, articles (226-227) impose a duty to intervene in relation to persons
who commit dangerous acts. Presumably the above mentioned duties follow the Indian Penal Code
approach regarding the liability of the principal offender in respect of omission. Surprisingly, the
F.P.C. did not follow this approach. Had it done so, it would have avoided ambiguity in the scope of
omission in the F.P.C.
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" The actus reus of an offence consist of criminal activity resulting from
commission or omission of an act where such commission or omission is
classified as a criminal offence."
Accordingly, there are two types of omission:
1- Omission resulting from failure to act where the Penal Code requires
such an act:
An example of this is article (261), which makes it an offence to abstain from taking
oath or giving testimony before judicial authority. A further example is article (328)
which punishes a person who abstains from delivering a child to the person who has
the legal custody of the child. In this type of omission, the F.P.C. only requires a
failure without any regard to any particular result.
2- 'Pure Omission' where the definition of an offence can be read to
include an omission in its commission:
An example of this is the offence of murder and that of manslaughter. When the
F.P.C. does not describe the physical element of a particular offence and the offence
itself can be committed by omission or action, then it can be said that this is a 'pure
OQ
omission' and sufficient for culpability, if, and only if, three things are proved:
1 - an obligation resulting from law or contract,
2- a causal link between the omission and the criminal result,
3- proof that the person could reasonably have intervened to avoid the result.90
89
Rabia, H., op.cit., p. 178.
90 ibid. pp. 179-181.
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Article (31) sets out to define an offence under a general principle and accepts that a
crime can be committed by an omission. However, this article was not well drafted
because there are some offences which cannot be committed with omission.
Examples of these are rape, assault, theft and robbery, which require an act rather
than omission. Moreover, article (31) appears to deal with the liability of principal
offender and no reference is made to the liability of accessories. The question then
should be: is there an express provision to deal with inaction in accessorial liability?
The answer is no. The F.P.C. has allocated 8 articles (44-52) to deal with the doctrine
of criminal complicity, but there is no article which expressly sets out the scope of
omission in the theory of accessorial liability. Article (46) states that:
"An accessory by causation shall be considered as a direct accomplice (a
principal), provided that he is found at the scene of an offence with intention
to commit it if it is not committed by another person."
This article somehow deals with the scope of inaction. However, there is no doubt
that the aim of this article is to govern a situation where there is prior agreement to
exchange roles in order to secure the commission of the offence. This may be
understood from upgrading the person from mere accessory to a principal offender
but the application of article (46) will not cover every case, which does not meet the
requirements of previous agreement. Anything beyond this would be too wide a
reading of the article and would expand accessorial liability provisions to ambiguous
and tenuous situations. Also the reading of article (45) requires some contribution to
the causation of the offence of the principal offender, such causal link would prevent
culpability in every situation of mere presence or omission, as in the examples cited
in English law where causation has no role at all.
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Article (242) states that:
" A prison term shall be imposed upon any public office holder who uses
torture, force or threat, by himself or by another, against a defendant, witness
or an expert, causing him to confess to a crime or to make statement or give
information in respect thereof, or to suppress any such matters."
The above article deals with situations of instigation but labels the instigator a
principal offender rather than accessory. This can be understood in relation to the
gravity of the offence and to the position adopted by the offender. However, this
article does not address the issue of omission, as it should be, therefore, the UAE
legislator should state in express provision that this offence can be committed with
omission.
The F.P.C. has three articles that deal with failure from notification of crimes,
articles: (272, 273, 274). Article (272) states that:
"Any public official or person in charge of detecting crimes and arresting the
accused, who fails or defers to inform about a crime within his knowledge
shall be punished by detention or fine.
A fine shall be imposed upon any official who is not in charge of detecting or
seizing crimes, and who neglect or delays to inform the concerned authorities
of a crimes within his knowledge, in the course of or in respect of his duty
job-
There shall be no punishment in the above two paragraphs if the legal action
of the crime requires a complaint.
Exemption from the penalty of the second paragraph may be granted if the
official is a spouse of the defendant, one of his descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters or having the same degree of relationship by marriage."
Article (274) states that:
"A fine not exceeding 1000 Dirhams shall be imposed on whoever becomes
aware of a crime and abstains from informing the concerned authorities.
Exemption from the penalty may be granted if such person is a spouse of the
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defendant, one of his descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters or in laws
having the same degree of relationship by marriage."
These articles possibly suggest that a mere presence at the commission of an offence
is not even a prima-facie evidence of accessorial liability.91 Apart from provisions
already alluded to, there is nothing in the F.P.C. in relation to mere presence and
omission. Thus, it is advisable to examine the matter in Arabic jurisprudence in
general.
The Lebanon Court of Cassation held in 1972 that mere presence at the commission
of a crime does not amount to accessorial liability unless there is proof of a previous
conspiracy. 92 However, a Lebanese commentator, M. Alojy,93 rejects the
requirement of conspiracy, insisting that accessorial liability can be established in
cases of spontaneous involvement provided that the accessory shared a mental state
with an offender. He says that mere presence must be compounded with the intention
of supporting the principal in committing the offence in question. In comparison,
article (80) of the Jordanian Penal Code (1951) states that:
"A person is an intervening party to felony or misdemeanour if he: c) was
present at the commission of the offence with the purpose of: terrorising the
opponents, strengthening the principal or to secure the commission of the
offence."
91 The usage of the articles (272-274) is too demanding when it makes it an offence to abstain from
reporting every crime whether felony, misdemeanour or contravention. Logically, it should be reduced
to felonies and some selected misdemeanours. Otherwise, the F.P.C. is clearly imposing a difficult
general duty.
92 Lebanese Court of Cassation 6 161 1972., cited in Alojy, M., (Part Two), op.cit., p. 164.
93
Alojy, M., ibid. pp. 164-166.
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Thus, a mere spectator is not an accomplice to an illegal scene unless he has an
intention to achieve one of the above underlined objectives.94 Thus, the position of
legal authorities in both Jordan and Lebanon differs from the situation in Egypt. The
Egyptian Court of Cassation denies that accessorial liability can exist by omission
and this cover mere presence case although the issue has not been discussed in
Egyptian legal commentary. 95
It might be concluded that in the UAE, police and public prosecution authorities tend
not to charge a mere spectator in such situations presumably because of the
restrictive interpretation of the rule of legality or, as one might assume, because of
the Egyptian law view that suggests that accessorial liability cannot exist by
omission. In a mere presence case, it would be hard to prove accessorial liability
requirements, namely, causation and mens rea. Moreover it is possible that public
prosecution authorities would view it as being not sufficiently serious to warrant
prosecution and it might use its right of not to prosecute under UAE Criminal
Procedures Code No 35 of 1992, articles (7, 9, 118). These provisions state that a
prosecution need not be brought where the merits brought before it is trivial,
worthless, or insignificant.
Another possibility is that UAE courts could take the issue of mere presence into
consideration to support the evidence against a defendant, but this should come after
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Al-Saeed, K., Almbadee Alama le Amusharka Aligramia fee Qcinon Alokobat Alordony, (Arabic.
The General Provisions of Criminal Complicity in Jordan Penal Code) (1983) Jordan: Majedlawy
Publication, pp. 86-87.
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Egyptian Cassation Court, Case No.1906, 28 151 1945, Y. 15, in Sidki, A., Alwageez fee Alqanon
Aljenai,(Arabic. Criminal Law) (1986), Egypt: Dar Almarif. p. 365.
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securing two main issues: causation and mens rea requirements. It could be argued
that if the legislator wished to have mere presence prosecuted then this should
expressly stated. An example, which demonstrates this, is article (47) of the UAE
Code No. 14 of 1995 on Fighting Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, which
states:
"Whoever, is arrested in premises referred in the previous article (any place
runs, prepares, or provide any narcotics or psychotropics stated in the code
schedules or according to art. 41) and he knows of its purpose shall be
punished by a jail term of not less than six months and not exceeding one
year, and by a fine of not less than 10,000 Dirhams and not exceeding 20,000
Dirhams. If the person arrested in such places is a husband, wife, any of the
ascendants or descendants of the person who runs, prepares or provides said
places, he shall be punished by a jail term of six months and by a fine of not
less than 5,000 Dirhams."
One must state that the issue of omission in Arabic jurisprudence, particularly in
Egypt, is plagued by uncertainty and there is conflict to whether omission has a role
to play in the liability of accessories. There are two schools of thought regarding this
difficult subject. The first school denies that omission has a role in establishing the
physical element; a view supported by many decisions of Egyptian courts.96 The
second view, even if it lacks the judicial support, insists that there is nothing in law
07
to exclude omission from accessorial liability.
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Mahdi, A., Shark Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat: Dirash Muqarana bean Qanon Alemarat
Alarbia Almutheda (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, wa Mashrua Alqanon Alithadi) wa Alqanon Almassri (Arabic.
Explanation of the General Rules of the Penal Law: A Comparative Study between UAE Laws (Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, and the Draft Federal Penal Code) and the Egyptian Law) (1983), Cairo: Atlas
Publication, p. 373; Obaid, R., Mbadee Alkesm Alam menn Alqanon Alikabi, (Arabic. Principles of the
General Part of the Penal Code) (4th ed. 1979), Cairo: Dar Alfeker Alarabi. p. 461.
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Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p.313; A1 Saeed, K., op. cit., pp. 93-4; Rabia, H.,
op. cit., p.406; Alojy, ML, (Part Two) op.cit., p. 167; Sorror, A., Alwaseet fee Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm
Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of Penal Code: The General Part) (6th ed. 1986), Egypt: Dar Alnhda
Alarabia. p. 174; Mustafa, M.M., Sharh Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of the
Penal Code: The General Part) (10th ed.1983), Cairo: Cairo University Press, pp. 347-8; Alia, S.,
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The attitude of Egyptian courts tends to be that of excluding omission as a basis for
accessorial liability. There are many examples of this. In one early twentieth century
case, the Court of Appeal, case No. 57 for 1902, held that silence of a police officer
witnessing an assault committed against an accused does not render him responsible
QO
as an accessory to the assault. This view of the Appeal Court might be taken as the
spur to other decisions. Indeed it was followed by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in
26 /10/ 1912, where the Court held that:
"Accessorial liability only exists in positive form and omission does not arise
such liability even if the person knows of the offence and does not take steps
• 99 99
to prevent it.
Again, the Egyptian Cassation Court expressly referred to the rejecting of the
application of omission in its decision No. 1906 for 1954 where it said:
"There is no doubt that accessorial liability exist only in a positive form, and
never occurs in negative participation."100
There is no single justification given by neither court decisions nor the commentators
who support this position. The basis of their arguments might be that 1) as a general
rule, theories of criminal liability require that there should be a criminal act.
Omission is an exceptional basis of liability and this is seen in many offences which
does not allow omission to its application. 2) The rule of legality which requires that
there be no crime or punishment except in accordance with the governing code,
guides the courts when there is a doubt as to whether a particular principle applies to
Shark Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam (Arabic. Explanation of the Penal Code: The General Part)
(1998), Beirut p. 317.
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Egyptian Court of Appeal Case No. 57 for 1902, cited in Rabia, H., op. cit., pp. 181-182.
99 ibid. p. 419.
96
a particular offence. The application of this rule would tend to favour a restrictive use
of the omission principle, which is uncertain. Also relevant here is the argument that
criminal offences should not created by implication. 3) Since the issue of causation
causes a great amount of difficulties when applied in the context of the positive act,
then it causes more serious problems in relation to omission. 4) The penal codes
legislation deals with complicity doctrine in many governing articles (for example
the F.P.C. deals with the issue in 8 articles), which shows that the issue was well
considered at the drafting stage. In spite of this, there is no declaration of one article
of omission to be applied in accessorial liability.
On the other hand, some legal commentators indicate that there is a place for
omission in accessorial liability, but only when it is compounded with a duty to act (a
similar approach of English law). Thus, omission in the view of this school of
thought is: "Abstaining from acting where there is a duty enforced by the law to
act."101 A. Mohammed says:
"a negative form of behaviour does not become an omission recognised by
the law unless it is based on a legal duty to act, and this is a general principle
107
apply to both liabilities: principal and accessory."
It has been pointed out that supporters of applying omission in accessorial liability
insist that before applying omission in accessorial liability cases, there must be a
legal duty to act. Where do these duties come from?
100
Egyptian Court ofCassation, Case No. 583 for 1945, Y. 15, cited in Sydki, op. cit., p. 365.
101 Mohammed A., Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The General Part) (nd.),
Egypt: Dar Almatboaat Algamaia. p. 59.
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Mohammed, A., ibid. p.375. Moreover it should be noted that Lebanon Court of Cassation equals
between omission and active participation and this would mean that omission compound with duty to
act is part of accessories actus reus in Lebanon. See Alojy, M., (Part Two) op. cit., p. 164.
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Commentators, expressly or implicitly indicate that such legal duty is taken from
civil law, particularly from the sources of obligation. An example of this in the UAE
Civil Code is article (124):
"... the resources of obligations are: 1- contract 2- unilateral disposition 3-
harmful action 4- beneficial action 5- law."103
The judicial authorities would refer to this article to see if the person who has
omitted to act was under one of these obligations to act, which is stated above.104
One might suggest that nothing in the reading of accessorial liability provision
prevents using omission of a legal duty in accessorial liability, especially when there
is no equivalent offence in the F.P.C. to punish such form of behaviour.105 The use of
omission liability here would serve justice; it would not easily allow an accused to
escape liability, and the majority of adherents of this view states that inactive
involvement is addressed under the category of assistance because the two other
forms, instigation and conspiracy, must only exist in positive form.106 This attitude is
contrary to the view expressed in the English Draft Code that addresses inaction as
inactive encouragement.
IOj Article (124) of UAE Federal Civil Code No 5 for 1985, amended by the Federal Code No 1 for
1987.
104 For example, if a person agrees with a blind person to take care of him in crossing a street every
day, and intentionally omits to do so while the blind man is on the road, thereby causing him an
injury. He would be an accessory to that offence on the ground that he has been under contractual
obligation to act. Another example is when a police officer intentionally refuse to intervene to stop an
assault committed in front of him. He would be an accessory to that assault because by law he has a
duty to intervene.
105 It has been pointed out, the F.P.C. includes two articles (272, 274) that presumably would restrict
the role of accessorial liability in omission.
106 A1 Shinaway, S., Alnadaria Alama fee Algarema wal Alikab fee Qanon Alokobat Al Kuwaiti,
(Arabic. The General Theory ofCrime and Punishment in Kuwait Penal Code) (2nd ed.1992). p. 616;
Rabia,, H., op. cit., p.406. Cf Mahdi, A., op. cit., p. 373.
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The situation in the UAE, especially in the F.P.C., regarding omission is not clear. A
possible reason for this is the lack of clarity and rarity of such cases. As has been
pointed out, the courts must first address the requirements of complicity: coincidence
of both actus reus and mens rea. Thus, presumably the accomplices must act with an
identical state of mind and there should be contribution on the accessories part to the
criminal result. There would be no problem if there was an express or tacit agreement
between the parties, whether it was decided before or during the offence, because it
would be for the court to infer the participation. But in the case of omission
compounded with duty to act, it would be difficult to use this approach for the
following reason.
There is no express provision to state that a person failing to fulfil a duty is an
accessory to an offence. I believe that the UAE courts would favour a restrictive
approach107 unless the matter brought before the court involved an offence of great
gravity, such as in murder and manslaughter. Moreover, as has been pointed out, it
would be true to say, although there is no supportive authority for this, that articles
(272) and (274) by implication restrict the scope of inaction in accessorial liability
by creating an obligation on both public officials and ordinary citizens to report an
offence which comes to their knowledge. It is not fully clear whether it addresses the
issue of being present at an offence or just having knowledge that a criminal offence
has been or is about to be committed, but, presumably, lawyers would rely on the
application of these two articles to avoid convicting a person who fails to prevent an
offence either by having the power of control or being an under duty to act.
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Consequently, I think that the F.P.C. should be amended to punish whoever
intentionally fails a duty to act as an accessory to an offence if it is committed in
accordance with such an omission.108
107Cf Rabia, H., op. cit, p. 182.
108 One might suggest that there should be an express article to indicate the duties, which in respect of
liability for omission may arise. However, this would be an impossible task for legislation. Thus,




The mens rea requirements for accessorial
liability
Chapter 3
The mens rea requirements for accessorial
liability
The necessary elements of a crime are normally considered to be an actus reus and
mens rea. However, under English law there are many crimes requiring no personal
fault, these being strict liability offences. The general requirements of a criminal
mens rea, reflects the idea that a person should not be convicted unless it can be
proved that he intended to cause the harm, or that he knowingly risked the
occurrence of the harm. The emphasis of these requirements has been upon the
defendant's personal awareness of what was being done or omitted, although some
judicial decisions have created exceptions to this. The doctrine of criminal
complicity extends this principle to accessories to a crime, who must also fulfil the
mens rea criterion for criminal responsibility. In addition, how can a person become
guilty of a criminal offence? The importance of such analysis comes from the notion
that one of the main functions of criminal law is to express the degree of
wrongdoing. Mens rea in this respect is a mechanism of criminal liability; it is the
morale element in an offence, which represents the accused's state of mind when he
commits an offence. Another reason for such analysis is found in the maxim: actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - an act does not make a person legally guilty unless
the mind is legally blameworthy. This leads us to investigate the operation of this
term in the criminal law system of both England and the UAE.
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The aim of this chapter is to discuss the issue ofmens rea in the context of criminal
complicity. I shall examine English cases to see how they treat the subject of mens
rea, and to elaborate the circumstances that make a person a secondary party. I shall
then examine the debate as to intention against 'knowledge or recklessness' to decide
the mental element of secondary participation. In addition, I shall examine how
English law treats the issue of the principal offence's future crime. Finally, a view is
expressed as to what approach English law should follow in this area. An evaluation
of the doctrine ofmens rea of accessorial liability under Arabic jurisprudence will be
undertaken to see how the issue is settled in that legal tradition and also to point out
the status of the concept under the F.P.C. Accordingly, some important questions
shall be asked including: Is the F.P.C. in this area intelligible to the layman? Should
the F.P.C. be interpreted in the light of other sources, such as legal commentary?
What approach should the F.P.C. take to mens rea in respect of accessorial liability.
English Law
(A) General requirements of mens rea
Mens rea is the state of mind which must accompany the actus reus in order for an
offence to be committed. This concept signifies that an act is not criminal unless the
mind is guilty. In relation to this mental requirement, crimes are divided into two
categories: crimes of specific intention and crimes of basic intention.
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3) Specific Intention:1 For the most serious crimes such as murder, theft,
obtaining property by deception and wounding with intent, what is required is a
direct or oblique intent to cause a criminal result; this is also required where the
definition of the offence calls for a further intent as to a particular thing, 'ulterior
intention.' An example of the first is murder and attempted murder; in respect of
these offences, the accused must have an intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily
harm. Theft is an example for the second, where the required mens rea is the
obtaining of the thing dishonestly and with an intention of permanently depriving
another person of his property.
At this stage, the question is, what does intention means? Direct intention means: 'a
•3
decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused's power.' This is to say
the intention is direct when the accused's main aim is to achieve the result; he desires
its occurrence, which suggests that the result is his purpose. However, when the
accused wants a particular thing to occur but realises that another thing virtually
certainly will occur, although it may not be desired, there should be a form of
intention. A well-known example is where D places a bomb in a plane to damage the
cargo while the plane is in the air. Here he has foresight of the fact that it is virtually
certain that this will cause loss of life. This is an oblique intention on D's part, but he
may still be charged with murder. However, oblique intent is not intention in itself,
1 Intention is not defined by any statute and its meaning is taken from case law. However, there is
doubt that case law has clarified the meaning. See: Williams, G., Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed.
1983), London: Stevens and Sons. p. 51; Card, R., Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (13th ed.
1995), London: Butterworths. pp. 62-63.
2 Section 1(1) ofTheft and Related Offences (1968).
3
Hyam v. D.P.P. [1974] 2 All ER 41 at 52; Mohan [1975] 2 All ER 193 at 200.Cf Steane [1947] K.B.
997; [1947] All ER818.
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but it is an evidence of intention and it is for the jury to decide whether there has
actually been intention).4 Although this type ofmens rea was designated to murder it
was assumed that it covered other crimes of specific intention." By contrast, the
English Draft Criminal Code of 1989 in defining intention, in cl. 18, indicates:
"A person acts...b) intentionally with respect to 'i' a circumstance when he
hopes or known that it exists or will exist; 'ii' a result when he acts either in
order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course
of events;"6
Thus, intention under the Draft Code is direct intention which is purpose, and oblique
intent, as a separate type of intention, established when a defendant is aware that the
offence will occur in the 'ordinary course of events' (a term used by the drafters to
denotes knowledge of virtual certainty as mentioned). Possibly the only distinction is
that the Draft Code proposed that oblique intention (knowledge of virtual certainty)
4
See, for this meaning, the following decisions of the crime of murder: In Moloney (1985) AC 905,
the House of Lords held that judges should not define intention beyond the term purpose.
Exceptionally the jury should be directed to decide whether the defendant contemplated the prohibited
result as a natural consequence in order to infer intention from his action. The case established that
foresight of a consequence might be an evidence of intention but the problem was that the term
'natural consequence' was left undefined and that caused concerns that it might combine recklessness
with criminal intention. However, the House of Lords in Hancock and Shankland (1986) AC 455,
overruled the above decision, in relation to test of 'natural consequence', stressing that when
considering the evidence of intent, the greater the probability of a consequence, the more likely that it
was foreseen and therefore intended. Again the House of Lords did not solve the dilemma of the
meaning of oblique intention and how the jury should be directed. In Nedrick (1986) 3 All ER. 1;
[1986] 83 Cr. App. Rep. 267, the Court of Appeal stated that 'a result is intended: a) when it is the
actor's purpose, b) a court or jury may also infer that a result is intended, though not desired when 1)
the result is a virtually certain consequence of that act and 2) the actor knows that it is a virtually
certain consequence'. R. Card suggest, that according to the above decisions, in certain crimes an
inference of intention may not be drawn, when the offence require specific purpose such as offences
under s. 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 'entering a prohibit area with intent to prejudicial to the
safety or the interest of the State' and also in blackmail. Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., pp.
68-69. This suggest that leading law commentators believed that oblique intention, as stated by the
above cases of murder, is applied to most crimes. However, as I shall examine below, the House of
Lords in Woollin decided otherwise by restricting the above type of oblique intention to the crime of
murder.
3
Interpretation of Moloney and Nedrick by Smith J.C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (18th ed.
1996), London: Butterworths. p. 63, and the drafters of the Law Commission Report No. 177,
Criminal Law: A Criminal Code For England And Wales (1989). Vol. 2 pp. 192-3; Card, R., Criminal
Law (1995), op. cit., pp. 68-69.
6 cl. 18, Draft Criminal Code 1989, Vol. 1 p. 51.
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should be a class on its own rather than being an evidence of intention.7 However, in
1998 the House of Lords in Woollin, although approving the decisions of Hancock
and Shankland and Nedrick, declared that the notion of oblique intent, as said by the
above cases, is only relevant to the crime of murder which means that this type of
oblique intent is not a form of intention in other intentional crimes.8
b) Basic intention:9 A crime of basic intention is one in which the mens rea
can be located either in intention or recklessness. In such cases, the prosecution's
task of proving the accused's mental state is easier than in cases where specific
intention is required. Examples of these crimes are unlawful wounding, common
assault, criminal damages and, rape.
The concept of recklessness10 is divided into two categories: subjective and
objective; both mould the notion of taking unjustified risk.11 The higher level is
subjective, which occurs when a person realises risk that a certain consequence may
possibly result from his action but he still carries on with his action. The lower level
7 The team of the Draft Criminal Code 1989 stressed that "a person awareness of any degree of
probability (short of virtual certainty) that a particular result will follow from his acts ought not, we
believe, to classed as 'intention' to cause that result for criminal law purposes...Liability based on the
awareness of a probable result can be provided for by casting the offence in terms of recklessnes."
Vol. 2 pp. 192-3.
8
R v. Woollin [1999] AC 92; [1998] 4 All ER 103. The House of Lords approved the decisions of
Hancock, Shankland, and Nedrick in relation to oblique intention adding that the jury are entitled to
find rather than infer intention from foresight of virtual certainty. Lord Steyn Woollin [1998] 4 All ER
103 at 107-108. Wilson, W., "Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin" [1999] 62 Modern Law Review 448
at 462; Ashworth, A., PCL (1999), op. cit., pp. 180, 182, 269; Childs, P., Nutcases: Criminal Law (2nd
ed. 1999), London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 17.
9 See the judgement of Lord Simon in D P.P. v. Morgan [1975] 2 All ER 347 at 363.
10 The English Draft Criminal Code defines recklessness in cl. 18, (c) as: "A person acts... b)
'recklessly' with respect to: (i) a circumstance, when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist,
and (ii) a result when he aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is in the circumstance known to him,
unreasonable to take the risk..." See Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 72.
11 Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 71.
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is objective, which occurs when a person fails to think about the possibilities of there
being a risk. However, he may be convicted if a reasonable man would have foreseen
that there was a risk in the circumstances.
c) Cunningham Recklessness: this subjective standard of liability operates
in most recklessness offences. The standard of subjective culpability was set out in R
v. Cunningham (1957).12 In this case, the defendant broke a gas meter to steal the
money it contained, and the gas escaped into the house next door and endangered
life. The charge was framed under s. 23 of the Offences Against The Persons Act for
1861 'maliciously administering a noxious thing so as to endanger life.' The
accused's conviction was quashed because of a misdirection by the trial judge as to
the meaning of the word 'maliciously', the court saying that it meant intentionally or
recklessly, which was not the accused's state ofmind during the commission of the
offence. In order to be convicted, the accused must contemplate that a particular
result might occur and nevertheless take the risk.
d) Caldwell Recklessness: this objective test, which is easier to prove, is
13derived from R v. Caldwell (1982). Here the accused started a fire at his ex-
employer's hotel, thereby causing some damage. He was charged with criminal
damage according to the Criminal Damage Act, an offence that requires basic
intention. The House of Lords held that the accused was careless as to whether he
damaged the property if he created a risk of damage which would have been obvious
12
Cunningham [1975] 2 Q.B. 396; [1957] 2 All ER412; [1957] 41 Cr. App. Rep. 155.
13 Caldwell [1982] AC 341; [1981] 1 All ER 961; Lawrence [1982] 2 AC 510, [1981] 1 All ER 974.
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to an ordinary person, and either did not give any thought to the possibilities of any
such risk when he carried out his action, or he did recognise that there was a risk and
nonetheless he took it.
In fact, failing to see any risk involved in an action should not constitute the basis of
liability because the phrase mens rea refers to the state of mind expressly or
implicitly required by the definition of the offence.'4 However, the authority of
Caldwell created a new concept in English criminal law which was more open than
the Cunningham test. The major element in this objective test is that the accused
need not have seen that there is a risk which could possibly occur; it is enough that
the risk was obvious to a reasonable man. The place for this test is in offences such
as dangerous driving or criminal damage.1" This standard of liability gives rise some
difficulties, such as to which type of recklessness to apply in basic intention offences.
It is also a narrowing of the concept of recklessness to negligence. The latter is a tort
law concept adopted by the criminal law to cover the presumed mens rea of some
offences, where the accused breaches a duty of care he owes when performing an
action which a reasonable man would not do. This applies particularly in motoring
offences; the only common law crime which applies gross negligence is
manslaughter.16
14 Caldwell type was applied by the House of Lords in involuntary manslaughter in Seymour [1983] 2
AC 493, [1983] 2 All ER 1058. The Court in this case suggested that this objective test should be
applied on all other offences of recklessness. However, the decision was overruled in 1994 by the
House of Lords in Adomako [1994] 3 All ER 79.
15 It is not exactly clear which other offences that apply this objective test. See Elliot, C & Quinn, F.,
Criminal Law (3rd ed. 2000), Longman, pp. 14-21.
16 McCall Smith, R.A. & Sheldon, D., Scots Criminal Law (1992), Edinburgh: Butterworths. pp. 39-
40. The terminology used by the F.P.C. dealing with the concept of fault covers the three:
Cunningham, Caldwell and negligence. It would be odd and incoherent if adopted in the mens rea
requirements of accessorial liability. I shall discuss later that this remains a possibility in the UAE. At
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(B) The required mens rea for accessorial liability:
What is the required mens rea?
Many questions arise in this connection and all are directed to one single idea,
namely how strong is the accessorial mens rea regarding the commission of the
principal offence? Thus, it might be asked: does English law require a coincidence of
state of mind between accomplices? In other words, must accessories act like
perpetrators with a similar state of mind in relation to the offence? Others can
understand the question as: does English law require higher degree of mens rea in
relation to accessories as in the case of intention? This issue has important
implications because the issue of mens rea is the vital element in deciding the
boundaries of accessorial liability.
There are conflicting arguments; some say that there must be a purpose to
participate. Others give purposes a wider meaning, and a third group supports the
idea that complicity by encouragement requires purpose whereas complicity by
assistance requires only knowledge.17 This is one of the grey areas of the law of
this stage, it is necessary to mention that English law contains some crimes that can be committed
without a mens rea based on 'the doctrine of absolute liability'. This concept is an exception to the
principle: 'actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea' which means the act is not criminal unless the mind
is guilty, a form of responsibility that Arabic jurisprudence does not adopt especially in the UAE. The
mens rea in the F.P.C. is always either intention or fault but there is no absolute liability. In strict
liability offences the accused's guilt is based on the commission of the actus reus alone; there is no
need to prove a guilty mind and even if the accused has taken every care to avoid committing the
offence, he is still held responsible.
17 Debate about this matter between Sullivan, G.R., "Intent, Purpose and Complicity"[1988] Crim. LR
641, [1989] Crim. LR 166, where he thinks that intention in complicity has a wider sense and does not
relate to purpose; and Dennis, I.H., "Intention and Complicity: a reply" [1988] Crim. LR 649, [1989]
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criminal complicity, as it appears that there is uncertainty regarding the issue ofmens
rea; case law and commentators differ on this point.
Accessorial liability is subjective in nature, that is to say, an accessory must
contemplate the carrying out by a perpetrator of the offence. When the accessory
does not contemplate commission of the offence, even where an ordinary person
would contemplate this, then, there is no liability for complicity. As the general ran
of cases and academic commentators shows, accessorial liability involves three
notions: intention, indifference, and knowledge.
The general run of complicity cases and some commentators indicate that accessories
must have acted intentionally. However, these tend not to discuss what is meant by
intention. Does the case law then assume a general concept of criminal intention?
Has intention in complicity a special meaning? There is no clear answer to this, and
it is therefore necessary to examine the meaning of intention as it is applied
1 8
elsewhere in criminal law.
Intention is regarded as the most culpable state of mind in the criminal law, and
indeed some serious crimes can only be committed intentionally. One might think
that this fundamental issue of liability would have been settled a long time ago but
Crim. LR 168, where he argues in favour of purpose in both complicity by influence or encouragement
and by assistance; also see Duff, R. A., "Can I help you? Accessorial liability and the Intention to
Assist" (1990) 10 Legal Studies 165; Williams, G., "Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code" [1990]
Crim. LR 4 and 98, where he argues in favour of purpose in encouragement and a modified foresight
in assistance.
18
Cf. R v. Powell; R v. English and Others [1998] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 261; [1997] 4 All ER 545. The
House of Lords strangely decided that the general concept of criminal intention as it is found in the
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this is not the case. That is to say, there is still uncertainty regarding some aspects of
intention in criminal law. The core meaning of intention is purpose,19 which is the
reason a person has for his action.
It appears that purpose is the major element which distinguishes intention from
subjective recklessness, because both tests of liability share the subjective standard
of blameworthiness. In other words, in both areas the accused must contemplate the
criminal result, which may result from his action. For example, A and B, on two
different occasions commit the same action (driving at high speed along a city street)
and cause the death of two persons. The court, however, convicts A of manslaughter
and B of murder. In this example the two accused have deliberately performed acts,
but only one of them B has done it with a state of mind which amounts to more than
the mere contemplation of the result. What is the basis of the distinction between
these two cases? It is likely to be purpose. The court in this hypothetical example
might find that B had threatened the victim with death or that he wanted his death for
some reason. That is to say, he acted purposely, whereas A did not have purpose to
kill.
Some would argue that intention does not relate to purpose, that it relates to reasons
for acting. (A person may do thing for no reason, such as dropping an object with no
purpose). A person may act intentionally for several reasons. For example A may kill
leading cases such as Hancock; and Nedrick do not govern the issue of mens rea in accessorial
liability. See chapter 4, pp. 235-243.
19
Smith, J.C Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p.57; Ashworth, A., "Criminal Liability in a Medical
Context: the Treatment of Good Intentions", in Simester, A. and Smith, A.T.H., (eds.) Harm and
Culpability (1996), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 179.
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his mother, not because he wants the death of his mother in itself, but because he
wants to inherit form her as quickly as possible. Should the killing itself amount to
purpose? It might be explanations for such action, but the criminal law is interested
in only one reason for that action. This reason is stated in the definition of the
offence; in the previous example the killing is the purpose because the task is not to
ask with what intention or reason the accused commits the action but whether one
particular legally relevant intention is present when the act is committed.
In R v. Walker (1989), a case of attempted murder, the Court of Appeal deals with
the issue directly when it says:
"Trying to kill was synonymous of purpose, and it had never been suggested
20that a man did not intend what he was trying to achieve."
The difficulty in this case only arose where he brought about a result, which he was
not trying to achieve. It appears that this judicial opinion follows the same line as
does the judgement ofMohan (1976), which indicates that the core of the concept of
• 21 • •intention is purpose. However, in some situations purpose cannot be proved and the
amount of thought directed by the accused to the result is very high. For example, a
person acts with purpose to do X, foreseeing that it is virtually certain that a side
effect Y will result. Is Y intended? The narrow sense of purpose that implies a choice
to bring an end to the action or as means to that end does not cover such a situation
or those actions that are wanted for themselves. For example, A wants to collect the
insurance taken out in respect of his property carried by an airline from London to
Boston. He times a bomb to explode while the plane is over the ocean, knowing that
112
it is virtually certain to kill the passengers. Should this amount to intention? Or
should it be regarded as recklessness? Commentators in this area are divided. For
example, Anthony Duff says:
"The persisting confusion over whether intention should in law encompass an
action's morally certain side-effects reflects a failure to distinguish these two
aspects of intention. The concept of intention both does and does not
encompass such side effect: it does, in that they are brought about
intentionally; it does not, in that the agent does not act with the intention of
22
bringing them about."
He does not consider side effects to be the same as intention, but he agrees that the
degree of foresight brings it more close to the concept of intention rather than
recklessness. Glanville Williams doubts this view and suggests that it confuse the
ordinary meaning of intention. He adopts purpose and foresight of the result being
virtually certain as intention. Both views agree that when the accused contemplates
certain harm as being more likely to happen, this contemplation points more to
intention than recklessness.
The courts' attitude to the adoption of a narrow or border concept of intention varies.
Cases like Steane (1947),24 and Gillick (1986)2;> consider intention in the context of
purpose and cases such as Smith (I960)26 and Chandler (1964)27 accept the wider
20 Walker [1989] 90 Cr. App. Rep. 226; (1990) Crim. LR 44.
21 Mohan [1976] Q.B. 1.
22
Duff, R. A., Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), Oxford: Blackwell. p. 80.
2j
Williams, G., "Oblique Intent" [1987] Cambridge Law Journal p. 417.
24 Steane [1947] K.B. 997.
25 Gillick [1986] AC 112.
26 Smith [1960] 2 Q.B. 423.
27 Chandler [1964] 1 AC 763.
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concept. In Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1975) the House of Lords
said that foresight of high probability of grievous bodily harm (GBH) satisfies the
29
mens rea of murder. However, in Moloney (1985) the House of Lords abandoned
the test introduced in Hyam, and required a higher degree of contemplation than in
Hyam. The authorities of Moloney, Hancok and Shankland (1986) and the Court of
Appeal in R v. Nedrick (1986) indicate that intention in criminal law will normally
require purpose or a court or jury may infer intention without doubt when the result
virtually is certain consequence of the act and the accused knows that. The courts
emphasise that knowledge here is only evidence of intention and it is not intention in
itself.30
It is true that one cannot enter into the accused's mind at the time he commits the
crime; it is required to find his intention from the surrounding circumstances.
However, what is meant by the statement that a result is certain to follow? There is
an argument that someone who accepts a risk of death amounting to virtual certainty
comes very close to a person who chooses the victim's death as a means to an end.
One might argue that there is no doubt that the bomb will kill, the only doubt is as to
how many will be killed. However, the meaning of the term virtual certainty is open
to debate. Let us suppose that in the bomb example, the bomber times the bomb to
28
Hyam v. D.P.P. [1975] AC 55. The degree of foresight brings intention close to recklessness
because there is still a doubt in the accused's mind of the result occurrence, see Ashworth, A., PCL
op. cit., pp. 174 - 175.
29
Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 905.
j0
Supra, footnotes 4, 5, and 8. This test can be used, by reference to English case law, to decide the
required mens rea of accessorial liability. However, the House of Lords recently narrowed such
suggestion by declaring in Powel; English (1997) that the above decisions ofHancock and Shankland
and Nedrick, on oblique intention, are not applied in accessorial liability, and finally in Woollin (1998)
by declaring that oblique intention, as in the above two cases, is only applied in deciding the required
mens rea for the crime ofmurder.
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explode before the plane takes off or designs the bomb itself in such a way as to
cause minor damage only. Does he contemplates the result as certain to happen?
Alternatively, let us imagine that he places the bomb on a military plane, knowing
that every one will use a parachute to escape death. Would it be true to say that the
bomber still contemplates the death as being virtually certain to happen?
If we apply to these examples the test applied in Hyam, namely that of the
contemplation of probabilities, then the placing of the bomb may be regarded as
amounting to an intention to kill. Under Hancok and Shankland and Nedrick,
however, the test is different and one has to ask: was the occurrence of death a virtual
certainty? But how can the court or jury measure the degree of certainty? This is a
difficult question with no clear answer. If the jury asks the judge for directions, what
kind of explanation might he give to assist the jury's inquiry into intention?31
Scottish criminal law try to avoid the problem of oblique intention by introducing the
term wicked recklessness as an alternative and sufficient mens rea for murder. This
term distinguishes extreme recklessness from simple recklessness. In other words,
31 Note that the term used is 'virtually' which means: almost; very nearly, and this is easier to be
estimated than 'absolute certainty' from the evidence of each case. Longman Dictionary of
Contemporary English (1992), England: Longman, p. 1175. By contrast, s.8 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1967 indicates that it is not bound in law to infer intention from foreseeing a result of being a
natural and probable consequence of the accused's action but reference should be made to all
evidence. This provision confirms the subjective nature of intention, and overrules the judgement of
Smith (1960) which ruled that in order to prove intention by the jury, inference should be based on the
test of reasonable man with no need to prove that the accused foresaw the result
See Gordon. G., Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd ed. 1978) Edinburgh, pp. 736-41; Jones, T.H. &
Christie, M.G.A., Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1996), Edinburgh: W. Green/Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 209-213.
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the distinction gives more weight to the gravity of the accused's conduct and
equiparates unintentional killing with intentional killing.33
As has been pointed out, the term intention (dealing with accessorial liability) has not
been defined in previous cases, and this leaves an element of doubt around this
central concept of criminal liability, and does not satisfy the requirement of certainty
in defining essential issues of liability. A requirement of purpose in complicity would
suggest that the accessory wants the crime to be committed. In the example of
murder as a crime of intention, when both the peipetrator and the accessory perform
their acts, they act in concert; there is unity both in their aim and in the result they
want to occur. The victim's death is their final goal; each will act towards it and this
mental state is what links them. They want the death of the victim and do their best
that it should be brought about.
Since accessorial liability depends on the perpetrator's liability, and because in
English law there is no need to prove a casual link between the accessory's action
and the result of the perpetrator's action, should this indicate that the accessory must
act purposefully? In other words, should he share the same state of mind as the
accused?
Some complicity cases suggest that there must be purpose on the accessory's part.
An example of this is Fretwell (1862) a nineteenth-century case.34 The defendant's
pregnant friend had threatened to commit suicide unless he brought her an
33
Ashworth, PCL (1995), op. cit,. pp. 262-263.
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abortifacient. He unwillingly supplied this and hoped that she would not use it.
Unfortunately, the substance killed her while she was using it and the accused was
charged with being an accessory to common law self-murder. It was held, however,
that the accused was not liable for this offence because he was unwilling that the
woman should take the substance.3? This case has been portrayed as making a
distinction between indifference and unwillingness, but there is uncertainty as to
whether the case actually did this.36 However, it appears that intention here has a
narrow meaning, which is that of purpose. That is to say, the accused did not have a
purpose to kill. This would lead us to conclude that there is a requirement that an
accomplice should act with a similar state ofmind to that of the principal offender.
In Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985), (a civil case),
the House of Lords held that a doctor who gives advice to a girl under 16 in her best
interests, while realising that this might facilitate acts of unlawful sexual intercourse,
should not be guilty of offence under Section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 of
aiding and abetting a girl under 16 to commit unlawful sexual intercourse.37
Lord Scarman said:
"The adjective "clinical" emphasises that it must be a medical judgement
based on what he [the doctor] believes to be necessary for the physical,
mental and emotional health of his patient. The bona fide exercise by a doctor
of his clinical judgement must be a complete negation of the guilty mind
,4 Fretwell [1862] Le & Ca 161.
35 ibid. In Gamble (1959) Devlin J cited Fretwell without disapproval for the proposition that 'proof
that the article was knowingly supplied is not conclusive evidence of intent to aid.' See Dennis I.H.,
"The Mental Element for Accessories" in Smith, P., (ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C.
Smith (1987), London: Butterworths. p. 40 at p. 52. Should this suggest the requirement of assent or
approval from the accessory to the commission of the principal offence?
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 139.
37 Gillick [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 All ER 402.
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which is an essential ingredient of the criminal offence of aiding and abetting
-50
the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse."
It is clear from this that the Court excluded the doctor from criminal liability because
he did not have an intention to aid and abet even though his prescribing advice could
be foreseen as virtually certain to assist the commission of an offence.39 It was not
his purpose to influence or assist the unlawful intercourse. This case appears to adopt
a narrow meaning of intention, as does Fretwell.40 On one view, the case law
suggests that intention in complicity refers to purpose, but other cases point in the
opposite direction. Fretwell and Gillick, both take the same line as the UAE
approach, which requires that often there should be a similar state of mind shared by
accomplices. However, does this indicate that English law and UAE law are in
overall harmony in this area?
In R v. Clarke (1984),41 the accused aided and abetted a burglary with the intention
of assisting the police by passing to them information about the other parties and thus
enabling the stolen goods to be regained. However, he was charged as an accessory
to the crime, and the trial judge directed the jury to convict the accused of voluntary
participation on the basis of his knowledge of the circumstances of the offence. On
38
Smith, J.C. & Hogan, B., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, (6th ed. 1996)
London: Butterworths. pp. 306-307. Only Lord Brandon thought that contraceptive advice is always
unlawful because it encourages the offence; this view takes the same line of Gamble, unless there is a
defence which has not been mentioned in the express judgements.
39
Ashworth, A., PLC (1995), op. cit., p. 173.
40 See for the same meaning in Smith, K.J., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity
(1991), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p .148 at note 31; Smith J.C., Criminal Law (1986), op. cit.,
pp. 60,137, 253, where he considers Gillick's effects as a defence of necessity. However, the above
statement of Lord Scarman is an objection to such a defence. See Smith K., MTLCC op. cit., p. 148 at
note 35; and also Williams G., "Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code" op. cit., p. 15.
41 R v. Clarke [1984] 80 Cr. App. Rep. 344; [1985] Crim. LR 209; R v. Anderson [1986] AC 27.
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appeal, it was held that the defence should have been left to the jury to decide.42
Unlike the previous cases, this case suggests that accessories can be found guilty
even when they do not share the perpetrator's state ofmind.
The first English case to discus the mens rea problem in this area was N.C.B. v.
Gamble (1959),43 a turning point in the law of complicity. The offender M, a lorry
driver, took his lorry to the National Coal Board premises, where it was filled with
coal. He then drove to the weightbridge. The operator H weighed the lorry and told
M that the load was excessive. M said that he would take the risk and took the
weightbridge ticket from H. and left. He was stopped by the police on the road and
was charged as a principal in the offence under the Motor Vehicles (Construction and
Use) Regulations 1955. The NCB was convicted under the vicarious liability
principle as an accessory to the principal's offence committed by their employee H.
This case suggests that complicity does not require anything beyond mere
indifference, even if the court actually used the term intention to describe the
accomplices' state of mind. The employee may not have intended to help M to
commit the offence. Only after he had committed his action of assistance, he was
aware of the risk that was involved in that action. Not surprisingly, this case has
given broader meaning to the mens rea requirement and has been described as
ambiguous and conflicting case.
42 Dennis I.H., "The Mental Element for Accessories" op. cit., p.53.
43 National Coal Board v. Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B.I 1.
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The most significant principle stated in Gamble for our current examination is that
the accessory does not have to share the perpetrator's purpose as to the result; Devlin
J said:
"An indifference to the result of the crime does not itself negative abetting; if
one man deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for murdering a third;
he may be indifferent about whether the third lives or dies and interested only
in the cash profit to be made out of the sale, but he can be still an aider and
abettor."44
At this early stage it should be noted that under accessorial liability applied in the
UAE, it might be true to say that the hypothetical example of the seller in Gamble is
outside the scope of the complicity provisions, where often there must be sharing of
purpose to the criminal result that both are needing its occurrence. English law in this
respect has a much wider notion of mens rea and the accessory does not have a
purpose to the result. However, a later view expressed in the case of Gamble in the
same judgement complicated the situation:
"to hold otherwise [i.e., that the mens rea require purpose] would be to
negative the rule that mens rea is a matter of intent only and does not depend
on desire or motive. "45
Moreover, the judge also said:
"Proof that the article was knowingly supplied is not conclusive evidence of
intent to aid. But prima facie... a man is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts...and it is always open to the defendant
...to give evidence of his real intention, but in this case the defendant called
no evidence."46
44 Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B. 11 at 23.
45 ibid. p. 23.
46 ibid. p. 20.
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Strangely, these later views of Devlin J requiring intention never appeared in the
hypothetical example of the gun seller. One commentator47 points out that what
Devlin J may have meant by intention is an act that is done voluntarily, although this
interpretation is undermined by the requirement of proof of the real intention, and it
seems that unwillingness or a lack of desire for the perpetrator's offence negates
mens rea. This conflicts, however, with the hypothetical example of the gun seller,
which follows the opposite view.
Another leading commentator has questioned the judicial approach in Gamble to
intention in complicity, Glanville Williams states that the term intention means more
than knowledge: could it mean the accessory's own purpose? How can the accessory
escape conviction? What kind of evidence must he put before the court? Why is it
40
upon the accessory, not the prosecution, to prove the real intention? These are the
weakest points in Gamble that are not answered by the decision, although it has been
taken as authority for the proposition that motive is immaterial to complicity.49 One
major point in Gamble is that accessories do not need to share the main actor's mens
rea; indifference to the criminal result is enough. Furthermore, it departs from
previous judgements, which implicitly require some connection between the minds
of accomplices, which implies intention.
47
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 144.
48
Williams, G., TBCL op. cit., p.342; "Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code" op. cit., op. cit., pp.
15-16.
49
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 145.
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Another case, which takes a similar line to the judgement in Gamble, is D.P.P. for
Northern Ireland v. Lynch (1975).50 The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an
appeal against conviction ofmurder as an aider and abettor. The accused, L, argued
that he had a defence of duress when he was ordered by a gunman to drive him and
others to a place where they intended to kill a policeman. The gunman was known to
be extremely violent and said to L that it would be dangerous to disobey him. L
believed that he would be killed if he refused to drive them, which he did, remaining
in the car until they finished the task and then driving them away. It was held in this
case that a person who knows of another's criminal purpose and voluntarily aids him
in it can be held to have aided that offence even if he had regretted the plan or was
horrified by it, he is still aider and abettor.5 xLynch has been taken to indicate that
knowledge is sufficient for conviction of complicity.
The conflicting authorities of Gamble and Gillick have divided opinion as to the
ground of mens rea in complicity, whereas in Gamble, apart from Lord Devlin's
commentary on intention, it seems that knowledge of what the perpetrator is about to
do is sufficient. However, in Gillick, the majority of the House of Lords accepted a
narrow interpretation of the word purpose.
r o
In Blakely and Sutton v. Chief Constable of West Mercia (1991), D1 and D2 had
laced B's soft drink with vodka intending him to stay the night with D1 instead of
50
Lynch [1975] AC 653, [1975] 1 All ER 913.
51 ibid.
52 See the three-way debate of Sullivan, Dennis, and Williams in Crim. LR. 1988; 1989; 1990 op. cit.,
at footnote 17.
53
Blakely & Sutton [1991] RTP 405; [1991] Crim. LR. 763.
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going home to his wife. Both of them intended to tell him about the drink before he
left, but B left before they could do so. B was convicted of driving with excess
alcohol in his blood. D1 and D2 were charged with procuring B's offence but their
convictions were quashed. The Divisional Court said that it is sufficient for other
forms of complicity, but not for procuring, that the defendant contemplated his act
would or might bring about or assist the commission of the perpetrator's offence.
As has been seen, the main requirement of Cunningham recklessness is subjective.
This could be a turning point in the law of criminal complicity,34 which rejects the
suggestion made by some commentators that mere recklessness is not enough and
there must be intention.55 If Blakely and Sutton following the decision of Gamble is
widely applied, it embraces the conduct of those who act without sharing the main
perpetrator's purpose, and would be bringing 'innocent activities' within the net of
criminal complicity. Can it be said after all that the issue of mens rea regarding
accessorial liability is settled? In other words, what term constitutes the minimum
requirement of mens rea in accessorial liability? This question will be addressed
below.
54 Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit., p.424; Card, Criminal Law (1995) op. cit., p. 558.
35
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit. p.138; Williams, G., TBCL op. cit., p. 336.. The English
Law Commission suggests that subjective recklessness is insufficient and that actual knowledge is
required. This was suggested to not bring those who act in ordinary course of business within the net
of criminal complicity. See: Law Commission Working Paper No. 43, Parties, Complicity and
Liability for the Act ofAnother (1972). p. 49. By comparison, negligence is inadequate to be applied
in the mens rea of accessorial liability. An example is provided by Callow v. Tillstone [1900] 83 LT
411. D1 was a veterinary surgeon who had examined a carcass and negligently certified it as sound to
D2. D2 was charged with selling unfit food, a strict liability offence. Dl's liability as accessory to that
offence was quashed because mere negligence is not a sufficient mens rea for accessorial liability.
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Intention v. 'Knowledge or Recklessness':
Essentially, the English theory of criminal complicity holds that accessorial liability
only requires basic mens rea, there being no need to share the perpetrator's state of
mind.56 However, this interpretation is not undisputed, and the question as to what is
the correct mens rea of accessorial liability under English law is a crucial one still
requires to be definitively addressed.
Many commentators share the view that accessorial liability requires intentional
assistance or encouragement, and that intention in this regard is not related to the
57
concept of purpose, but is rather connected to knowledge. Thus, knowledge is
sufficient to establish accessorial guilt. In this sense, therefore, mens rea signifies
only that the accessory intends to perform his action and knows that what he does is
capable of assisting or encouraging the commission of the crime. However, this is
problematic because intention itself requires that either purpose, or oblique intent be
established, that is, that the actor contemplates the occurrence of the crime to be
virtually certain. (According to the Draft Criminal Code and case law before
56
Smith, K. MTLCC, op. cit., p. 153; Williams, G., TBCL op. cit., p.340; Gillies, P., The Law of
Criminal Complicity (1980), Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd. p. 58.
57 See below.
38
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p.137; "Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law
Reform" (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 453 pp. 454-463, J.C. Smith indicates that for basic accessory liability
(original or first crime), which is based on intentional assistance or encouragement, contemplation is
enough, while for parasitic accessory liability (additional crime), he suggest that the House of Lords
should adopt intention, purpose or knowledge of certainty, as the adequate mens rea. This appears to
be unusual statement because it seems that the opposite should be suggested. Moreover, it should be
noted that in Buxton, R. J., "Complicity in the Criminal Code" (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 252; Ashworth PCL
(1995), op. cit., p. 423; Card, Criminal Law op. cit., p. 558; Curzon, L.B., Criminal Law (8th ed. 1997)
M&E Pitman Publishing, p. 63; The 1989 English Draft Code in cl. 72(1), all suggest a distinction
between consequences and circumstances, requiring intention to the consequences and knowledge to
the circumstances. However, two questions arise: Why there is no such distinction linked to the
liability of the principal offender by reference to this distinction? Is there any clear distinction
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Woollin). These two concepts are fundamental to any discussion of the concept of
criminal intention. Many commentators have, however, suggested that an accessory
can satisfy the criteria for mens rea even in the absence of proof of purpose or
knowledge of the existence of a certainty. Such a view ignores the simple
requirement that intending an action is a necessary element in both intention and
fault (subjective recklessness); and this sometimes referred to as voluntarily or wilful
action. Consequently, the distinction between intention on the one hand and
knowledge or recklessness on the other ought to be related to the outcome. Thus, if
the defendant's purpose is that the crime should be committed, or he has knowledge,
based on virtual certainty, of its future occurrence, then intention is present.
Otherwise, it is a matter of fault or recklessness. It is possible that the majority of
English commentators are not concerned with this fundamental and important
difference and consequently take a contrary view of accessorial liability. However,
their position on intention changes in the context of the liability of the principal
offender, where they hold that intention is constituted by purpose and oblique intent.
Why is intention treated differently? Is there any such distinction? If accessorial
intention is not inferred from the general theory of criminal intention, how can one
call it intention? Even the House of Lords failed to address this question in Powell;
English in 1997, declaring, rather, that the general theory of intention is related to
principal offenders only and not to their secondary parties.59 Why has this issue not
been resolved? In fact, there is no obvious reason why English law is hesitant in
providing an answer to this anomaly. Accordingly, one cannot continue the analysis
between consequences and circumstances in a criminal offence? There is no clear answer to both of
these.
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of intention under accessorial liability unless it can be more clearly defined.
Therefore, I might at this stage conclude that the mens rea of accessorial liability lies
elsewhere.
R. A. Duff, for example, points to two possible explanations for such disharmony
regarding the concept of intention in the context of the aiding of crimes.60 Firstly,
English courts seem to be unwilling to make full use of the defences of duress and
necessity, acquitting defendants by manipulating the concept of intention, as in
Fretwell and Stean, or, in a civil context, in Gillick. Secondly, since there is no
recognition of a lesser offence of 'facilitating crime' under English law; a heavy
burden is taken on by the courts of either acquitting accessories who only facilitate
the principal crimes or of convicting them notwithstanding the triviality of their
actions. As it is understood from the general run of cases, English law in this regard
favours a conviction. A supportive view of this is found in Giannetto (1996).61 The
defendant was charged with the murder of his wife, and the jury asked the judge
about what the law requires to establish accessorial liability. The judge explained if
someone told Giannetto 'I am going to kill your wife' and the husband answered by
patting him on the back, saying 'oh goody', the husband is an accessory to murder.62
This clearly indicates that any degree of assistance or encouragement if sufficient for
conviction.
59 R v. Powell; R v. English [1998] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 261; [1997] 4 All ER 545. A full discussion of this
case is in chapter 4, pp. 234-242.
60
Duff, R. A., "Can I help you?" op. cit., pp. 167-8.
61 Giannetto [1996] Crime L.R. 722; [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1.
62
Smith, J. C., "Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., at 454.
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Duff suggests that conviction for assisting crimes should be connected to the concept
of purpose and that a new offence of facilitating crimes should be created to embody
the activities of persons who knowingly facilitate the commission of crimes.63 This is
an interesting suggestion for the English Law Commission to discuss, especially in
relation to some dangerous activities, but, in the meantime, if the courts continue
using the misleading definition of intentional assistance and encouragement, they
have, first of all, to discuss the essence of intention in accessorial liability.
Consequently, if the courts cannot find a clear and distinguishable answer to this,
they have to expressly use the concepts of knowledge or recklessness to establish the
required mens rea of accessories.
Many conflicting views have been expressed on the issue of accessorial mens rea
under English law, but most of them have merely resulted in further doubt and
uncertainty, (which in fact is a difficulty in the case law in this area). However, as
mentioned above, discussions of criminal intention regarding accessorial liability
tend to be conflicting. This view is supported by two cases: by the House of Lords in
Powell; English (1997) where it was declared that intention, according to Moloney
and Nedrick, which was supposed to deal with general issues of mens rea, is not
applicable to the issue of accessorial mens rea; and also by the judgements in Blakely
and Sutton and Gamble, which indicate that criminal intention is not the minimum
requirement of accessorial liability and that probably the current mens rea for such
liability is grounded on subjective recklessness, except in the case of procurement,
which requires proof of intention.
6j
Duff, R. A., "Can I help you?" op. cit., p. 168.
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Louis Westerfield claims that Gamble attempted to divorce the concept of criminal
intent from knowledge, and that only the latter concept is sufficient to establish the
mens rea for accessorial liability. The essence of this approach is that it affords the
prosecution the power to prove accessorial liability more readily.64 The discussion of
the mental element in accessorial crime is very problematic; this was the experience
of the team which participated in drafting the English Draft Criminal Code of 1989.
For example, I. H. Dennis points that:
"It is betraying no secret to say that the code team found one of the hardest
parts of their work the drafting of the provisions dealing with parties to crime.
In particular the mental element for accessories proved an exceptionally
complex matter."65
In spite of such difficulties, perhaps the best interpretation is the simple one
presented by Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn. They state that:
"Once the prosecution have established that the secondary party did an act or
acts which could help or encourage the principal to commit the crime, they
must prove that the secondary party had the mens rea. They have to show that
the defendant knew or foresaw a risk (subjective recklessness) that the acts
and circumstances constituting the crime would exist (as always, they do not
need to know that these acts or circumstances would be a crime, because
ignorance of the law is no defence). For example, a woman who tells a man
to have sexual intercourse with another woman, knowing that he may to have
sexual intercourse with that woman, and aware of the circumstance that that
woman might not be consenting at the time, could be liable for counselling
64
Westerfield, L., "The Mens Rea requirement of Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law-
Knowledge or Intent" (1980) Missipi Law Journal, Vol. 51 June/Sept p. 155 at p. 167.
65
Dennis, I. H., "The Mental Element for Accessories", op. cit., p. 40. English Draft Criminal Code
1989, in cl. 27, indicates that: " (1) a person is guilty of an offence as an accessory if; a) he
intentionally procures, assists or encourages the act which constitutes or results in the commission of
the offence by the principal; and b) he knows of, or (where recklessness suffices in the case of the
principal) is reckless with respect to any circumstances that is an element of the offence;" I believe
that the team of the Draft Criminal Code 1989 used intention, in accessorial liability, in very broad
meaning, to blend the requirement of intention with awareness or recklessness, which follows case
law that produced uncertainty to the whole issue. I prefer that they should used cl. 18 (b) which
includes oblique intention in deciding the minimum mens rea requirement of accessorial laibility.
128
the offence of rape. For the offence of procurement, recklessness is probably
is not sufficient, and intention must be proved.
The level ofmens rea required is very low, because there is no need to prove
that the defendant had any mens rea as to the fact that he or she would be
encouraging or helping the principal. While the courts sometimes talk of
'intending' the help or encouragement, all this appears to mean in this context
is that the person acted voluntarily that he or she intended to do what he or
she did rather than he or she intended its effect on the principal."66
David Lanham supports this by indicating that accessorial liability is based on
recklessness whatever the mens rea of the substantive offence.67 I.H. Dennis, who
comments of the degree of knowledge regarding accessorial liability, also takes this
view. Fie states that:
"It is also immaterial the he (the accessory) did not regard the commission of
the offence by the principal as probable or likely provided that he realised it
was a reasonable possibility."68
Some might argue that it is not enough that the secondary party performs acts which
in fact aid or encourage the commission of the crime; it must be proved that he
intended that the crime should be committed, or was indifferent to whether it would
66
Elliot, C & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (Is' ed. 1996), Longman, pp. 155-156. Cf Halsbury's Laws of
England (4lh ed. 1990) Vol. II (I), Lord Halisham, London: Butterworths. p. 46: "A person cannot be
convicted as a secondary party unless he was aware of all the essential matters which make the act
done a crime; but he need not have known that the act amounted in law to a crime. Whether an
accused was aware of essential matter is to be decided on all the relevant evidence. He can be
adjudged to have known if he deliberately close his eyes to the circumstances. Criminal liability as a
secondary party arises by virtue of the common law; hence, mens rea is required for that party,
although the offence is one of strict liability as regards the principal. It is not enough that the
secondary party does acts which in fact aid or encourage the commission of the crime; it must be
proved that he intended that the crime should be committed or was indifferent whether it would be
committed or not. It is not necessary, however, to prove that there was a shared intention between the
secondary party and the principal. A person does not become a secondary party to a particular crime
by rendering assistance to others knowing merely that the others have some criminal objective in
view; it must be shown that he knew that the crime contemplated was the same kind or one of several
kinds as that in fact committed."
67
Lanham, D., "Accomplices and Constructive Liability" (1980) 4 Criminal Law Journal 78.
68
Dennis, I. H., "The Mental Element for Accessories", op. cit., p. 48.
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be committed or not (as was established in Gamble.) In fact, this view is erroneous,
for several reasons: the primary reason is that Gamble was a leading case that moved
the level of mens rea required for the accessorial liability to the scope of knowledge
rather than intention. The other reason is that what the above paragraph indicates is
closer to the definition of intention rather than knowledge or recklessness, especially
given that English law treats a person who shuts his eyes to the consequence of his
action as having actual knowledge, and therefore can be said to intend such a result
or consequence.69 A third reason is that what has been said above is just a continuous
misunderstanding of accessorial mens rea. The implication is that the uncertainty that
prevails in this area has moved the level of contemplation below knowledge of
certainty to something close to suspicion. Thus, such a statement does not reflect the
reality of the issue and its contradiction is reflected in the later cases of Blakely and
Sutton; Maxwell; and Chan Wing-Siu. This would seem to indicate that subjective
recklessness is the minimum requirement of accessorial liability, apart from in the
70
case ofprocurement.
69 Antonelli and Baraberi [1905] 70 JP 4; Davies Turner & Co. Ltd. v. Brodie [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1364,
[1954] 3 All E.R. 283; Thomas v. Lindop [1950] 1 All E.R. 966; Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 162 at
note 3; Devlin J. in Gamble [1959] 1 Q.B. 11 at 23.
70
Blakely and Sutton v. Chief Constable of West Mercia [1991] RTP 405; [1991] Crime LR 763;
D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140; Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985]
AC 168. It seems that such a mistake has occurred also in the discussion of American law regarding
accessorial liability. For example, Catherine Carpenter points that criminal courts indicate that the
common law link the accessorial guilt to the concept of intention, however, on the other hand, the
courts are satisfied that the guilt is not related to purpose but knowledge, which is sufficient for
conviction. Carpenter, C., "Should the Court Aid and Abet the Unintended Accomplice: The Status of
Complicity in California" (1984) Santa Clara Law Review Vol. 24, Spring 343 at 348. To avoid such
conflict the Committee On standard Jury Instruction in California suggested that: "A person aids and
abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the
crime, he aids, promotes...the commission of such crime." [The Committee On standard Jury
Instruction, Criminal, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California Jury Instruction, Criminal
3.01 (4th rev. ed 1979). Cited in Carpenter, C., ibid. p. 349.] This enabled juries to concentrate on
deciding that the defendant had knowledge of the principal having intent to commit the crime, and
similarly avoided any ineffectual arguments on requiring the accessory to have a criminal intent. By
contrast, English law did not seriously take the proposal of LC. No. 43 p. 43 in proposition 7 where it
was mentioned that: "Subject to the following paragraphs, a person is accessory to an offence by
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Knowledge of the future: what must the accessory know?
It was pointed out that English law focuses on knowledge or contemplation as the
corner stone of the mental element in relation to accessorial liability. As Glanville
Williams indicates, an accessory is responsible for crimes committed within his
purpose or within the intention of the principal offender, of which he has knowledge,
and such a matter, under English law, is for juries to decide.71 However, because of
the wider and floating mens rea of accessorial liability, this area is problematic and
raises many doubts, confusing the term 'knowledge' with other related concepts such
as suspicion, the possible occurrence of two or more crimes, or having no idea that
the principal will commit the actus reus. I shall examine, in due course, English case
law and commentary.
The focus of this section is a single enquiry, namely, how much must the accessory
know of the principal's thoughts on the commission of the crime to incur criminal
liability? English law in the past required accessories to know matters essential to the
crime. In Johnson v. Youden, Lord Goddard JC said:
"Before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of
an offence he must at least know the essential matters which constitute that
offence." 72
reason of conduct described in proposition 6 only if he: intends that the offence be committed; or
knowingly helps the commission of the offence with knowledge of the external elements of the
offence and any necessary mental state of the principal, and does not act with the purpose of
preventing the commission of the offence or of nullifying its effects." The drafters directly indicated
that the aim of this paragraph is to distinguish intention form knowledge, which suggests that only the
category of assistance minimally require knowledge that a crime will be committed.
71
Williams, G., TBCL, op. cit., p. 351; Card, R., Criminal Law (1995) op. cit., p. 561.
72 Johnson v. Youden [1950] I K.B. 544 at 546; Wilcox v. Jeffery [1950] 1 All ER 464 at 466; Davies
Turner & Co Ltd v. Brodie [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1364 at 1368.
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There is no clear evidence on what 'essential matters' means, but presumably the
Court's desire was to stress the subjective nature of contemplation and that an
accessory must have full knowledge. In other words, the accessory should act in
concert with the principal offender in bringing about the crime contemplated by both
of them.
Departing from this authority, some later cases indicate that accessorial liability does
7T
not require accessories to have full knowledge. In R v. Bainbridge, C bought on
behalf of P some oxygen-cutting equipment suspecting that it might be illegally used.
After six weeks P used the equipment in breaking into and entering a bank. On the
basis of his provision of the equipment, C was charged as an accessory to the robbery
on the allegation that he had full knowledge. Notwithstanding his insistence that he
only suspected that something might happen, he was convicted, the Judge directing
the jury said that:
"the prosecution have to prove these matters: first of all they have to prove
the felony itselfwas committed.. .Secondly, they have to prove the defendant,
this man Bainbridge, knew that a felony of that kind was intended and was
going to be committed, and with that knowledge he did something to help the
felons commit the crime. The knowledge that is required to be proved in the
mind of this man Bainbridge is not the knowledge of the precise crime. In
other words, it need not be proved he knew the Midland Bank, Stoke
Newington branch, was going to be broken and entered and money stolen
from that particular bank, but he must know the type of crime that was in fact
committed. In this case it is a breaking and entering of premises and the
stealing of property from those premises. It must be proved he knew that sort
of crime was intended and was going to be committed. It is not enough to
show that he either suspected or knew that some crime was going to be
committed, some crime which might have been a breaking and entering or
might have been disposing of stolen property or anything of that kind. That is
not enough. It must be proved he knew the type of crime which was in fact
committed was intended."74
7j
R v. Bainbridge [1960] 1 Q.B. 129.
74 ibid. pp. 132-3.
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C appealed against the conviction, alleging, inter alia, that the judge misdirected the
jury, and insisting that they should have been directed that for conviction they must
be satisfied that at the time when C bought the equipment he knew that it was to be
used for a particular breaking and entering. Nevertheless the Court of Criminal
Appeal dismissed his appeal, holding that the direction was correct and confirming
that 'knowledge is connected to knowledge of the intention to commit a crime of the
type which was committed, and knowledge in this regard is not necessary indicated
1 c
to show of the particular date and premises concerned.'
The term type was left undefined by the Court of Appeal, causing vagueness in its
interpretation. J.C. Smith argues that since this decision, academic lawyers and law
students have suffered sleepless nights worrying about the broader ambit and wider
application of knowledge connected to the term type.lb Perhaps, the prosecution were
fortunate with the judgement of Bainbridge, merely because it gives prosecutors
wider control in establishing the guilt of an accessorial party in such circumstances.
J.C. Smith points to a serious problem caused by stretching knowledge to its extreme
limits. The problem arises when an accessory, C, provides the principal with the
75 ibid. pp.130-134. The Court of Appeal tried to rely on Foster's Crown Law (3rd ed. 1809) at p. 369
where he said: "If the principal totally and substantially varieth, if being solicited to commit a felony
of one kind he wilfully and knowingly committeth a felony of another, he will stand single in that
offence, and the person soliciting will not be involved in his guilt...it was no more than a fruitless
ineffectual temptation, the converse, of course, being that if the principal does not totally and
substantially vary the advice or the help and does not wilfully and knowingly commit a different form
of felony altogether, the man who has advised or helped, aided or abetted, will be guilty as an
accessory before the fact." Bainbridge ibid. p. 134. However, such reliance is inconsistent with the
subjective standard of criminal complicity. It is doubtful that the Court of Appeal made a correct
interpretation of Foster's opinion. On the other hand, Foster himself favours objective standard in
criminal liability, which is seen, in his view of the 'probable test' under the doctrine of common
purpose. See Chapter 4.
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necessary object such as a jemmy, keys, or a means of transport in the knowledge
that he might use that object to commit robbery or any other type of such crime.77
However, where P is convicted, for example, for 20 or 30 burglaries, should C be
convicted as an accessory for all those offences in which that object was used?
Presumably, under the current situation there is nothing to stop C's conviction of the
full number of offences. One might feel that justice, in general, would require C to
have knowledge of some of those crimes, but under the current unfocussed and
uncontrolled view of mens rea in this area, his liability is not clearly delineated and
conviction of all those crimes is quite possible. Hume, the eminent Scottish jurist,
proposed, in respect of this problem, that time should be an essential factor in
deciding the guilt of accessorial liability. Accordingly, assistance, as a form of
accessorial liability, should be connected to an immediate crime, which would
78disallow conviction of remote and temporal crimes. However, McCall Smith &
Sheldon, argue persuasively that the time factor does not make any difference
because the commission of the offence is in the hand of the principal offender and
that the accessory often does not have the opportunity of controlling the context of
the crime.79
The English Law Commission, in its Report no. 43, seems to have wished to
establish a similar rule by stating that:
"Where a principal is helped in the commission ofmore than one offence by
a single act of help, the accessory who afforded that help shall not, after
having been convicted of one or more of such offences, be convicted of
• RO
another of such offences of equal or lesser gravity."
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Smith, J.C., "Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., 465.
77 ibid. p. 456.
78 McCall Smith,., & Sheldon, D., op. cit., p. 78.
79 ibid. p. 78.
80 LC. No. 43, op. cit., proposition 10, p. 74.
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J.C. Smith, strongly and correctly recommends adopting the above proposition to
solve the problem of endless convictions created by applying knowledge or
8 ]
contemplation as appropriate mens rea. Having said that, there is a remaining
problem, which is that an accessory may still be held liable for a very large number
of offences committed by the principal. This is in form of open-ended liability which
may, perhaps, seems excessive.
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In D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell. C was a member of a violent group who
used firearms and bombs to attack Catholics. He was ordered to drive his car to an
inn, guiding some strangers who were travelling in a following car. The strangers
(principal offenders) threw a bomb into the inn. C was convicted, as an accessory, of
unlawfully and maliciously acting with intent to cause an explosion likely to
endanger life, contrary to the Explosive Substances Act 1883 s.3 (a), and with
possession of the bomb contrary to s.3 (b). C appealed, indicating that he had not
contemplated that a bomb would be used, albeit he was aware that a terrorist attack
was planned. He said that he thought that some violent activities might take place,
but was not sure which specific type of crime would occur. However, the Court of
Appeal of Northern Ireland was convinced that C was an accessory, and did not
allow his appeal. The case went to the House of Lords were the appeal was again
rejected, and the House held that 'A person may be convicted of aiding and abetting
the commission of a criminal offence without proof of prior or actual knowledge if
81 Smith, J., "Criminal Law ofAccessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., p. 456; Able [1984] 1 All
ER 277. However, recalling the fact the J.C. Smith was a leading member of the 1989 English Draft
Criminal Code, it was a surprise that the Draft Code did not include such a recommendation.
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he contemplated the commission of one of a limited number of crimes by the
principal.'83
Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Bciinbridge, held that accessories need not know all
the details of the offence in which they participate. Suspicion of illegal activities is,
however, not enough; accessories must contemplate the type of the offence that the
perpetrators might commit, while in Maxwell, the House of Lords stated it is enough
that accessories contemplate the range of offences that might be likely to be
committed. One can argue that both authorities depart from the rule that accessories
must have full knowledge, indicating that accessories do not have to share the same
degree of knowledge with the main actor who commits the offence.
Knowledge of the future is tentative and no one can predict that something will
happen unless they have knowledge of relevant facts.84 Youden did not define what
'essential matters' means, thus retaining some uncertainty as to the proper foundation
of this term. Even legal commentary rarely discusses the meaning of the term, which
confirms that the issue of 'knowledge of the future' is a very difficult concept.
Having said that, A. Ashworth suggests that an accessory should know the essential
nature of the intended crime of the principal but this does not require knowledge of
RS
time, place, or location. In fact, the decision in Youden was intended to stress the
subjective nature of criminal complicity and, contrary to the present situation,
82 Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140.
83 D P. P. for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140.
S4 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime, (1993). p. 43;
Harris [1987] Cr. App. Rep. 75 at p. 78.
83
Ashworth, A., PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 426.
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required a higher degree of contemplation, which should be connected to knowledge
of a particular crime that the principal will commit. Currently, according to
Bainbridge and Maxwell, English law has moved to a broader mental requirement,
whereas Youden was understood as restricting liability to those situation in which
there was knowledge of "essential matters" a more limited form of liability.
It is not absolutely certain, however, that Bainbridge and Maxwell decisions are
uniform. According to various legal commentators, Maxwell is a modification of
87
Bainbridge, and not a new departure. This is mainly supported by the fact that the
House of Lords in Maxwell cited Bainbridge as an authority. Although many
commentators regard Bainbridge as the foundation of Maxwell, a careful
examination of the case suggests the opposite. For example, Viscount Dilhorne, one
the judges who decided Maxwell, expressly stated that:
"That case (Bainbridge) establishes that a person can be convicted without
having knowledge of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence
without his having knowledge of the actual crime intended. I do not think that
any useful purpose will be served by considering whether the offences
committed by the UVF can or cannot be regarded as the same type of crime.
Liability of an aider and abettor should not depend on categorisation."88
This suggests that the term type has a different meaning from the term contemplation
of the range of offences in Maxwell. Lord Scarman had emphasised that although
Maxwell is no more than a modification of a principle and sound development of the
86 ibid. p. 427.
87
Williams, G., TBCL, op. cit., p. 336; Smith, J., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p.143; Card, Criminal
Law (1995), op. cit., p. 561; Elliot, C. & Quinn, F., Criminal Law, (1996), op. cit., p. 157. Smith, K.
MTLCC, op. cit., pp. 166-167 but this was implicitly indicated which suggest that K. Smith is
undecided regarding the matter.
88 Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140 at 1145.
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law at this point, it is in coherence with previous cases; it is evident, however, that
Bainbridge is a departure from the 'actual knowledge' requirement in Youden. It is
worth noting in this regard that in Bainbridge the defence argued that the direction
made to the jury should be based on the concept of full or actual knowledge, which is
supported by Youden,90 Nevertheless the Court found that the law at this point is too
narrow and wanted to extend accessorial liability to indicate that knowledge of the
same type of the crime contemplated is enough to establish guilt.91 Perhaps the
reason behind this approach is that the Court believed that Bainbridge was willing to
assist the principal offender in the robbery and thus deserved punishment. The
hidden reason of the court here might be that there is no other general concept of
criminal liability such as facilitating offences or public order crimes to convict the
secondary offender and thus there was a need to extend the ambit of the doctrine of
criminal complicity. Some might argue that the court had good reason to extend the
doctrine but surely the foundation of the concept type is contrary to the 'subjective
incrimination' which is well entrenched in English law, especially in criminal
complicity.
One has to go back to Lord Scarman, who sees no distinction between these two
leading cases. He indicates that:
"The principle (Maxwell) thus formulated has a great merit. It directs
attention to the state of mind of the accused: not what he ought to have in
contemplation, but what he did have. It avoids definition and classification,
while ensuring that a man will not be convicted of aiding and abetting any
offence his principal may commit, but only one which is within his
contemplation. He may have in contemplation only one offence, or several;
89 Lord Scarman in Maxwell at p. 1150.
90
Bainbridge [1960] 1 Q.B. 129 at pp. 130-2.
91 LC. No. 131. op. cit., p. 43.
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and the several which he contemplates he may see as alternatives. An
accessory who leaves it to his principal to choose is liable, provided always
the choice is made from the range of offences from which the accessory
Q9
contemplates the choice will be made."
From this view, it appears that what did he say earlier was wrong and that Maxwell is
a true departure from Bainbridge. Likewise it might be true to say that Maxwell is a
recent modification of Youden; in both cases the test is based on subjective
knowledge, but Maxwell interjects an extensive requirement of contemplation. In
confirmation of this point, K. Smith correctly indicates that Bainbridge establishes a
free-floating liability based on objective criteria which links the guilt of the
accessory to offences which are totally unforeseen by him, provided that he
Q-3
objectively contemplates a particular type of offences.
Suppose that the perpetrators in Maxwell committed rape or some other kind of
sexual assault on residents at the hotel, would C be an accessory? If the applicable
test is type, there is a possibility that he would be, because the term type is very broad
in nature and it might be easy to argue that one crime is the same type as another.94
Similarly, where C contemplated in general that a crime against the person might be
committed, if a rape or sexual assault then occurred, C might be held to have some
responsibility for it because sexual offences can be classified within the broad
category of crimes against the person. The term 'actual contemplation of a range of
offences', as found in Maxwell, is narrower than the above except where the
accessory gives the principal a blank cheque to commit whatever crime he wants,
92 Lord Scarman in Maxwell at p. 1151.
93
Smith, K. MTLCC, op. cit., p. 167.
139
and this in fact if put into practice, will push accessorial liability to excessive
length.95 The House of Lords in Maxwell emphasised the subjective nature of
contemplation in criminal complicity. The facts in question were that the incident
happened in Northern Ireland in the 1970's where violence was causing problems for
the British authorities. C was a member of an extremist group, which was well
known for violent crimes and the use of guns. Both the Court of Appeal of Northern
Ireland and the House of Lords were satisfied that C knew that the other car of the
principals contained weapons to be used in an attack; that C was the only person who




Smith, J., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 144; Elliot, C. & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (1996), op.
cit., p. 157; Smith, K. MTLCC, op. cit., p. 168 at note 31.
93 The concept of blank cheque was mentioned by Lord Scarman when he said that: "An accessory
who leaves it to his principal to choose is liable, provided always the choice is made from the range of
offences from which the accessory contemplates the choice will be made" Maxwell, op. cit., p.1151.
Cf. Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., pp. 170-171, where he argues that the concept of blank cheque hardly
exists under English criminal law because of the following factors: that such liability would be based
on subjective recklessness at large; it brings accessorial liability within criminal conspiracy; there
would be a failure to establish the required actus reus; it would bring accessorial liability close to the
concept of inchoate offences though the latter is more connected to specific crimes; the secondary
party often thinks of a particular crime which he has detailed knowledge and that should be
considered. However, the above view of K. Smith is not convincing and perhaps the concept of blank
cheque will exist, but the question is when. This is supported by the fact that accessorial liability is
understood to be based on recklessness, and that the issues of mens rea is much more important than
the discussion of actus reus., If the concept of blank cheque is applied, it will extend the English
version of criminal complicity considerably beyond its current floating boundaries and even from the
principle of 'range of offences' mentioned by Maxwell itself. Further, if it happens, it will not be a
surprise move because English courts, from the time of Gamble until Powell; English, have shifted, in
terms of mens rea, the liability of accessories to the broad concept of recklessness rather than
intention, and this is implicitly understood to give the court wide authority to control crime.
96
How did the English Law Commission address the issue knowledge of the future crime of the
principal? LC. No.43 for 1972. is vague regarding this point. The Draft Criminal Code 1989 (Report
No. 177), which supposed to codify common law authorities, surprisingly instead of expressly
discussing the two tests of 'type' and 'contemplation the range of offences' turned around the problem
by indicating, in cl. 27, that an accessory is liable although not aware or does not contemplate a
circumstances of the offence such as the identity of the victim, time, or place. While LC. No. 131
prefers Maxwell. See also Ashworth, PCL (1995), op. cit., p. 428.
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An important question has to be addressed at this stage: should an accessory's
knowledge of the principal's state of mind be considered as one of the essential
matters for accessorial guilt?
This may be answered in two ways. First, it might be said that there is no direct
authority in English law from which to draw the conclusion that an accessory must
know the exact state ofmind of the principal offender, especially given the low mens
rea requirement for accessorial liability. Second, the comments of K. Smith stand
peerless in this regard.97 Fie says that a distinction should be made between two kind
of accessorial liability, that of the 'moving force' and that of any other type of
accessories who facilitate the commission or who join after the decision of the
principal to bring the crime about has been made. According to K. Smith, accessorial
guilt grounded on the notion of the 'moving force' of the crime, should not be based
on proof that they knew the principal's state of mind, simply because they created
such mens rea and obviously knew of its establishment. By contrast, the proof of the
guilt of the other type of accessory should make a quite different demand, namely, it
should require knowledge of the principal's state of mind, which should thus be
considered as an essential matter. Further, he goes on to suggest that in conduct
crimes, like theft, there must be knowledge of the mens rea of the principal offender
97 K. Smith cites Stephen as an authority to what he proposed. Stephen (Art. 37, Digest) said: "when
the existence of a particular intent forms part of the definition of an offence, a person charged with
aiding or abetting the commission of the offence must be shown to have known the existence of the
intent on the part of the person so aided." Also, LC. No. 43; the English Draft Code (Report No. 177);
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 179 at note 71. However, Stephen's opinion was linked to common
purpose cases and in fact English courts have departed from many earlier authorities such as
Stephen's especially in the liability of additional offences. Further, Stephen himself did not establish
the distinction between conduct/result crimes. Cf Chan Wing- Siu and Powell; English, which all
implicitly suggest that it would be odd to lean on Stephen's view as an authority because the current
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because such knowledge is an essential matter. In result crimes such as homicide
offences, the situation is different: the connection of guilt here is the knowledge of
98
the accessory of the likely rather than the exact mens rea of the principal offender.
It must be borne in mind that the classification of conduct/result crimes, in general, is
not supported by English case law, nor indeed by legal commentary. In fact, there is
disagreement as to who first introduced this classification into English law. Glanville
Williams ascribed this concept to J.C Smith, and others attribute it to the well-known
Scottish jurist G.H. Gordon." Whatever its origin, this classification has not been an
established feature of English criminal law and lacks authority. A more general
objection is based on the fact that the general run of English case law regarding
criminal complicity indicates that knowledge of the likely mens rea of the principal
offender is enough to constitute accessorial liability. Glanville Williams confirms
this by indicating that 'knowledge of the perpetrator's intent or possible intent is
sufficient.'100 By contrast, knowledge of the literal state of mind of the principal
offender has two unusual features. First, it probably requires the accomplices to share
a similar state of mind, which as matter of fact is not a corner stone of criminal
complicity. Second, insisting that the accessory must know the precise mens rea of
the principal makes it more difficult to prove knowledge, a result which might not be
situation implicitly suggest that it is enough that the accessory contemplates the likelihood of the
principal's mens rea. See Chapter 4.
98
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., pp. 178-9.
99
Ferguson, P.W., "Jurisdiction and Criminal Law in Scotland and England", in R. Hunter., (ed.)
Justice and Crime (1993), Edinburgh: T&T Clark, p. 97.
100
Williams, G., TBCL, op. cit., p. 351; LC.No. 43, proposition 7 (1) (b) requires help to combine with
knowledge of any necessary mens rea of the principal offender; the Draft Criminal Code, (Report No.
177) in cl. 27 (1) (c) indicates that the accessory need to intend that the principal shall act or is aware
that he is or may be acting, or he may act with the mens rea required for the offence. While under LC.
No. 131 the situation is obscure.
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welcomed policy because it might lead to many clear instances of accessories
escaping conviction presumably because there is no alternative offence such as
facilitating crimes. Third, common sense suggests that knowledge of the future is
often seen as an unclear concept, comprising anticipation with some element of
suspicion, rather than, a confident expectation that something will happen. In short,
presumably the current situation of English law does not favour or allow such a
higher degree of expectation, preferring instead to extend the ambit of criminal
complicity, which can be called 'the wider net of incrimination'.101
Conclusion:
The issue ofmens rea is immensely complex, but a full consideration of it is essential
because mens rea is probably the most important element in deciding the
circumstances in which accessorial liability can arise. Further, the mens rea issue in
this context, that of the degree of knowledge, is one of the most problematic concepts
in accessorial liability, and continues to cause a great amount of confusion as to the
boundaries of accessorial liability. In spite of this, the policy makers, (criminal courts
and the majority of legal commentators) favour the adoption of 'knowledge,
contemplation, or recklessness' as the main mental requirements of accessorial
liability. Such a policy insists that although this form of mens rea is low,
uncontrolled, and brings normal activities into the net of incrimination, it gives
English criminal law wider power to control many secondary activities which
101 See Chapter 4, especially the decision of Chan Wing- Siu and Powell; English, which indicate that
the degree of contemplation is not important.
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support the commission of crime. This can be justified in terms of willingness,
indifference, or knowledge that such crime will occur in accordance with aid,
instigation, counsel, or procurement. If this is true of the current situation of
accessorial liability in English law, it suggests two conclusions. First, that the mental
element falls short of the notion of purpose. Second, the above justifications are very
good reasons to move away slightly from purpose. However, a close analysis of the
current situation indicates that this is not true: case law has moved far from this
proposition and softened the mental element so as to include subjective recklessness,
and at the same time ushering in confusion regarding 'knowledge of the future'.
It is true to say that English criminal law concentrates on knowledge, contemplation
or any word suggest a similar meaning, instead of intention as the appropriate mens
rea. Such a view does not look on terms such as willingness, indifference, or 'having
a stake in the outcome' in order to determine contemplation. Instead, the concept of
contemplation is rather more amorphous, which can be understood as to include
recklessness. Although one might suggest that courts and legal commentary mention
intention and knowledge as the requirement of all mens rea, the current mens rea
required under English law is a low degree of anticipation, akin to recklessness.
Further, some of those who advocate such an attenuated state of mind as being
sufficient to constitute mens rea decline to recognise that it could possibly lead to an
infringement of the rights of an accessory. For example the liability of the principal
102
Powell; English [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 261 at pp. 235-243; Times Newspaper, October 31 1997;
Chan Wing- Siu v. R [1985] 80 Cr. App. Rep. 117 at 172, 282; Williams, G., Criminal Law: The
General Part (2nd ed. 1961), London, p. 397.
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is more clear-cut, and easier to argue for acquittal in relation to causation and mens
rea. In accessorial liability is covered by uncertainty that we have already seen in
causation and the low requirement ofmens rea. Moreover, even in procurement, the
prosecution charges the accessory with the general formula of aiding, abetting,
counselling andprocuring, which does not help the accessory to prepare his defence
in terms of a clear focus. Likewise, the punishment of the accessory is at the same
level as the convicted accomplices, does not reflect the fact the accessorial activities
are different; some are trivial, insignificant, or unimportant while others are crucial
to the crime, and may be little separated from the principal's action, especially from
the point of mens rea. The courts should have this in mind when deciding the
appropriate punishment.
A few final comments might focus on the views of a legal commentator who
accurately concludes that English law needs to move from the current attitude
towards accessorial liability, to one based on a more accurate analysis of mens rea.
K. Smith says:
"Introducing (or reintroducing) purposefulness into complicity would reduce
objections of this nature. Requiring an accessory to act both with purpose of
encouraging or assisting the principal, and also with similar level of
culpability (except for strict liability) in respect of circumstances and results
to that necessary for principal liability, offers an even more measured and
appealing correlation between and principal fault demands. Indifferent, non-
purposeful assistance, presently punished as complicity, could then more
appropriately be treated as less serious liability.. .dividing secondary
participation in such two-tier fashion would probably reflect conceptually
distinguishable types of criminality. A change of this nature would constitute
a desirable refinement of possible roles which non-perpetrators may perform,
and more harmoniously complement modern attempts to grade principal
culpability with greater subtlety."103
103
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 196.
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This opinion could well be considered and adopted in the English version of
accessorial liability, but the English Law Commission in their last report no. 131
declined to adopt it. In fact, notwithstanding the Chan Wing/Powell principle,
English law should use criminal intention, usually discussed for the principal
liability, as the main area of discussion regarding the required mens rea for
accessorial liability. As mentioned before, such intention should contain purpose and
oblique intent, which is based on higher degree of contemplation and can include a
state of indifference which should be the required mens rea for accessorial liability.




(A) General requirements of mens rea:
Two elements constitute mens rea in the F.P.C: intention and fault. The former
means that the accused desires or accepts the criminal result caused by his voluntary
action, while the latter means that the accused contemplates or fails to contemplate
an undesired result caused by his risky action. It must be noted that the principle:
actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea is applicable to every offence in criminal law.
This means that the UAE law does not apply the concept of absolute liability, which
is known in English criminal law as strict liability, where the accused's state ofmind
is immaterial as far as liability is concerned.
The aim of this section is to fill in the gaps, to understand the meaning of mens rea
under the F.P.C., if that can be achieved, and to see how Arabic jurisprudence
conceives of such a cornerstone of criminal responsibility.
(a) Intention:
Intention is defined in article (38):
"The mens rea of a crime consists of intention or fault. Intention arises when
the accused's will moves towards the commission or omission of an act,
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where such commission or omission is legally defined as a crime, for the
purpose of producing a direct effect or any other criminal result which the
offender has expected."
The F.P.C. is vague regarding the core meaning of the term intention and there is no
official explanation to rely on to infer its definition. Legal commentators' views as to
intention are that this state of mind arises when the accused desires the criminal
result caused by his voluntary action with the knowledge of the essential elements
that determine his criminal action. Another definition is the willing of the action and
the result. For instance, A. F. Sorror defines intention as 'wilful action which brings
about a desired result compounded with the knowledge of the essential element
required by the law to constitute an offence.'104 Consequently, intention under the
F.P.C. has two meanings: wilful action that brings about the desired result and the
knowledge that the behaviour will have a particular result and the desire that this
result should come about. This first meaning is the major key to distinguishing
intention from fault, whereby in the latter the accused engages in risky behaviour. In
such a case, he does not want the result to come about although he has a very high
degree of foresight that the prohibited result will occur.
The second related meaning of intention is: the knowledge of the essential element
required by the law. This is called the knowledge of facts, which the accused must
know. The absence of such knowledge would affect his intention and might save him
from conviction. Knowledge covers the following situations:
Knowledge ofevery aspect ofthe actus reus:
104
Sorror, A., Alwaseet fee Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation ofPenal Code: The
General Part) (6th ed. 1986), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. p. 348.
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Every offence has an actus reus, in other words, criminal conduct which the penal
code defines. The accused must know every aspect of his criminal conduct, such as
knowledge of the subject that the law protects in those cases where the accused's
action has caused harm to it. An example of this is in murder. The accused must
know that he is planning or directing his actions against a live person. The definition
of murder requires that the accused must intend the death of the victim; for instance,
A thinking that B is dead, takes his body and throws it from a mountain which in fact
causes B's death. A cannot be convicted for murder under UAE law unless he has the
required intention relating to a live person even if he might be convicted of
manslaughter.105 In theft, the required mens rea is depriving another of his movable
property. If the accused thinks that such property belongs to him, he cannot be
convicted of theft. Another aspect of knowledge of the actus reus applies in certain
offences, in which the accused must know the identity of other persons, things or the
time of the offence. An example is provided by article (150) of the F.P.C., which
punishes any person who instigates a member of the UAE army to join another
country's forces during the war. Thus, the accused must know there is a war going
on; the absence of such knowledge would prevent his conviction.
Knowledge ofaggravated circumstances that affects classification ofoffences:
Article (41) of the F.P.C., states:
"A defendant who is ignorant of the aggravating circumstances that change
the classification of a crime, shall not be responsible accordingly; however,
he may benefit from the mitigating factor although he is ignorant thereof."
105
Compare with Thabo Meli v. R [1954] 1 WLR 228; [1954] 1 All ER 373, where there was a
conviction.
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Consequentially, the F.P.C. lists certain circumstances which, if they arise in the
commission of a crime, may change the classification of the crime from
misdemeanour to felony or, on the other hand, change the crime from the scope of
one governing article to that of another. These surrounding circumstances are an
essential element of the latter article. Where the accused's knowledge is absent, the
latter offence will not arise. An example of this is 'simple theft', which is a
misdemeanour governed by article (390). If the offender uses coercion, the governing
article will be (385), 'felony of theft compounded by coercion.' That is to say, if the
offender during the commission of theft assaults the victim by mistake, he is not
blamed as a felon. Another example is carrying a weapon while committing a theft.
This changes the offence from misdemeanour to felony. The offender must know,
however, that he is carrying a weapon. If someone has planted the gun on the
accused without his knowledge and the police arrest him, he cannot be convicted of a
felony; he must have knowledge of that aggravating circumstance.
However, there are some minor facts which the accused does not have to know, and
the absence of the knowledge of these would not affect his criminal liability. Some of
the minor facts are:
The aggravating circumstances that intensify punishment: Another form of
aggravating circumstance in the F.P.C. is that which only intensifies the punishment
without changing the governing article. Each offence has an upper and lower
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boundary. If such aggravating circumstances arise, the judge will intensify the
punishment to the upper boundary.106
The circumstances in question are divided into: general circumstances applying to
1 07
every offence and specific circumstances required by single offence.
An example of the second is article (388):
"... Punishment by imprisonment for at least five years and at most seven
years shall be inflicted for an act of theft if it is committed by a workman at
his place ofwork or it causes damage to his employer."
According to legal commentary, the aggravating circumstance in the previous article
is theft committed by a workman. For example, if the workman steals property,
which he thinks belongs to the employer's guest while it in fact, it belongs to the
employer, he is blamed for those aggravating circumstances. However, it must be
pointed out that noting in the F.P.C. suggest this which indicates that the offender
should have knowledge of such aggravating circumstance.
106 Article (103) states that: "Where there is an aggravating circumstance, the court may impose
penalty as follows:
(1) if the principal penalty for a crime is a fine, its maximum limit may be doubled or a judgement of
detention may be awarded,
(2) if the principal penalty for a crime is detention, its maximum may be doubled,
(3) if the principal penalty is imprisonment with a maximum period of less than fifteen years, the
penalty may be imposed to such an extent,
(4) if the principal penalty for a crime is temporary imprisonment with a maximum period, it may be
commuted to life imprisonment."
107 Article (102) states:
"Without prejudice to the cases in which the law states special causes for severity, the following shall,
inter alia, be considered to be aggravating circumstances:
(1) commitment of a crime for a vicious motive,
(2) commitment of a crime, by exploiting the victims mental element weakness or his inability to
resist, or circumstances where are unable to defend himself,
(3) commitment of a crime in a savage way or by mutilating a victim,
(4) commitment of a crime by a public official, by taking advantage of his official authorities or his
capacity, unless the law provides a certain punishment, owing to such a capacity."
151
The occurrence of a result that is more serious than that intended by the offender:
Generally, when a person decides to act in a particular way he will be anticipating a
particular result which he wishes to bring about.
However, sometimes a more serious result may occur. As an exception to the general
principles of criminal liability, the law here blames the accused for that more serious
result even if he did not contemplate its occurrence. An example is afforded by
article (336):
"Whoever assaults another person physically in any manner without
intending murder, but the assault leads to death, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years."
According to this article, the accused only intends the offence of assault. However,
his action causes the death of the victim; he is responsible for the death even if he
does not contemplate it. There are a few similar articles in F.P.C., which make the
accused responsible for any more serious result for his action. These are 'violation of
freedom' (344), 'exposure to danger' (349), and 'crimes committed against honour
'rape and indecent acts' (357). Here the knowledge of the occurrence of the more




This form is often called general intention. It has two meanings:108
108
It must be noted that the F.P.C. neither expressly nor implicitly suggests such classification. It is
merely provided by legal commentaries.
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a) First degree purpose: A person desires a particular end to his action; it arises
when he commits a voluntary action and his aim, object, or desire is to bring about a
prohibited end prescribed by the law. For example, the intention required for murder
is the death of the victim; in theft, it is to deprive another of his property. This is
called first degree purpose.
b) Second degree purpose: Intention is also considered direct when the offender's
purpose is to bring about a result, and when his action will inevitably cause another
result. For example, A decides to bomb an aeroplane intending to damage the plane
only, being motivated by malice towards the airline. His purpose is to damage the
plane, but where the death of passengers is inevitable, he is regarded as having
intended the deaths. Second degree purpose is the term used to describe this form of
intention.
(2) Oblique intention;
Another form of intention is oblique intention, which is not identified by the F.P.C.
This concealed form of intent is vague controversial and disputed in Arabic criminal
jurisprudence, (the reasons for this are stated at the end of the chapter) which suggest
that it is of questionable application in UAE criminal law, at least from the point of
view of the principle of legality. Having said that, it could be said that oblique
intention occupies a middle position between intention (purpose) and contemplated
fault (subjective recklessness). The issue is disputed and there are two schools of
thought on the notion of this form of intention. They may be summed up as follows:
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a) School One: Most Egyptian legal commentators tend to prefer the following
meaning:109 'Oblique intention' is a type of intention based on direct intention. That
is to say, when an offender intends to bring about a particular result a more serious
result might occur, and the offender will be responsible for this, even though he did
not contemplate the more serious result.' Interpretation suggests that there must be
first a purpose to cause a criminal result and if such a purpose is absent, the accused
may not be responsible for the more serious result. For example, A assaults B which
causes B's death. A's intention is only to assault, he did not contemplate the more
serious result which is death. The law blames him here because he ought to
contemplate such a result and his intention in this case is oblique. The ambit of this
type of intention does not cover every offence, it needs to be stated expressly, and the
accused need not contemplate the result. In other words, this type of intention is not a
general principle and applies only to certain offences such as assault and rape. If the
victim killed following the action, the accused is responsible for the death. One
explanation of this is that criminal law in this type of intention is more concerned
with the result rather than requiring the accused to have actual knowledge of the
occurrence of the more serious result. The test in certain offences is objective; the
accused is expected to contemplate a result where a reasonable man would do so.110
109
Husni, M., Alnadciria Alama le Alkasd Aljenai, (Arabic. General Theory ofCriminal Intention) (3rd
ed. 1988), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. pp. 281-285.
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Supporters of this first school of thought are: Rashid, A., Muqdima le Mbadee Alnadaria Alama,
(Arabic. Introduction to the Principles of the General Theory) (1974). pp. 362-367; Alsaeed, M. A.,
Almbadee Alama le Qanon Alokobat (Arabic. The General Principles ofPenal Law) (1962), Egypt, p.
400; Alkullaly, M. M., Almasulia Aljenaia, (Arabic. Criminal Responsibility) (1948), Egypt, p. 188;
Ismaeel, M. A., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. Explanation of the General
Provisions of the Penal Code) (1951). p. 392; and others. See: Husni, M., Husni, M., Sharh Qanon
Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of the Penal Code: The General Part) (6th ed. 1989),
Egypt, pp. 618-623; (Arabic. Criminal Intention), op. cit., pp. 270-292.
154
b) School Two: A few current commentators support a second meaning, which can
be defined in comparison with direct intention.111 In direct intention, the accused
certainly contemplates the occurrence of a desired result that the accused's aim or
object is to bring about. In oblique intention, the accused does not contemplate that
the result will happen for certain; it is either a probable or possible consequence of
i i ^
his voluntary action, nonetheless, he accepts the occurrence of the result. An
example of this is: Z is driving at speed in a city. He must contemplate that someone
may cross the road, but he does not care and would accept killing or injuring anyone.
Z might be convicted under oblique intention if he kills or injures a pedestrian. It
must be noted that scholars who support this second view are distinguishing between
a state of blindness and a person who does not care about causing a result and
accepting the occurrence of a probable result. The latter only is oblique intention.113
Proponents of this position hold that this type of intention is an independent form of
direct intention, which does not rely on a purpose and covers every crime requiring
intention without express provisions. Finally, it is based on actual foresight of an
111
Supporters of this second school of thought are: Husni, M., (Arabic. The General Part), op. cit., pp.
617; (Arabic. Criminal Intention), op. cit., pp. 270-292; Sorror, A., op. cit., pp. 356-357. Others are
either generally supporting such view but with some slight modification, which can bring some
confusion at the same time, such as Mustafa, M.M., Shark Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic.
Explanation of the Penal Code: The General Part) (10th ed.1983), Cairo: Cairo University Press, p.
435; Rabia, H., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Okobat Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda: Alguza Alawal,
Almbadee Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of the General Part of UAE Penal Code: Part
One, The General Principles of Crime) (1993), Dubai: Albayan Press, p. 311; Or refusing the idea of
oblique intention in general such as Mahdi, A., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat: Dirash
Muqarana bean Qanon Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, wa Mashrua Alqanon
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the Egyptian Law) (1983), Cairo: Atlas Publication, pp. 215-221.
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uncertain result.114 Both schools fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem
of oblique intention under the F.P.C.; the reasons for this will be pointed out later in
this chapter when I shall discuss the need to reform the F.P.C.
(3) Specific intention:
In principle, general intention in its direct meaning would cover every crime where
required by the F.P.C. Thus, general intention in this respect is the knowledge that
the behaviour will have a particular result and the desire that the result should come
about. However in the case of certain crimes the F.P.C. requires a certain motive or
specific element to constitute the crime in question and the general intention would
not be sufficient. The requirement of a specific motive here is an exception to the
general principle in article (40), which states that 'A motive to commit a crime shall
be immaterial, unless the law provides otherwise.'
An example of specific intention, for instance, is provided by the mens rea in theft,
which requires that the accused deprives another of his property. When, however, the
accused takes a piece of property of another person and destroys it, his action does
not constitute theft, although he might be convicted of damaging property belonging
to others."^ Another example of specific intention in the F.P.C. is found in article
(216), (the offence of forgery of instruments), where the specific intention is stated
expressly:
114 ibid. pp. 27, 272.
115 Article (424) of the F.P.C.
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"
Forgery of an instrument is a change of its authenticity by any of the means
stated herein after, resulting in damage, for the purpose of using it as a valid
instrument."
Such absence of specific intention would either mean the accused's action would not
be legally culpable, or would require change in the governing provision from one
article to another.
(b) Fault:
The second notion of the term mens rea is fault. However, the F.P.C. has not
precisely defined fault, even if a mention is made of various forms of fault. Article
(38) states:
"...Fault arises if a criminal result occurs by reasons of the defendant's fault,
whether such a fault is negligence, indifference, carelessness, recklessness,
imprudence or non-compliance with laws, regulations rules or orders."
As has been shown, the concept of fault is a broad umbrella term containing various
mental states, broader than then usual, and there is no equivalent of this term in the
common law systems, as in the case ofEnglish law. Commentators define fault as "A
demeanour that does not comply with the precaution that is required by social
life."116 Another effort to define the term is: "a dereliction of human behaviour that
would not be done by a reasonable person in the same circumstances."117 A further
definition is: "A voluntary action to commit a risky situation where the person ought
116 Obaid, R., Mbadee Alkesm Alam menu Alqanon Alikabi, (Arabic. Principles of the General Part of
the Penal Code) (4th ed. 1979), Cairo: Dar Alfeker Alarabi. p. 675.
117
Mustafa, M., op. cit., p. 447.
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to act with a duty of care." As it can be seen from the above definitions, the term
fault is based on the idea of breaching a duty of care, which causes an undesired
result, prohibited by the law. The offender contemplates a result from his own action
or fails to contemplate the result where he ought to.
The standard of duty of care is usually based on two notions: an expectation of
knowledge and obligations created by the law. In relation to human knowledge,
everyday experience gives us the knowledge of what is safe and what is dangerous.
People have a minimum standard of knowing risks, especially if such knowledge
comes from field or work experience.119 Driving a car without a safe breaking system
would entail a high risk for other road users. A race between two cars would carry a
huge risk to the drivers and pedestrians. A football player, acting in an aggressive
manner without regard to the rules of fair play might cause injuries to other players.
Leaving a baby near a fire might result in the baby's death. All these examples would
bring about a result, albeit an undesired one. The actions create the undesired result,
the accused either has given thought of what might happen or he has failed to give
such thought where he ought to.
The second notion, which constitutes the standard of duty of care, comes from legal
obligation. Commentators refer here to law in a broad sense, even from outside the
provisions of criminal law, such as civil law, traffic laws, health regulations and
118 Mohammed A., Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The General Part) (nd.),
Egypt: Dar Almatboaat Algamaia. p. 256.
119
Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 382.
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regulations governing certain groups attitudes or custom.120 All of these laws or
regulations impose upon their members a duty to act with care. Such a breach of duty
of care would be fault if there is an occurrence of a criminal result prohibited by the
Penal Code. However, a breach of that duty, whether coming from breaching legal
obligations or failing to achieve a minimum standard of knowledge, must have
caused the criminal result in question. In other words, there must be a causal link
between the fault and the result before the person can be charged with a criminal
offence.
Certain points must be noted in relation to liability for fault:
In spite of the fact that the F.P.C. has provided an example of this form of liability
without defining the term itself, it is true to say that fault would be presented in the
following forms:
a) Advertent fault: This form arises when an offender contemplates the occurrence
of a prohibited result from his dangerous behaviour. However, he continues his
action with the hope that either the result would not occur, or he would avoid such
occurrence depending on his ability. For example, Z wants to try out his new sports
car on a city road. He contemplates the fact that he might kill or injure pedestrians,
but he uses the car nonetheless, and depends upon his own ability to drive. However,
he causes the death of B. Z might be convicted ofmanslaughter.
b) Inadvertent fault: This form arises when an accused has given no thought to
causing a prohibited result arising from his dangerous action, in circumstances in
120 ibid. p. 329.
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which a reasonable person would have given such thought. An example of this is: a
baby-sitter leaves a child without thinking the child might interfere with an open fire,
which burns the child's hand. The baby-sitter might be charged with causing injury
by fault.
Both advertent and inadvertent fault would cover the examples of fault mentioned in
article (38).
c) Subjective or Objective: Although the F.P.C. does not make this requirement,
legal commentators favour objective tests rather than subjective ones to decide the
accused's state of mind. The objective test is based on the concept of the reasonable
person, often called the standard of reasonable man. In theory, this rational man must
be taken from the accused's class or society, and put in the same circumstance in
which the offender caused the result. If this rational man foresaw a result, the
accused is also expected to have foreseen it. For example, if M, a person with
specialist knowledge, causes an injury to B, the presumption of the reasonable man
test in determining M's liability will be based on an ordinary person from the class of
persons with such specialist knowledge, in the exact circumstances ofM's action. If
that ordinary person foresaw a risk in that situation, M ought to have contemplated
the risk, which determines his liability.
d) The degree of fault: The F.P.C. does not mention the degree of awareness of
risk needed to constitute fault, that is to say, the Code does not distinguish gross fault
from slight fault; this accords with the scholarly consensus. It might be true to say
that the F.P.C takes the same approach as the UAE Civil Code, especially article
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(282), which does not distinguish the degree of fault in civil liability. Consequently,
a slight fault is sufficient to constitute criminal liability if there is a causal link
between the action and the result.
Another argument which supports this opinion is found in the principle of the unity
of civil and criminal decision, stated in article (269) of the UAE Penal Procedures
Law, which states that:
"A conclusive penal judgement given on the merits of a penal action for
innocence or conviction is considered determinative effect and shall be
adhered by civil courts in actions that have been conclusively decided
concerning the occurrence of crime. A judgement of innocence shall have
such force whether the charge is non-suited for lack of any cause of action, or
whether the accused is discharged for insufficiency of evidence. However,
the judgement shall not have such force if it is based on the fact that the
incident is not punishable by the law."
The determinative effect of a criminal case on a civil case, where the victim is suing
the offender for causing damage, would logically lead us to say that the degree of
fault is irrelevant when bringing a case to criminal courts, which would give the
121victim the chance to obtain an indemnity.
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(B) The mens rea of accessorial liability:
As has been mentioned above, the F.P.C. specifies two forms of mens rea: intention
and fault. Because of this, there is no absolute liability. The prosecution in the UAE,
therefore, needs to establish mens rea before charging a person with a criminal
offence.
The principle to be addressed at this stage is the required mental element for
accessories under the Arabic version of criminal complicity, in order to see if it is
based on coincidence of accomplices' mens rea in criminal complicity. The latter
means that when the theory of complicity is in question, this principle arises which
indicates that there must be coherence between the accomplices' states of mind. In
other words, there can be no charge of complicity unless the parties have the same
mens rea relating to the offence in question. That is to say, where a perpetrator
intentionally commits an offence with an accessory who is involved through fault,
1
both will have a separate degree of liability. An example of this is: Z recklessly
leaves a loaded gun on a table. B comes and takes it to kill M. Z is not an accessory
to B's crime of murder since there is no joint state of mind. Having said that, the
following discussion shall not be taken as to entirely represent the UAE criminal
system, especially the coincidence of accomplices' mens rea, but it could be said that
many features are in harmony with the F.P.C. This will be examined carefully later in
this chapter. Thus, the early discussion concentrates on the view of Arabic
122
Mustafa, M., op. cit., p. 364.
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jurisprudence. Consequently, since the principle in question requires a coincidence of
accomplices' mens rea, our target is to see how does this principle exist in
accessorial criminal liability within the required state of mind; offences of intention
and offences of fault.
(A) The coincidence of intention:
Many offences can only be committed intentionally, for instance: murder, theft,
fraud, assault, rape. The accused's aim in these examples is to bring about the
prohibited result as stated in the definition of that offence. The coincidence of
intention requires that an accessory must have an intention that the perpetrator brings
about the prohibited result, that is to say, all accomplices involved in offences of
intention must share the same intention as stated in the definition of the offence. For
example in murder, the intention of the accessory must be that the perpetrator kills
the victim. In theft, he or she must intend that the perpetrator deprives the owner of
the property. If there is no joint intention between them, each has his separate
liability. That is to say, no charge of complicity arises unless there is a coincidence of
intention between the parties. How can such coincidence be identified? Putting it
another way, how can an accessory join the perpetrator in his offence? Do they need
to sit together and discuss the plan to exchange roles, or is it sufficient that the
accessory can participate without the accused's knowledge?
It should be pointed out that in Egypt, until 1950, the belief was that the coincidence
principle must exist in a particular form, which is a previous explicit agreement or at
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least a tacit agreement between the parties to commit the offence.123 In other words,
the evidence of coincidence of intention requires that there should be plotting and
discussing roles between the accomplices; which leads to the conclusion that the
requirement was that the parties must know each other's roles which exist in terms of
a conspiracy to commit the offence, whether the agreement is before or during the
commission of the offence. An example of this is as follows: A undertaking a bank
robbery at night. B, a security officer, discovers him, but instead of arresting A, he
shows him an easy way to escape. Although there is no explicit conspiracy between
A and B, there is at least a tacit agreement that the offence should be committed.
The weakest point to arise as implication from the previous view is that many
incidents would be excluded from the scope of criminal complicity although there is
a coincidence between the parties' states of mind. For example, M, is a security
officer who knows of a gang's intention to rob his employer's house, opens the door
of the house before the gang arrives, intending that the owner's property be stolen. In
fact, they do that with M's assistance. However, they do not know what he has done
for them. According to the 'agreement' view, M is not an accessory to the gang's
offence since there is no agreement between them. Another example of how this
view might exclude significant acts is in the following: B wants to inherit his
mother's estate quickly, and so puts some poison in her medicine. M, his older sister,
finds out. As a matter of experience, she recognises that the quantity is not sufficient
to kill the victim. When B is out, the sister puts a bottle of poison in his room
intending him to use this to kill their mother, which in fact he does. M, according to
123
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scholarly opinion, at that stage is outside complicity provisions because there is no
knowledge between the parties.
Both examples deal with the form of assistance in complicity, which represents a
strong argument against applying the 'agreement test.' In other words, the problem
exists only in the provision of assistance where the other forms, incitement and
conspiracy, requires that the parties know each other's roles. From 1950, the
Egyptians started to think of the consequences of the agreement test, which was the
first step to moving away from this unsuitable test of requiring agreement between
the accomplices. This was the case when the Egyptian Court of Cassation overruled
the agreement test when it was held that:
"Only what the law requires, is that the accessory know that the perpetrator is
committing an offence and assist him to complete its commission."124
Although this decision was concerned with assistance in complicity, legal
commentators point out that the effects of the decision cover the other forms of
complicity, namely incitement and conspiracy. This means that a previous agreement
to commit an offence is not a necessary condition in order to prove the coincidence
1 7 S
of the accomplice's mens rea. The principal does not need to know of the
accessory's participation, the accessory must know that the principal is to commit or
is committing the offence and must share that intention with the principal. The
coincidence of mens rea must be compounded with causation, that is to say, there
must be a causal link between accessory participation and the result.
Codes) (2"d ed. 1992), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. pp. 27-8.
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As it appears, intention in accessorial liability is governed by the general theory of
criminal intention, which has been stated previously.126 This means that accessorial
intention is identical to the perpetrator's intention. One important thing, which is not
shared, of course, is the action to bring the result, which the perpetrator does.
Therefore, one can infer accessorial intention from a wilful action compounded with
desire on the part of the accessory that the perpetrator bring about the prohibited
result. That is to say, the picture of an accessory's intention is composed of two
elements: knowledge of the offence and wilful action to participate.
(1) Knowledge:
The accessory must know the consequences of his action and the unlawful action
being committed. In other words, he must realise what he is doing and that his action
might lead him to be involved in an offence. He must contemplate that what he does
might encourage or help another to bring about a criminal result. In encouragement,
the encourager must know that his words will lead the perpetrator to commit an
offence. In assistance, the accessory must contemplate that the assistance he provides
will be used in committing an offence. Since the aspects of this knowledge are
identical to the perpetrator's knowledge discussed above, I refer to that section.
(2) Wilful action:
Contemplation of consequences is not enough; the accessory must intend his action.
Intention here means a desire that the perpetrator bring about the prohibited result,
l2>
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that is to say, the accessory's purpose is to influence or help the perpetrator to
commit the crime in question. As has been pointed out, the notion of the accessory's
intention is derivative from the general theory of intention in criminal liability. This
means that the accessory must contemplate the consequence of his involvement,
compounded with the desire that the offence occur. In incitement, the encourager
must intend to persuade another to commit a particular offence. Suppose, for
example, M says to B, 'if you are man enough, go and teach D a lesson.' This he
says as a joke, without intending that B assault D, which he does. M probably cannot
be charged as an accessory to assault if the evidence shows that there is no joint
intention between M and B, even ifM contemplated that assault would take place. In
assistance, consider this example. M sells D cutting equipment with a high degree of
foresight that D might use it to commit an offence. D uses the cutting equipment for
a robbery. The prosecution in this example cannot charge M as an accessory simply
because he contemplated the occurrence of the offence. To charge M, there must a
proof that he intended to participate in D's offence. Foresight without desire cannot
be a ground of accessorial liability in intention offences.127 On this issue, Husni
oddly provides us with examples, starting:
"A person who provides or makes an imitative key for another person with
the contemplation that the other will use it to commit theft, does not have the
requisite mens rea for complicity because his interest is in money only."128
He adds another example, where he says:
126 ibid. p. 359.
127 ibid. p. 354.
128 ibid. p. 358; Rabia, H., op.cit., p.431, who suggests the same regarding accessorial liability in the
UAE.
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"A person who designs a police uniform which he sells or lends to a person
cannot be charged of complicity if that person commits an offence by using
that uniform."129
It might be understood from these examples that a state of blindness does not amount
to intention, and is not sufficient grounds for convicting a person as an accessory.
However, there is a need to discuss this kind of blindness situation, because of the
serious effect it has in accessorial liability. Should the UAE follow the inappropriate
view of Husni? We shall find out later in this chapter when discussing the necessity
to reform the mens rea of accessorial liability.
(B) The coincidence of fault:
Some offences can only be committed with fault. These include manslaughter,
causing injury by fault, and causing fire to property by fault. In these offences, the
accused causes an undesired result prohibited by law. The forms of mens rea are
negligence; inadvertence; carelessness; recklessness; imprudence or non-compliance
with the provisions of the law, as an illustration of criminal fault adopted by the
F.P.C., which is represented in two concepts; advertent fault, and inadvertent fault.
There is doubt whether coincidence of fault is a proper form of criminal complicity
in Arab jurisdictions. There are, in fact, two schools of thought regarding this issue.
The first group, supported by many commentators and decisions, indicates that there
129
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is no room for fault in accessorial liability.130 The second group insists that there is
131
no reason for excluding criminal fault from this liability. The majority refuse to
extend accessorial liability to cover fault offences where there is a coincidence
between the parties. They insist that accessorial mens rea is only intention to
participate in offences that can be committed intentionally. It might be true to say the
idea behind this attitude is the nature of some forms of accessorial liability. This
means that incitement and conspiracy require that the accused does the prohibited
action with intention, which means that fault, is outside the state of mind in those
two. By way of assistance, the legislator sometimes states in the F.P.C. and a number
of other Arabic codes, 'providing assistance with knowledge that the things provided
might be used in committing an offence.' The term knowledge is a metonym of the
term intention, which means that fault, is outside accessorial's mens rea.
Another point is that the concept of fault offences does not require the accused to be
the direct cause of the criminal result. It is enough to be one of the reasons of the
result's occurrence. The legislator has defined these kinds of offences in broad terms,
which means that a person who is involved in such a case would be a perpetrator
rather than an accessory.
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By contrast, a minority of commentators and a few cases insist that it is possible to
say that criminal fault forms part of accessories mens rea when there exists a
coincidence in the parties' state ofmind. According to this view, complicity arises in
fault offences where there is coincidence of mens rea between accomplices. That is
to say that the mens rea of an accessory would be the contemplation of the
consequence of the action, or a failure to contemplate that prohibited consequence,
where a reasonable man would do so. For example, A gives his car to B, a person
who is not a good driver. If B kills someone on the street then A is an accessory to
manslaughter. Both have acted with fault and, according to this group, they are
accomplices. The minority indicates that since the Code is silent about accessorial
liability mens rea, fault cannot be excluded from complicity theory. It is enough to
have coincidence of mens rea between the parties, and it is illogical to say that the
accessory in fault offences can be charged as a perpetrator, because accessorial
liability has less criminal role than a perpetrator's liability.
Reform
Under the F.P.C., there is doubt as to what accessorial mens rea requires, whether
intention, fault or both. The F.P.C. and courts do not expressly declare which of these
options to adopt. Further, the requirement of the coincidence of mens rea between
accomplices is not expressly mentioned, which gives rise to further doubts and
vagueness as to the proper understanding of the F.P.C. Moreover, in relation to the
Publication, p. 660; Sorror, A., op cit., p. 404-401, 456-458; Mustafa, M., op cit., pp. 364-365; Rabia,
H., op cit., p. 434.
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three forms of secondary participation mentioned in the F.P.C., incitement,
conspiracy, and assistance, the F.P.C. implies that the first two forms can only be
committed intentionally, although this is not stated expressly in the Code. A slight
problem arises in assistance, which is a broad term, and can be interpreted to include
199
knowledge within its meaning. Nevertheless, the current situation of accessorial
liability needs urgent reform regarding the mens rea requirement. Having said that,
this cannot be achieved unless, first, the requirement ofmens rea, in relation to some
forms of accessorial liability, is considered for reform by applying the notion of
oblique intention. Consequently, the plan of this section is to examine the adequate
mens rea of accessorial liability in the light of the F.P.C., and what the authorities in
the UAE should do about it.
Accessorial mens rea
The following paragraphs are devoted to an examination of the F.P.C. regarding
accessorial mens rea. It is worth bearing in mind some previously stated facts, before
proceeding to a direct examination the position of the matter in the UAE.
It has been pointed out above that the prosecution must establish the mental element
of accessorial liability before charging accessories in respect of the principal crime.
In addition, It was noted that the F.P.C. adopts two forms ofmens rea: intention and
fault. The majority opinion insists that there can be no indictment on grounds of
1,2 There is a strong view that although the legislation use the term knowledge in describing the form
of assistance, as it is the case under the F.P.C., the original aim is to adopt intention as the required
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accessorial liability unless the parties have the same mens rea relating to the offence
in question. This is often called a 'coincidence of parties mens rea.' If such a state of
mind is not proved, there will be separate charges.133 Further, it was mentioned that
the F.P.C. implicitly requires that an accessory must have the intention that the
principal offender brings about the crime, which at the same time, suggests that
accomplices often share the same intention stated in the definition of the offence.
Intention in this regard is controlled by the general theory of criminal intention,
which apparently has to be identical to the perpetrator's intention. Thus, under the
current situation, accessorial intention is a wilful action compounded with the desire
that the perpetrator bring about the prohibited result.
However, some leading Arabic legal commentators indicate that what has been said
above is relevant for intentional crimes only. It means that since the requirement is
the coincidence of mens rea, accessorial liability can be established if both the
principal and accessory act in fault. This indicates that accessorial mens rea depends
on the nature of the crime. Consequently if it is an intentional crime, the mens rea is
intention, and if it is an offence of fault, the mens rea is fault. In both examples, the
accomplices have to share the same mental element. The main reason for such a
position is that since the Code is silent as regards mens rea, the concept of fault can
be accommodated in accessorial liability because it acts in line with the requirement
of 'coincidence of mens rea.' By contrast, it was noted that the majority of
commentators refuse to extend accessorial liability to cover fault offences, where
there is a coincidence of parties. They insist that accessorial mens rea is only
mens rea like the forms of encouragement and conspiracy. See: Sidky, A., op. cit., p. 359.
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constituted by intention to participate in offences that can be committed
intentionally.
The required mens rea of criminal liability when the F.P.C. is vague:
An important question must be addressed at this stage: what is the situation when the
F.P.C. is silent or in doubt regarding the mental element of any offence? A. Mahdi
indicates that Arabic legal commentary confirms that, when the law is silent about
the mental element in an offence, the required form ofmens rea is intention, without
its being expressly stated as such, while the form of fault needs to be explicitly
stated.134
However, this is not the case in the F.P.C. when the Code takes another approach.
Article (43) states that:
"An offender shall be responsible for a crime whether he has committed it
with intention or fault, unless the law explicitly provides for intention."
This is clearly interpreted as a departure from the above requirement of the Arabic
legal commentary. The above article suggests that the Code must expressly state the
form of intention, otherwise fault should be treated as the required mens rea of an
offence. It is important to note that the F.P.C. in this connection acts in line with the
1989 English Draft Criminal Code, where it states in cl. 20. (1):
"Every offence requires a fault element of recklessness with respect to each
of its elements other than fault elements, unless otherwise provided."135
Mustafa, M., op.cit., p. 364.
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Mahdi, A. op. cit. p. 200-222; Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 279; Sorror, op. cit. p. 372; A1 Shinaway, S.,
Alnadaria Alama fee Algarema wal Alikab fee Qanon Alokobat Al Kuwaiti, (Arabic. The General
Theory ofCrime and Punishment in Kuwait Penal Code) (2nd ed.1992). p. 753.
English Draft Criminal Code 1989. See commentary in Vol. 2 p. 195 at p. 27.
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Since the F.P.C. is silent regarding accessorial mens rea, does this suggest that fault
is the minimum requirement of culpability?
This idea has not yet been addressed by other Arabic legal commentators. On the
other hand, one might think that article (43), above, is a vital source from which to
propose that the form of fault is the minimum requirement of accessorial mens rea.
However, article (43) is rather ill structured. First of all, there is no clear reason why
the F.P.C. in article (43) departs from the above requirement that intention is the
normal form ofmens rea and need not be explicitly stated, a point that is accepted by
almost all Arabic jurists. Second, a careful examination ofmost articles of the F.P.C.
suggests that the Code abandoned the application of article (43) in favour of the view
of Arabic jurists. For example, crimes committed against property such as theft
robbery, burglary, breach of trust, and fraud, are in fact very serious crimes, and the
F.P.C. does not expressly state that intention is the required form of mens rea. Does
this suggest that those crimes can be committed with fault? In fact, the answer must
be in the negative, because the nature of these crimes does not allow such an
approach, and it is difficult to see a court accepting this approach. This promotes one
to suggest that the application of article (43) is misleading and should not affect the
position of mens rea when dealing with accessorial liability whether regarding the
current or the appropriate conception.
Consequently, another question establishes itself. What is the required accessorial
mens rea under the F.P.C.?
The answer to this is that criminal intention is the required mens rea whatever the
offence is. This conclusion leads us to discuss three important topics:
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1- what should constitute intention under accessorial liability.
2- the essence of accessorial liability.
3- why must intention be the required mens rea, regardless of the mens rea of the
principal offender.
(1) What should constitute intention under accessorial liability:
It must be emphasised that the following discussions examine oblique intention as a
general concept. However, since our concern is the liability of accessories, I believe
that this notion of intention should be adopted in deciding the required mens rea of
such liability. A discussion of oblique intention of the liability of the principal is
beyond this study.
It was earlier indicated that direct intention is clearly connected to purpose. Arabic
legal commentators call this first degree purpose and move further from this strict
nature of criminal intent to another form called second degree purpose, where the
offender's original purpose is to bring about result (A) but his action will inevitably
cause another result (B). (This is interpreted as oblique intent under the English Draft
Criminal Code). Consequently, such a form cannot stand on its own, as it has to be
based on desiring a criminal purpose in the first place. An obvious example is that in
which the offender wishes to bomb a cargo aeroplane intending to damage the plane
in order to claim under an insurance policy. The first degree purpose is to damage
the plane; the second degree purpose is that of killing the passengers or the crew.
However, in a situation where a person only contemplates that a criminal result will
certainly follow from his voluntary action, under Arabic jurisprudence this will be
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considered as merely an instance of gross fault or subjective recklessness as it is
understood in English law.
The question is why should this not be considered as oblique intention, or merely as
evidence of intention. Such a high degree of contemplation probably should be
judged separately from fault and intention, or should be considered as intention or
evidence of intention, but should not be categorised within the concept of fault. For
instance the American Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) treats this notion as separate form
of culpability. Thus under the M.P.C. mens rea is established in three forms: purpose;
knowledge; and recklessness. Section 202 (2) (b) indicates that:
"A person acts knowingly with respect to material element of an offence
when...(ii) if the element involves a result of this conduct, he is aware that it
is practically certain that this conduct will cause such a result."136
In this regard, it must be said that since the appropriate accessorial mens rea under
the F.P.C. is intention, adopting the above form of the M.P.C. in the concept of
criminal intention will have the ability of encapsulating many activities which
probably now are outside the net of accessorial liability. For example, a person who
lawfully sells guns and knows that his customer will certainly use one in committing
an offence, might not be considered as an accessory if the prosecution cannot show
that he wanted the principal offender to commit the offence.
One might argue that 'oblique intent' should be applied to the prevalent view in
Arabic legal commentary. However, given that 'oblique intention' in Arabic
1,6 Clarkson C. Keating, H., Criminal Law: Texts and Materials (4th ed. 1998), London: Sweet &
Maxwell, p. 152.
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jurisprudence is a very controversial and confusing issue, the classification of
intention or purpose into first degree purpose and second degree purpose being a
result of such conflict, this source does not provide the best solution. Further, it must
be emphasised that the opinions of Arabic legal commentators do not have binding
effect; were this to be so, it would confine UAE criminal law to an unacceptable
extent. UAE criminal law being formed from a variety of sources, a move away from
regional views should be made without any pressure from such indefensible
restrictions, retaining only that which merits retention.
In addition, it was indicated that there are two schools of thought regarding oblique
intention. Neither provides an accurate or proper solution to the problem. The less
convincing is the first school which demolishes the boundaries of criminal intention
and brings much uncertainty to the issue by indicating that when an offender intends
to bring about a particular result and a more serious result occurs he will be
responsible for it, even though he did not contemplate the end result. This is justified
by indicating that an offender must first harbour the purpose of causing a criminal
result (A) and as consequence of this action, another result (B) occurs. The offender,
thus, is responsible, on objective proof of the reasonable man test, for result (B). This
is called an oblique intent, indicating that it is an exceptional form, and as such, it
needs to be expressly stated in specific articles of penal codes.137
This interpretation of the first school is not totally convincing and leaves one
uncertain as to the proper aspect of oblique intent. Having said that, this is not to
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defend the opinion of the second school, which also has its drawbacks. Oblique
intention according to this school means that the offender does not need to
contemplate that the result will certainly happen, but rather that either a probable or
possible result will flow from his voluntary action. However, the offender must
accept the possible occurrence of such a result, otherwise such contemplation is
1 TO
classified as gross fault. Proponents of this school indicate that this type of
intention is an independent form of purpose, which is a class in its own without any
need for express provision. It was argued that this does not involve anything new
because desiring or accepting a result as being likely to happen amounts to the same
thing, which means that the offender wants the prohibited result or consequence to
occur. I believe that the degree of contemplation should not be important or relevant
simply because both desire and acceptance of a result can be called purpose, the only
difference being how strong such a purpose is (only to decide the appropriate
punishment.)
A. Sidky indicates that the efforts of legal commentary regarding the distinction
between direct and oblique intent have not provided an answer to the problem. He
thinks that this is a normal situation because such a problem should be solved by the
courts in examining criminal cases, where the facts of each case provide the
opportunity for proper examination. Accordingly, he indicates that since the
legislation does not provide a direct answer to such a distinction, the criminal courts
1,7 See the summary of those opinions in Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Intention) op. cit., pp. 281-285.
138 ibid. p. 294
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have to examine and evaluate the notion of oblique intent, which should be
determined subjectively.139
Sidky's view is reasonable in its general outline. However, he fails to deal with some
important points. First, oddly under Arabic jurisprudence, the role of legal
commentary is much more important than the view of the judiciary, which causes
another odd outcome by leading to reliance on outsiders who do not work within the
reality of distinctive customs and culture of other countries, especially countries such
as the UAE. Second, it must be understood that judges are unwilling to act so as to
create a new legal principle, which is, rather, the task of the legislature. Even where
the law grants such an opportunity, the judiciary, especially in the UAE, will
probably rather take its cue from another Arabic country, particularly Egypt. In this
case, however, the Egyptian judiciary has not provided a united solution to the
problem. Therefore, it must be said that the best answer in relation to the issue of
criminal intention is to be provided directly and expressly by the Code, which needs
amendment to solve the problem. This brings us to another question: what should the
Code state about oblique intent in relation to accessorial liability?
Before answering this, one might turn to a leading commentator, R. Bhanam, who
asks a very simple question: what distinguishes intention from other forms of mens
rea?140 He points out that direct intention is related to the notion of purpose, but this
is what intention contains. In fact, there is a middle position between criminal
139
Sidky, A., op. cit., p. 326.
140
Bhanam, R., Alrtadaria Alama le Alqanon Aljenai, (Arabic. The General Doctrine of Criminal
Law) (1995), Egypt: Almareaf Publication, pp. 751-5.
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intention and fault (recklessness) for a voluntary action which is performed with
knowledge or contemplation of a virtually certain or probable consequence. Unlike
other Arabic commentators, Bhanam points that this form is called indirect intention,
which amounts to what it is understood as oblique intention.
Bhanam's view is not shared by other legal commentators and comes to a similar
position to that of English case law before Woollin (1998), except in two respects.
Firstly, Bhanam's views put this type ofmens rea into a special class behind purpose
and ahead of subjective fault and suggest that it stands on its own, as a form of
intention and not merely an evidence of purpose (in the same way as does the
English Draft Criminal Code in cl. 18). Secondly, the level of contemplation of the
voluntary action is either that the result will occur (virtual certainty) or that might
occur (probability) but if the result is merely possible, it is only governed by
subjective fault.
Bhanam's opinions are weighty, but some points need to be discussed. According to
Bhanam, when the result is probably going to occur the intent in question is indirect.
However, this combines subjective fault with indirect intent, which is not a widely
held position and it would result in conflict and disharmony between the two forms
ofmens rea. Perhaps it would have been preferable if he had linked a higher degree
of contemplation such as virtual or practical certainty with this notion of mens rea.
Such a suggestion would not acknowledge the existence of problems in examining
oblique intention from the point of view of the degree of knowledge or
contemplation, but would emphasise, rather, that the degree of knowledge should be
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decided by examining all the evidence and inferring the degree of knowledge in each
case, which should be separate from intention and fault.
The F.P.C. should use either the view of the American M.P.C. which distinguishes
knowledge of virtual certainty from other forms of mens rea and call it 'knowledge'
or cl. 18 of the English Draft Criminal Code which treats knowledge of virtual
certainty as an oblique intention apart from purpose, or adopt the use of virtual,
practical certainty used in the English case law as an evidence of purpose. This type
of intention should be the required mens rea, with purpose, in relation to the
accessorial forms of instigation and assistance, or at least regarding the form of
assistance. By contrast, conspiracy should require only purpose. The above opinions
of oblique intention are much preferable to the two Arabic schools of thought.141 The
F.P.C. is vague in relation to oblique intention, and this perhaps brings an
opportunity to adopt either of the above, in relation to accessorial liability, but only
when the F.P.C. is amended. Under the current situation intention means first degree
purpose and second degree purpose, as previously mentioned.
It is important to remind oneself that there are problems in applying the test of
knowledge of virtual certainty to criminal intention, especially when distinguishing
this from the notion of subjective recklessness. The important question would be:
how can a court determine whether a defendant contemplated a result as virtually or
practically certain or as having no substantial doubt that the result will occur? Even
in applying the knowledge of probabilities, as an oblique intention, there would be
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some difficulties in determining the degree of contemplation. In this connection,
Glanville Williams writes that:
"There is no agreed mathematical translation of 'probable,' and all we can
say about 'likely' is that it may cover lower degree of probability than
'probable' (although dictionaries make them both the same). In statistics,
probability means the whole range of possibility between impossibility and
certainty (in mathematical terms, between naught and one)... Even if there
were an Act of Parliament saying that probability in law means a probability
of (say) 51 or more, the jury would have great difficulty in adjudicating the
issue unless evidence were presented of elaborate experiments to determine
the probability."142
However, he supports knowledge of virtual certainty, when he states that:
"Clearly, one cannot confine the notion of foresight of certainty to certainty
in the most absolute sense. It is a question of human certainty, virtual
certainty, or practical certainty. This is still not the same as speaking in terms
of probability."143
The above view suggests that where virtual or practical certainty or having no
substantial doubt exists, the matter should be treated as oblique intent. Surprisingly,
Williams does not agree with this when dealing, in particular, with accessorial
liability. Rather he propounds a justification for requiring intention to act and
knowledge of the consequences, something that has not expressly been examined by
English case law.
On the other hand if it is accepted that contemplation of a result as virtually certain to
occur, based on inferences from all the evidence presented to the court, constitutes
oblique intent, this would cause some confusion with the normal definition of the
term. The reason for this is that it does not actually constitute intention itself
141 See the situation of oblique intention under English law at the beginning of this chapter.
142 Williams, G., TBCL, (1st ed. 1978) op. cit., pp. 215-216.
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Williams, G., TBCL, (2nd ed. 1983) op. cit., p. 85.
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(purpose), nor a subjective fault or recklessness. It is merely a class in itself and need
to be expressly indicated, which follows the same approach of the American M.P.C.
and the English Draft Criminal Code.
Many discussions of criminal complicity play a central role in the writings of legal
commentators, but since they alone do not decide the matter, other principles need to
be invoked. For example, should intention, regarding accessorial liability, be judged
differently from the general theory? In other words, should intention here, be based
only on the notion ofwanting the offence to occur?
It has been noted that criminal intention has a very narrow meaning, based on
'purpose', and there is no mention of oblique intent under the F.P.C. Likewise, it was
suggested that knowledge of virtual certainty should be treated, at least from an
evidential point of view, as evidence of intention, until the Code is amended.
However, such a restrictive approach might lead some culpable accessories to escape
the net of accessorial liability. A clear example of this is where a person provides
help not with aim that the principal should commit the crime but in order to facilitate
its commission. The person in this example is indifferent whether the primary crime
is committed or not. Under the current situation of the F.P.C. the prosecution has to
prove that the accessory wanted the crime to occur, which by the same token,
indicates that intention to facilitate the crime is probably not sufficient for
incrimination. In a point of fact, such a thing is inappropriate and causes some
problems for the prosecution. There is no reason why the Code should not include
facilitative purpose with the meaning of intention in all accessorial forms. Indeed, the
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F.P.C. has adopted such a term, regarding accessorial liability as an offence against
the external security of the State, as in article (171) and some other offences.144
To conclude, the amendment of the F.P.C. should concentrate on developing the
concept of oblique intention in relation to accessorial liability. This should take either
the position of the American M.P.C. or that of English law. Until such an amendment
occurs, the UAE courts should take note that there is a problem relating the
requirements of intention in accessorial liability, which is currently connected to
purpose. A positive step is needed, which suggests that the courts should treat
knowledge of virtual certainty, especially regarding accessorial liability, as evidence
of intention. One might argue that this cannot be accomplished in a codified legal
system because case law is not a source of law. Certainly, this does not suggest
giving the courts a legislative power, but the proposed function of the court here is
merely an interpretative one; this can include the development of a concept within
the subjective criteria of criminal guilt, a matter which could be under the control and
restriction of F.S.C. of the UAE and the Dubai Cassation Court. One interpretative
source is legal commentary, which now does not follow such approach. However,
interpretation should not be bound by legal commentary, it should concentrate on the
144 An example of this under the F.P.C. are:
Article (150): "A death penalty shall be imposed on...B) any one who, at the time of war, instigate
soldiers to join the service of any foreign state or facilitate such an action."; Article (187): "A death
penalty or life imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who commands an armed gang, takes
the gang charge, or manages its movement; system for the purpose of capturing, plundering territories,
or properties owned by the State or any group of people, or for the purpose of resisting the military
force ordered to capture the offenders of these crimes. Other members of such a gang shall be
punished by temporary imprisonment."; Article (188): "Life or temporary imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly supplies or give the gang mentioned in previous article [
article 187] weapons, tools, equipment, tools to help them in reaching their aim, sends them aid, raise
funds for them, or involves in any kind of criminal communication with the leaders or directors of the
gang, or by knowing their aim and character provides them with houses or places of meetings."
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subjective nature of intention and bring a higher degree of knowledge close to the
requirement of intention, especially in accessorial liability. It is important to mention
that this does not constitute an overlap of the concept of gross fault with purpose, it is
merely a suggestion that gross fault or, in other words, knowledge of virtual certainty
should be treated as evidence of intention, which is, in fact, a matter of evidential
procedures until the Code is amended to expressly indicate that such state ofmind is
of a class in itself. Moreover, the above suggestion will not infringe any rule of law
because it does not declare that knowledge of virtual certainty (gross fault) is an
intention in itself, but merely an evidence of intention, which helps in clearing the
vagueness of this part in accessorial liability. R. Youngs correctly indicates that even
in codified legal systems the codes need to be interpreted, developed and
supplemented because the drafters cannot consider every possible situation that an
article might govern.145 It is wrong to imagine that any code does not need
interpretation.146 Perhaps the only problem is that such a suggestion would not be
accepted by the majority of Arabic legal commentators, which might lead judges and
prosecution to refuse the proposal. However, considering the fact that the above
proposal is based on subjective criteria and an evidential standard, judges should
adopt the proposal because it gives the power to control crime in the case of
accessorial liability; otherwise, it will allow many offenders to escape criminal
responsibility because of the narrow and restricted meaning of criminal intention
l4:>
Youngs, R., English, French & German Comparative Law (1998), London: Cavendish Publishing
Limited, p. 50.
146 For example, during the time of Frederick of Prussia the Prussian Land Code contained about
17,000 clauses and was intended to help lawyers but even legislation on this massive scale cannot be
applied in purely mechanical way. ibid. p. 44.
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under the F.P.C. A supportive view of this comes from Judge Hassan Kera, the
previous Head of the Dubai Cassation Court. He said:
"The Cassation Court is a court of law, seeks to supervise the application and
the unity of interpreting the law...For interpretation, the court shall not be
bound by written articles, even old ones because its function is to clear and
moderate the law to accommodate the application of new theories in
society."147
(2) The essence of accessorial liability:
Two important matters need careful examination under this heading. The first of
these is an understanding of the essence of accessorial liability according to legal
commentary and in terms of the actual situation. Second, there is the issue as to
whether consensus on a legal subject is desirable in terms of arguments concerned
with Arabic legal unity.
a) Understanding of the essence of accessorial liability in legal
commentary and the actual situation:
In Arabic legal commentary, regarding the issue ofmens rea, there is consensus that
accomplices must have something called mental connection, an Arabic legal term,
used to link their guilt jointly under the doctrine of criminal complicity; if such
connection is not established their guilt is judged separately. For example H. Rabia,
indicates:
147
Kera, H., "Muqdima", Majalt Alqda xva Altashria (Arabic. "Introduction" (January 1993) Court &
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"The material element (causation) is not enough to establish criminal
complicity. Yet, there must be a sort of mental connection to combine
accomplices under one criminal enterprise. There is a unanimity that such
1 48
mental connection must exists, but what constitutes it is under debate."
It has been pointed out above that the principle of the coincidence of accomplices'
mens rea was divided into the following: coincidence of intention; and coincidence
of fault. Further, It has been argued that the latter is not appropriate in deciding the
mental element in accessorial liability, and I pointed out that many commentators
approved the first. Such commentary indicates that the principle of coincidence
demands that an accessory must have the intention that the principal commits a
crime, thus, all accomplices must share the same intention as stated in the definition
of the offence. Accordingly lack of joint intention or, in other words, mental
connection means each must be judged on separate liability because such joint
intention, under their view, is the essence of complicity. It has already been
mentioned that, in the past, the view was that mental connection must require some
sort of conspiracy: agreement or tacit understanding. One might think that such a
view points to the requirement that accomplices must know each other, discuss the
crime, and apportion their roles. This may have been the view in the past;
commentators from the 1950's onwards tried to move mental connection from the
above view to one in which the accessory only must know that the principal is to
commit or is committing the offence and must share that intention with the principal,
regardless of whether he knows of the accessory's participation.149 Thus, the
accessory's knowledge is the only important issue when speaking in terms of
148
Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 371.
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Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 28..
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knowledge between the parties, which at the same time suggests the there is no need
to establish on the part of the principal knowledge of the activities of accessorial
parties.
One might argue that the move from the old view was due to its narrowness and
undue restriction which prevented the extension of the net of criminal complicity.
This may be true, but two points raise some doubts as to this analysis. First it might
be possible to state that those who instigated and advocated the move are the
commentators who supported applying fault in complicity, and because fault does
not encompass agreement, they might favour abandoning the requirements for
agreement, even in its tacit form, in deciding the required mental connection. Having
said that, those who suggested intention alone is sufficient as the required mens rea,
have taken the same view that knowledge is only important to the accessory;
accomplices must have joint intention but it is not necessary that the principal has
knowledge of the accessory. This brings more controversy to the issue. Second, if the
basis of such a move is linked to the accessory's willingness to participate in the
principal's crime, it would be very strange to suggest that they must share intention.
In fact, this would bring us back to the starting point, that there should be some sort
of knowledge between the principal and the accessory in deciding the required
mental connection. Many have indicated that this is not needed. For instance, H.
Rabia summarises the view of Arabic legal commentary by indicating that:
"The correct view presumes that the mental connection in intentional crime
requires that there must be a joint criminal intention. Such a thing requires
each accomplice must have intention to intervene compound with knowledge
of the action of the other parties.. .There is no necessity that the principal
offender must know or even accept the actions of co-principals or
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accessories. What is required is that the accessory must have knowledge of
the actions of the principal offender and intend to intervene."150
Instead of linking the mental connection to the concept of knowledge or willingness,
sharing the same mens rea with the principal is the current description favoured by
legal commentary. The direct effect of this approach is that instead of focussing on
the accessory's willingness to participate, a groundless requirement of joint intention
is required. (One might think that since there is a agreement between commentators
over this, then this should be classified as an authority. It should not.) In fact, in most
cases, accomplices act with a similar state of mind, in other words, with joint
intention. However, should this suggest that joint intention is the essence of our
discussion? If so, what are the grounds for this? In fact, not only common sense
suggests that there is a serious misunderstanding in deciding the mental connection,
there is also no great need to establish joint intention. The primary difficulty lies in
the scope of joint intention, which requires establishing that knowledge or at least a
tacit agreement exists between the parties, and this is not required according to legal
commentary.
Yussar A. Ali indicates:
"The mental connection in criminal complicity... requires two important
elements. First the awareness of the accomplice of the activities of other
accomplices, ... Second, the willingness to engage or incorporate in the
committing of the crime."151
150
Rabia, H., op. cit., pp. 373-375.
151
Ali, Y.A., Shark Qanon Alokobat: Alnadariat Alama, Alkitab Althani, (Arabic. Explanation of the
Penal Code: The General Theories, Book Two) (1987), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. p. 10.
189
This view confirms the situation wherein willingness to participate must be treated as
the essence of accessorial liability and as representing the reality of the situation.
Unfortunately, Yussar A. Ali departs from his earlier argument when he indicates:
"The willingness to participate means 'joint intention'' or in other words
'intention to intervene' Without this there would not be a total unity between
1 S?
accomplices in achieving their goal."
In departing from his earlier view, Yussar Ali defines willingness to participate as
including 'joint intention or 'intention to intervene'. Strangely, he uses both terms to
mean similarity ofmens rea between the parties, which confirms that he believes that
joint state of mind, whether in intention, or fault, is the essence without which no
criminal complicity exists. However, he declines to offer any reason for departing
from the earlier statement, which implies that there is some misunderstanding of the
essence of accessorial liability in Arabic legal commentary.
Using the term 'intention to intervene'' refers to the accessorial state of mind and
does not mean 'joint intention because the terms differ in relation to knowledge.
Logically the first focuses only on the accessory's state ofmind and insists that there
is no need to establish knowledge between the parties, (the current view accepted by
legal commentators although they do not declare that willingness is the essence).
'Joint intention', on the other hand, stresses that knowledge is essential and that the
prosecution must establish such a link. It should be noted that M. Husni confirms this
by insisting that 'intention to intervene' just brings controversy and does not provide
the best answer to the problem and thus should not be used as a term in this
132 ibid. p. 11; Sorror., op. cit., p. 403.
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connection. He notes that the above term tends to the conclusion that fault is not
within the definition of accessorial mens rea, while he thinks it is, and, unlike other
commentators, he does not use the above term. Instead, Husni uses 'joint intention'
intending it to be understood as the essence of criminal complicity.
One might wonder why there is such misunderstanding of the essence of accessorial
liability. Presumably, the requirement of joint intention is a consequence of the
derivative nature of accessorial liability, in that liability is incurred only where the
principal has committed, or at least attempted to commit, an offence. A strict
interpretation of this would suggest that, since accessorial liability depends on the
liability of the principal, accomplices should be charged and convicted of the same
crime and generally the same punishment. Joint state ofmind serves such a purpose,
without which would exist on odd situation contrary to the notion of secondary
involvement, which derives its criminality from the committal of the principal
offence. An example of this is where A instigates a driver, P, to speed with the aim
that P should kill a pedestrian, which he does by fault. A might be liable for murder
or attempted murder, and P might be liable for manslaughter or assault. According to
the above orthodox view the derivative nature of accessorial liability would only link
A to manslaughter and this cannot be achieved because of the odd requirement of
joint intention. Otherwise A's liability must be judged separately from complicity.
Should I confirm that the derivative nature is the reason behind the requirement of
joint state of mind? It must be said that those who advocate using the term 'joint
intention' do not expressly advocate the above view. It is only implicit within their
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attempt to find the hidden foundation to establish joint intention as the essence of the
subject. This raises the question as to whether accessories can be convicted of a more
serious crime than the principal offender. In the above example, the question is
whether A should be charged and convicted ofmurder separately or as an accessory,
assuming that P's crime is only manslaughter. It is a new question and there is no
serious discussion of this except in general terms. However, M. Husni rejects the
notion that A and P should be judged according to the doctrine of criminal
complicity. He says:
"When the actions of the principal is not serious his liability should not be
serious, and this leads to say that the actions of accessory should be the
same... The accessory is responsible for what has been committed not for
what he wants to be committed. If the accessory intends a serious crime and
the principal commits less serious crime, the accessory is responsible for the
less serious because it (the principal crime) is the basis of his liability."133
Thus, although not expressly stated by Husni, joint intention is required because of
the derivative nature of criminal complicity. This view is, however, not universal .
For example, A. Mahdi, while endorsing the joint intention approach, indicates that,
in the above example, A and P are accomplices but that A is liable for murder or
attempted murder, P is liable for manslaughter or assault according to the criminal
complicity.154 Likewise A. Sorror indicates that the derivative nature of criminal
complicity does not remove the requirement to distinguish the guilt of accomplices
according to their state of mind relating to the crime that was committed. He says
that:
"The Egyptian legislation favours a limited version of the derivative theory of
complicity...This brings into attention four presumptive examples: ...
Second, 'intention and fault' an accessory can act intentionally in a crime that
153
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op.cit., pp. 447-8.
154
Mahdi, A., op.cit., p. 393.
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the principal commits with fault. An example of this is when a nurse puts
poison in a bottle, which another gives to a patient recklessly, and causes his
death. The nurse is liable for being an accessory to murder while the principal
is responsible for manslaughter because complicity arise from the intention of
the nurse to engage or contribute in homicide. This acts in line with applying
limited sense of the derivative theory. Joint intention is only required when
the principal acts intentionally"155
The existence of divided opinions regarding the matter suggests that there is room for
arguing that accessories may be convicted of more serious crimes than the principal.
There is no clear statement as to the reaction of the UAE courts to the above debate,
although, the F.P.C. probably endorses Sorror's view, indicating in article (52) that:
"If the classification of a crime or penalty changes in relation to the intent of
an offender or as a result of his knowledge, an accomplice whether principal
or accessory to the crime shall be punished be punished in accordance with
his intent or knowledge."
Presumably, this article runs contrary to the application of the principle of the
coincidence of mens rea, in relation to joint intention. It indicates that accomplices
could have a separate mens rea from the principal, in relation to the one offence.
However, someone might argue that this article is relevant only in circumstances that
can intensify or reduce the punishment, which have to be related to one crime only.
For example, in the case ofmurder, under the F.P.C. the mens rea can be of differing
degrees, namely, simple intention; intention compounded by plotting in advance;
intention compounded by premeditation; using poisonous or detonating substances.
Thus, without changing the charge, the accomplices can be convicted and subjected
to more serious punishment, depending only on their knowledge of some aggravating
circumstances as in above example. However, the effect and the language of article
135
Sorror, A., op.cit., pp. 474-5; Bhanam, R., (1995) op.cit., pp. 690-1.
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52, suggest the opposite, which presumably proposes that accessories can be liable
for more serious crimes than the principal (to remove any uncertainty concerning
such matter, UAE should clarify the law at this point).
Consequently, it is safe to say that the depiction of joint intention as the essence of
criminal complicity both lacks logic and runs counter to criminal law policy. From
the above examination, I conclude that the pure essence of criminal complicity lies in
the accessory's willingness to contribute to the offence of the principal offender,
based on his intention to participate. The essence of the subject can be extended if
the proposed definition of oblique intention is accepted as including both willingness
and a high degree of knowledge of a crime. This provides a strong foundation based
on issues related to the accessory only, from the language of the F.P.C. and the
understandings of legal commentary. Declaring that intention to participate, in other
words, willingness, is the essence of accessorial liability enables the courts to direct
their efforts so as to deal with certain activities which otherwise might remain
outside the net of criminal complicity. For example, the doctrine of innocent agency
treats an accessory as a principal offender if he uses an innocent person to commit a
crime. Thus, the principal here would not be punished because of the lack of a
relevant mental state, where the principal acts with fault and the accessory with
intention, under the joint intention approach, the accessory is neither principal, under
the concept of innocent agency, nor an accessory and his liability should be located
elsewhere. Yet, if it is not possible to find or locate a set of rules to punish such an
offender, he or she might escape on otherwise justified conviction. This might be
justifiable under a joint intention basis but not under the willingness/knowledge
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approach, which would treat a person in such circumstances as an accessory where
the doctrine of innocent agency would fail so to do so. Some commentators may
justify their approach to include fault in criminal complicity by insisting, wrongly, on
joint state of mind as the essence of the mental connection required between
accomplices.
Should the UAE courts adopt our view of the mental connection? The court taking a
common sense approach can interpret the essence of liability as the accessory's
willingness to participate, or his high degree of knowledge that the principal will
commit an offence, if the latter is enacted or approved. This approach is based on
analogy, comparison, interpretation of the F.P.C., and commentary, although
admitting it currently lacks support. Although it might be hoped that the courts will
consider this view, there are reasons for UAE courts to cling to the principle of
coincidence of mens rea. It is likely that the courts will apply joint intention as the
essential element in deciding the mental connection between accomplices. This can
be justified in examples where accomplices share joint intention, although
willingness is still the essence. There remain, then, several vague areas, as a result of
the following factors: first, accessorial liability is a closed subject and many presume
that the issue is clear and settled, which in fact is not. Second, foreign judges do not
investigate the reality of the issue under the UAE criminal system, either because of
their link to their own legal culture or because of a lack of materials which are
directly relevant to UAE criminal law. Even recent books dealing with criminal law
fail to investigate the F.P.C. and the local criminal codes directly. Instead the authors
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make use of links to their own legal culture, thinking that Arabic legal discussion
must take place within a structure of 'legal unity.'
b) Must 'unanimity or consensus' of Arabic legal commentary be
considered as part of interpretation the F.P.C.?
Regarding the issue of mens rea, the issue cannot be dealt with cursorily merely
because there is an indication from the legal commentators that there is unanimity or
consensus that accomplices must have a joint state of mind. There is clear pressure
on jurists to retract their views of what is and what should be the law within the
confines of Arabic legal commentary, based on 'unanimity or consensus.' However,
these terms are vague and controversial and might be viewed as somewhat exclusive.
So, why is it that those terms lead many to think of a legal unity existing between
Arab States especially those in the Middle East?
Before discussing this claim, two important issues must be mentioned. First, any
interpretative measure should concentrate on the wording of the F.P.C. regarding the
issue of accessorial liability. This suggests that what has been said in legal
commentary is inappropriate in relation to the 'coincidence of parties' mens rea
whether by intention or fault. Some might argue that when there is vagueness
regarding an issue, the view preferred in legal commentary should be adopted. This
could be valid in many fields of law, but any proposal relating to criminal law must
be approached with caution, because criminal liability carries such significant
penalties, and is considered so crucial to rights and liberties. An analysis of the
language of the F.P.C. must be the first step in any interpretation. This is not to
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suggest that the role of legal commentary be restricted, but it provides a clear basis
from which to consider the issue of accessorial mens rea. It was pointed out that
there are two schools of thought regarding this issue. Both agree as to the adoption of
the principle of 'coincidence of parties' mens rea', but differ in what should be the
minimum form of mental element. It is not known which view the drafters of the
F.P.C. adopted, or even considered. In addition, it would be problematic to suggest
that the Code adopted the principle of 'coincidence of parties' mens rea', given that
there is nothing in the F.P.C. to suggest this, even though it was possibly copied from
the code of another country, which does apply such a principle. Secondly, one might
argue that Arabic law shares a considerable unity, and this should be borne in mind
in therefore any interpretative measurement, particularly in relation to Egyptian legal
commentators. Flowever, this would be inaccurate, because there is no such tie as
exists between common law countries where a case in country A can be often applied
easily in country B. If this has been the case in Arabic countries, why should the
Government of the UAE have set up a committee charged with drafting a criminal
code? It would have been simpler to select, for example, the Egyptian Penal Code as
a model and to introduce it in the UAE. Presuming an identity of legal interest
ignores the fact that countries differ from one another in many respects and the law
cannot ignore this. For example, the UAE has achieved a higher state of financial
development than most other Arabic States, and to suggest that the UAE adopt
financial laws of countries less developed in this respect would be inappropriate. A
further example is that in 1997 the legislature in the UAE drafted a Code of Money
Laundering, which was totally based on the recommendation of the Financial Action
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Task Force (FATF).'36 The Egyptians are debating whether to draft such a code, yet,
if both codes were to be issued, it would not be necessarily helpful to analyse the
1 C *7
issue ofmoney laundering in one country in relation to the other's code.
It might be asked why legal issues should be addressed domestically. There is strong
view, shared by many, that, contrary to other systems, one must always assume a
high degree of unity within Arabic legal systems. A possible reason for this might be
based on Arabic Nationalism, and yet here what ties do exist are declining and might
be restricted to political rather than legal goals. Thus, a conclusion of legal unity is
likely to be misleading, and simply wrong. For example, Enid Hill indicates:
"Middle Eastern law is not a unity, nor has it ever been. Each modern Middle
Eastern State has its own legal system. Therefore, Middle Eastern law cannot
be assumed to be a unity for the purpose of comparison. Given the
differences existing among Western legal systems, this statement is any thing
but remarkable. What is remarkable, however, is how frequently the Middle
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East is assumed to be a legal unity."
136 The Draft Code ofUAE Money Laundering is still an unofficial document because the Ministry of
Justice and Islamic Affairs is still discussing the ambit of the code and how strong it should be to
surround laundering crimes. Presumably, the UAE in this connection is the first Arabic country to
draft such a code. However, money laundering is a controversial concept and linked to seize the
proceeds of any crime, which the draft code seeks to accomplish, but this is very difficult to achieve
because there is a strong debate about the proper definition of money laundering and how should be
applied by the domestic laws. Many countries are restricting the application of money laundering to
drug trafficking because it is one of a few crimes on which all countries of the world agree on. Thus
one wonders what will happen if such a code is passed but cannot operate because of the vagueness
that shadows the definition of money laundering. It has been said that 'to pass a law and not have it
enforced is to authorise the very thing you wish to prohibit.' Cardinal Richelieu., "Memories", in
Edwin Moore., Collins GEM: Quotations (3rd ed. 1999), Harper Collins Publisher, p. 232.
http://www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/1999/04/07/sya/5.html. [Arabic],
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Hill, E., "Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern Law" (1978) 26 American
Journal ofComparative Law 279. at p. 284. The author was an associate professor of political science
at the American University in Cairo in early 70's. It is worth mentioning that there is no general
agreement regarding the definition of 'Middle East', the author classified it as ' those areas that owe
their Middle Eastern character to historical culture cum religious identification rather than geography.'
Hill, E., ibid. p. 290 at note 42.
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In confirmation of this, Hill reports a story about the Egyptian Civil Code that might
challenge any claim of legal unity:
"The problem of interpreting laws was of manageable proportions when
adopted codes were taken from a single source. The eclecticism of recently-
adopted civil code however has raised problems of interpretation. The
Egyptian Code (Civil Code) of 1948 required jurists to refer to twenty odd
foreign codes for the understanding of the historical source of a rule...Dr
Sanhuri, architect and chief interpreter of the 'eclectic' Egyptian code, has
said that since the rules were formulated to be consistent with the Egyptian
environment and usage...they were divorced from their sources and acquired
an independent existence."159
This is a compelling statement based on the fact that every country has its own
political, economical, and social system, which differs from one state to another.
Accordingly, one must take seriously the statement of Professor Abdalrazzaq Al-
Sanhuri, a well known jurist, that legal texts should be founded on national
standards, and not suffer compulsory interpretation from any legal commentators or
from any other Arabic legal system. Such a matter has to be optional and not
obligatory.
1,9 ibid. p. 289. The author's original reference to this is a conversation between Al-Sanhuri and
Farhat Ziadeh, cited in Ziadeh, F., Lawyers, the Rule ofLaw, and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (1968),
Floover Institution: Stanford California, pp. 144-6. It must be said that although Al-Sanhuri tried to
build an identity for Egyptian law, others, who were the majority, favoured mimicking foreign legal
systems without thinking about the consequences on their culture especially in criminal law. For
example, Tewfik Al-Hakim, a famous Egyptian playwright and novelist, wrote a novel criticising the
alien character of French law and its application to the Egyptian peasants who were supposed to
understand and know the Napoleonic Code. Al-Hakim., The Maze ofJustice, trans. Eban (1947) cited
in Hill, E., op. cit., p. 290 at note 45.
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(3) Why must intention be the required mens rea regardless of the
mens rea of the principal offender?
It was mentioned that the vagueness overshadows the view of Arabic legal
commentaries regarding the issue of mens rea especially by applying the objective
standard of fault within the required mens rea of accessorial liability. This leads us to
favour intention. There are, however, many other good reasons for allowing criminal
intention such a position. One central reason can be found in the words used by the
F.P.C. to describe the required forms of accessorial liability, which suggests that the
nature of all three forms of accessorial liability only requires criminal intention. For
example, encouragement and conspiracy demand that the offender perform the
prohibited action with intention, which means that fault is not of the essence in
deciding the state of mind for accessorial liability. By way of assistance, the
legislation states in article (45), that 'Providing assistance with knowledge that the
things provided might be used in committing an offence.'' The term knowledge is
understood as a metonym of the term intention, and rather than to suggest that fault is
within mens rea of complicity.160 Thus a simple reading of article (45) suggests that
the natural meaning of the words 'encouragement, conspiracy, and assistance'
signify a narrow state of mind standard based on criminal intention. It is very
doubtful that the drafters intended to impose a broad mens rea for accessorial liability
as in fault, because it represents an unwanted incrimination of ordinary actions, for
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example in a situation where, in the course of his business, a person supplies goods
or equipment later used by others to commit an offence. Such a situation is implicitly
included in the F.P.C's treatment of accessorial liability in offences committed
against the external security of the state. I shall examine the situation under these
offences latter.
Second, in the sphere of criminality, accessorial liability may be defined as an
attribute or condition attached to a number of crimes. Thus, it occupies middle
ground between inchoate offences and the liability of the principal offender.
However, the essence of accessorial liability brings it close to inchoate offences in
terms of danger (rather than harm), the specified actus reus, causal connection, and
the element of choice regarding the occurrence of harm. Considering the fact that an
inchoate offence cannot be established by criminal fault and must be linked to
intention, why should not accessorial liability have the same requirement of mens
rea? There is no clear reason why encouragement, for example, should be treated
differently in terms of the mental state required. It is wise to indicate that the same
conditions ofmens rea should be applied whether the form is an inchoate offence or
a mode of accessorial liability.
Third, intention is the highest and most culpable state of mind in criminal law; this
should be the mental state of those who secondarily participate in criminal offences
because in fact they do not engage in bringing about the offence nor do they possess
its mens rea? Accessorial activity in this connection is secondary in nature because
160
Sidki, A., op. cit., pp. 355-9.
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often the principal offender controls the whole crime. One main factor in this is his
choice to decide whether to bring about a crime, the accessory lacks such notion of
choice. Consequently, a high standard should be required, otherwise it will bring
some activities within the net of criminal law without properly addressing the
creation of a distinction between wrongdoing and how should the law response to it.
It initially seems difficult to make such a distinction in the activities of accomplices
and to allow fault with its broad umbrella to play a part in deciding the required mens
rea. Thus, some of those who advocate the fault approach decline to recognise such
variance arguing, rather, for a unity in accomplice's mens rea as it is having the same
degree ofwrongdoing.
Fourth, it was noted that the article (45) of the F.P.C., in describing encouragement
and conspiracy used the phrase: '...and it occurs in accordance with such
(encouragement, conspiracy)'. This might possibly have been drafted to suggest that
the existence of a causal connection between accessorial action and the main crime
should be established. It might be possible also to infer from such words that the
F.P.C. restricts the mens rea issue to intention only. Such an explanation is
significant because we have already seen that there are problems in applying the test
of causation to accessories in the same manner of the liability of the principal
offender.
Fifth, an examination of some parts of the F.P.C. indicates that intention is the
required state of mind for accessorial liability, for example, in Part One: Crimes
against the security and interests of the State. Particularly in Chapter One, regarding
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crimes against the external security of the state, the F.P.C. containing 24 articles
[149- 173], mostly applies higher penalties to offenders, including the death penalty.
It is probably true to indicate that the issue of accessorial liability in Chapter One (of
the F.P.C.) is not entirely governed by the general theory of accessorial liability
which is located in the general part of the F.P.C.
Article (171) regarding accessorial liability in crimes affecting the external security
of the State indicates:
"A person is considered as an accessory by causation in crimes indicated in
this chapter (Chapter One, articles: 149- 173) if he:
1) is aware of the criminal offender's intention and supplies him with aid,
means of subsistence, accommodation, shelter, a meeting place or other
facilities, carries his letters, facilitate his search for the subject of the crime,
concealed; transport; or provide him with information.
2) is knowingly conceals things used, or to be used in the crimes, or resulted
from it.
3) destroys, steals, conceals, or purposely change the facts of a document
which helps to detect the crime, evidence, or punish the offender."
This article has many different implications but its central aim is to guarantee the
assurance that accessorial liability, in this context, is judged separately from the
general theory of accessorial liability. As it is clearly seen from the wording of article
(171), the F.P.C. uses the terms awareness and knowledge to describe the mens rea
required for assistance in these crimes. It is interesting to note that the F.P.C. adopts
criminal intention in the general theory of accessorial liability, yet, exceptionally,
departs from this in those crimes affecting the external security of the State, by
requiring only knowledge or awareness that the provided help will be used to assist
principal offenders or their associates. The F.P.C. in this regard expressly state the
mental element in terms of knowledge in contrast with the general doctrine of
accessorial liability, which lacks such reference. One might ask what is the main
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reason behind this? There is no immediate answer, but perhaps the drafters chiefly
believed in the importance of deterring any criminal acts against the State by extreme
means. However, if this is the case, the F.P.C., in Chapter Two, regarding crimes
affecting the internal security of the State, articles [174-201], does not act in line
with the accessorial provisions of article (171). Chapter Two, however, states that
encouragement and conspiracy are crimes of a principal offender rather than forms of
accessorial liability; accessorial assistance is judged by the general theory of
accessorial liability which requires criminal intention as the only form ofmens rea.161
To conclude on this point, it can be argued that it would be wrong to judge the F.P.C.
from a general perspective; one should, rather, focus on the whole set of articles,
which, taken together, strongly suggest that intention is the required mens rea in
accessorial liability. All the evidence seems to point to intention or willingness as the
essence of accessorial mens rea. However, the worrying point is that the F.P.C. does
not expressly indicate this. This might lead some judges to adopt fault as the required
state ofmind, according to the second school of thought. The prediction of failure of
the courts is mainly based on the fact that legal issues are in the control of jurists
trained in another legal tradition, who may not have full regard for the integrity of
UAE law. This has not happened yet but it may well be a problem in the future.
161 See articles (187, 188, 191) and (192) of the F.P.C.
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Accessorial liability for the additional offence:
'the doctrine of common purpose'
The term 'common purpose' has generally been employed in the doctrine of criminal
complicity to resolve the liability of an accessory of a collateral crime committed by
the principal.1 In other words, this concept governs the liability of accessories where
for example, P and A have agreed to commit crime X together, and this is the
primary aim of their association. However, in the course of committing crime X, P
commits an additional crime, Y. Is A liable for both crime X and crime Y? What
factors decide the scope ofA's responsibility for crime Y?
Usually a crime will not necessarily always be the only result of a plot. There might
be unforeseen or undesirable results. For example, a robbery might lead to murder, or
a theft might lead to an assault. Also procuring of abortion might produce the death
of the woman. This concept, or doctrine, as it is often called, captures such
accessorial activity that needs careful examination. One reason for this is that the
culpability of the accessory, unlike the principal, is realised only under his mens rea
because in the majority of common purpose cases, the accessory attitude is very
negative in nature. In other words, the accessory does not commit the collateral
offence's act, nor does he possess the mens rea required of the principal. For
instance, he might be present at the committing of the offence but not actually
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contributing in any way to the collateral crime; he might also be present, but in
another room of the house where a murder has been committed by the perpetrator; he
might be outside providing a look-out to the other accomplices and might not know
what actually happened at the scene of the crime. Therefore, many questions arise
from this doctrine. This chapter discusses the ambit of such liability in both English
law and in UAE law.
English Law
Generally speaking, accessorial liability consists of the general body of concepts or
rules that governs the prior or contemporary activity or association of an accessory
who is responsible for the principal offender's criminal behaviour. One part of such
criminal liability is the concept of common purpose, which means: The rules that
direct the liability of an accessory who participates in a joint enterprise, make him
liable for any additional offence committed by the principal. The accessory is liable
for this either if he has expressly or implicitly agreed on the committing of the
collateral offence, or he has contemplated the possibility that the principal might
"5
commit that additional offence, and nevertheless, continued with the enterprise.
'
Gillies, P., The Law of Criminal Complicity (1980), Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd. p. 93.
The first sign of the term 'common purpose' suggests that accomplices share the same state of mind
required for the offence but in general practice this view is not true in English law.
2
Smith, K.J., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 1-2.
3
Presumably, the current situation in English law would require foresight only as the sufficient mens
rea. See for example Smith, K., MTLCC, op cit., p. 237; One must note that J.C. Smith emphasises
that the concept of common puipose is a major part of the doctrine of complicity, and he heavily
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Maklin (1838) best describes the concept:
"It is a principle of law that if several persons act together in pursuance of a
common intent, every act in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in
law, done by all." 4
Although most cases dealing with this doctrine are concerned with collateral liability
for homicide, it is relevant to any other crime. 5
Subjective versus Objective
The principle of individual autonomy suggests that a defendant should be responsible
for his own behaviour, which is based on his free will and his making of choices and
decisions. The principle of mens rea puts this into practice by requiring that a
defendant should only be held liable for either intention or contemplation of a
forbidden event or consequence. This, in fact, is understood as a subjective
requirement of awareness to hold a person responsible for a criminal outcome.
Besides this, there is another contrary concept, namely, the objective view of
liability, which is constructive in nature and broadly concentrates on the prohibited
result. The objective view in criminal law maintains that the occurrence of the harm
defined by the offence is highly relevant, while the subjective view indicates that
criticises the estimation of LC. No. 131, which suggests that such doctrine should be abolished. Smith,
J.C., "Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 453 at 461-5. Many
terms are used by legal commentators to describe this liability such as: joint enterprise; common
design; common pursuit; and the liability for unintended consequences.
4 Maklin (1838) 2 Lew CC 225, per Alderson B, cited in LC. No. 131.p. 7.
5
Smith, K.J., MTLCC, op cit., p. 210; Clarkson, C. M., "Complicity, Powell and Manslaughter"
[August 1998] Crim. LR 556 at 560; Smith, J.C., "Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law
Reform" op cit., 453; also it is worth mentioning that accessorial liability is discussed by Hale, Pleas
ofthe Crown, under the crime of murder; Cf. LC. No. 131 p. 145.
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such harm is irrelevant and only the accused's state of mind is more important. This
argument is unbroken in all aspects of responsibility.''
This led some commentators to assume that subjective versus objective is the main
issue which underlines the theory of criminal liability. For example George Fletcher
(1988) indicates:
"The traditionalists root their case in the way they feel about crime and
suffering Modernists hold to arguments of rational and meaningful
punishment. Despite what we might feel, the Modernists insist, reason
demands that we limit the criminal law to those factors that are within the
control of the actor. The occurrence of harm is beyond his control and
therefore ought not to have weight in the definition of crime and fitting
punishment. The tension between these conflicting schools infects virtually
all of our decisions in deciding a system of crime and punishment."7
English law has been clearly moving towards a subjective basis of criminal liability
that requires a focus on the accused's state of mind rather than adopting a
constructive liability.
The subjective version would require the jury to put themselves in the position of the
defendant at a specific moment to infer that he either intended or contemplated the
result. The objective view focuses on the prohibited outcome by linking the
accused's liability to the harm caused on 'the reasonable man' test. This means that if
a rational man, in the position of the defendant, intended or contemplated the
prohibited event or consequence, then the accused is liable.
6
Robinson, P. H. & Darley, J. M., "Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality: Role of
Social Science in Criminal Law Theory" (1998), 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 18
Autumn, p. 409 at 414- 415.
7
Fletcher, G., A Crime ofSelfDefence: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial (1988) at 64. Cited in
Robinson, P. H. &. Darley, J. M., "Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of Criminality" op. cit., p.
415.
8
Ashworth, A., "Transferred Malice and Punishment of Unforeseen Consequences", in Glazebrook,
P. R., (ed.) Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 77.
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It has already been pointed out that to constitute a person as an accessory to an
offence, he must have knowledge of essential matters of the offence. This explores
the theory that the basis of accessories' criminality in the primary offence is
subjective in nature, and this is true regarding his involvement in an additional crime
of the joint enterprise with the principal offender. Some might argue that if English
law chooses subjective standards regarding the issue ofmens rea in both primary and
collateral offences, then there is no need to discuss the 'subjective versus objective'
issue. However, English law used to adopt an objective basis of liability in common
purpose cases for additional offences committed by the principal offender, namely,
the test of the rational man or probable consequences, which connects the guilt of a
person to a presumed criteria of liability, something that would assist the jury in
linking a person with an offence. Moreover, Arabic criminal jurisprudence, as in the
case of UAE F.P.C., adopts, somehow, an objective basis of liability for the guilt of
an accessory to a collateral offence committed by a perpetrator. It has been argued
that the objective view of liability that used to be prevalent in English law was the
historical background for the UAE Code through the medium ofEgyptian law. I shall
discuss this later to see if this is true.
Legal commentary at this point differs. For example, Ashworth (1995) indicates that:
"A hundred years ago Sir James Stephen stated the test as whether the crime
committed by the principal could be regarded as 'probable consequence' of
the common design, an objective test of foreseeability, to be applied to the
point at which the assistance was given or the agreement reached."9
9
Ashworth, A., Principles ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1995), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 431.
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This indicates that Stephen was the first to introduce the objective test of
foreseeability in the doctrine of common purpose, which at the same time suggests
that such a test only occurred in the mid-nineteenth century (1800).10 However, P.
Gillies (1980) takes another view, stating that:
"The requirement of subjective contemplation on the part of the accessory has
not always prevailed. Prior to 1700, a number of English Judges took the
view that a person who had conspired with another for the commission of
crime X could be inculpated as an accessory to the latter's commission of the
crime Y, provided that Y was objectively incidental to their joint commission
ofX."11
Other commentators were either silent or obscure on this issue. Thus, one must
examine some cases, cited by legal commentary, in order to gauge the courts attitude
regarding subjective or objective tests to understand the concept of common purpose.
In Mansell and Herbert (1556), a person seized some goods belonging to a
Frenchman during wartime, and took them to his house. A man pretending to be a
vice- admiral came to the house with servants and assaulted a person there. One of
the servants killed a woman at the house. The Court held that:
"Where persons assembled with force to seize goods under pretence of lawful
authority, and a woman coming out of the house was killed by a stone thrown
by one of the assailants at another person in the gateway, this is murder in
them all."12
10
James F. Stephen was born in 1829 and started his real career in 1859. See: Cross, R., "The Making
of English Criminal Law: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen" [1978] Crim. LR 652.at pp. 652-3.
"
Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., p. 93.
12 Mansell and Herbert (1556) 73 ER 279.
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This case implicitly suggests that the test is objective, although some of the judges
pointed out that if no malice was intended, then charge ofmurder cannot be extended
to others.13
In Thody (1663), P and A engaged in a fight with two others C and D, and A killed
C. Both were convicted of manslaughter. The Court agreed that if two persons
engage in a fight that leads to the death of an opponent they are guilty of
manslaughter, and if both came with an intent of malice, then both the are guilty of
murder. However, if one party who is responsible for the death came with malice and
the other had not, the first is guilty of murder while the other is guilty of
manslaughter.14
Although not totally clear, this case relies on subjective bases of liability as it is
implicitly understood by its facts, but like the former test, both courts did not use the
term common purpose, joint enterprise, or any usual current vocabulary of the
liability of accessories for collateral offences.
In Lord Mohun (1692), a murder case, the Lords asked the judges to answer seven
questions. A related question was:
"5- Whether a person, knowing of the design of another to he in wait to
assault a third person, and accompanying him in that design, if it shall happen
that the third person be killed at that time, in the presence of him who knew
of that design, and accompanied the other in it, be guilty in law of the same
crime with the party who had that design, and killed him, though he had no
actual hand in his death?
Ans. If a person is privy to a felonious design, or to a design of committing
any personal violence, and accompanieth the party in putting that design in
13 ibid. 73 ER 279 at 300.
14
Thody (1663) 89 ER 386.
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execution though he may think it will not extend so far as death, but only
beating, and hath no personal hand, or doth otherwise contribute to it than by
his being with the other person, when he executeth his design of assaulting
the party, if the party dieth, they are both guilty of murder. For by his
accompanying him in the design, he shews his approbation of it, and gives the
party more courage to put it in execution; which is an aiding and abetting
assisting and comforting of him, as laid in the indictment."13
This case illustrates that if an accessory joins the principal in assault which leads to
the killing of the victim, his culpability is based on an objective test, and he is liable
for murder, as is the principal, regardless of whether the accessory had thought that
the assault would lead to murder. However, like the previous cases, the court did not
expressly state that the test was objective, but this is implied from the verdict. It
neither relied on a precedent nor on a commentary. Moreover, the court somehow
suggested that the accessory in collateral offences committed an actus reus because
he was present at the scene of the crime, which gave the principal courage to commit
the murder. Should this suggest that an absent party, if any, would escape
conviction? The case does not answer this. Did the following cases stop at this stage
of using objective criteria?
The ambiguity of the English courts regarding the issue of 'subjective versus
objective' continued. In Anonymous (1723)16 A and P were assaulting C. D, a
stranger, tried to intervene peacefully, but P ran to D and stabbed him with a knife.
Both A and P were charged with murder. However, the judges agreed that A could
not be responsible for murder because it did not appear that he intended any injury to
15 Lord Mohun (1692) 90 ER 1164 at 1164-7.
16
Anonymous (1723) 88 ER 121.
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the person killed. The court here moved again to the subjective standard but did not
make it clear. Also, unlike the previous cases, the court for the first time started to
speak about intention, which is subjective in nature, although no reference was made
to the term 'common purpose.'
By the nineteenth century, cases became more clear on the subject. For example, in
Rex v. John Leonard White and John Richardson (1806)17 two accomplices were
charged with attempted burglary and the collateral offence of assaulting a watchman
who tried to arrest the principal after chasing him. The judge directed the jury, that if
the accessory had the same illegal purpose, and both determined to resist which
might be part of the plan to use force, then both are guilty of assault. Such inference
would be implied from the evidence surrounding the case. The jury inferred no
common purpose and the accessory was acquitted. As it was seen, the case adopted
subjective criteria, which was taken up by following cases. For instance in Rex v.
1 R
Collison (1831) two private watchmen, seeing P and A with two carts laden with
apples, suspecting them to be stolen, went to apprehend them in order to get
assistance. One watchman approached P and the other approached A. However, P
assaulted the first watchman using a bludgeon. Both P and A were indicted for an
assault and wounding with intent to murder. Garrow B. said:
"To make the prisoner (A) a principal, the jury must be satisfied, that, when
he and his companion went out with a common illegal purpose of committing
the felony of stealing apples, they also entertained the common guilty
purpose of resisting to death, or with extreme violence, any persons who
might endeavour to apprehend them; but if they had only the common
purpose of stealing, and the violence of the prisoner's companion was merely
the result of the situation in which he found himself, and proceeded from the
17 Rex v. John Leonard White and John Richardson (1806) 172 ER 469- 470.
18 Rex v. Collison (1831) 172 ER 827.
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impulse of the moment, without any previous concert, the prisoner will be
entitled to an acquittal."19
As it appeared, the verdict was not guilty. The court selected subjective criteria and
used the usual language which is found in cases nowadays. However, the court did
not expressly give any indication of its use of the subjective version. Was it
agreement or contemplation? No clear answer can be obtained from the ruling,
although it is possible to say that the court had in mind the agreement test regarding
the additional offence.
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In Macklin, Murphy, and Others (1838) a group of people had gathered and were
committing a riot. Constables intervened to disperse the crowd and arrested the
offenders but one constable was beaten severely by the mob using sticks, stones, and
fists, and this led to the constable's death. Alderson, B. said:
" ...You the jury, must determine, whether all these prisoners had the
common intent of attacking the constables- if so, each of them is responsible
for all the acts of all others done for that purpose; and, if all the acts done by
each, if done by one man, would, together, shew such violence, and so long
continued, that from them you would infer an intention to kill the constable, it
will be murder in them all. If you would not infer such a purpose, you ought
91 ^
to find the prisoners guilty ofmanslaughter."
As a result of this direction, the accomplices were convicted of manslaughter. The
case illustrates the fact that its interpretation to the formula of additional offences is
subjective by directing the jury to infer the common intent. Presumably, the court at
the final ruling had in mind the scope of the accomplice's real plots or in other words
their express or tacit agreement to the primary offence of riot. Having said that, the
19 ibid, at 828.
20 Macklin (1838) 168 ER 1136.
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court in fact used the two functions of criminality - subjective and objective versions-
and tried to apply them in this case, in spite of the fact that these two versions are
actually in conflict with each other and indicate different kinds of justification.
Alderson B tried to link the two concepts by revealing that the act must be in
pursuance of common intent, and that if a deadly weapon was used, it is reasonable
to infer the parties intention to murder whereas if no weapons was used, only fists,
99
then it is not reasonable to infer such intention, and it is only manslaughter.
However he later said:
"Again, if the weapon used is not deadly, e.g. a stick, then the same question
as above will arise for the determination of the jury, as to the purpose to kill;
and in any case if the nature of the violence, and the continuance of it be such
as that a rational man would conclude that death must follow from the acts
done, then it is reasonable for a jury to infer that the party who did them
intended to kill, and to find him guilty ofmanslaughter."23
Unlike in the previous cases, the court for the first time used the term 'rational man'
or in other words the 'reasonable man' test. However it is not clear that the court or
the jury in fact used it in this case, especially since the facts indicate that the
constable was heavily beaten. A reasonable person would conclude that it was
murder but the outcome of this case was a conviction for manslaughter.
K. Smith (1991) claims that no clear authoritative principle emanated from the
previous cases.24 However, although those cases were ambiguous and hazy, and
moved from one standard to another without declaring that either subjective or




said that they did establish a point that there are two standards of responsibility and it
is necessary to elaborate on them in order to adopt one particular standard. Perhaps it
was Michael Foster who noticed such a distinction of subjective and objective
requirements from those previous cases, and tried to modify the objective criteria by
linking it to the test of probable consequence. He states that:
"...So where the principal goeth beyond the terms of solicitation, if in the
event the felony committed was probable consequence of what was ordered
or advised, the person giving such orders or advice will be an accessory to
that felony."25
Foster's suggestion is generally inspired by a notion of criminal liability based upon
objective character, and not concerned with the accused's state of mind or the notion
that the accused have to contemplate the outcome. Foster's view was that an
accomplice should be held responsible for events and consequences, even if they
were beyond his original intention, if those events or results in the ordinary course of
things were a probable consequences of the principal's action.26 Only accessories
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before the fact and abettors were subject to this objective standard. This was also
the approach in both draft codes of 1843 and 1846. The 1879 English Draft Code
moved forward by applying Foster's probable test in general regarding the
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responsibility for the consequences of the common purpose.
24
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. tit., p. 212.
25
Foster, M., Crown Cases (3rd ed. 1809) p. 370. R v. Betts and Ridley [1930] 22 Cr. App. Rep. 148, is
a supportive case to what Foster had suggested.
26 Ashworth, A. J. "The Making of English Criminal Law: Blackstone, Foster and East " [1978] Crim.
LR 389 at 396.
27 ibid, at 39; Smith, K., MTLCC, op. tit., p. 212.
28
Smith, K.J.M. M.T.L.C, op. tit., p. 213 at note 16, states that: "Ss. 71 makes anyone who 'aid or
abets' 'counsels or procures' a 'party' to the offence. Its final paragraph extends 'common purpose'
liability to any offence committed in pursuance of the common purpose or which 'ought to have been
known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of such common purpose'. This provision,
therefore, applies to any party whether present or not when the collateral principal offence is
committed."
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James Stephen, shares a similar view in stating that:
" When several persons take part in the execution of a common criminal
purpose, each is a principal in the second degree, in respect of every crime
committed by any one of them in the execution of that common purpose.
...If any of the offenders commits a crime foreign to the common criminal
purpose, the others are neither principals in the second degree, nor
accessories unless they actually instigate or assist in its commission... If a
person instigate another to commit a crime, and the person so instigated
commits a crime different from the one which he was instigated to commit,
but likely to be caused by such instigation, the instigator is an accessory
before the fact."29
This might suggest a combined agreement between English commentators regarding
the objective test in cases of common purpose. However, this is not the case. Russell
on Crime, for example, an authority much used by English judges, does not take this
view of the matter. As K. Smith indicates in the 1843 and 1865 edition of Charles
Greaves no reference was made to suggest that the objective criterion is the one to
adopt in relation to liability for criminal complicity of common purpose. 30
Surprisingly the editor of the 1877 edition, Samuel Prentice, suggests the test is
objective when he states that:
"It is submitted that the true rule of law is, that where several persons engage
in the pursuit of a common unlawful object, and one of them does an act
which the others ought to have known was not improbable to happen in the
course of pursuing such common unlawful object, all are guilty."31
The above view stood until Turner's 1958 edition of Russell, where it was omitted
with no clear reason. The actual wording cited in the 12th ed. ofRussell on Crime, is:
" There has been much discussion as to the liability of an accessory when the
principal does not act in conformity with the plans and instructions of the
accessory. If the principal totally or substantially varies from the terms of the
instigation, if being solicited to commit a felony of one kind, he wilfully and
29
Stephen, J.F., Digest of the Criminal Law (4th ed. 1887), London, pp. 32-34, arts 38, 41.
30
Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., pp. 211-214.
31 Russell on Crime, (7th ed.) p. 114.
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knowingly commits a felony of another, he will stand single in that offence,
99
and the person soliciting will not be involved in his guilt..."
"Nowadays, it is submitted, the test should be subjective and the person
charged as accessory should not be held liable for anything but what he either
expressly commanded or realised might be involved in the performance of the
project agreed upon. It would on this principle, therefore be a question of
evidence to satisfy the jury that the accused did contemplate the prospect of
what the principal has in fact done."33
This controversy over the battle of subjective and objective criteria in the field of
common purpose is best described as unsteady (moving from one side to another).
The court decisions were faltering between them in a vague way without a clear
visibility of which one to adopt as the only form of liability. The courts, in those
decisions did not make a direct move to avoid such ambiguity. It would have been
better if it had declared one of the tests appropriate in order to clarify matters to the
parties concerned in a criminal case. For example, a defence lawyer would prefer to
know what the law says on this point, in order to make his defence. If it is objective
he would provide a defence from the objective standard, namely, from the notion of
the 'ordinary man' and would argue for acquittal. On the other hand, if the test is
subjective, he would try to find an answer from a subjective point of view, for
instance by proving that the defendant, before or at the time of the committing of the
additional offence, did not contemplate the outcome.
32
Turner, J., Russell On Crime, 12th ed. p. 160.
" ibid. pp. 162. K. Smith suggests that the omission of the paragraph of the objective standard in the
1877 edition was because of the new cases of complicity which stressed the subjective criteria by
requiring knowledge of essential matters on the part of accessories before linking them to the doctrine
of criminal complicity, and the rejecting of felony-murder rule by the Homicide Act 1957. See: Smith,
K.J., MTLLC, op. cit., pp. 213- 214.
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This is also true in relation to the prosecution, juries and the judges themselves. An
example of such controversy is found in Pridmore (1913),34 where A and P were out
poaching and were being watched by three keepers. P had a hunting gun while A had
a stick with him. In order to avoid apprehension P fired at one of the keepers. There
was disagreement about who had fired the shot, but the judge directed the jury that it
did not matter since there is a common agreement between the parties. Both A and P
were charged with attempted murder. They appealed on the ground that there was no
evidence that there was a common purpose between the two parties and that the court
inferred that A, by holding the stick at the keepers, was evidence of a joint enterprise,
when in fact it had been done in a defensive manner. Surprisingly, the Crown argued
otherwise by quoting the objective standard as supported in Russell.35 One of the
judges suggested that the court should follow Doddriage (1860) where it was held
that a common intent to poach does not sustain the allegation of intent to wound, and
that what the Crown mentioned would only apply to some kinds of crime like
assembly and riot.36 However, Phillmore J, in delivering the judgement, did not rely
on his colleague's submission, and also did not make a reference to what the Crown
indicated. He dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a common purpose
between the parties demonstrated by the fact that A did indeed brandish a stick at the
keepers. As it turned out, the court did apply a subjective version but it is strange that
the Crown was in doubt about the law on that point, which indicates that there was a
problem over which type was the one to apply.
'4 Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr. App. Rep. p. 198.Cf. Pearce (1929) 21 Cr. App. Rep. 79.
35 Russell on Crime, (7th ed.) p. 114, indicates that "it is a rule of law, that where there is a joint
enterprise with unlawful object, and one party does an act which the others ought to have known was
not improbable to happen in the course of pursuing such common unlawful object, all are guilty." The
Crown did not support any precedent for this. See Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr. App. Rep. pp. 200-201.
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Probably this controversy of accessorial liability in collateral offences was a result of
the felony- murder rule. As Lanham indicates (1983), this rule means that a person
may by found guilty of murder if in the course of committing a felony he kills, even
though he does not intend to cause any harm and is not reckless as to the harm
done.37 Such a rule was accepted during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries
38
but its roots are found in Coke's time, as he was the founder of such a concept.
English law featured some changes towards the subjective version of culpability,
such as the abolition of felony- murder by the Homicide Act 1957, the Criminal
Justice Act 1967,39 and, more importantly, the court decisions of Bainbridge and
Anderson andMorris.
The move to the subjective criteria:
English law has considered some changes in the subjective standard required for
additional crimes in accessorial liability and seems to be leaning towards establishing
an accepted formula. In this section, I shall examine some leading cases.
36 Lord Coleridge in Pridmore (1913) 8 Cr. App. Rep. p. 200.
:1
Lanham, D., (1983) "Felony Murder-Ancient and Modern" Criminal Law Journal 90.
ibid. pp. 91-94. It might be assumed that English law, in relation to complicity, tried to act in
accordance with such a concept of principal liability. However, even though Foster was supportive of
the felony-murder rule it appears that he did not want the same rule to be applied in relation to
accessories by introducing the objective standard of culpability, where in the felony-murder rule the
guilt is not attributed to negligence. See: Lanham, D., "Accomplices and Constructive Liability"
(1980) 4 Criminal Law Journal 78.
j9 Section 8 of The Criminal Justice Act 1967 indicates: " A court or a jury, in determining whether a
person has committed an offence a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a
result of his action by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions;
but .. .b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all evidence, drawing
such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances."
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In R v. Anderson and Morris (1966)40 W met A's wife, a convicted prostitute, and
she took W to her flat where, it was said, he tried to strangle her. She ran out into the
street, chased by W, where she met M, told him what had happened, and M and W
fought, but were separated by another person. A arrived, learned from his wife what
had happened, got a knife in M's presence, and went with M and his wife to find W.
When they found him, M said: 'Here he comes now' and there was a fight in the
street, resulting in A stabbing W to death. A was punching W, and M was standing at
W's back not taking any part in the fight. When W was trying to push past A, A
stabbed W to death. A denied that M had assisted him, and also said that M refused
to help him in the fight. M said that he did not know about the knife being used and
that he only fought with W earlier on but not in the incident when W died. In the
early stage of the case the jury was directed that:
"If you think there was a common design to attack W but it is not proved, in
the case ofM, that he had any intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm,
but that A, without the knowledge ofM, had a knife, took it from the flat and
at some time formed the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to W
and did kill him - an act outside the common design to which M is proved to
have been a party - then you would or could on the evidence find it proved
that A committed murder and M would be liable to be convicted of
manslaughter provided that you are satisfied that he took part in the attack or
fight with W."41
A, the principal, was convicted of murder, and the accessory, M, was found guilty of
manslaughter. They both appealed against the conviction.
The relevant issue for discussion is M's appeal, which was on the ground that there
was a misdirection by the trial judge based upon the notion that the doctrine of
40 R v. Anderson and Morris [1966], 2 Q.B. 110.
41 ibid.
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common purpose holds accessories responsible for the committing of a collateral
offence if that offence is pursuant of the joint criminal venture. However, if one party
goes beyond that which was expressly or tacitly agreed, the other is simply not liable
for the unauthorised act. In addition, it is the duty of the jury to decide whether the
act was or was not part of the common purpose. The court did not invite the jury to
draw the distinction between acts within the common purpose and the acts which are
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out side it.
The Court of Criminal Appeal examined the case and heard the defence and the
Crown for their argument. The ruling favoured of the defendant in that it held:
"Where two persons embarked on a joint enterprise, each was liable for the
acts done in pursuance of that joint enterprise including liability for unusual
consequences if they arose from the agreed joint enterprise, but that, if one of
the adventurers went beyond what had been tacitly agreed as part of the
common enterprise, his co-adventurer was not liable for the consequences of
the unauthorised act, and it was for the jury in every case to decide whether
what was done was part of the joint enterprise or went beyond it and was an
act unauthorised by that joint enterprise. Accordingly, since the jury were
directed that, in law, they could or should convict M of manslaughter even
though he had no idea that A had armed himself with a knife, they were
misdirected and M's conviction had to be quashed."43
The case recognises the subjective standard but what is the ambit of these criteria?
42 ibid. pp. 113-114. [1966] 2 Q.B. At the Appeal Court the Crown said that the direction was right.
They relied on Salisbury's case [1553] 1 Plowd 10, which indicated that: "if two or more persons
engage in an unlawful act and one suddenly develops the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm
whereby death results, the killer is guilty of murder and the other persons are guilty of manslaughter."
Ibid, p.l 14. However, Lord Parker C. J. said: "Be that as it may, this court is quite satisfied that they
should follow the long line of cases to which I have referred, and it follows accordingly that, whether
intended or not, the jury were misdirected in the present case, and misdirected in a manner which
really compels this court to quash the conviction. In the result, therefore, leave to appeal will be
granted to both the applicants; this will be treated as the hearing of the appeal and, instead of quashing
the conviction of Anderson, the court will direct a new trial under section 1 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1964. In the case of Morris, the court will allow the appeal and quash the conviction." ibid. pp.
120-121.
43 ibid. p. 110.
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As already stated, the Court in Anderson & Morris confirmed three principles: 44
1- every party engaging in a joint enterprise is liable for acts done in pursuit of that
enterprise even if it has unusual consequences.
2- if one party goes beyond what has been tacitly agreed, the other party is not liable
for the unauthorised act.
3- it is a factual matter for juries to decide whether what has been done was a part of
the joint enterprise or went beyond it.
Simon Bronitt claims that the Court of Appeal in this case formulated the subjective
standard in common purpose cases. However, this is questionable because, firstly, we
have seen in the previous pages the movement of English courts between the two
standards of culpability, and secondly as John Smith points out, the Court of Appeal
in this case considered a line of authorities from 1830 and delivered judgement by
five members of the court.45
This case adopts the subjective standard based on agreement or an authorisation test
to hold an accessory as a party to the collateral offence. Thus, the precept of
attaching one party to the liability of an unwanted result is either express or tacit
agreement.46 One important result here that what goes outside the express or tacit
44 ibid, at p.118. Supported by Davies v. D.P.P. [1957] AC 378; Lovesey & Petrson [1970] QB 352,
quoted in L.C. No. 131 p. 59.
45
Bronitt, S., "Parties to a Crime" http://law.anu.edu.au/eriminet/notes.html/; Smith, J.C. & Hogan,
B., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, (6th ed. 1996) London: Butterworths. p. 232.
46 See for example McCall Smith, R.A. & Sheldon, D., Scots Criminal Law (1992), Edinburgh:
Butterworths, p. 83 where they indicate: "What is implicitly agreed will depend on the circumstances:
an agreement to commit robbery involves an agreement to use at least some degree of force; an
agreement to break into building involves implicit agreement to damage property in course of gaining
access."
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plan will not be taken into account against the secondary party, even though he did
contemplate the unwanted outcome.
What was the reason behind the court decision? In other words, what is the basis of
guilt under the express/ tacit agreement formula?
Nothing is suggested by the Court of Appeal in this case, but presumably one of the
following would be true:
1- Assent or approval.
2- Joint contemplation between the accomplices.
3- Defence of the agreed plan.
1- Assent: Keith Smith suggests that the Court of Appeal in this case favours
connecting guilt to the notion of consent between the parties. Although he admits
that was not the reasoning of the case, he does not share its view by indicating that
the language of cases in this field of liability prefers the term 'contemplation' rather
than 'agreement'.47 This latter view is rather strange because even if some previous
case used the language of foresight or contemplation instead of agreement, the Court
of Appeal here expressly chooses the latter, and in fact went on to examine the
concept of common purpose from 1830 until 1966. Moreover, if the judgement was
based on the notion of consent or willingness that the principal should commit the
additional offence, it would suggest that the required mental state of accessories is
intention, because consent is a concept much more closer to intention rather than
other features of mens rea. This would be a vague outcome especially where the test
47 Smith, K., MTLCC, op cit., pp. 218-219.
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in the primary offence is knowledge or recklessness. Did the court here, in the
additional offence, want to move to intention?
If so, should it only be purpose, which employs assent or willingness in its
application, or would it also cover oblique intention? This latter concept of
contemplating a result which requires virtual certainty is not intention in itself; it is
only evidence from which the jury can infer criminal intention. The court did not
offer any guidelines in this respect. Another point to mention is that agreement, or in
other words conspiracy, is not an essential element in establishing accessorial
liability. This by the same token would require accomplices to be jointly acting and
that they know each other, which is also not required especially if the accessory's
involvement is based on assistance rather than encouragement. The court again is not
clear on the issue. It might be noted that John Smith implicitly admits that assent or
approval is not the essence of accessorial guilt in this type of liability. He indicates
that:
"It may be that the law is too harsh and, if so, it could be modified so as to
require intention (or even purpose) on the part of the accessory that, in the
event which has occurred, the principal should act as he did. Indeed, there is
no decision preventing the House of Lords from taking this step and it is
possible that they will shortly be invited to do so. If it were to be decided that
intention should be required, the jury would be told that they should not find
D [the accessory] guilty of murder unless they were sure that D either wanted
P to act as, with the intention which, he did, or knew that it was not merely a
40
'real possibility' but virtually certain that he would do so."
48
Smith, J. C., "Criminal liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., p. 465.
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2- Joint contemplation: Simon Bronitt in his commentary of an Australian case,
John (1980),49 which has similarities with Anderson and Morris, suggests that the
court in using an agreement test regarding the committing of the accidental offence
means it requires a joint contemplation between the parties.30 This would mean that
there must be a sharing of a state of mind between the accomplices, and more
precisely, that parties have to jointly contemplate the possibility of the occurrence of
the further offence. This view emphasises the notion that accomplices are acting
within a common design, and that they know each other. However, there are some
weak points in this argument. First, parties of a criminal venture may not have
known each other. In other words, accessorial liability can be established without
knowledge between the parties if their action together produces a criminal result.
Second, if the court's reason to invoke the agreement test is that it requires joint
foresight, accessories can escape liability for additional offences if the principal lacks
contemplation regarding the committing of the other offence and is convicted on the
basis of an objective state ofmind. An example might provide clarity. Suppose that P
and A want to burgle a house, and they manage to do so by entering through an open
window. On the way out P accidentally commits simple damage to a valuable item.
This latter offence is governed by Criminal Damage Act, S.l (1), which can be
proved on the basis of objective recklessness, which was the situation of P. If the
notion of guilt in common purpose is the joint contemplation, then A can escape
liability proving that P had no such thought even if A himself did think of such
possibility. Also, requiring joint contemplation suggests that accomplices share such
foresight before the criminal venture but in many examples only accessories would
49 Johns v. The Queen [1980] 143 C.L.R. 108, decided by the High Court of Australia.
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think that something might go wrong before the committing of the primary offence,
like robbery-murder for example, while the principal or principals would have such
thoughts required for the offence just shortly before the committing of the additional
offence. This concept of joint contemplation would not be favoured in English law,
and it might not be the reason of the verdict in Anderson and Morris. Moreover, it
clearly appears that the doctrine of common purpose does not link the accessorial
guilt to a jointly state of mind. Accessories have their own mens rea, which is
different from that required for the principal.
3- Defence of the agreed plan: The third possible basis of the judgement in
Anderson andMorris is that there was consensus or contemplation on the part of the
accessory offender but such a basis perhaps has a further aim which is creating a
defence of the agreed plan. As matter of common sense, when the court spoke of
agreement or authorisation, there should be an understanding between the parties that
the additional crime should be committed. On the other hand there is a possibility
that the court was thinking of linking the test of incrimination to contemplation, not
necessarily jointly, but that the secondary party contemplates the possibility that
something might go wrong.51 Both tests are likely to be correct but it is also probable
that the court implicitly wanted to establish a special defence to accessories to hold
against any departure from the normal course of events that might produce an
50
Bronitt, S., "Parties to a Crime" http://law.anu.edu.au/criminet/notes.html/.
51 Lord Parker C.J. said: "it seems to this court that to say that adventurers are guilty of manslaughter
when one of them has departed completely from that concerted action of the common design and has
suddenly formed an intent to kill and has used a weapon and acted in a way which no party to that
common design could suspect is something which would revolt the conscience of people today" in
Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 Q.B. op. cit. p. 120. Accordingly, what would be the situation if the
secondary party suspects or contemplates the additional offence? Lord Parker does not answer this.
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unwanted result. The Court of Criminal Appeal here indicates that it followed many
authorities from the last 130 or 140 years, which suggests that it did not establish a
new formula. But in fact this is not the case because it used a new language of
agreement or words corresponding it, such as 'authority'.
Suppose that a person has knowledge of criminal law. He becomes an accessory to
crime, and he wants to limits his liability. He would rely on that phrase been invoked
by the Court here to avoid conviction by having signed an agreement with his
accomplices to follow the agreed plan and that there should be no use ofweapon or if
used it should be for frightening and nothing more. Perhaps he can film what they
agreed about. This example might seem odd but it is possible from what the Court
said about a departure from the agreed plan.
All in all, as I have illustrated above, the attitude of the courts move in a subjective
line but under one or two of above three possible foundations of guilt. The question
now is whether the English courts will settle on this formula?
52
In Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen, a case decided by the Privy Council on appeal
from Hong Kong, three persons were convicted of murder and wounding with intent.
It appeared that they went to the victim's flat, armed with knives, to rob him. Two
accomplices stabbed him to death and his wife was assaulted. In their defence it was
argued that the test of foresight, if sufficient for conviction, must be based on
32 Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC168.
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contemplating the offence as a probable incident only."3 However, their appeals were
dismissed.34
Sir Robin Cooke said:
"The case must depend rather on the wider principle whereby a secondary
party is criminally liable for acts by the primary offender of a type which the
former foresees but does not necessarily intend."55
As clearly indicated, the test of mens rea mentioned by Cooke entirely focuses on
foresight or words corresponding to it. As he says, it is based on a wider formula or
principle than the agreement test stated in Anderson and Morris.56 A simple
33 The defence for the defendant said that the Crown must prove that the accused foresaw the probable
reaction to that contingency by his co-adventurer, and this means for them that the guilt should be
based on a matter of a degree. In addition, it suggested that the Court here should decide the case on
the agreement test, either expressly or tacitly. The Crown made three objections to that: 1- There is no
such authority in English or Commonwealth law to supports this defence contention. 2- It is
misleading to use the word "possibility" and "probability". Juries must use their common sense and
give words their ordinary meaning. The issue of degree, as the defence suggested, is sufficient for
discussing the concept of recklessness, which is decided objectively, but the issue of this should be
examined subjectively. 3- Public policy aim to the prevent crimes requires that the person who lends
himself to a criminal enterprise with the knowledge that it involves the possession of weapons which
in fact are used by his partners, should not escape conviction by reliance upon the nuances of prior
assessment of the likelihood that such conduct will take place. He should be as liable as the other
accomplices. Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC168. pp. 170-173. As it will be seen, the Privy
Council was strongly supportive of these arguments of the Crown.
54 The two defendants, armed with knives, forced their victim into the kitchen where he was stabbed,
while the third person guarded the wife. When they left the flat, the deceased's wife was slashed
across the head. Three bloodstained knives were left in the flat. The three accomplices told the police
that they went to the flat to collect a debt owed by the deceased to the third appellant. Only the first
and second appellants admitted taking a knife and knowing that the others had knives. The
accomplices pretended that the deceased had attacked them with a chopper or knives, and the second
accomplice stated that he stabbed the deceased in a self-defence. The third denied knowing that the
others had knives.
33 Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC168 at 175.
56 ibid. Sir Robin Cooke at p. 179 said: "Various formulae have been suggested - including a
substantial risk, a real risk, a risk that something might well happen. No one formula is exclusively
preferable; indeed it may be advantageous in a summing up to use more than one. For the question is
not one of semantics. What has to be brought home to the jury is that occasionally a risk may have
occurred to an accused's mind - fleetingly or even causing him some deliberation - but may genuinely
have been dismissed by him as altogether negligible." He also said at p. 179: " If they think (the jury)
there is a reasonable possibility that the case is in that class, taking the risk should not make that
accused a party to such a crime of intention as murder or wounding with intent to cause grievous
bodily harm. The judge is entitled to warn the jury to be cautious before reaching that conclusion; but
the law can do no more by way of definition; it can only be for the jury to determine any issue of that
kind on the facts of the particular case."
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interpretation of this suggests that it is enough to establish the guilt of the secondary
party in a collateral offence by connecting or proving that the accessory
contemplated the committing of the offence; there is no need to find out if there was
an express or tacit agreement between the accomplices. This plainly means that the
court has made both tests of primary and additional offences the same and this would
be true if we assume that only knowledge is the current state of mind required to
establish the liability of the secondary party. Moreover, such movement toward
proving an easier mens rea would be welcomed by the prosecution rather than trying
to prove the agreement or authorisation as stated earlier. However, Sir Robin Cooke
himself has complicated all of this when he said:
" That there is such a principle is not in doubt. It turns on contemplation or,
putting the same idea in other words, authorisation, which may be express but
is more usually implied. It meets the case of a crime foreseen as a possible
incident of the common unlawful enterprise. The criminal culpability lies in
participating in the venture with that foresight."
Accordingly, Cooke has proposed that both contemplation and authorisation are
combined, and are identical. In fact, this is not true for a couple of reasons: First,
linguistically there are different. Contemplation means the act of thinking deeply and
quietly, while authorisation, involves the notion of giving permission to or for.
Secondly, ordinary language would not treat the two concepts alike, and if it came
before a legal examiner, he would assume that there is a difference.59 Why did Sir
37 Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC168 at 175.
3S
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1992), London: Longman, p. 59 and 220.
39
Giles, M., "Complicity: The Problems of Joint Enterprise" [1990] Critn. LR 383 at 385. She says:
"This statement uses both authorisation and contemplation. There is of course a difference between
them; contemplation incorporates the wider principle of recognition of a possible future mens rea,
while authorisation implies more strongly narrower principle of joint conditional intent, because it
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Robin Cooke make such statement? Did he think that the test of mens rea has been
always based on foresight? Alternatively, is there any further reason for such
analyses? After following Cooke's statements, it occurs to me that he noticed that the
question in this case is a new issue in English law.00
The decision of Chan Wing-Siu was approved in English law in R v. Ward (1986).61
English law now faces two tests of liability: Agreement and Foresight, which creates
some problems if both are adopted. One example of this is when the accessory
contemplates that the principal might over act or may go too far. However, he might
honestly wish that the principal will not act in this way, or directly informs him that
overacting is not accepted. This somehow would stop the concept of express/ tacit
agreement between the parties from being the basis of an accessory's guilt. Should
the accessory escape guilt in this example, although he decides to continue in the
project?
If only the agreement test is adopted, then the accessory might benefit from a defence
that the extra offence is outside the original common purpose. This sounds
suggests some communication on the matter enterprise, either express or implied, between the
parties."
She later tries to find some reasons for the adoption of contemplation!
1- "Not allowing morally culpable accessory to escape liability." But what does morality mean? Does
contemplation amount to intending a consequence? Another consideration is that the accessory might
dismiss the thought that the principal would commit the other offence. How can it be identified?
2. "the interests of justice are finely balanced" but the commentator himself says:
"The maximum penalty for the principal and the accessory is the same...To find an accessory liable
for murder on the wider principle, where there is no express or implied authorisation to the principal,
is something at which the court may balk, knowing that life sentence is inevitable. " ibid. pp. 386-7.
The English Draft Criminal Code 1989 adopts contemplation in cl. 27. (1): "a person is guilty of an
offence as an accessory if; c) he intends that the principal shall act or is aware that he is or may be
acting or that he may act with the fault (if any) required for the offence."
60 Sir Robin Cooke said: "In England, it appears not to have been found necessary hitherto to analyse
more elaborately the test, which the jury have to apply. But, in association with the modern emphasis
on subjective tests of criminal guilt, the matter has been examined by appellate courts in Australia and
New Zealand." Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [ 1985] AC 168 at 176.
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reasonable where it stresses the fact that the accessory does not accept the occurrence
of that additional result, which is, by the same token, negative as to the issue of
agreement. However, there is a difficulty if he continues with the joint enterprise,
especially where he realise that there is a risk that the principal might commit an
additional offence. The accessory here might claim that he did not consider the risk a
serious one in nature and that is why he decided to go ahead with the criminal
project.
On the other hand, crime prevention consideration might press the courts to adopt a
test other than that of agreement. Thus, when a man lends himself to a criminal
enterprise knowing it involves the possession of potentially murderous weapons
which are used by his accomplice, public policy requires that he should not escape
the consequences of their conduct by reliance upon prior agreement.62 Accordingly,
what is the situation in case law? How can English law operate two different
concepts simultaneously?
In R v. Slack (1989)63 the Court ofAppeal held that:
61 R v. Ward [1986] 85 Cr. App. Rep. 71.
62 Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen [1985] AC168 at 172.
63 R v. Slack [1989] Q.B. 775. The direction made by the Crown Court was that the jury, if they found
that the appellant engaged in burglary, contemplated and foresaw the principal committing the
addition crime ofmurder, they should convict. This in fact, is similar to what the court in Chan Wing-
Siu had said. The important point of the appeal, for the defence, was that the judge misdirected the
jury in his direction on murder by equating foresight and contemplation with intent. The defence
indicated that the direction was wrong in law and that it did not accord with decision and commentary
on the subject, making reference to R v. Hyam [1975] AC 55; R v. Moloney [1985] AC 905; R v.
Hancock [1986] AC 455; R v. Nedrick [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025, arguing that foresight is merely
evidence of intent and that the jury must be directed to it in accordance with such cases. The defence
did not argue for the authority or agreement test; it would have been different if they did so. Slack
ibid. pp. 776-777. On the other hand, the prosecution at p. 777, argued that the governing law of
complicity regarding the situation of common purpose is to be found in Chan Wing-Siu v. The Queen
[1985] AC 168 which was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R v. Ward, [1986] 85 Cr. App. Rep.
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on a trial for murder in the case of a joint enterprise, proof was necessary
that the principal party intended to kill or do serious harm at the time he
killed; that, albeit the secondary party was not present at the killing or did not
know that the principal party had killed or hoped that he would not kill or do
serious injury, nevertheless the secondary party was guilty of murder if, as
part of their joint plan, it was understood between them expressly or tacitly
that, if necessary, one of them would kill or do serious harm as part of their
common enterprise; that the precise form of words used in directing the jury
was unimportant provided that it was made clear to them that, for the
secondary party to be guilty, he had to be proved to have lent himself to a
criminal enterprise involving the infliction, if necessary, of serious harm or
death or to have had an express or tacit understanding with the principal party
that such harm or death should, if necessary be inflicted, and that accordingly,
the appeal would be dismissed, for the direction made clear to the jury that
for them to find the appellant guilty as secondary party they had to find that
he must have at least tacitly agreed that, if necessary, serious harm should be
done to the occupant or that he had lent himself to the infliction of such harm
and there was ample evidence on which the jury could conclude that the
prosecution had satisfied them so as to be sure on those matters so far as
concerned the appellant."64
One might assume that the Court of Appeal in this case returned to the agreement
test. This may be true, but an intensive analysis shows that the Court of Appeal was
not clear about its position. This is because the reason of appeal was that the Crown
Court used the test of foresight alone. Why did the Appeal dismiss the case here?
The Law Commission Paper No. 131, clearly points out that:
"Although this judgement [Slack] refers a number of times to the need for an
agreement, it is summarised in the headnote as requiring an 'understanding'
on the part of the defendant that the collateral crime would take place: a
position ambiguous between foresight and authorisation."63
71. Also, it said that cases of deciding the general requirement of mens rea, such as Hancock and
Nedrick only apply the issue of intention in the principal liability and it is unsuitable for a accessories.
This appears to be taken 1997 by the House of Lords in R v. Powell, R v. English [1998] 1 Cr. App.
Rep. 261 which confirms that intention in the doctrine of complicity is not governed by precedents for
the the general requirements relating to mental element.
64 On what the proper direction should be, Lord Lane C.J said: "As appears from the cases we have
cited, the direction may be in a variety of different forms. Provided that it is made clear to the jury that
B to be guilty must be proved to have lent himself to a criminal enterprise involving the infliction, if
necessary, of serious harm or death or to have had an express or tacit understanding with A that such
harm or death should, if necessary, be inflicted, the precise form of words in which the jury are
directed is not important." Slack op cit., p. 781.
65 LC. No. 131 op cit., p. 60.
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Did the Court of Appeal want to invoke a new concept of 'understanding'? However,
it seems that there was nothing in the case to suggest such a proposal but it might be
true to point out that the Court found a problem in dealing with two broad concepts
in one issue. Perhaps the Court tried to extend the concept of tacit agreement to
become closer to the concept of contemplation. It might be a neighbouring term, but
it clearly is not identical, and no one said that understanding is to be considered as a
third term in this field of liability with agreement and contemplation.
The House of Lords and Powell; English Principle:
In 1997 the House of Lords had to decide two separate criminal appeals regarding
the issue of an accessory's foresight of the principal committing the additional
offence in their joint enterprise. The case in which this arose was R v. Powell, R v.
English. 66
In the first case (Powell's case), P and D went with another to buy drugs from a drug
dealer. They said that the third man shot the drug dealer when he came to the door.
They were convicted of murder although it was not known which one was the
principal. The Crown Court based its conviction upon proof that P and D knew that
the other man had a gun with him and that he might use it to kill or to cause serious
harm to the victim. After dismissing their appeal in the Appeal Court, the case went
to the House of Lords.
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In the second case (English's case), E appealed against the decision of the Appeal
Court to dismiss his appeal against conviction of the murder of a police man who had
been stabbed by W with a knife, although both E and W were attacking the victim
with wooden posts. E said that he did not have knowledge of the knife. The judge
had directed the jury according to the issue of contemplation, and that they have to
consider that E contemplated that W might cause serious injury with the wooden post
despite the fact that E did not have knowledge that W had a knife.
The House dismissed the appeal of P and D, but allowed the appeal by E, on a
number of grounds:
Firstly, where there was a joint enterprise to commit a crime, it was enough to found
a conviction for murder that the secondary party contemplated that the primary party
might kill with intent to do so or to cause really serious injury, which means
requiring a lower mental state for accessories than principals, and this is specially
directed to give effective protection to the public from criminal gangs. Secondly, if
the principal committed an act which was fundamentally different from that which
they jointly contemplated, and the accessory did not foresee it, then he is not be
guilty of murder unless the weapon used was just as dangerous as that which was
contemplated.67
The consequences of the decision:
66 R v. Powell, R v. English [1998] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 261; Times, October 31, 1997; Clarkson, C. M.,
"Complicity, Powell and Manslaughter" [August 1998] Crim. LR 556.
67 R v. Powell, R v. English [1998] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 261 pp. 261-2.
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The ruling in Powell; English is very important as it is a House of Lords decision and
brings light to bear on problems in the doctrine of common purpose. The
consequences of the ruling are:
1- The decision declares a distinction between principals and accessories
regarding the general requirements of mens rea:
One of arguments that the defence brought was that the House should discuss the
requirements of intention that Moloney, Hancock and Nedrick required. In a direct
answer to the claim Lord Steyn, surprisingly, said:
"Those decisions distinguish between foresight and intention and require in
the case of murder proof of intention to kill or to cause serious bodily injury.
But those decisions were intended to apply to a primary offender only. The
liability of accessories was not in issue. Plainly, the House did not intend in
those decisions to examine or pronounce on the accessory principle. The
resort to authority must therefore fail."68
This is in fact a ratio decidendi because it was an answer to a defence argument. This
would stop lawyers from arguing on this point but at the same time creates some
ambiguity as to what intention means in the liability of accessories. The House tried
to avoid this, but why? One direct answer would be that it is because of the term
knowledge, which settles the issue of accessorial mens rea. Moreover it concludes
that the mens rea required for accessories is lower than what would have to be
proved in relation to principal offenders.69
68 ibid. p. 267. Latter in Woollin (1998) Lord Steyn went further by deciding that oblique intention
under the above cases is related only to the crime ofmurder. See chapter 3.
69
Powell; English at p. 268.
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2- The decision emphasises the subjective element in mens rea required for
accessories:
The House declares its sympathy with the criteria of contemplation to be the
subjective standard required to govern the issue of mens rea in the liability of
common purpose.
Lord Steyn stated that;
"The established principle is that a secondary party to a criminal enterprise
may be criminally liable for a greater criminal offence committed by the
primary offender of a type which the former foresaw but did not necessarily
intend. The criminal culpability lies in participating in the criminal enterprise
with that foresight. Foresight and intention are not synonymous terms. But
foresight is a necessary and sufficient ground of the liability of accessories.
This how law has been stated in... Chan wing- siu v. R (1985) & Hui Chi-
Ming (1992).... John Smith has recently concluded that there is no doubt that
this represents English Law."70
It seems to be that there are two major reasons for moving to contemplation rather
than express/tacit agreement: First, there is one major problem with the agreement
test, which is, for example, if one party contemplates that the primary offender might
commit a further crime which is not within the agreement. However, the accessory
here might frankly wish that the principal will not so act or directly inform him that
going beyond the agreement is not accepted. The court said that such a person
deserves to be punished, and surely his culpability cannot be based upon the
70 Lord Steyn in Powell; English pp. 266-7; Lord Hutton, at p. 282; Smith, J.C., "Criminal liability of
Accessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., p. 464, who explains how the principle applies in the
case of murder: "Nevertheless, as the critics point out it is enough that the accessory is reckless,
whereas, in the case of the principal, intention must be proved. Recklessness whether death be caused
is a sufficient mens rea for a principal offender in manslaughter, but not murder. The accessory to
murder, however, must be proved to have been reckless, not merely whether death might be caused,
but whether murder might be committed: he must have been aware, not merely that death or grievous
bodily harm might be caused, but that it might be caused intentionally, by a person whom he was
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agreement test because there would be no agreement in this example. If this was the
case, the accessory is entitled to a defence here. However, because the accessory
continues his association with the joint enterprise, in spite of the risk he had realised,
the criminal system is willing to convict him. For this reason, the standard of
culpability must move to another criterion, which is contemplation or any word
corresponding to it.
Secondly, the House of Lords revealed that steps must be taken to control crime and
criminal gangs, and one way of doing this is to adopt a flexible standard of
contemplation in this type of responsibility.71 Besides, although the discussion of this
case is related to the crime ofmurder, the court expressed its opinion that there is no
special rule that governs the attitude of accessories in the offence ofmurder, but that
72this subjective principle applies to their involvement in most criminal offences.
All of the three judges expressed their formal agreement, and directly supported the
ruling which establish the principle of contemplation, in the liability of common
purpose cases, derived from Chan Wing-Sin. This principle is now called the 'Chang
Wing Siu /Powell; English principle'.73 I shall discuss below the judges expressed
view to the matter regarding this form of liability, to find what lay behind their
approach.
assisting or encouraging to commit a crime. Recklessness whether murder be committed is different
from, and more serious than recklessness whether death be caused by an accident."
71 Powell; English at pp. 268- 9; Chan Wing- Siu v. R. (1985) 80 Cr. App. Rep. 117 at 172, 282/
Williams, G., Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed. 1961), London, p. 397 where he says: "It
seems that a common intent to threaten violence is equivalent to a common intent to use violence, for
one so easily leads to the other."
12 Lord Steyn in Powell; English at 266.
73
Smith, J.C., " Commentary on R v. Reardon', (May 1999) Crim. LR 392 at 393.
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Lord Mustill supported the final ruling, and mentioned the difficulties of adopting the
agreement test, in which some accessories would escape conviction when they are
morally responsible. However, in a surprising statement, he stated that to control the
issue of mens rea in common purpose cases there are two options: (1) To abandon
the principle of express/tacit agreement, and to adopt the formula of contemplation
only. (2) To keep the latter operating this in field of liability in the majority of cases,
and only exceptionally and in a minority of cases should there be applied the test of
foreseeability as indicated by Sir Robin Cooke in Chan Wing Siu. Lord Mustill stated
that he supports the second option.74
There has not been a single case that clearly indicates that both formulas be applied,
simply because they are different in their function. Another point is that Lord Mustill
suggests this new dual function but does not bring proper justification. For example,
what distinguishes the majority of cases and the minority? For the first he cites the
agreement test while for the second he requires the contemplation method. What
would happen when the accessory fails to prove the details of his express/tacit
agreement with the principal? Should the judge move the case towards the test of
foreseeability? There is some doubt, and according to one of the primary principles
of criminal law, the defendant should have the benefit of the doubt.
Both Lord Steyn and Lord Hutton have expressed their willingness to rely on the
contemplation test, which was used in Chan Wing Siu, and emphasised its
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importance because the contemplation criteria presents itself as the current formula
in the liability ofjoint enterprise in English criminal law.73
However, there was some ambiguity in dealing with second case (the English's
case). The Crown Court directed the jury on the principle stated by the Court of
Appeal in Hyde (1991), which in fact is the same as the contemplation test of Chan
Wing-Siu and its supporting cases.76 The defendant, English, had received an
acquittal from the House of Lords because there was no evidence to indicate that he
had knowledge of the knife used by his principal W, even though he was at least
contemplating that W would cause the victim serious bodily harm with the wooden
sticks they had. Surprisingly, that sort of foreseeability is sufficient to charge E with
being an accessory to murder; but the House of Lords did not find this point relevant,
and neither did the prosecution. Many would take the view that the weight of
authority would support a conviction rather than an acquittal on the grounds that E
had contemplated the committing of the principal offence, and this is the main thread
of the contemplation test. However, the House wished to declare that the issue of
74 Lord Mustill in Powell; English at pp. 264 - 6.
75 ibid. pp. 266-287. Lord Hutton said: "The first issue is what is the degree of foresight is required to
impose liability under the principle stated in Chan Wing- Siu... On this issue I am in respectful
agreement with the judgement of the Privy Council in that case that the secondary party is subject to
criminal liability if he contemplated the act causing death as a possible incident of the joint venture,
unless the risk was so remote that the jury take the view that the secondary party genuinely dismissed
it as altogether negligible." ibid. pp. 286
76
Hyde [1991] 92 Cr. App. Rep. 131, [1991] 1 Q.B. 134. The House of Lords, in Powell; English,
stated that: "The problem raised by the second certified question is that, if a jury is directed in the
terms stated in Hyde, without any qualification (as was the jury in English), there will be liability for
murder on the part of the secondary party if he foresees the possibility that the other party in the
criminal venture will cause really serious harm by kicking or striking a blow with a wooden post, but
the other party suddenly produces a knife or a gun, which the secondary party did not know he was
carrying, and kills the victim with it." p. 283.
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weapons is relevant in determining the scope of mens rea in this form of liability.
Lord Hutton expressed the following view:
"However, I would wish to make this observation: if the weapon used by the
primary offender is different to, but as dangerous as, the weapon which is the
secondary party contemplated he might use, the secondary party should not
escape liability for murder because of the difference in the weapon, for
example, if he foresaw that the primary party might use a gun to kill and the
77latter used a knife to kill, or vice versa."
In general, this case shifts the issue of mens rea of accessorial liability, in the
additional offence committed by the principal, to contemplation rather than
express/tacit agreement. This suggests that if a party contemplates that the primary
offender might commit a further crime which is not within the agreement, the
accessory is responsible, provided that he contemplates such an offence. The reason
for this is that when the accessory continues his association with the joint enterprise,
in spite of the risk he had realised, the criminal system is willing to convict him for
this unsociable behaviour but this case causes some uncertainty. For example, Lord
Hutton, although expressing the importance of foresight as being the proper test in
this type of liability, does not rule out the possibility of using the express/ tacit
70
agreement beside the contemplation. Apart from this, one should note that Powell;
77
Lord Hutton in Powell; English, p. 286.
78 Lord Hutton said: "the test of foresight is the proper one to apply. I consider that the test of foresight
is a simpler and more practicable test for the jury to apply than the test of whether the act causing the
death goes beyond what had been tacitly agreed as part of the joint enterprise. Therefore, in cases
where an issue arises as whether an action was within the scope of the joint venture, I would suggest
that it might be preferable for the trial judge in charging a jury to base his direction on the test of
foresight rather than the test set out in the first passage in Anderson and Morris. But in a case where,
although the secondary party may have foreseen grievous bodily harm, he may not have foreseen the
use of the weapon employed by the primary party or the manner which the primary party acted, the
trial judge should qualify the test stated in Hyde... in the manner stated by Lord Parker in the second
passage in Anderson and Morris." Lord Hutton in Powell; English, p. 287. Although the general
assumption of this case stresses the fact that English law is heading towards contemplation or
foresight as the required criteria to decided the liability of accessories in the collateral offence, in fact,
the above direction is, rather, a complication of the whole issue by returning the criteria of common
design, or tacit/express agreement as it was in Anderson and Morris. It is not clear whether the above
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English presumably acted in line with the English Draft Criminal Code, which
suggests that any future codification of criminal complicity should take this into
consideration.79
statement is related to the crime of murder or another crime or crimes. This surprising statement
shows how much uncertainty surrounds criminal complicity and how pressing is the need for
codification. I think that this part is not in coherence with the case's final conclusion that the focus is
to see whether or not the accessory contemplated the additional offence which should represent the
law in this regard.
79 Clause 27 adopts contemplation. It states that: " (1) A person is guilty of an offence as an accessory
if; c) he intends that the principal shall act or is aware that he is or may be acting or that he may act
with the fault (if any) required for the offence." English Draft Criminal Code 1989. See the team
commentary in Vol. 2, paragraph 9.28, p. 208.
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UAE Law
Under the F.P.C. an accessory instigates, conspires, or assists a crime if he shares the
intention and knowledge of the principal offender. However, not every crime or plan
achieves its desired end. There might be unexpected results or unwanted outcomes
that never came under the consideration of the accomplices. The following section
examines this issue under UAE criminal law.
Historical background
The situation under the domestic codes of the Emirates is as follows: The Dubai
Penal Code for 1970, in article (32), states that:
"The liability ofcommon purpose-.
When two or more persons agree to commit illegal participation, and an
offence or more resulted from such association, every present party at its
commission is liable, provided that the offence is an expected result from the
primary aim."
Article (33) goes on to asserts that:
"If a person instigates; incites another to commit a crime, and the other
commits it in accordance with such instigation or incitement, it does not
matter whether that crime is the aim of instigation; incitement or any other
crime...provided that the crime is an expected outcome of the instigation or
incitement."
These articles of the Dubai Code are incoherent, ambiguous, and lack appropriate
wording. This is owing to several reasons. Although article (32) expressly uses the
term 'common purpose', as indicated by English law, surprisingly the article omits to
include the category of assistance, and only refers to agreement of conspiracy. This
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by no means would suggest that the Code intended to exclude aiding from the ambit
of the unexpected result or the additional offence, since there is no a clear
assumption for such elimination. In addition, according to this article, only the
present party is liable and he has to be a conspirator. However, as it is commonly
acknowledged, assistance has many roles to plays other than conspiracy. The aiding
party might be present or absent, while in many examples the conspiring party may
not be present. This suggests that there was a mistake in using the appropriate words
in describing the categories of accessories regarding the liability of the additional
offence of the principal offender. To avoid this, the Dubai Code in article (33)
indicates that instigators are liable whether absent or present, but, as mentioned
before, this is a separate type of liability from accessorial liability under the Dubai
Code. Another point is that the Code used the term expected result. There is not
much guidance given to the true meaning of such a term, which links the accessories'
involvement with an unexpected or unwanted result.
By contrast, the Abu-Dhabi Penal Code was almost silent regarding this connection
except that in very general words linking the inchoate liability of instigation to the
different crimes committed by the principal without indicating that such crimes must
be an expected result of the instigation, as was indicated by the Dubai Criminal
80
Code. In comparison with the Dubai Code, the Abu-Dhabi Penal Code is very
80 See articles (15, 16, 17) of the Abu Dhabi Penal Code. A. Mahdi indicates: " The instigator is liable
for the different crime if it is a possible consequence of his instigation. However, the Abu Dhabi Penal
Code does not expressly state such condition... but I believe that the liability of the instigator
demands that the additional crime has to be a probable consequence of the instigation. This is
supported by article (16) of the Abu Dhabi Penal Code, which indicates that the instigator is
responsible for the principal crime if it is committed as consequence of the instigation. This situation
is the same in both Latin and Anglo-Saxon criminal system." Mahdi, A., Shark Alquaed Alama le
Qanon Alokobat: Dirash Muqarana bean Qanon Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, wa
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limited in some aspects, and very broad in others. However, both Codes failed to
produce a coherent response to the issue of collateral offence in accessorial liability,
as they omit to give a whole evaluation of this problematic liability. One example of
this is the issue of 'subjective versus objective': should the accessories be judged
upon their real contemplation, or imputed assumption? In other words, do the
accessories need to contemplate the result, and on what level is this required virtual
certainty, probability, or possibility? Or the expectation is linked to either the
reasonable man experiment or the probable test which indicates what crime is a
probable outcome of the other. Nothing in the Codes clarifies any of these doubts.
One might argue that since these Codes are influenced by the Indian-English legal
tradition, the answer is to be found in those legal systems, especially in English law.
However, this suggestion is uncertain regarding this type of liability, because as it
was indicated earlier, the issue of 'subjective versus objective' was not settled in
English law until the nineteenth century and leaned more towards the subjective.
Moreover, as appears in almost all commentaries of Arabic jurists, a mistake is made
in declaring that English law follows the test ofprobability which sets certain crimes
81
to be probable of others as it was suggested by Foster and Stephen. I have already
mentioned that this is not true, but it is difficult to convince Arabic jurists, who
greatly influence judicial opinion. Although this part of the UAE domestic codes is
Mashrua Alqanon Alithadi) wa Alqanon Almassri (Arabic. Explanation of the General Rules of the
Penal Law: A Comparative Study between UAE Laws (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and the Draft Federal
Penal Code) and the Egyptian Law) (1983), Cairo: Atlas Publication, pp. 416-7.
81 See for example: Husni., Husni, M., Almushraka Aligramia fee Altashreat Alarabia, (Arabic.
Criminal Complicity in Arab Codes) (2nd ed. 1992), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. pp. 459-461463. Cf.
Sorror, A., Alwaseet fee Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of Penal Code: The
General Part) (6lh ed. 1986), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia. p. 463; A1 Shinaway, S., Alnadaria Alama
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not applicable now, this inaccuracy should be cleared because basically it is contrary
to the true position of legal history of English law, and more importantly, as some
might suggest, the current situation of this test of probability has a foundation in a
great system like English law. This might be taken to justify the application of the
probable test in Arabic jurisprudence.
The current situation:
The issue of the probable result or additional offence is totally dominated by the
F.P.C, article (51) ofwhich provides that:
"An accomplice (co-principal and accessory by causation) to an offence shall
receive the penalty of the offence which has been committed, notwithstanding
that it is different from that intended to be committed, whenever the offence
which took place is a probable result of the participation."
Accordingly, in the UAE, the F.P.C. departs from the presumed requirement that
there must be a coincidence of both of the accomplices' acts and the mental element
in the primary offence. For liability in respect of the additional offence, committed as
a consequence of the central crime, only the principal has to satisfy the actus reus
and mens rea requirements of that collateral offence. By contrast, other accomplices
such as co-principals and present or absent accessories are judged by an exceptional
form of liability, which links their guilt to crimes outside the scope of their
agreement to a notion called the probable consequence test (an Arabic reference to
the liability of common purpose or additional offence). This test of probability
indicates that if a person commits the action of instigation, conspiracy, assistance and
fee Algarema wal Alikab fee Qanon Alokobat At Kuwaiti, (Arabic. The General Theory ofCrime and
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the principal commits a crime different to what the accessories wanted, but likely to
be caused by such action, then that person is an accessory to the latter crime of the
principal offender.82 It is useful to mention that article (51) of the F.P.C. was taken
from article (43) of the Egyptian Penal Code with one sole exception: the Egyptian
Code only binds the probable test to accessories. Elowever, Egyptian judicial and
83
some scholarly opinion now make the same requirement as that made by the F.P.C.
Further, it is worth bearing in mind that the F.P.C. prefers the objective basis of
liability as it is understood from the words of article 51, but it lacks a direct
indication to which objective foundation it requests such as objective recklessness
evaluated by the notion of an ordinary person or just pre-determining that certain
crimes are a probable result of another.
Arabic commentary indicates that this type of liability has two aspects: first, the
liability of the accessory for a less serious offence than that which had been agreed
upon, and second, liability for more serious offences.84 The principal offender might
commit a crime less serious than the original crime, in which he shares intention and
knowledge with the secondary offender. For example, in murder, an accessory might
instigate the killing, but the perpetrator commits a minor assault or an attempted
murder. In another example, a principal may be assisted in bringing about a murder,
but he commits theft or causes damage to the property of the victim. In these
Punishment in Kuwait Penal Code) (2nd ed.1992) p. 674.
82 The Arabic jurisprudence do not use the current vocabulary of accessorial liability employed by
English law for additional offences such as the terms of common puipose; joint enterprise; common
design; common pursuit; and the liability of unintended consequences. The only terms used are the
liability ofmore serious offence, and the liability for the probable result or consequence.
s > Article (43) of the Egyptian Penal Code indicates that: "Who participated in a crime even if it was
not deliberately committed, is responsible for the crime that is actually committed, if it is a probable
result ofprovided instigation, conspiracy or assistance."
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situations a question may arise about whether an accomplice could be charged with
85crimes he never wanted to occur. Arabic Codes comprise different views towards
this aspect of liability. Some do not expressly state the position of the law in this
regard, and leave the task to general principles of the criminal responsibility. Others
take the opposite view by imposing express provision, which indicates an
exceptional move of those general principles.86
Elements of accessorial guilt regarding the additional offence:
There are two elements required to establish accessorial guilt in respect of the
additional offence. Firstly, there must be proof that the accessory was engaged with
the principal offender in the primary crime, and secondly, the additional offence has
to be a probable consequence of the primary offence in which there has been
87
accessorial participation. These elements are discussed below.
84
Sorror, A., op. cit., pp. 461-2; Mahdi, A., op. cit., pp. 399-400.
83
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., pp. 447-8.
86
Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian Penal Codes do not provide direct answers to these problems,
which take the same position as the French and the German Penal Codes. Under these codes,
accessorial liability has to be estimated from general rules, which requires intention. For example,
Husni indicates: "It is not difficult to refer to the general principles in criminal responsibility to solve
this problem and apply these principles if the legislator does not impose a provision to affirm how
they should be worked out, and when some codes do not include such articles, it becomes inevitable
that the general principles will be applied... This means that the responsibility of the accessories in
relation to the more serious offences is exactly like that of the liability of principal offender. The
accessory is not responsible for the crime unless these similar elements are proved: ...the criminal
intention is required, if it is not available then the mental element of the accessory is not established.
Accordingly, criminal intention affirms the boundary accessorial responsibility." Husni, ML, (Arabic.
Criminal Complicity) op. cit., pp. 450-3; See also: Al-Saeed, K., Almbadee Alama le Amusharka
Aligramia fee Qanon Alokobat Alordony, (Arabic. The General Provisions ofCriminal Complicity in
Jordan Penal Code) (1983) Jordan: Majedlawy Publication, p. 62; Alia, S., Sharh Qanon Alokobat:
Alkesm Alam (Arabic. Explanation ofthe Penal Code: The General Part) (1998), Beirut, p. 331.
87
Rabia, H., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Okobat Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda: Alguza Alawal,
Almbadee Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of the General Part of UAE Penal Code: Part
One, The General Principles ofCrime) (1993), Dubai: Albayan Press, p. 442-3.
249
1) Proof of accessorial involvement in the primary offence:
This condition, sometimes referred in Arabic as the availability of participation
elements, seems to be an obvious requirement and need not to be expressly indicated
since accessorial liability of the additional offence is connected with the accessorial
involvement in the primary offence, which by the same token indicates that both
primary and additional liability are judged by a single doctrine. However, since
almost all Arabic legal commentary takes this as the starting element, it is important
to discuss this requirement. Thus, the prosecution first has to prove that the accessory
involvement satisfies the requested elements of accessorial liability. These are
instigating, assisting or conspiring with the principal, (properly) sharing with the
principal his state of mind (intention), and finally that there is some form of
causation in the accessory's involvement and that the principal offender commits the
crime or at least attempts to do so. For example, Husni states that:
"If this element is not fulfilled, as for example the accessorial action were
legal in its nature, but a crime is committed because of it and it was a
probable result of this instigation, agreement or the help, given, the person is
not responsible in the eyes of the law for the crime committed by the
principal... In application to that, if someone asks someone else to forbid
another person to entering a building, and the other commits a murder, the
person who gave the order is not responsible for the murder, even though it
was a probable result of the order."88
The Egyptian Court of Cassation provides an example of such requirement in a case
in which a person had asked another to obtain a passport of a nationality other than
his own. The principal, without the knowledge of the first person, forged the
documents required and obtained a forged passport. The Court said that the
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agreement was not to commit forgery of which the counterfeited passport was the
result, and that providing a passport to a non-entitled person does not necessarily
OQ
require committing forgery. Implicitly then, the Court seems to suggest that the
prosecution, and minor courts, must establish the general requirements of accessorial
liability before proceeding with accessorial involvement in the additional offence. '0
2) The additional crimes have to be a probable consequence of the accessorial
actions:
This condition requires that the additional crime, which is committed as a result of
the joint enterprise, has to be a probable consequence of the accessorial action of
instigation, conspiracy, or assistance given to the principal to commit the primary
crime, even though, the latter crime was not an expected outcome by the
accomplices.
The test of probable result means that an accessory is liable for any crime, which in
the ordinary course of things was a natural and probable consequence of the original
crime of participation.91 According to Bhanam, this test is evaluated from general
• • 92
experience and knowledge of things, or common sense. However, is this
announcing of 'common sense' enough to justify criminal responsibility? It is only a
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., pp. 466-7; Sorror, A., op. cit., p. 464.
89
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 47 for 1930, Y. 2 p. 40. Majmuat Ahka'am Mahkama'at
Alnaqad (Arabic. Decisions of the Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
90
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op. cit., p. 467.
91
According to this test, the accessory is responsible for such probable crimes even though it was not
intended nor foreseen. See: Robinson, P. H., "Imputed Criminal Liability" (March 1984) The Yale
Law Journal Vol. 93, No. 4. 609.; Zuhair, N.A.A., Almasualia Aljinaia Almuftrda, (Arabic. Imputed
Criminal Responsibility) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Cairo, nd.
12
Bhanam, R., Alnadaria Alama le Alqanon Aljenai, (Arabic. The General Doctrine ofCriminal Law)
(1995), Egypt: Almareaf Publication, p. 699.
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broad justification and is strongly objected to by some legal commentary. For
example, Alan Gledhill indicates that criminal codes must be comprehensive, and
strictly construed. Fie says that referring to ordinary ideas and common justice is a
step to justify something that does not comes within the terms of the codes. Hassan
Rabia, in his commentary on UAE criminal law, summarises the position of Arabic
93 . ...
legal commentary on this test. He indicates that the criteria is connected not with
what the accomplice actually contemplates but with the imputed conception of the
ordinary course of events as indicated by Bhanam. Thus, Rabia lists some crimes
indicating which one are a probable from another. For example, he suggests that
murder is probable resulting crime of criminal damage; rape and killing who might
come to rescue the victim in rape, arson is a probable result of theft or burglary but
assault and murder are not probable results of corruption or forgery. He ends this by
saying that the test is evaluated on its merits and is for the judge to decide. However,
such listings do not establish any instrumental criteria for the probable test, and
presumably it indicates that, under Arabic legal commentary, accessorial liability in
this type of liability is judged on outside the normal requirements of mens rea. This
opinion is contrary to the English Criminal Justice Act of 1967 in s. 8, which stresses
that the court or the jury shall not conclude that the defendant intended or
contemplated a result of his action only by it being a natural and probable
consequence of such actions. The inference must be directed to all the circumstances
of the case.
93
Rabia, H., op. cit., p. 440-3; Bhanam., (1995), op. cit., p. 699.
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To return to the view of Bhanam. He finds some of his arguments unsound and tries
to limit the criteria of probable consequence. He says that probability should be
strong to lead to such conclusion. For instance: C instigates P to rob another person,
but P is weak and inexperienced in the use of firearms. Because of this, he hires his
friend D, a more able-bodied, to commit the robbery. D commits the crime but kills
another person. Here C is not a party to murder although he is a party to robbery
because he instigated P to commit a robbery, which had a minor risk of murder,
which was committed by D. This is not enough to consider the crime of murder as a
probable consequence of the robbery.
It seems an odd view, but by comparison with other Arabic legal commentary,
Bhanam's view is unique, and suggests that he gave more thought to the subject than
most other commentators.94 Having said that, he does not make a strong foundation
to his proposed limitation of this harsh test of probability. Should the courts consider
this and build up a theory? It is strongly advised that they do, especially the UAE
courts, so as to have a balanced opinion in comparison with legal commentary.
However, with respect, the opinion of Bhanam regarding the minor risk is still based
on that odd notion of probability and any limiting view would not succeed unless it
moves to another foundation. This will be discussed later.
94 This is not to deny that there is some other worthy opinions, Sorror, for example, suggests that the
probable test is not fixed to a general standard that X is always a probable of Y. He says that such
probability is to be discussed in each case. For example, it is not appropriate to indicate that murder is
always a probable crime of burglary. However, this comment is said in broad terms without complete
investigation of the issue and does not discuss how accessories can escape blame, as Bhanam tried to
establish. Sorror. A., op. cit., pp. 463-4.
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It is worthwhile mentioning in this connection some reported cases from Egypt. In
the Egyptian Cassation Court in Case No. 204 of 1957, three accomplices entered the
victim's house with the purpose of committing burglary. One party fired two shots,
which caused the death of the owner; the others tried to steal a cow, but they could
not because the victim's son was holding it. They appeared in the Cassation Court
and were convicted ofmurder and attempted burglary.
The Court ruled against the defendants indicating that:
"According to legal commentary, both co-principals and accessories are
responsible for the crime committed by the principal offender, even if it was
different from the primary one they intended and agreed to commit, because
the latter crime was a probable offence of the primary crime."95
The Court failed to value the importance of the issue by avoiding any discussion on
how does this test works. Initially it seems difficult to offer a clear view of the
thoughts of the court on applying the test ofprobable result.
In another appeal case from Egypt,96 two persons forced a woman to join them in a
car in order to rape her. They stopped near a farm, and took her outside the car, and
while they were starting to rape her, she screamed loudly, which were heard by two
guards nearby. One party used a gun to kill one guard and wounded the other. After
dismissing their appeal, they were brought to the Cassation Court and convicted of
murder, attempted murder, and attempted rape.
The Cassation Court's opinion was that:
95
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 204 for October 7th 1957, Y. 8, p. 760. (Arabic. Decisions of the
Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
96
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 25 for 1961, Y.12, p. 156. (Arabic. Decisions of the Egyptian
Cassation Court), Egypt.
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"The conviction of the other accomplice (the accessory to murder) was
correctly right, notwithstanding he was only driving the car. This is because
the ordinary course of events suggest that the felony ofmurder, and attempt,
are a probable consequence of attempted rape, and by common sense those
who carry a gun are expected to use it."
To conclude on this point, it was argued that it would be inappropriate to broadly
judge people on the notion of common sense or on the ordinary course of events. It
would be better if the Court had discussed the notion of expectation or contemplation
when it mentioned at the end that carrying a gun develop a contemplation of
committing a more serious offence. The Court did not take that chance, and abstained
from delivering a more justified argument. It would have been preferable if the Court
had tried to link guilt to the 'ordinary man' test, which suggests that the court is
obliged to examine the whole case instead of indicating that X is a probable
consequence ofY and vice-versa. This failure to deliver a clear verdict as to how the
probable test operates is possibly due to an earlier decision of the Egyptian Court in
1940, when it established a dictum regarding this connection by indicating that:
"The accessory must legally expect all the probable and logical results, which
logically and normally occurs from his involvement from the fact that he
Q7
wanted to contribute in its commitment."
Accordingly, a person is assumed to contemplate all the probable results of his
action, although he could not have knowledge of such results. The harshness and the
vagueness of the probability test here shows a conflict in finding a clear foundation
of guilt, which reflects a struggle to understand the whole subject. The inadequacy of
the opinion of the Egyptian Cassation Court is demonstrated by the fact that the most
serious crime is considered to be a probable result of another of like nature. How
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does the probability test actually operate? What defences can accessories claim?
Does the Arabic jurisprudence justify the blaming of accessories for additional
offences?
QO
In the Egyptian Cassation Court case No. Ill for 1965, a watchman, A, joined
others in burgling a store belonging to the company for which he worked. The
accomplices tied up the night watchman, B, who was a colleague of A. The parties
managed to steal what they wanted, and took to the cars waiting outside. However,
A, thinking that B might testify against him, acted separately by killing B with a gun.
The Cassation Court convicted all accomplices of burglary and murder in spite of the
fact that the killing of B was outside the original plan of burglary, and despite the
fact that A had acted individually. The Court was satisfied that the test of probable
consequence asserted that murder is a likely consequence of burglary, and all
accomplices must be responsible. This decision is consistent with a previous decision
of the court, which indicated that the probable test is to be identified from general
experience and knowledge of life as was argued earlier by Bhanam. Apparently
Arabic view of commentary and courts list offences as being a probable consequence
of others and vice-versa. However it does not enumerate the criteria by which any
clear principle can be identified or established. For example, the Egyptian Court of
97
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 180 for 8 January 1940, Y. 3, p. 234. (Arabic. Decisions of the
Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
98 Case No. Ill for June 7lh 1965, Y. 16, p. 556; Case No. 167 for November 20th 1978, Y. 29 p. 809,
similarly the Court ruled that the offence of murder is a probable consequence of burglary. (Arabic.
Decisions of the Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
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Cassation has illustrated that murder is considered as a probable result of the
burglary. It said:
"If someone has agreed with others to break in to another person's house, the
Court, according to the test of probable consequence assumes that the
accomplices contemplate or ought to contemplate that the victim will be
awake and would try to defend, and logically they would try to stop him by
killing him and not in another way. This is known as a chain of events, and
who was involved in the first instance, in theft, the law makes him
responsible for the final event ofmurder, because it is a probable result of the
first."99
Most Arabic legal commentary indicates that murder is considered a probable result
of theft or damage, which is also considered as a probable result to participation in
assault, but insult or rape is not a probable result of theft or damage. In the UAE, the
issue is not totally clear. However, there is one important case, which is examined
below.
The 'Capri-Sun' Case':100
This case is commonly known by the name of the soft drinks factory where the crime
took place in Dubai on 3 December 1993. In this case, A, T, and D agreed on a plan
to burgle the factory where T and D worked. They knew that there would be a night
watchman on duty. They bought adhesive tape, wires and cutting equipment to open
the room, which they knew contained money (The prosecution gave evidence that
they were joined by O and S). The accomplices entered the building and seized the
watchman and both T and S held him and covered his face with the adhesive tape. T
99
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 180 for 1934, Y. 3 , p. 234 (Arabic. Decisions of the Egyptian
Cassation Court), Egypt; For other similar cases see: Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity) op.
cit., p. 469.
100 Dubai Cassation Court Case Nos. 82, 83, and 101, for 5 November 1997, unpublished decision.
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strangled him with wire, while O and D broke into the room which the money was
kept.
All accomplices were arrested and brought to trial on the charge of burglary and
murder. The Dubai Court of First Instance sentenced A, T, and D to death penalty,
and O to life imprisonment, while the defendant S was found not guilty because of
paucity of evidence. The Court of Appeal up held the death penalty against the
principal offender, T, the life imprisonment of O, and reduced the conviction of A
and D to life imprisonment, while the defendant S was sentenced to life
imprisonment as well in spite of the fact that he did not admit being an
accomplice.101 A, D, and S appealed against the conviction to the Cassation Court of
Dubai.102
The appeal of the defendant A:
101 ibid. pp. 5-7. Usually, the Cassation Court is a court of law, which suggests that factual issues
cannot be brought in front of it. However, in a ruling that involves a death penalty, the Cassation
Court is considered a court both fact and law. The common ground of appeal means that the court may
reverse the judgement in favour of the defendant if it finds that the previous ruling involved a defect
concerning public order or based on a breach; misapplication or misconstruction of the law, or that the
previous court had issued the ruling contrary to its jurisdiction, or that the another Code has been
enacted in favour of the defendant. See: article (246) UAE Code No. 35 of 1992 on Penal Procedures
& Rehabilitation . Moreover, the same Code provides some security to a defendant who has been
ruled against with death sentence. Article (253) indicates: "Without prejudice to the preceding
provisions, the ruling of death penalty shall be examined by Cassation Court, and the execution shall
be suspended until the Court ruling. The clerk of the Court of Appeal that has issued the judgement
shall send the case's file to the Court of Cassation within three days of the judgement. The
Prosecution shall lodge with the courts records clerk a summary of its opinion on the judgement
within twenty days of the date of its issue and provide lawyer for the defendant. The court shall
dispose of the case according to the provisions in paragraph (2) of article (246) and paragraph (2) of
article (249)."
102 D argued, inter alia, that there was no agreement to kill. The Court dismissed his appeal and
referred to what it had stated against the defendant A. By comparison, S was acquitted because of
paucity of evidence that he was an accomplice, ibid. pp. 10-16.
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A argued that his conviction and sentencing to life imprisonment by the Court of
Appeal was an error in applying the proper law. He said that the Court should not use
the test of probable result (article 51), which linked his action of burglary to murder
committed by T, fixing his guilt to both crimes by indicating that murder is a
probable consequence of robbery. Further, he said that even in admitting his guilt to
burglary, he is not responsible for murder because the killing of the victim by T was
outside the common plot of the burglary, and insisted that T had acted alone. His
grounds for such an argument is that he did not share the intention to kill, which is
supported by him not committing even a minor act regarding the killing and therefore
he should be acquitted.103
The Dubai Court of Cassation strongly rejected the argument of A. The Court fully
supported both the Court of First Instance and the Appeal Court in convicting him.
The Cassation Court followed the two elements stated above regarding the liability
of accessories in the additional offence, namely proving the accessorial involvement
in the primary offence, and applying the test of probable consequences. First, the
Court discussed in detail A's involvement in the primary offence of burglary, and
how he was the instigator or the prime mover of nearly all the others, which clearly
established his guilt. The Court stressed a strong point made by investigation of the
role of A in general. The Court said that A had knowledge that there would be a
committing of murder and that this is indicated by his meeting with T and D to
discuss the plan in general. This was supported by the evidence that they bought
cutting equipment, sticky tape, and heavy wire, which in fact were used in the killing
103 ibid. pp. 5-7.
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(the victim's face was fully covered with the tape and strangled by the wire). It is
also supported by comparing the confessions of the other accomplices. Therefore, the
Court was satisfied that A had both knowledge and intention to commit the burglary
and the murder. Consequently, the Court dismissed his first argument.
The other argument of A was that the probable test should not be applied against
him. The Dubai Court took this chance to respond to that argument and, at the same
time, to address the probable test of article (51). It stated that:
"Article (51) of the F.P.C. is an exceptional provision indicated by the
legislation, in this type of liability, to be applied instead of the normal
principles of criminal law which suggests that a person is charged with a
crime of either being a principal or a party to it. However, since a crime
might bring about unwanted or unexpected additional results, the legislation
produce a reference to charge and convict a person as an accessory where he
contemplates or ought to contemplate those probable crimes of the primary
crime. The enactment of this exceptional rule is based on the belief that the
accomplice intended the primary offence and its natural and logical
consequences. Even though this express article is placed in the elementary
provision of the Code, it is considered as general principle that the evaluation
of that probability should at first look at the first offence and infer what result
it could produce, and this is done logically and by reference to ordinary
course of events. Thus since murder is a probable consequence of burglary,
the defendant's argument is not convincing and therefore his appeal is
dismissed."104
The effects of the 'Capri-Sun' Case:
In English law, the liability of accessories is evaluated on subjective bases for both
the primary and the additional offence. According to the F.P.C., the situation is
different, as it requires a subjective element for the primary offence while the
additional offence is considered (somehow) objectively. This indicates that the policy
of the first is consistent and stable, while the latter directs liability at the beginning
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up to its highest limit by connecting it to the concept of intention, and for the
additional offence the scale drops heavily to the lowest boundary. This illustrates a
lack of consistency, cohesion; and logical correspondence by the F.P.C. towards the
entire subject. In other words, it appears that the F.P.C. does not establish accessorial
liability unless there is a strong connection between the accomplices, which indicates
that the aim is to punish only those with a strong mental link. This also suggests that
the F.P.C. does not lend itself to a deterrent view regarding accessorial liability of the
main offence, but surprisingly selects a strongly deterrent policy regarding the
additional liability of accessories by liking it to imputed liability in spite of the fact
that both primary and additional crimes are judged by a single doctrine.
On the other hand, the Dubai Cassation Court expressly indicates that article (51) is
an exceptional rule. Consequently, under Arabic jurisprudence, this signifies that the
rule is limited in its application and interpretation and should not be examined by
comparison with other articles. This principle indicated expressly by the UAE Civil
Code in article (30), states that:
"Exception shall not be acted upon in analogy and further interpretation
thereof shall not be elaborated."105
This principle of civil liability is accepted by criminal law commentators and
considered as a fundamental part of the doctrine of criminal law. Flowever, although
the Cassation Court is aware of this, it surprisingly stated that this elementary article
is a general principle and to be applied in other fields of criminal liability. The Court
104 ibid. pp. 9-10.
105 Article (30) ofUAE Federal Civil Transactions Code. No 5 for 1985, amended by the Federal Code
No. 1 for 1987.
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thus extended the scope of article (51) of the F.P.C. to a broad foundation contrary to
article (30) of the UAE Civil Code. Moreover, in fact, this is a serious breach of the
rule of legality, and must not be taken to represent the law at this point.
It might be argued that the Dubai Cassation Court followed Arabic jurisprudential
principles, indicted before, that there must be proof that the accessories engaged with
the principal offender in the primary crime and that the additional offence has to be a
probable consequence of the primary offence of the accessorial participation. In spite
of this, it did not precisely discuss the element of causation regarding accessorial
liability in respect of the primary offence, and this casts more doubt on the issue of
causation since accessories are formally named by F.P.C. as accessories by
causation.
The most important observations in the case are to be found in the discussion of the
required mental element of accessorial liability in respect of the additional offence.
The Court indicated that it must first inquire into the element of the accessorial
connection to the primary offence and then must infer its probable result. The
question is how can such reference be made?
At first, the Dubai Cassation Court based the notion of the probable test on the
opinion that the accessory either contemplated or ought to have contemplated the
occurrence of the probable crime. This objective criterion is usually linked to the
notion of the reasonable person. Flowever, rather strangely, in a surprise move, the
Court said that the F.P.C. indicates that the rule of probable consequences is based on
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the belief that the accomplice intended the primary offence and its natural and logical
consequences. This unpredicted move shows that it is hard to know what the Court
had in mind in declaring the basis of guilt in this type of liability. This might suggest
that there is no clear understanding of the whole subject, as it appears, by mixing two
different concepts of intention and objective recklessness. Moreover, it might be
possible that this misunderstanding is due to an earlier principle stated by the
Egyptian Cassation Court, indicated above, which pronounced that accessories must
legally expect all the probable and reasonable results, which logically and normally
occurs from his involvement.106 This is not say that the conviction of A was wrong,
but that the Dubai Cassation Court was in doubt regarding a clear conception of the
issue ofmens rea that it should have established.
Nevertheless some would argue that in spite of this doubt the Dubai Cassation Court
is in favour of applying objective recklessness as a connection to accessorial guilt. Is
this correct? Do the Federal Courts of the UAE share this view?
Although that there is no similar decisions delivered by the Federal Courts in this
regard, the answer must be in negative, for several reasons. One reason is that
although the role of Dubai Cassation Court is appreciated by other federal courts,
prosecutors, lawyers, and other officials, it is still merely a domestic court of the
emirate of Dubai, and that the Federal Supreme Court (F.S.C), which is the highest
judicial court of all other Emirates, has not examined the issue. Nevertheless, perhaps
the F.S.C. would take the view of the Dubai Court because there is no clear
106
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 180 for 8/1/1940, p. 234; Case No. 25 for 30/1/1961, p.156.
(Arabic. Decisions ofthe Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
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difference between Islamic law, which is operated by the F.S.C, and secular law
favoured by the Dubai Cassation Court regarding accessorial liability.
Another central reason is that the concept of 'probable consequence' under Arabic
jurisprudence, particularly in Egypt, is a very problematic conception, as it is not
easy for judges and jurists in this field to efficiently analyse and describe how this
doctrine operates and what is its required state of mind. This controversy would
result in an onerous task for UAE courts. One might suggest that UAE courts would
be waiting for other Arabic criminal system to find a solution, as for example the
Egyptian Court of Cassation. This might be true, but even Egyptian jurisprudence is
struggling to define the issues of the required mens rea of accessories in the
additional offence and that of how one can operate the probable test under
accessorial liability. This Egyptian experience will continue because Arabic legal
commentary is not yet aware of the problems that cover many aspects of the doctrine
of criminal complicity.
A third reason is that the Cassation Court is likely to follow the majority of Egyptian
judicial and legal commentary which lists crimes and indicates, by reference to
common sense and the ordinary course of things, that crime X is a probable result of
crime Y while crime Z is not. This, however, ignores another important aspect of the
doctrine of criminal law, which indicates that when legislation creates liability, it
should specify the conditions under which it operates and set out defences or excuses
reducing its limits. This logical concept is not met by the terms of article (51) of the
F.P.C. because it fails to indicate some defences against the application to this rule.
264
A critical question arises here. Did the Dubai Cassation Court in the 'Capri-Sun'
case intend to shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant? The
answer is difficult because the wording of the F.P.C. is unhelpful on this point due to
its broad meaning. However, if such shift is intended by the Cassation Court, it is
unconstitutional because the UAE Constitution clearly indicates that those accused of
criminal offences are presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.107 The F.P.C. is
almost silent in this respect but it is commonly acknowledged that the law on this
point requires the prosecution to produce proof as to the guilt of the defendant
beyond any reasonable doubt.
Moreover, if one presumes that the intention of article (51) is to divert the burden of
proof to the defendant instead of the prosecution, and that is constitutional, this
would give the defendant the opportunity to dismiss the charge or the conviction on
the balance of probability that what had occurred was not an ordinary or natural
consequence of his participation in comparison with the prosecution's primary
obligation to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, this cannot be true
because the defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to prove his innocence on such
balance of potentialities against the prosecution's allegation, and this is always
considered as an essential element of a criminal trial. To require a defendant to
defend himself against an unproved allegation is to deprive him from a fair trial in
107 Article (28) of the UAE Constitution 1971. The UAE Penal Procedures Code No. 35 for 1992 put
this into practice in article (2) which states that no punishment shall be imposed on any person unless
he is convicted in accordance with the law.; Further, the UAE Civil Transaction Code No. 5, amended
by Federal Law No. 1 for 1987, indicates the same broad terms of guaranty in articles (37) and (65).
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accordance with the law. Thus, a person is presumed innocent and must be acquitted
unless the prosecution offers evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt, which
requires the court to look at and weigh the strength of all the evidence presented at
the time of the trial. Such proof must examine the accessory's state of mind
concerning the additional offence of his joint enterprise. Legislation sometimes
creates a statutory presumption to help the prosecution in proving the required state
of mind regarding the offence, but here the prosecution does not have to prove
anything beyond that there was a participation regarding the first crime and that the
second crime is a probable result from the first. This might lead one to say that
prosecution has to argue about the element of probability. Unfortunately in practice it
does not. The prosecution only indicates in a very broad sense the application of the
probable consequence test regarding the additional element because there is not as
yet any single clear criteria to establish such test.
It must be noted that the Cassation Court of Dubai failed to value the importance of
the issue by avoiding any discussion as to how this test works. It initially seems
difficult to offer a clear view of the court's thoughts on applying the test of probable
result.
One of the problematic issues is that article (51) does not suggest whether it makes
the evidence conclusive or not because if it is the first, the accessory is not eligible to
avoid conviction by any means, while according to the latter he can so. The situation
is not clear in the UAE. It has been reported in Egypt that 'cil-Haganya' (the previous
These rules are recognised as one of the most important safeguards in criminal liability, which force
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official name of the Ministry of Justice) made comments on article (43) of the
Egyptian Penal Code regarding the probable test of the additional offence. It said
that:
"If A and B enter an occupied house with a weapon and somebody tries to
seize them, and A kills that person. The court can charge B with murder
because it is a probable result of burglary, even though B does not intend the
killing. Actually, there is no purpose of this article other than to affirm the
rule that the accessory cannot defend himself by revealing that he did not
intend the results which his actions might lead to."108
This is a very inflexible statement and presumes that crime Y is a probability of
crime X and that this is conclusive evidence. The UAE courts should not adopt this
opinion as it deprives the accessories from a fair trial, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and does not consider all the facts of each case. Most importantly,
it is contrary to the requirement of mens rea.109 It is important to indicate that
whatever may be the law on the point; accessorial liability should not be enlarged
beyond the criminal purpose that the accessory shares or subjectively-objectively
knows. Probability has a significant evidential role in deciding the accessorial
liability but to make it an independent ground for convicting accessories is not
judicial enforcement to do all efforts to ensure that no innocent person is wrongfully convicted.
108 in Husni., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 465 at note 3.
109 Some of the American commentary provides a strong criticism of the probable test in this regard by
indicating that: "The 'natural and the probable consequence' rule of accomplice liability, if viewed as
a broad generalization, is inconsistent with more fundamental principles of our system of criminal
law. It would permit liability to be predicated upon negligence even when the crime involved requires
a different state of mind. Such is not possible as to one who has personally committed a crime, and
should likewise not be the case as to those who have given aid or counsel.. .Indeed, the most that can
be said for the 'natural and the probable consequence' rule of accomplice liability is that it has usually
been applied to unique situations in which unusual principles of liability obtain. Two exceptions to
the general rules ...are felony-murder and misdemeanour manslaughter... If the 'natural and the
probable consequence' rule of accomplice liability is limited to such cases it is not objectionable or, at
least is no more objectionable than other applications of the felony-murder and misdemeanour
manslaughter rules." Lafave, W. Scott, A., Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1986) West Group Publication, p.
590.
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justified on penal policy grounds as it amounts merely a prediction of guilt and does
not even base liability on negligence.
Reform:
One could argue that criminal law sometimes employs imputed liability, which is
attributed on the basis that an action lacks one or more conditions that are generally
required for guilt. Examples of these are the presumptive knowledge of law, strict
liability, or intoxication. These examples are justified and in fact applied in the
doctrine of criminal law but still are exceptional rules and do not cover every
offence. For example, the F.P.C. sometimes reveals the aim for punishment
regardless of the absence of a state of mind. An example of this is article (336),
which blames the principal in assault for the death of the victim although he does not
realise that death might occur.110 Such an exceptional departure could be justified on
the grounds that there should be someone to blame for a serious result. Nevertheless,
these examples provided for by the F.P.C. are concerned with the liability of the
principal offender, who brings them about, as without his action, there could be no
such more serious results, as in the above example of homicide. By comparison,
accessorial participation needs to be analysed more deeply because often the
connection between accessorial action and the more serious result seems to be
remote, and in many examples the accessory lacks the mental requirement. Moreover
it is accepted that one of the main functions of criminal law is to express the degree
110 Article (336) states that: "Whoever assaults another person physically in any manner without
intending murder, but the assault leads to death, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not
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of wrongdoing by adopting mens rea as a mechanism of criminal liability, which is
necessary and required by the legality principle, which in turns indicates that the
commission of an act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is legally
culpable. This should be accepted by the F.P.C. concerning the liability of
accessories.
If one accepts the fact that linking the additional liability of accessories to a vague
test of probability is considered to be a departure from what has been indicated
above, it is useful to suggest reform in the view of Arabic jurisprudence relating to
this type of liability. The reform should suggest moving the required mens rea from
being linked only to probability to either intention (purpose or oblique), subjective
recklessness, or objective recklessness, which all insist on evaluating the whole facts
of the case before convicting accessories of the punishment in respect of the
additional offence of the principal offender.111
The question is: would it be sufficient to change the standard of mens rea in respect
of the additional offence? Or, re-phrase the question, might Arabic legal commentary
exceeding ten years." See also articles: (334), (349), (357) which emphasise that contemplation of the
more serious result is not an important issue.
111 It is useful to remind that two concepts constitute mens rea in the F.P.C.: intention and fault. Direct
intention means desire or purpose and knowledge that the action will inevitably cause another result.
(first degree purpose and second degree purpose.) The F.P.C. is vague in relation to oblique intention,
which suggests that this term does not exist in the Code. I suggested in chapter 3 that, at least in
relation to accessorial liability, the F.P.C., should use either the view of the American M.P.C. which
distinguishes knowledge of virtual certainty from other forms of mens rea and call it 'knowledge' or
cl. 18 (b) of the English Draft Criminal Code which treats knowledge of virtual certainty as an oblique
intention a part from purpose, or to adopt the use of virtual, practical certainty used in the English
case law, before Woollin, as an evidence of purpose .
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favour upgrading the imputed liability of the additional offence to the notion of
intention?
This is a new question and has not been at any length discussed in Arabic legal
commentary. The essential advantage of this is that it will benefit the accessory
offender, who often does not commit any physical action and who does not possess
any mens rea regarding the commission of the additional offence. However, because
of his earlier involvement in the primary offence he is liable, with the principal
offender, for both crimes. This promotion puts the categories of accessories onto the
same level as the principal regarding the issue ofmens rea, and, by the same token, it
establishes conformity and adequately deals with one form of mens rea in both
primary and additional offences. In other words, promoting the required mens rea
from vagueness to intention would allow accessorial liability under the F.P.C. to
determine accessorial mens rea in the whole doctrine of complicity by one form of
mens rea, namely, intention. English law adapts this coherent approach; it requires
one minimal mens rea for both the primary and the additional offence, with an
obvious exception that such a standard under English law is knowledge or,
recklessness.
As mentioned before, intention under the F.P.C. is presumably restricted to purpose
or desire that the crime should be committed, and that it does not encompass oblique
intention. Thus, without amending the F.P.C. in relation to oblique intention, any
upgrading of the mens rea of article (51) to purpose is inappropriate and would lead
in many examples to escape conviction. Moreover, prosecution would presumably
intervene to stop any promotion ofmens rea in this type of liability because it would
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deprive the prosecution of the benefit of proof under the probable test and would
make their task very difficult in proving purpose. At the same time such a promotion
would act against the deterrent aim of the legislation envisaged in article (51).
112
Realistically, any further discussion in this connection is unnecessary.
Consequently, I should investigate the issue under recklessness. As has already been
113
argued, the term fault or recklessness is not defined by the F.P.C. Under the F.P.C.
this concept includes many mental states, and there is no equivalent of this term in
the common law systems. However, fault under the F.P.C. has two broad meanings:
advertent and inadvertent fault. Moreover, the F.P.C. does not expressly indicate how
this term operates. Arabic legal commentators favour the objective test and not the
subjective one to resolve the issue of mens rea. Further, it was indicated that the
It has been indicated, in chapter 3, that Arabic jurisprudence has not reached consensus about the
issue of knowledge or oblique intent. Moreover, it should be noted that some Egyptian judicial
opinions attempted to link the liability of accessories in the additional offence to the notion of oblique
intention as examined by Arabic jurisprudence. For instance, the Egyptian Cassation Court Case No.
180 for 1934, stated that: "If it is not possible to convict the accessory of the primary crime of theft in
connection with the crime of murder committed by his principal, because there was not a satisfactory
evidence that the accessory had a purpose for murder. Objective proof, that he had an oblique
intention to murder, with reference to him being present at the crime, is sufficient for convicting him
for the additional crime of murder, and this is based on the notion that his presence indicates that he
had to contemplate the crime of murder, even though he had no such contemplation." Egyptian
Cassation Court No. 180 for 1934, p. 234. A1 Shinawi, op. cit., p. 676, reports that the Kuwaiti High
Criminal Court has adapted the above ruling of the Egyptian Cassation Court in its ruling in 17
November 1968. The Egyptian ruling has been heavily criticised in legal commentary that presumably
forced the Egyptian Cassation Court Case to avoid such express discussion of this subject in future
cases. Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 470-1; Shinawi, op. cit., p. 676. The
Egyptian Cassation Court Case No. 180 for 1934 ignores the actual notion of oblique intention should
be based on knowledge of virtual certainty rather than the above imputed test of mens rea, as it was
mentioned by the Court. In fact the above Court addressed oblique intention as form of presumptive
knowledge which actually deprives intention from its subjective nature. Such subjective nature is the
key element of intention.
113 Article (38) states various forms of fault. It indicates that: "...Fault arises if a criminal result occurs
by reasons of the defendant's fault, whether such a fault is negligence, indifference, carelessness,
recklessness, imprudence or non-compliance with laws, regulations, rules, or orders."
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F.P.C. does not mention the degree of risk needed to constitute fault, which means
that the Code makes no distinction between gross fault and slight fault.
The question is therefore this: does subjective knowledge or recklessness provides a
basis for reform? The answer to this is not provided in Arabic legal commentary.
However, moving the accessorial mens rea into this standard would be a much easier
solution rather than moving it towards the standard of intention, bearing in mind
what had been said about prosecution's preference for flexibility in proving
evidence. Such a move would bring some conformity with intention as a required
state ofmind in the primary offence. In spite of this, the criminal law of UAE is not
equivalent to English law, and this is not only because of its historical background,
but also because English law rules are mostly coherent, consistent, and systematic
and operated with clear understanding, and because of the wealth of opinion in both
case law and legal commentary. English law in general favours a subjective basis of
liability. Understanding the codified criminal laws of the UAE is very difficult
because of a paucity of cases and domestic commentary. Having said that,
recklessness under the F.P.C. is generally not examined subjectively but in fact
objectively. Article (38) implicitly states numerous frameworks of recklessness such
as negligence, indifference, and carelessness, which suggests that the general part of
the F.P.C. has favoured the Arabic jurisprudence preferences of objective
recklessness, and for this reason a move to subjective recklessness is possibly not
desirable.
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This leaves us with one last proposal: objective knowledge or recklessness based on
the test of the reasonable man. A moderate view expressed in some Arabic legal
commentary, suggests that the proper accessorial mens rea in the additional offence
is based on criminal intention for the primary crime, combined with unintended fault
(objective recklessness) regarding the additional probable crime."4 M. Husni insists
that the proper test of mens rea regarding accessorial liability in the additional
offence, should be based on an objective standard, and that should be expressly
stated by the legislation. Thus, objective recklessness indicates that the accessory
should contemplate or ought to contemplate the possibility of the probable result.1"
Under this view, the courts have to look to all the evidence surrounding the case such
as whether there was an agreement not to act in a certain manner or whether the
offenders had knowledge of firearms and other relevant factors that might help to
decide foresight or contemplation.116
This might be a satisfactory option for amending article (51) if the UAE legislation
decides not to move the required mens rea of the additional offence to a subjective
114
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 473; Bhanam (1995), op. cit. p. 700. It has
been argued earlier that Bhanam connects mens rea to the broad concept of knowledge and a remote
risk defence that should be available to accessories but here he returns to the standard of the
reasonable man. Husni, by contrast, has a better view except where he lists certain crimes as a
probable results of others, as it has been illustrated earlier.
115
Husni, M., (Arabic. Criminal Complicity), op. cit., p. 473.
116 Husni suggests that: "Accordingly, the probable criteria is not subjective because it does not
examine the psychological part of the accessory to decide whether he had actually expected the result
or not. Moreover, this criterion is not a pure objective because its investigation is not limited to the
examination of the physical relationship between accessorial action and the crime, like exploring the
issue of causation. It only examines the notion of the accessory being able to contemplate or ought to
contemplate the committing. It is obvious that one cannot decide such ability and duty to contemplate
unless we investigate the circumstances in which the partner's activity took place and whether they
allowed him to expect and make this expectation. In other words, the formula is that of a reasonable
person in the position of the defendant, who expected the occurrence of the additional offence,
committed by the principal. The criteria is objective in its nature but some personal elements enter
into its contents." ibid. p. 468.
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standard of liability. Having said that, I believe that for the current situation, article
(51) should be approached by courts on the above objective standard, without
waiting to the F.P.C. to be amended, because it is the only way one can stop the
harsh application of imputed liability and embody a consideration of justice on this
type of criminal responsibility.
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Chapter 5
Miscellaneous aspects related to accessorial
liability
Chapter 5
Miscellaneous aspects related to accessorial
liability
This chapter, the final chapter of the thesis, aims to examine a number of important
and related aspects of accessorial liability. The first of these is: issues related to the
liability of the principal offender by indicating the definition of this category and the
legal distinctions between those who are principals and those who are merely
accessories. After this, I shall examine the derivative theory, which is considered the
cornerstone of accessorial liability, and point out some of the problems that led the
English Law Commission to introduce a proposal to change the shape of accessorial
liability to one based on inchoate liability. Under this proposal, the notion of
accessorial liability or criminal complicity is abandoned. In addition, I shall discuss
the doctrine of innocent agency, which is a legal fiction that has emerged to deal with
the limitation of derivative liability and which considers and treats an accessory as a
principal offender. Final comments will be concerned with examining selected
defences available to accessories, such as withdrawal. As with previous chapters, our
examination starts with English law, followed by the UAE law. It should be noted
that because of some similarities between the two systems, some of the matters




(A) Issues related to the liability of the principal
offender
Who is the principal offender:
The principal is the main actor in the commission of the offence and usually the
person who commits the actus reus.1 Under this definition, the role of the principal is
viewed as being that of the person who, in law, performs the offence, as is normally
indicated by the wording of the offence.2 Other definitions place emphasis on
causation as being the distinctive feature of the definition of who is the principal by
indicating that the principal is the most immediate cause of the actus reus.
Nonetheless both definitions focus on a single criterion: a person who brings about
the actus reus of the offence. This leads one to classify principals as follows: the
single principal, where a person commits the actus reus required of an offence; the
co-principal, where two or more bring about the actus reus of a crime together, or
each commits an act or acts specified for the offence; the constructive principal.
where one assists or encourages an act or acts done by another, who is considered as
'innocent agent' and is thus not guilty of an offence. Here the provider of assistance
or encouragement is considered a principal offender in respect of an offence.4
1
Elliot, C & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (Ist ed. 1996), Longman, p. 150.
2
Williams, G., Textbook ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), London: Stevens and Sons. p. 329.
3
Smith, J.C., Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (18th ed. 1996), London: Butterworths. p. 128.
4
Gillies, P., The Law ofCriminal Complicity (1980), Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd.
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Legal distinction between principal and accessory:5
Ashworth claims that in English law there is little practical difference in
distinguishing principal offenders from accessories.6 The main reason for this is that
the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 indicates in s. 8 that a person who aids, abets,
counsels and procures shall be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.7
Surprisingly, Ashworth stresses practice here rather than any general principle
requiring that the role of the principal be distinguished from that of the accessory. It
is clear that in Ashworth's writing he bases his approach on principles of criminal
law (such as fair labelling), an approach similar to legal commentary in the civil law
tradition, rather than on practice of the courts. However, he does not rely entirely on
legal practice, as he indicates that English courts try to encourage prosecutors to give
the defendant fair warning of the charges against them, not just generally, but by
o
specifically with terms such as 'aid, abet, counsel, and procure.' However, others
either expressly indicate the need to distinguish or directly describe such legal
p. 139; Halsbury's Laws of England indicates: "A principal is a person who by his own act or omission
directly brings about the actus reus, or any part of the actus reus, of a crime. A person may be a
principal, notwithstanding the fact that he is not present when the crime is committed, if he causes the
actus reus by some contrivance, or by the use of an innocent agent." Halsbury's Laws of England (4th
ed. 1990) Vol. II (I), London: Butterworths. p. 44. See for example, R v. Sheppard (1839) C & P 121;
R v. Kelly and M'Carthy (1847) 2 Car & Kir 379.
3
A classification used by Glanville Williams, TBCL, op. cit., p. 333.
6
Ashworth, A., Principles ofCriminal Law (3rd ed. 1999), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 247; It
is worth noting that Halsbury's Laws of England indicates that since all accomplices are liable to be
tried and punished as a principal offender, it is unimportant to distinguish between accomplices in a
crime and that the words 'aid, abet, counsel or procure' may all be used in an indictment against a
secondary party as was suggested in Ferguson v. Weaving [1951] 1 K.B. 814, [1951] 1 All ER. op.
cit., Vol. II (I) pp. 44-5.
7
Dennis, I.H., Sweet & Maxwell's Criminal Law Statutes (3rd ed. 1995), London: Sweet & Maxwell,
p. 1.
8
Ashworth, A., PCL, op. cit., p. 248, note 14.
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distinctions.9 Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between principals and accessories
because of the 'different character of their contributions to a given crime.'10 For
example, Gillies insists that any reformulated code of criminal complicity should
distinguish between these two different types of responsibility in response to their
different characters; and principles produced from the nature of the culpability they
entail." (Neither the 1989 Draft Criminal Code nor LC. no. 131 acknowledges this).
The main differences are (from substantive criminal law, which is the concern of this
thesis):
Actus reus: The source of liability in relation to the principal offender is to be
found in the definition of the offence committed, which might differ from one
offence to another in relation to the different descriptions, special characters and
requirements. The accessory is not treated similarly, as his source of liability is
governed by only one general provision of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
(s.8), and common law precedents, which address this liability, often, under a single
concept of to 'aid, abet, counsel, or procure an offence'. Moreover, it is generally
assumed that the principal must perform an actus reus for every crime of which he is
to be convicted. This is not the same rule required for conviction of being an
accessory. The direct example is the doctrine of common purpose (accessorial
liability for an additional offence committed by the principal). The principal here is
required to commit both the actus reus of the main and any additional crime, while
9 Clarkson C. Keating, H., Criminal Law: Texts and Materials (4th ed. 1998), London: Sweet &
Maxwell, pp. 535-6; Williams, G., TBCL, op. cit., p. 333; Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit.,
p. 127; Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., pp. 39- 41.
10
Gillies, P., ibid. p. 41.
11
Gillies, P., ibid. p. 286.
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the accessory needs only to commit the actus reus of providing help or
encouragement in relation to the main crime. In relation to his liability for any
collateral or additional offence, there is no need to prove a further actus reus on his
part; all that is required for his liability is proof of the requisite mens rea in relation
to the principal's acts.
Causation: As discussed above, English law does not consider causation as an
essential element of the liability of secondary parties. Importantly, in deciding the
liability of the principal who commits the crime, the principal may only be convicted
if he causes the offence by himself, either jointly with another co-principal or
through an innocent agent. The level of proof is one ofbeyond reasonable doubt.12
Omission: As Gillies indicates, the definition of some offences such as assault,
burglary, and robbery is restricted to the criteria of the act rather than omission
unless the omission can be construed as being part of a continuous act or broader
1 T
event. The liability of accessories in this regard is broader than that of the principal.
The issue of inaction in aiding and abetting comes under two headings: mere
presence, and omission based on duty and control. Mere presence is no more than
prima-facie evidence from which the jury may infer encouragement because the
12 One might think that accessorial liability would require causation, as suggested by K. Smith, based
on the vague notion of 'making the difference'. However, if this is true, it would be still not similar to
the requirement ofbut-for test of causation required for the principal offender.
13
Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., p. 42. For example it was held in Fagan v. Metropolitan
Police [1969] 1 Q.B. 439, that the definition of some offences such as assault is restricted to act rather
than omission which insufficient unless it can be understood as an act. See for example, Childs, P.,
Nutcases: Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1999), London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 1.
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presence of another during the offence offers moral support to the principal.14 By
contrast, omission is a failure to act where there is duty to intervene or where a right
of control exists. Such duty to act may be created under statute but more commonly
arises under common law categories such as the holding a public office which
requires a duty of care to others, the duty of parents towards their children, the
voluntary undertaking of the care of another who is unable to care for himself, and
situations in which there is a contractual duty of care.1:1
Mens rea: It has been pointed out that the mens rea required for accessories is not
the same as that of principals. This is viewed by Glanville Williams as the chief
grounds for distinguishing between principals and accessories.16 An example of this
is the crime ofmurder, which requires the principal to possess intention to kill or to
cause GBH, while to secure the conviction of an accessory, the prosecution only has
to prove that he actually contemplated that the principal might have intended to kill
or cause GBH. This is clearly a major difference and cannot be ignored by reference
to wording of the 1861 Act and the practice of courts. Moreover, the accessory must
possess mens rea for every crime he engages in, while the principal might be
convicted without mens rea, as in the case of strict liability.
The derivative nature of accessorial liability: Given that accessorial
participation is not a crime in its own right, except where assisting or otherwise
14
Coney [1882] 8 Q.B. 534; Wilcox v. Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464, K.B.D; R v. Allan [1963] 2 All ER
89; R v. Clarkson and Carroll [1971] 3 All ER 344.
15
Dytham [1979] Q.B. 722;R v. Russell [1933] VLR 59, (an Australian Case); Nicholls [1874] 13 Cox
CC 75; Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354; Pittwood [1902] 19 TLR 37.
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participation in an act is made criminal (as in the case of the statutory offence of
aiding suicide), accessorial liability must depend on the criminal liability of the
principal being established. This is often described as the 'derivative theory', which
means that in order to establish accessorial liability the principal (whom the
accessory aided, abetted, counselled or procured) committed the offence or at least
attempted to commit it. This is understood by Glanville Williams as meaning that
someone must be proven to have been a perpetrator of the offence.17 Although
English law adheres to this essential point, courts have improved on and slightly
moved away from its literal reading, as we shall see later on. However, it remains a
fundamental part of accessorial liability. For example, Bronitt indicates that the
modern common law of accessorial liability has excessively moderated the derivative
theory from what it was in the 16th century, which required that 'to be guilty as an
1 8
accessory, the principal had not only to be convicted but punished as well.'
However, as Bronitt observes, accessorial liability still requires proof of the guilt of
the principal, which is based on the assumption that the offence must be committed
or at least attempted by the principal.19 The law here considers accessorial
involvement as irrelevant in terms of being serious and dangerous and not worthy of
being punished unless such involvement led to a crime committed by the principal.
(This assumption is true regarding aiding, while for encouragement there is an
inchoate offence punishing unsuccessful encouragement under inchoate liability).
16
Williams, TBCL, op. cit, p. 333.
17
Williams, ibid. p. 333.
18




Vicarious liability: Vicarious liability (which is the liability of one person for the
act of another, as it is found in some offences of strict liability, expressly or
implicitly stated by a statute) means that a person may be held to have committed an
offence, not by reason of anything he has done but by reason of an act done by
90
another who is in his employment or authority. Such a person is labelled as a
principal offender and not as an accessory.21
Attempt: Liability for attempt is a form of liability attached, first of all, to the
principal who carries out an act (indictable offences, either-way offences, but not
summary offences unless required by a statute) more than merely preparatory to the
commission of an offence. Undoubtedly, there would be accessorial liability if the
principal attempted to commit a crime, but this depends on there being a principal,
which by the same token indicates that 'one can attempt to be a principal but not to
be an accessory'.22
Jurisdiction: It is generally acknowledged that a person who aids and encourages a
crime committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of English law may not be
charged with being an accessory (unless there is a special provision for this in a
20 Law Commission Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989).
Vol.2, pp. 211-2. Note that the Draft Code has expressly indicated, in cl. 26 ss.(2), that such liability is
addressed under the liability of the principal offender as reflection of the existing law. ibid. vol. 1 and
vol. 2 p. 204.
21
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 127.
22
Williams, TBCL, op. cit., p. 333. See: s.l(l) Criminal Attempt Act 1981.
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statute), while those who aid, abet, counsel or procure a crime, for example in
Scotland, may be convicted as accessories to a crime committed in England.
Punishment: The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 clearly indicates, in s. 8, that
accessories shall be tried, indicted and punished as principal offenders, which might
be classified strictly in the sense of the accessorial derivative nature. However, in
modern day practice, English law, following the House of Lords decision in Howe
(1987), has moved forward by acknowledging that accessories might be liable for a
greater offence than that of their principal based on their greater contribution to the
crime involved.24 According to Glanville Williams, English courts may distinguish
between principals and accessories in deciding their punishment according to their
role, but such flexibility is restricted in murder as a consequence of the application of
a fixed sentence of life imprisonment for accomplices.
(B) The derivative theory
Accessorial liability or complicity (as some might prefer to call it) is not an offence
in its own right but a mode of participation in another person's criminal offence. This
important distinction is known as the derivative theory or concept, which, in fact, is
one of the cornerstones of accessorial liability.
23 Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd [1970] 2 QB 54, [1970] All ER 577; Godfrey /1923] 1 KB 24. See:
Card, R., Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (13th ed. 1995), London: Butterworths. p. 552.
24 Howe [1987] AC 417. Cf. Richards [1974] QB 776.
23
Williams, TBCL, op. cit.. p. 332.
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The problem of identifying accomplices:
The derivative theory is an essential element in criminal complicity, stating that in
order to establish the guilt of accessories there must be a principal offender.26 For
example, in Thornton v. Mitchell (1940),27 a bus driver had to reverse as a result of
the conductor's signal, a pedestrian was knocked over as a result. The Divisional
Court acquitted the driver of being a principal in driving without due care, while the
conductor was for his part acquitted because there was no principal offence (for
driving without due care) that he had aided and abetted. The derivative theory
requires that there is a commission of an actus reus by a principal before the guilt of
accessories can be established. Moreover, although as matter of practice accomplices
should be tried together, there is nothing in law that states that accessories can be
tried and convicted after the conviction of the principal offender, since the
prosecution has to establish the commission of an offence by the principal offender
rather than his guilt (there could be some problems as in a situation where the
principal, for example, has escaped trial because he acted in self defence, which
means there is no crime neither for him nor the convicted accessory). Logically the
prosecution and the courts should fully examine the case to see if there might be such
a defence that might lead to acquittal of the accessory. Also it is should be noted that
conviction of the principal is merely a res inter alios acta (a thing done between
others) rather than conclusive evidence.28
26 Russell on Crime (12th ed. 1964, by J. Turner), p. 128.
27 Thornton v. Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339.
28
Williams, TBCL, op. cit., p. 331. Moreover, there is no need to convict the principal before the
accessory: Austin [1981] 1 All ER 374; Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189. The acquittal of the principal, for
reasons other than no crime was committed, does not benefit the accessory: Hui Chi-ming v. R [1991]
3 All ER 897; s. 74 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. See: Smith, J.C., Criminal Law
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It should be noted that the practice of English courts in cases when the identity of the
29
principal is not known is to treat all parties as accomplices. This is subject to proof,
beyond reasonable doubt, that each must have been either the principal or an
accessory. It seems that if such a standard of proof cannot be met, there can be no
conviction of complicity.30
..71
For example, in Giannetto the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife.
He was convicted although the prosecution could not prove that he was either the
encourager or the perpetrator of the murder. He appealed against his conviction on
the ground, inter alia, that the trial judge made an error in not directing the jury that
they must be unanimous as to whether he was a principal or an encourager. However,
his appeal was dismissed. The reason for this dismissal was that the prosecution was
unable, 'for good reasons', to prove that the defendant was either an accessory or a
(1996), op. cit., pp. 151-2, where he criticises the decision of D P.P. v. Shannon [1975] AC 717, a
case indicated that acquittal of one party to conspiracy does not lead to the acquittal of the other party.
29 This is an old rule applied in the case of Swindall And Osborne (1846) 2 C & K 230 which was
taken by the English Draft Criminal Code 1989, in cl. 28 (1), to represent the common law in this
regard. Law Commission Report No. 177, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code for England and Wales
(1989). Further, Halsbury's Laws of England indicates that " If several persons act together in a
common unlawful enterprise and the actus reus of the crime is caused by one of them, but it is not
known by whom, all are principals in its commission.", op. cit., Vol. II (I) p. 44. See for example: R v.
Salmon (1880) 6 Q.B. 79; R v. Pridmore (1913) 77 JP 339. Cf. Rv. Borthwick (1779) I Doug KB 207.
See also, Swindall & Osborne (1846) 2 Car & Kir 230; Smith v. Mellors & Soar (1987) Cr. App. Rep.
279; Fitzgerald [1992] Crim. LR 660. Cited in Card, R., op. cit., p. 568.
30 Lane & Lane (1985) 82 Cr. App. Rep. 5; Russell & Russell (1985) 85 Cr. App. Rep. 388; Aston and
Mason (1992) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 180. See: Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 568. Edward
Griew, who was a member of the drafters of the Draft Criminal Code 1989, indicates that the guilt of
accomplices at this exceptional circumstances, requires first that one of the accomplices aided,
abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence by the other, 'whether by positive act
or exceptionally by omission failing to exercise a right or duty'. Second that each knew or at least was
reckless to the conduct of another. E. Griew, E., "It Must Have Been One of Them" [1989] Crim. LR
129 at 130-1; Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 552. Conviction should not be based on the
terms: 'joint enterprise or acting in concert', this is against the general assumption that knowledge
between parties is not an essential element in establishing accessorial liability. Moreover, the use of
the above terms might bring confusion that prosecution should establish knowledge, something that is
surely not desired by prosecution and might lead to an acquittal. Thus, it is more appropriate instead to
use the term ' accomplices'.
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principal, and this therefore should not lead to acquittal, especially when the
evidence indicates that the defendant was involved in one way or another in the
murder. Thus, to secure the conviction, the jury were invited to find at least that the
defendant encouraged the murder. This was based on the fact that s. 8 of Accessories
and Abettors 1860, as amended, indicated that any one who aids, abets, counsels or
procures a crime is liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender.
Such a rule gives a measure of flexibility to the prosecution and to courts to avoid
applying a strict form of derivative theory, which might lead to the acquittal of an
accomplice when the identity of the principal is not known.
However, bearing in mind that there are actual and theoretical differences between
principals and accessories, especially in respect of causation and mens rea, courts
should be neutral in this regard by restricting such a rule to a situation where it is
difficult or impossible to establish the identity of the principal, otherwise the
prosecution, where it can establish such identity but cannot secure the conviction of
the principal, might try to convict a person without establishing the elements of
liability as it is required by the law in respect of the establishing of the guilt of the
principal.32
jl
Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 1.
",2 The House of Lords in Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140 held that, 'whenever possible', the
prosecution should clarify in the listing charge of the offence whether the defendant was a principal or
merely an accessory. By implication, when it is impossible to do that, the defendant cannot cling to
the above direction when the facts of the case shows that he was at least an accessory. See:
Glazebrook, P. R., "Structuring the Criminal Code: Functional Approaches to Complicity, Incomplete
Offences and General Defences", in Simester, A. P., & Smith A. T. H., (eds.), Harm and
Culpability,(1996), Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 195 at 199.
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Comments on the new proposal of LC. No. 131:
The English Law Commission in their report No. 131 has introduced a remarkable
new concept in their proposal to abolish criminal complicity, and have created
instead an inchoate liability for assisting and encouraging crimes. This means that the
derivative nature of criminal complicity, which is currently a major feature, should
not be required any more and, consequently, should be consigned to the legal history
books. The new offences would be committed as soon as one intentionally
encourages another to commit a crime or as soon as one assists another with the
knowledge or belief that he may commit an offence. Moreover, liability based on
common purpose or joint enterprise (liability for additional offences) should not be
part of these new offences and it is to be located elsewhere. In fact, this move is not
33 The offence ofassisting crimes, (paragraph 4.99, pp.113-4) indicates that:
"(1) A person commits the offence of assisting crime if he
(a) knows or believes that another (the principal) is doing or causing to be done, or will do or cause to
be done, acts that do or will involve the commission of an offence by the principal; and
(b) knows or believes that the principal, in so acting, does or will do so with the fault required for
offence in question; and
(c) does any act that he knows or believes assists or will assist the principal in committing that
offence.
(2) Assistance includes giving the principal advice as to commit the offence, or as to how to avoid
detection or apprehension before or during the commission of the offence."
The offence ofencouraging crimes, (paragraph 4.163, p. 133) indicates that:
"(1) A person commits the offence of encouraging crime if he
(a) solicits, commands or encourages another (the principal) to do or cause to be done an act or acts
which, if done, will involve the commission of an offence by the principal; and
(b) intends that that act or those acts should be done by the principal; and
(c) knows or believes that the principal, in so acting, will do so with the fault required for the offence
in question
(2) The solicitation, command or encouragement must be brought to the attention of the principal, but
it is irrelevant to the person's guilt whether or not the principal reacts to or is influenced by the
solicitation, command or encouragement.
(3) The defendant need not know the identity of the principal, nor have any particular principal or
group of principals in mind, provided that he intends his communication to be acted on by any person
to whose attention it comes.
(4) 'Offence' in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of sub-section (1) above means the breach of a specified
prohibition laid down by statute or the common law; but for the purposes of this section the defendant
may solicit, command or encourage the commission of such an offence without intending that it
should be committed at a specific time or place." Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 131,
Assisting and Encouraging Crime, (1993).
288
totally surprising since English law indeed replaced the strict notion of derivative
theory (e.g. irrelevancy of causation, focus on the mens rea required for accessories
than joint state ofmind of accomplices, liability of accessory for more serious crimes
rather than the principal.. .etc.) However, the surprise is in the proposal to abolish
criminal complicity and the cutting-off from it the doctrine of common purpose.
Under the new proposal of the Law Commission, the derivative nature of criminal
complicity is to abandoned for a risk-based theory. That such new liability is to be
treated as an inchoate crime suggests that there is to be no more discussion of
criminal complicity. The aim of the new proposal is to avoid problems caused by the
derivative nature and to fill the gap of not being able to punish some dangerous
forms of assistance that still require the principal to commit the offence. One must
say that such a proposal is simpler than the current situation in terms of the language
used; there is greater clarity as to the mens rea requirement but should this in itself be
enough to support this theory? This is possibly not so, since there are some points
that stand against this critical move. The proposal relating to the new offence of
assisting crimes involves some major difficulties:
Unnecessary extension of criminal law: One must acknowledge that some
forms of assisting crimes are dangerous and anti social in nature (e.g. supplying
gangs with weapons or information in the knowledge that without them the offence
might not be committed) and should be punished. Law enforcement agencies are
unable to stop such activities before the committing of an offence because of the
derivative theory that operates under criminal complicity (unless of course there is an
289
express crime such as for example possession of weapons). Secondly, creating an
inchoate offence of assisting crimes can be considered as a step forward in
controlling crime in its earlier stages and by the same token reducing the chance of
greater harm caused by the principal's offence."'4 However, there are some other
major factors against such a move: LC. No. 131 suggests that the new crime should
*3 C
cover statutory and common law offences. This is an unnecessary extension of
criminal liability in comparison to the liability of the principal, which has not yet
been similarly treated. Such a move might also incriminate some actions that
otherwise seem innocent in general and not infringements of the criminal law.
A random example of the non-intervention of criminal law is found in the Theft Act
1968 which indicates that it is not an offence to pick fruits, flowers or foliage from a
plant growing wild unless the picker is doing that for reward or sale. Thus criminal
law here does not attach responsibility to the principal because the desire is not to
extend the law and consequently under the current situation of the form of assistance
there would be no accessorial liability in the above example. However, under the
new proposal giving help to the picker in the above example is a crime in spite of the
fact the principal does not commit any crime. This would only be the case, of course,
if the accessory thought that the principal was acting with the mens rea that would
make the act criminal, that is, if he thought that the principal was likely to sell the
picked flowers. This example leads to the question of whether all form of assisting




Slapper, G., " Case Notes: A Curious Branch of the Law" May 23 2000 The Times: Law, p. 51.
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new offence of assistance to all crimes, even to summary offences is a very serious
extension of English law that attaches great importance to harm-theory rather than to
37risk rationale. The drafters of LC. No. 131 possibly had in mind that the best way
of controlling crimes is to extend accessorial liability and demolish the general
theory of criminal complicity. However, one should view this approach with caution.
Such a move can be viewed as excessive and inappropriate in terms of defining what
constitutes a crime. For example, generously serving alcohol at a party with the
knowledge that a person might be driving afterwards would be a criminal offence of
assisting crimes although the other person might not drive at all. Selling or giving a
knife (or any other object) to someone with the knowledge that he might kill or
assault someone constitutes an offence although the other actually might use the
knife or the object for innocent purposes. Thus, under the new proposal, the offence
of assistance requires a low-level mens rea, and culpability would be considered as
being complete once the offender provides assistance with merely the knowledge that
the other might use it to commit an offence.
The following question should be asked: are there any other options in this context?
Why should not the law relating to the liability of the principal be extended? For
example, the crime of attempt, under the liability of the principal offender, means
any act that is more than merely preparatory to the intended commission of a crime.
Thus intention and the merely preparatory stage are the essential elements in attempt.
Any move to a risk-based theory should also consider shaping the concept of attempt
to a line similar to the new proposal for accessories. The drafters of LC. No. 131
17
Smith, J.C., "Criminal Law ofAccessories: Law and Law Reform" (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 453 at 460.
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could have proposed such a modification in attempt, by reason of their attachment to
the theory of risk-based liability; by considering that the principal acting in the
merely preparatory stage commits an attempt might be justified as a means giving the
law more scope to control crime. Moreover, as a concomitant of the new risk-theory,
attempt might be constituted even where the principal acts recklessly (on the view
that any move to risk-theory should be applied to all parties of criminal offence). Is
there a serious need for such an extension of criminal law under the assumption of
risk theory? Properly not, but if such a proposal is accepted I think it should logically
also be considered in regard to the liability of the principal offender.
Punishment: Although the LC. No. 131 proposed that criminal complicity should
not exist any more following the proposal of the new offences of assisting and
encouraging crimes, they were influenced by the doctrine of complicity, which
allows imposing similar penalties of the crime committed on accomplices. Such
influence is seen in the recommendation that the offenders of the new two inchoate
crimes should receive the same maximum punishment for the crime that has been
encouraged or assisted and that differences in the level of culpability should be left to
io
the discretion of the court.
This recommendation implicitly suggests that the LC. No 131 still uses the derivative
theory by requiring excessive punishment of the offenders of the new offences
although there is no connection between the new offences and the liability of the
principal. One should bear in mind that even a supporter of such a new move would
still question such proposal in relation to the excessive punishment required by the
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proposal. For example, C. Clarkson and H. Keating (1998) argue that because of the
philosophy of LC. No. 131 in distinguishing principals from accessories according to
a distinction between harm and danger theory, it logically follows that a lesser
blameworthiness or lesser harm caused should result in a lesser level of criminal
TQ
liability and punishment.
Common purpose: I have already discussed that the concept of common purpose
has generally been employed in the doctrine of criminal complicity to resolve the
liability of an accessory to an additional crime committed by the principal. It means
that this concept is an essential part of the general doctrine of criminal complicity.
This fact indicates that in order for such concept of common purpose to be
established there must be first of all criminal complicity in the main or the original
crime, which suggests a strong link between liability for additional crimes and
38 LC. No. 131, paragraph 4.188, pp. 141-2.
39 For example, although C. Clarkson and H. Keating are supportive of the new proposal of LC. No.
131, they think that there must be a distinction in relation to punishment, suggesting that English law
should take a similar approach to the German criminal law in this regard. They state that:
"The accessory who provides assistance or encouragement is clearly blameworthy, but not as
blameworthy as the principal who actually pulls the trigger, stabs with the knife or takes the property.
It is the principal who is the dominant party who has to make the final decision to commit the crime...
The accessory is likewise tainted or contaminated—but for what he has done, namely his lesser role of
assistance or encouragement. Of course, it does not follow that all secondary parties should be treated
the same. One might wish to distinguish between different classes of accessories in terms of their
liability and punishment. The actions of the instigator or master-mind behind the crime are arguably
more reprehensible than those of an accessory simply assisting the principal at the scene of the crime;
the causal contribution of such an instigator towards the ultimate crime is certainly greater; he may
thus deserve greater punishment. These ideas are recognised by German law which provides that
punishment for an accessory be reduced as follows:
1. Instead of life imprisonment, the punishment is imprisonment for not less than three years.
2. In cases of prescribed terms of imprisonment, the maximum term may be reduced to three-fourths
of the prescribed maximum. The same reduction applies to monetary penalties.
3. The minimum term of imprisonment is mitigated as follows:
A. From a minimum of ten or five years to a minimum of two years.
B. From a minimum of three or two years to a minimum of six months.
C. From a minimum of one year to a minimum of three months.
D. In other cases the statutory minimum is retained." Clarkson C. Keating, FL, Criminal Law: Texts
andMaterials (1998), op. cit., pp. 572-4.
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criminal complicity and that they are not to be separated. Because LC. No. 131
proposal demolishes the doctrine of criminal complicity, the Commission suggested
that liability for common purpose is to be treated separately from their new proposal
of encouraging and assisting crimes and should be located elsewhere. J.C Smith
logically emphasises that the concept of common purpose is certainly part of the
doctrine of complicity, and cannot be separated from the complicity doctrine; if it is,
he says that it would be like 'cutting the tail of a dog, the tail will not wag any
more.'40 Therefore, it is true to say that in order to establish such liability there would
still be a need to establish criminal complicity. This means that we will still use the
term complicity or accessorial liability although the new crime proposed by LC. No
131 tries to abolish it.
To conclude, if there is, exceptionally, a need to create an inchoate offence of
assisting crimes, criminal complicity should not be abolished but, rather, one should
have such inchoate liability of assisting crimes as the current offence of incitement
with its own punishment.41 Likewise it would preferable that such a new offence be
applied only to assisting felonies or a selected offences such as murder, arson,
burglary, robbery, rape and similar serious offences or, if needed, to selected
misdemeanours rather covering every statutory and common law offence. Moreover,
in terms of mens rea, assisting crimes should be based on intention (purpose and
40
Smith, J.C., "Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" op. cit., 453 at 463.
41 It is a fact that the criminal complicity is largely a matter of common law which might be the reason
for uncertainty that affects nearly every part of this doctrine. However, such uncertainty cannot be
taken as a major factor in the demolition criminal complicity by cutting it into parts, rather, it should
rebuilt within its current boundaries and the first step is a codification, at least, to avoid such
uncertainty. For example, J.C. Smith indicates that there is a need to provide an urgent codification of
such comprehensive liability and that such codification should formulate such rales in terms of the
derivative theory. This concept is an assurance that accessorial liability does not impede or threaten
legitimate social activities that the new proposal No. 131 might cause, ibid.
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oblique intention) to avoid extending the law to unnecessary situations, as mentioned
above, and at the same time, to be similar to those other inchoate offences such an
attempt, conspiracy and incitement.
(C) Innocent Agency42
According to G. Fletcher, the doctrine of innocent agency (or perpetrator-by-means
as he has described it), operates outside accessorial liability because it deals with the
liability of principal offenders.43 In fact, such a doctrine is an exception to the
definition of the principal in that he is the most immediate cause of the actus reus and
is to be considered as part of the liability of the principal offender notwithstanding
that it is constructive in nature based on the assumption that the law, at this point,
considers and treats an accessory as a principal offender. Surprisingly it seems that it
does not yet have a universal definition because it differs from one case to another
and this is reflected in legal commentary, as I shall discuss below.
It was assumed that the notion of a constructive principal that operates under the
doctrine of innocent agency only related to a situation when C encourages or assists
P, who lacks the required mens rea, to commit an offence. C is considered to be a
principal because P is exempt from liability, and because the restriction implicit in
the derivative theory that there must be a principal; C then must be considered a
42 R v. Tyler (1838) 8 C& P 616; R v. Michael (1840) 2 Mood CC 120; R v. Manley (1844) 1 Cox CC
104; R v. Bannen (1844) 2 Mood CC 309; R v. Bull and Schmidt (1845) 1 Cox CC 281; R v. Clifford
(1845) 2 Car & Kir 202; R v. Blaesdale (1848) 2 Car & Kir 765; R v. Butcher (1858) Bell CC 6. See:
Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed. 1990) Vol. II (I), pp. 42-52.
4j
Fletcher, G., Basic Concepts ofCriminal Law (1998), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 197.
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constructive principal. The authority for this is in R v. Cogan and Leak (1975).44 L
encouraged C to have intercourse with his wife, who did not consent. C mistakenly
believed the contrary. C's conviction, as perpetrator of the rape, was quashed by the
Court of Appeal, on the ground of his defence that he honestly believed the wife to
be consenting, a matter which had not been left to the jury. This left the court with
the problem of there being no principal offender, which under the derivative theory
might lead to L being acquitted. To avoid this, the Court of Appeal applied the
doctrine of innocent agency to secure L's conviction.
In this regard, Bronitt indicates that the doctrine of innocent agency has emerged
largely to deal with the negative consequences of derivative liability, and that it is a
legal fiction which strains the notion of human agency and causation in the criminal
law almost to breaking point.45 Further, it is possible to say that the situation is rather
different if the actual principal is exempt due to reasons other than lack ofmens rea,
which means that the person who provides aid or encouragement might be
considered as an accessory. This was the issue in the case of Bourne (1952).46 C was
convicted of abetting his wife P to commit buggery with a dog. P, under the law, was
a principal, but she was exempt because of the defence of duress. The Court of
Appeal held that the defence of duress in relation to P did not elide C's guilt as an
accessory.
44 Rv. Cogan and Leak [1975] Q.B . 217; [1975] 2 All ER 1059.
45
Bronitt, S., "Parties to a Crime" http://law.anu.edu.au/criminet/notes.html/.
46 Bourne [1952] 36 Cr. App. Rep. 125.
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This area of law is very unclear, and because of this the English Draft Criminal Code
(which was supposed to codify the common law and not to invoke new principles)
indicates that a person is guilty of an offence if he procures, assists or encourage act
or acts done by another who is not guilty himself of an offence because he is under
ten years of age, or does not posses the required mens rea, or has a defence.47 It
appears that the reason for this approach is the sheer difficulty of codifying this area
of law. Consequently, in the light of the English Draft Criminal Code, one might
define an innocent agent as 'a person who commits the actus reus of an offence but is
himself devoid of responsibility either by reasons of incapacity, lack of mens rea, or
because he has a defence'.48 However, there are problems in applying such a
definition, such as, some crimes do not allow, both in terms of legal elements and
language, certain categories of person to be punished as principal offender; an
unmarried person cannot be called a principal in bigamy; a women cannot be called
principal in rape.
47
English Draft Criminal Code 1989 , Vol. 1, s. 26 (c). The LC. No. 131 indicates that the drafters of
the English Criminal Code had great difficulties in determining the scope of the doctrine of innocent
agency because the decisions of Cogan & Leak and Bourne have defects in their justification but
acknowledging, at the same time, that the decision of Bourne should be discussed under the doctrine
of innocent agency. LC. No. 13 lp. 30; By contrast, the LC. No. 43 indicates that the following
represented the law in 1972: " (1) A person acts through an innocent agent when he intentionally
causes the external elements of the offence to be committed by (or partly by) a person who is himself
innocent of the offence charged by a reason of lack of a required fault element, or lack of capacity. (2)
A person is not guilty of committing an offence through an innocent agent when (a) the law provides
or implies that the offence can be committed only by one who complies with a particular description
which does not apply to that person, or specifies the offence in terms implying personal conduct on
the part of the offender; or (b) the innocent agent acts with the purpose of preventing the commission
of the offence or nullifying its effects." LC. No. 43, proposition 3, pp. 14-15.
48
Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 550. This, however, has not been declared by English
courts to be a definition of the theory.
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In D.P.P. v. K & B (1997)49 two girls, aged 11 and 14, procured the rape of V by P,
(an unknown person); they were charged with, inter alia, aiding, abetting,
counselling and procuring P to rape; P was or might be under the age of 14 and
therefore doli incapax. The stipendiary magistrate was of the opinion that the act had
amounted to the offence of rape. However, two issues did not support the conviction
ofK & B. Firstly, the prosecution had failed to negate doli incapax in relation to the
boy. Secondly, K & B were females, and thus, could not be convicted as principal
offenders. They were therefore entitled to be acquitted of the charge of aiding and
abetting. The prosecution's main argument in appeal was that the magistrate's
decision was wrong because the gender of K & B was irrelevant and they should be
convicted of aiding and abetting as procurers.50 The Court ofAppeal held that:
"...Here the fact that the magistrate had found that the prosecution had failed
to rebut the presumption of doli incapax in the principal did not preclude the
respondents from being capable of committing the offence of procuring the
rape. The actus reus had been proved and the respondents had had the requite
mens rea namely the desire that the rape should take place and the procuring
of it."51
What is understood from the above case is that some crimes require certain classes to
commit the actus reus as principal offender, (such as man in rape; driver in a driving
offence). This indicates that the use of the doctrine of innocent agency is
inappropriate in this regard. However, this does not mean that secondary parties are
exempt from responsibility; they can be convicted as procurers of the offence
49D.P.P. v.K&B [1997] Cr.App.Rep. 36.
50 ibid.
31 ibid. pp. 36-7. See, for example, Millward [1994] Crim. LR 527, where the Court of Appeal used
the term procure, (although the general charge was aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring as it is
usually under accessorial liability), to convict a person as an accessory to the offence of causing death
by reckless driving; Walters v. Lunt (1951) 35 Cr. App. Rep. p. 94.
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(despite the fact that their general charge was aiding, abetting, counselling and
procuring the offence in question). Procurement, as was indicated in chapter 1,
requires establishing both elements of causation and intention (which is not the case
in aiding, abetting, or counselling). One might view such use of procurement as a
lawful trick used by the court to avoid any linguistic misleading or inappropriate
terms (such as a principal in rape to a female) having, at the same time, some related
criteria of the element of the guilt of the principal (causation and intention.)32
The law at this point should consider all the above patterns, which the doctrine of
innocent agency might operate under (lack ofmens rea; reasons other than mens rea;
or when the actual principal has a defence) under the liability of the principal
offender, (an approach taken by the English Draft Criminal Code).33 Or, as seems
much more appropriate, it could adopt the formula used by the M.P.C., such as
causing an innocent agent to commit a crime.54 Alternatively, since it appears that
many now favour defining accessorial liability in terms of encouragement and
assistance, one might describe such activity as procurement (instead of causing) of an
offence, whether based on accessorial liability; principal liability, or, (although not
desired), as a separate offence form of criminal complicity.
52
However, as Ashworth indicates, the Divisional Court left the possibility that a woman can be
convicted as a principal in rape by applying the doctrine of innocent agency. Ashwoth, A., PCL
(1999),op. cit., p. 453 at note 136.
53 Vol. 1, cl 26(1).
54 M.P.C. in s. 2.06 mentioned in Ashworth, A., PCL (1999) op. cit., pp. 451-2.
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(D) Defences available to accessories
General defences:
Although a person might commit both the actus reus and mens rea of a crime, he may
not be convicted of the offence because he has a defence whether by a common law
or a statute.53 Some of these defences might lead to acquittal (complete defences)
such as self defence; others, such as diminished responsibility, might lead to reduce
liability for the offence; or might lower the sentence {partial defences). In addition,
these defences can be viewed as applied to all offences {general defences), others are
specific defences being applied to certain offences such as the defence of provocation
which is available only to murder/6 Moreover, some offences have a particular
57defences attached to them, such as permission and protection in criminal damage.
33
Elliot, C & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 2000), Longman, pp. 239. Deliberate departure by the
principal, is a defence from which an accomplice might benefit form to avoid conviction. The
authority for this is in R v. Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473. In this case, Saunders asked
Archer on how to kill his wife; the advice was that to kill her by poison. Saunders gave the wife a
poisoned apple, which she gave to their daughter who died after eating it. However, Saunders did not
intervene to stop her eating the poisoned apple. He was found guilty of murder but the liability of
Archer reminded questionable for two years until the Court acquitted him from the charge of murder
because he was not present, which suggested that assent to murder could not be established. Clarkson,
C. and Keating, H., Criminal Law, (1998), op. cit., pp. 567-8, summarise the interpretations made to
the judgement: (1)- the narrow interpretation implies that accessories will not be liable if the principal
deliberately chooses another victim, as it was the case in Saunders watching his daughter eating the
poisoned apple. (2)- the broad interpretation suggests that an accessory will only be liable if he
expressly authorises or foresees the harm that occurs. Peter Gillies observes that the defendant is not
liable as an accessory if he instigated, encouraged or assisted principal to commit one crime but the
latter ends up committing another which was not in the contemplation of the accessory. Thus, the test
is to find out the actual contemplation of the accessory in order to link him with what has the principal
done beyond their intended (or contemplated) crime. Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., pp.
151-2. The English Draft Criminal Code 1989, in cl. 27. 1(c) and 5, properly takes a similar position.
Powell; English might support the above view of contemplation in its general conclusion but it did not
totally clarify such an issue. See: chapter 4.
36
Simpson, F., Blackstone's Police Manual: Crime 1998/99 (1998), London: Blackstone Press
Limited, pp. 17-22.
57 ibid. The defence of duress is not available to murder: R v. Howe [1987] AC 417 or attempted
murder: R v. Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412. The current defences under English criminal law are:
Automatism (involuntary action). Intoxication: there is no general defence for intoxication but
involuntary intoxication might indicate that a defendant lack the required mens rea for the offence.
Insanity: a person claiming to be insane will be judged against the M'Naghten rules, which require
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One needs to go back to common law or a statute to find the circumstances that such
a defence might operate under. The reason for this is that it is agreed, although not
totally clear, that an accessory can rely on one or more of the general defences, if he
thinks he is so entitled. This view is supported by the English Criminal Draft Code
which clearly indicates that, unless otherwise provided, standard criminal law
defences (general defences), are applied to both principals and accessories. The
commission expressly indicates that:
"Paragraph (b) makes clear that defences apply equally to principals and
accessories. This facilitates the drafting of provisions creating defences,
which it may be convenient to express, as offences themselves are commonly
expressed, in terms referring to the act of the principal. The common law
(which governs the liability of accessories) undoubtedly assumes such
defences to be generally applicable although we are unaware of explicit
authority on the point. Paragraph (b) means merely that a person may rely on
a defence to avoid liability as an accessory if he himself satisfies its
requirements. It does not mean, as clause 27 (1) (c) makes clear, that he can
take the benefit of a defence the requirements of which are satisfied by
another who would but for the defence be guilty as a principal. Indeed, by
assisting and encouraging such another he may himself be guilty as a
principal."59
that if a defendant, at the time of the commission of the offence, was under a defect of reason, disease
of the mind, or did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, he did not know that
what he was doing was wrong, he is insane. The other defences are mistake, necessity 'duress of
circumstances', defence of self, others or property, infancy: a child under the age of 10 is presumed to
be doli incapax (incapable of evil), preventing crimes: the Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 3 (1) indicates
that: "A person may use such force as is reasonably in the circumstances in the preventing of crime, or
in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or persons unlawfully
at large." See: Simpson, F., op. cit., pp. 17-21. It should be noted that Superior order is not a defence
to a crime, thus an employee, who does a criminal act cannot rely on the fact that he was only obeying
the instructions of his employer. Cf. the Court of Appeal decision (Civil Division) in R v. Salford
Health Authority [1988] 2 W.L.R. 442, a secretary who typed a letter arranging illegal abortion would
not be guilty of aiding and abetting because she was ordered, by here employer, to do that. See: Smith,
J.C., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (1989), (The Hamlyn Lectures Fortieth Series),
London: Stevens & Sons. p. 70.
38 This is, in fact, huge area of common law, and would takes a enormous efforts to go into details of
how a particular defence affects accessorial liability, which is something beyond the scope of this
thesis. I recommend that the defence in both England and UAE, or even the prosecution, should
investigate such defences which might either lead to acquittal, reduce liability or lower the sentence if
convicted.
39 Vol. 2, p. 204; cl. 25 (b), Vol. 1. LC. No. 131 similarly suggests the same in their report, paragraph
4.100.
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It must be noted that in relation to the defence of duress (a defence available to a
person who commits a crime because he was acting under a imminent threat of death
or serious injury to himself by another) this is not available in the offence of murder
whether the defendant is a principal or an accessory. The reason for this is that the
law assumes that an ordinary person is expected not to kill, even in circumstances of
this nature.60
Withdrawal:61
Unlike the position in attempt, English criminal law recognises a defence of
withdrawal in criminal complicity, which might lead an accomplice to escape
liability if he decides not to take part or any further part before the offence is
committed.62 It is possible to say that the ambit of this defence is not totally clear
because this area of law is vague, and seems to work under general principles (such
as that there must be timely communication, to serve unequivocal notice, or to take
60 Howe [1986] Q.B.626; [1987] AC 417; Elliot, C & Qumn, F., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 2000), pp. 278-
9; Cf Lynch v. D.P.P. for Northern Ireland [ 1975] AC 653; Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit.,
pp. 240-9.
61
Probably the first authority for withdrawal was Saunders & Archer. The Court said: "If I command
one to kill JS and before the fact done I go to him and tell him that I have repented and expressly
charge him not to kill JS and he afterwards kills him, there I shall not be accessory to this murder,
because I have countermanded my first command, which in all reason shall discharge me...but if he
had killed JS before the time of my discharge or countermand given, I should have been accessory to
the death, notwithstanding my private repentance." Saunders & Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473 at 476
mentioned in LC. No. 131 pp. 53-4; Roskill L.J in R. v. Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr. App. R.
212 referred the authorities to withdrawal first stated in Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473 at
476, Edmeads and Others (1828) 3 C & P 390 at 392, Croft (1944) 29 Cr. App. Rep. 169; See: Smith,
K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 251.
62
Elliot, C & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 2000), op. cit., p. 224. This defence is not available in
an attempt case to a defendant who voluntary chooses not to carry out a crime, ibid. p. 194. It must be
noted that although withdrawal is a defence to accessorial liability, a defendant might be liable for
inchoate offences of conspiracy or incitement. Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., p. 175; Smith,
J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 158; Smith, K., MTLCC, op. cit., p. 252 at note 17.
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all reasonable steps to prevent the crime) in order to help the jury to decide whether
or not to grant a defendant such a defence.
The possible reason for such broadness or lack of clarity is that the courts either want
to leave this defence under broad terms, in order to have some measure of flexibility,
or that there is a failure by the courts in placing those broad terms to accommodate
the issues of firstly, encouragement on one hand and assistance on the other, and
secondly the time withdrawal occurs, whether some time or shortly before the
commission of the offence by the principal.63 The most cited case regarding
withdrawal is R v. Becerra and Cooper (1975).64 In this case, three accomplices B,
C, and another broke into a house to steal B gave C a knife to be used in case of
interruption of the plan. V heard noise coming from below and decided to go down
stair. B said ' let us go', jumped out of the window and run away. C stayed and
stabbed V with the knife. Both were convicted of murder. B appealed that although
63 Case law regarding withdrawal is not clear and does not present a satisfactory picture on how this
defence works or should work: in Philips (1848) 3 Cox C.C. 225, the defendant agreed with others to
assault the victim but withdrew shortly before the commission of the crime. Nevertheless, he was
convicted. Peter Gilles suggested that the Court, in the above case, required more positive steps from
the accessory to neutralise the previous encouragement. A similar conclusion was reached in
Goodspeed (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 133. As Gillies suggests, these two cases indicate that more positive
action is required rather than merely communication of the intention of withdrawal. Gillies, P.,
Criminal Complicity, op. cit., p. 175; Croft [1944] 1 KB 295: suggests that repentance without action
is insufficient; Smith J.C. Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 159; Fletcher [1962] Crim. LR p. 551:
merely saying 'don't do.. .don't be fool' was not considered by the Court of Appeal to be an effective
withdrawal to conspirator in arson. In Grundy [1977] Crim. LR 543: C provided the principal with
information to commit burglary six weeks before its commission but for two weeks he tried to
persuade them not to commit it. The Court of Appeal accepted this was an effective withdrawal and it
was left to the jury. In Baker [1994] Crim. LR 444: the Court of Appeal did not infer withdrawal when
the accessory said to the principal 'I'm not doing it.' See: Smith J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p.
159 who also points out that such action must be voluntary. It has been pointed that when there is
more than one principal in encouragement, effective communication to serve unequivocal notice must
be communicated to all those who have been encouraged by the accessory. Smith J.C., Criminal Law
(1996), op. cit., p. 158; LC. No. 131 p. 55; Saunders and Arche and Croft (above mentioned), are
taken as authorities to indicates that 'unequivocal notice' requires express notice of withdrawal. Smith
K, MTLCC, op. cit., p. 255.
64 R v. Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr. App. Rep. 212.
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there was a common design he was entitled to ask for acquittal because the fact of
the case indicates that he withdrew from the common design and therefore should not
be convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. Roskill L.J.
delivered this statement:
"Where practicable and reasonable there must be timely communication of
the intention to abandon the common purpose from those who wish to
dissociate themselves from the contemplated crime to those who desired to
continue in it. What is "timely communication" must be determined by the
facts of each case but where practicable and reasonable it ought to be such
communication, verbal or otherwise, that will serve unequivocal notice upon
the other party to the common unlawful cause that if he proceeds upon it he
does so without the further aid and assistance of those who withdraw. The
unlawful purpose of him who continues alone is then his own and not one in
common with those who are no longer parties to it nor liable to its full and
final consequences."65
This case does not help a great deal to state clearly what the law requires. This has
led commentators to avoid this vagueness by suggesting a more direct and simple
formulation. For example, Andrew Ashworth clarifies the law regarding withdrawal
by saying:
"The essence of withdrawal in complicity is that the accomplice must not
only make a clear statement of withdrawal and communicate this to the
principal, but must also (if the crime is imminent) take some steps to prevent
its commission. The closer the principal offence's is to commission, the more
active the intervention is required of the accomplice for effective
withdrawal."66
What is indicated by Ashworth is a very simple example on how English courts treat
(or should treat the subject). However, such straightforwardness is something that
one can not achieve by distorting the language of the courts. For example in the
above case the trial judge suggested that in the circumstances surrounding the case,
65 See: Rook (1993) 97 Cr. App. Rep. 327at 333, which takes a similar approach and also is taken to
indicate that absence on the day of the commission of the crime does not amount to effective
withdrawal. Clarkson C. Keating, H., Criminal Law (1998),, op. cit., p. 565.
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physical intervention was the only way that the defendant might succeed with a
defence of withdrawal. However, The Court of Appeal said that it was not necessary
that it should discuss whether the trial judge was right or wrong and that to establish
withdrawal as defence in such circumstances, the defendant should, at least, take all
reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the crime which he had agreed that the
others should commit. One clearly would understand that the Court did not want to
restrict the law at this point to one conclusion; perhaps it wanted the defence to be
more flexible and to differ from one case to another. This might be an advantage;
simplicity, as Ashworth pointed above, is preferable at least in so far as it shows how
the defence of withdrawal operates. Moreover, although there is no authority on this,
it appears that the requirement of establishing effective withdrawal may differ from
encouragement and assistance. Gillies, for example, thinks:
"English Courts have almost always favoured the idea that the defendant
must take effective steps to undo the promotional significance of his own act
of incrimination, if he is to escape liability for the crime... This, it is
submitted, is as the law should stand. If the defendant has performed a
subsidiary or coequal act of encouragement.. .then it will often happen that he
can do this simply by communicating to the prospective principal his desire
to not to see the crime proceed. Where he assisted the principal in a vital way
(by supplying information to a housebreaker and thief, for example, as to the
location of valuables), or has instigated a person who was otherwise without
criminal intent to commit a crime, then a mere expression of disinterest will
frequently not suffice to neutralise the defendant's act of incrimination. "67
66
Ashworth, A., PCL, (1999), op. cit., p. 454.
67
Gillies, P., Criminal Complicity, op. cit., p. 179. Glanville Williams appears to distinguish
incitement from assistance in relation to withdrawal. He thinks that the accessory who incites a crime
needs expressly and clearly to countermand the crime or withdraw his assent in due time before it is
committed. He thinks that such express withdrawal can be assumed from his conduct rather than
verbal behaviour. In assistance, he thinks that accessories must do their best to prevent the
commission of the crime and that the best way of doing this might be by warning the victim or taking
other means short of informing the police. TBCL, op. cit., pp. 363-4. Further commentary comes from
R. Card who indicates that in relation to assistance the accessory can withdraw, prior to the
commission of the offence, by communicating his intention to the principal. However, if it occurs
shortly before the commission of the crime, something more is required, depending on the
surrounding circumstance, such as physical intervention. Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit.,
p.567.
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68This opinion of Gillies probably represents the law on this point. However,
although he was right in saying that in instigating a person who was otherwise
without criminal intent to commit a crime a more positive step is required, this is
possibly not the case in English law, which does not require accessorial instigation to
be a but-for factor in the liability of the principal.
Accordingly, effective withdrawal may depend on the type of participation. Thus in
encouragement it is sufficient for the accessory to communicate his intention to
withdraw to the principal, while in assistance, more is required than merely verbal
communication of intention to withdraw. Effective withdrawal can easily be
determined if it occurs in the preparatory stage of the crime, but where the crime is in
its later stage the only way to withdraw requires physical intervention to stop the
principal from completing the crime.69 If the principal does more in what amounts to
be an attempt, it is not possible to establish withdrawal but punishment may
mitigated.70 On this, Smith observes:
"Although no more than hinted at in Becerra, implicit in the defence appears
to be a proportionality or relational condition whereby the greater the
accessory's involvement in an enterprise the more substantial the effort
needed to remove himself from liability. This is broadly responsible for the
probable distinction between cases of encouragement and those where
68 It must be noted that there is no authority or that the authority is not clear on this, especially in
relation to assistance. For example, the drafters of the 1989 English Draft Criminal Code were unclear
of the authorities of this area of law (the team were supposed to codify the case law in a single code).
Consequently, they restricted the application of the defence of withdrawal to encouragement. This
shows how much uncertainty surrounds withdrawal. See the English Draft Code in Vol. 2 p. 211. By
comparison, LC. No. 43 indicated that communication of intention to withdrawal to the principal is
enough whether occurs in instigation or assistance. One should note that withdrawal under their
proposal is a matter of mitigation rather than exemption from criminal complicity. LC. No. 43
Proposition 9.
69
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., pp. 158-9; LC. No.131 p. 54.
70 Rook (1993) 97 Cr.App.Rep. 327 at 334; Ashworth, A., PCL (1999), op. cit., p. 453.
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material assistance has been supplied... Whilst withdrawal from situations
where material aid has been furnished is implicitly recognised by English
case law, quite how much more than an express countermand is necessary
71
lacks authority."
In the absence of clear justification for the defence of withdrawal, legal
commentators have tried to provide an explanation on why withdrawal is allowed as
a defence. K Smith indicates that this area of law is clouded with uncertainty as to
what determines the scope of withdrawal as a defence. He suggests two
justifications: firstly, the defence reduces the chance that the principal will commit
the offence. Secondly, the defence might be based on the notion that the offender has
abandoned his involvement in order to show that he is less socially dangerous. In the
first case, more action is needed, while in the second a lesser amount of repentance
79
can be sufficient to establish withdrawal.
One might well suggest that criminal law should require an accomplice, in order to
benefit from the defence of withdrawal, to prevent the commission of the crime he
had either encouraged or to the commission of which he had contributed. This fixed
or strict standard means that the defendant must either prevent the offence from
71 Smith K, MTLCC, op. cit, pp. 257-8.
72 ibid. pp. 252-3. It seems that he does not favour justifying withdrawal on the basis of 'a lack of
actus reus' because this brings up the issue of causation, which is not required in deciding the liability
of accessories. He thinks that a coherent discussion of withdrawal as a defence must be proceed on the
basis of recognising some means of acquittal beyond a claim of no actus reus. ibid. p. 252. However,
it must be pointed out that justification can be based also on 'a lack of actus reus' regardless of
causation. The question is: does causation constitutes the whole of the actus reus or is it, as it appears,
only an element of the actus reus. The latter is true which means that justifying withdrawal on 'a lack
of actus reus' can also be correct regardless of causation which the law does not require. Moreover,
such standard of justification can be based on a derivative theory, which indicates that accessorial
activities (although some actions might constitute an inchoate offence of incitement or conspiracy)
require the committing of the crime by the principal. This means that those activities, especially in
assistance, are not criminal in themselves but are criminal because of their link to liability of the
principal.
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being committed, inform the police or, to a lesser degree, warn the victim. Is this the
best option regardless of the time factor in which withdrawal might occur? On this
issue K Smith suggests:
"Limiting exculpatory behaviour to actions directed at preventing the offence
could be seen as incorporating into the defence a form of penalty against the
accessory for his initial voluntary involvement, or a charge for the concession
of granting the defence. In practical terms, such a condition forces a
withdrawing accessory into either warning the targeted victim or law
enforcement authorities of the planned offence both of which approaches
with their risks of exposure might prove unattractive to repentant accessories.
However, despite this, it might be thought that only where withdrawing
actions are directed at preventing the offence is the chance of thwarting the
principal sufficiently meritorious to warrant excusing the accessory. Such
calculations are of a very fine order and necessarily highly speculative.
Furthermore, it is certainly arguable that legitimate concerns over an
accessory properly earning his exemption (at least in respect of his form of
withdrawal) are adequately met by requiring that he took 'all reasonable
steps' or 'makes proper effort' to withdraw. Depending on the circumstances,
there may be no option for withdrawal other than by directly or indirectly
attempting to prevent the offence's commission. This would be true of the
provision of useful information. General use of a reasonableness test carries
the flexibility to achieve an appropriate correlation circumstances of the
complicity and which should exempt the accessory between the nature and
particular the type of countermanding action."
It might be concluded, then, that it is necessary for courts, (or in the case of any
future codification of the doctrine), to pay attention to two points: first when the
crime is still some way from being committed, courts should distinguish between
incitement and assistance, in that in the former, communication of intention to
withdraw is enough, while in the latter the defendant should also take what steps are
necessary (depending on the facts of each case) to prevent the commission of the
offence, such as returning the provided materials or resorting to other means which
declare his intention to withdraw. Secondly, if the crime is about to be committed,
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both incitement and assistance should be treated as to requiring reasonable steps to
prevent the commission of the offence. In general, simplicity is required and a notice
of the distinction should be made between encouragement and assistance. The time
factor should be taken into account.
(E) Victims:
The issue of victims as parties to a crime is well known one in criminal law
commentary and in case law. English criminal law distinguishes between willing and
unwilling victims by considering the willing victims in statutory crimes such as
sexual offences, parties to crimes committed upon them. However, some of those
willing victims are exempt from liability because of protection provided by the law.
J.C. Smith summarises this rule as follows:
"Where a statute has been designed for the protection of a specific group,
those members of that group cannot become accomplices to the crimes
committed upon them, even where they have given their consent."74
The previous rule in fact seems to be an exception from a general rule in complicity,
which states that:
"It is unnecessary for the crime created by statute to provide a provision that
it shall be an offence to aid and abet, counsel or procure."75
Strictly speaking, it is understood that willing victims in statutory crimes are parties
to the crime committed upon them only if they have not been excluded or been given
7j ibid. pp. 258-259.
74
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., pp. 160-2.
75 ibid.
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protection by statute.76 Tyrell (1894),77 (giving rise to what known as the Tyrell
Principle), is a leading case on this point: D1 was a girl between the age of 13-16
tried and convicted on an indictment charging her with having unlawfully aided and
abetted, counselled and procured D2 to commit unlawful carnal knowledge of her. It
was proved that she actually did aid and abet, solicit or incite the man to commit the
misdemeanour, which is punished by s.5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885.
However the conviction was quashed and a principle was set out in the judgement:
"It is not a criminal offence for a girl between the ages of 13 and 16 to aid
and abet a male person in committing, or to incite him to commit, the
misdemeanour of having unlawful carnal knowledge on her contrary to
78
section 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885. "
Lord Coleridge C.J in giving judgement said:
"The .. .act was passed for the purpose of protecting women and girls against
themselves. At the time it was passed there was a discussion as to what point
should be fixed as the age of consent. That discussion ended in a compromise
and the age of consent was fixed at 16. With the object of protecting women
against themselves the Act of parliament has made an illicit connection with
girls under that age unlawful; if a man wishes to have such an illicit
connection he must wait until the girl is 16, otherwise he breaks the law; but
it is impossible to say that the Act, which is silent on aiding or abetting, or
soliciting or inciting, can have intended that the girls for whom the protection




Tyrell [1894] Q.B. p. 710. Taken by the English Draft Criminal Code in cl. 27 (7) as an authority to
exempt such type of victims from accessorial liability.
78
Tyrell [1894] Q.B. pp 710-712. Part I, in which s. 5 comes, is headed "Protection of Woman and
Girls."
79 ibid. pp. 710-712.
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Thereafter, the Tyrell principle has been adopted in the later cases, an example of
which was R v. Whithouse (1977) where it was held that a 15 year old girl cannot be
RO
an accessory to incest because she was the victim of the offence.
At this point, it must be emphasised that the Tyrell principle applies only to statutory
offences which give protection to certain people, such as the young or mentally
R1
subnormal, from being an accessory to crimes that they were a willing victim.
Another point made by J.C. Smith is that since the Tyrell principle applies only to the
willing victim of the crime (as mentioned before) it would be a true decision to
convict an underage girl of abetting a man to have sexual intercourse with another
under age girl.82 Moreover, a prostitute can be convicted of abetting in the keeping of
o->
a brothel and living off the earnings of another prostitute.
(F) Other related issues:
Under this heading it is proposed to point out some defences recommended by the
English Draft Criminal Code 1989, which might be included in any future statutory
drafting of criminal complicity. The draft says in el. 27. (6) that:
80 R v. Whithouse [1977] Q.B. 868.
81 Card. R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 565.
82 Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p.162; Curzon, L.B., Criminal Law (8th ed. 1997) M&E
Pitman Publishing, p 69.
8j
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law (1996), op. cit., p. 162. The victim rule is under attack from some
criminal law scholars due to its uncertainty the ambiguity. For example, Glanville Williams has
argued that why protection is given to girls under sixteen, sometimes the underage girl is more
experienced than the youth but the law does not come into this question. He also says that the victim
rule is just a wider proposition that courts may find a person to be excluded from complicity
provisions by implication, for the same reasons as the victim rule. Williams, G., "Victims and Other
Exempt Parties in Crime" (1990) 10 Legal Studies 245-2. LC. No 131 recommended that this defence
should be only available in assisting crimes. Paragraph 4.103.
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" A person is not guilty of an offence as an accessory by reason of anything
he does-
(a) with the purpose of preventing the commission of the offence; or
(b) with the purpose of avoiding or limiting any harmful consequence of the
offence and without the purpose of furthering its commission; or
(c) because he is under an obligation to do it and without the purpose of
furthering the commission of the offence."
(a) Purpose of preventing the commission of an offence:
The intention of cl. 27. s. (6) (a) is to link this defence to law enforcement in the case
of police informer or undercover agent, who assists the commission of an offence but
for the purpose of bringing its offenders to trial. What is understood from the above
clause is that this defence properly should be available to law enforcement or those
who work under their supervision. Doubts arise on two points: first, whether an
ordinary person pretending to act with a criminal in order to prevent the commission
of the offence should have such defence. The above clause implicitly does not
distinguish between law enforcement and ordinary persons. By contrast, the drafters
of the Draft Code used the term law enforcement, and this would suggest that this
defence is linked only to law enforcement or who works under their supervision.84
However, if it is applied to both, it is possible to say that an ordinary person would
obviously have great difficulties in establishing such a defence. Second, the above
clause does not distinguish between the modes of accessorial liability and implicitly
suggests that it is available to all three forms mentioned by the Draft Code
(assistance, encouragement, and procurement). However, the drafters of the Code
used assistance as example of the defence in their commentary. It appears that this
defence is not needed if the criminals did not commit the offence; it rather works as a
84
English Draft Criminal Code 1989 drafters' commentary in Vol. 2 par. 9.33, p. 209.
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or
defence if such offence is committed. Currently there is no such recognised defence
of law enforcement under English law.86 It seems that case law here, although it does
not recognise this defence, acknowledges that police working behind the scene is part
07
of their job to investigate crimes and bring criminals to trial. It seems that it is
lawful for law enforcement agencies to take part in an offence that has already been
planned and is going to be committed, if such participation is for the purpose of
00
trapping the offender. However, dishonest law enforcement agents who aid and
abet a crime committed by another who would not otherwise commit the offence are
SO
accessories to the crime in question. English law, although it does not recognise
entrapment as defence, demands a fair trial by indicting in s. 78 of Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 that a judge is entailed to exclude evidence that might
have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceeding.90
b) Purpose of avoiding or limiting any harmful consequence of the
offence:
It is possible to say that the intention of the team of the Draft Code to provide this
defence is to avoid problems of the low level of mens rea required for accessorial
liability. It is not clear how this defence would work but it seems that the reason for
85 ibid.
86 LC. No. 131 par. 2.91 p. 51.
87 The situation now is that English courts exempt law enforcement officers, and those who work
under their supervision, from accessorial liability if they work undercover with criminals because of
their duty to mitigate the consequences of an offence. See: Lord Parker CJ in Birtles [1969] 1 W.L.R.
1047 at 1049, mentioned in LC. No. 131 par. 2.93 p. 52.
88 R v. McCann (1977) 56 Cr. App. Rep. 359; R v. McEorlly (1973) 60 Cr. App. Rep. 150; Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 48; Clarke (1984) 80 Cr. App. Rep. 344. Cf. Smith [1960] 2 Q.B.
423; Yip Chiu-Cheung [1995] 1 AC 111.
89 Lord Salmon in R v. Sang (1980) 69 Cr. App. Rep. 282 at 296.
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drafting it to cover similar to that situations of Gillick (mentioned in Chapter 3).91
Again the general reading of this defence does not distinguish between the modes of
accessorial liability, although the drafting team in its commentary used assistance to
92describe the actus reus,
c) Belief in legal obligation:
The drafting team of the Draft Code provided this defence because there is
controversy surrounding case law where accessorial liability arises in those cases
where a person in possession of an article hands it to its owner with the knowledge
93
that he might commit an offence with it. Thus, if someone returns a knife belonging
to P believing that he is under legal obligation to do so, he is not responsible as an
accessory although he contemplates that P will use it to commit an offence.
90
Smith, J.C., Criminal Law {1996), op. cit.. p. 164. There is no defence of entrapment in English law:
R v. Sang [1980] AC 402, 69 Cr. App. Rep. 282, but it might mitigate the sentence: Mackay and Show
[1992] Crim. LR 602, quoted in Card, R., Criminal Law (1995), op. cit., p. 566.
91 The team provided the following examples of the ambit of this defence: The supply of condoms to
prisoners or sterile hypodermic needles to drug abuses, if done solely for limiting the risk of sexual
diseases. See: the drafters' commentary in Vol. 2 par. 9.34, p. 209. English Draft Criminal Code 1989.
92 ibid.
9j ibid, at note 52.
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UAE Law
(A) Issues related to the liability of the principal
offender
Who is the principal offender:
Article (44) of the F.P.C. states that:
" A principal of a crime is the one who either commits it by himself or is a
direct accomplice in its commission. A person shall be a direct accomplice to
a crime in the following instances:
First: where he joins another in the committing of an offence.
Second: where he takes part in the committing of an offence that consists of
several acts, and he intentionally commits any such act.
Third: where he utilises another person by any means to commit an offence,
and that the latter is not responsible, for any reason, under criminal law."
Thus, under the above article three types of principal offenders are identified: the
single principal, the co-principal, and the constructive principal who is acting
through an innocent agent. Unlike English law, article (46) of the F.P.C. includes a
fourth category by indicating that:
"An accessory by causation shall be considered as a direct accomplice (a
principal), provided that he is found at the scene of an offence with intention
to commit it if it is not committed by another person."
It appears that the above article is an extension of the categories of the liability of the
principal offender. It is applied to an accessory who, according to a plan made with
other accomplices, is a substitute for the original principal who might not commit the
offence. For example, when the original principal hesitates to go through with the
venture, such a substituted principal will commit the offence instead. It must be
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noted that the above article has strict proof requirements, which stipulate that the
accessory must be present at the place of the crime, and that he must have an
intention not only to be an accessory but also to intervene by committing the offence
himself. Thus, his punishment will be similar to the punishment of the principal
offender when the law provides a fixed punishment to such type of accomplices.
Legal distinction between principal and accessory:
Actus reus: As in English law, the definition of the offence is the source of liability
of the principal offender. Moreover, he must commit the actus reus of the both the
main and any collateral crime. In contrast, the actus reus of accessorial liability has
to be either or both forms of instigation; conspiracy; and assistance (article 45), and
this is only required for the main offence but not is not necessary to any further
additional offence.
Mens rea: Like English law, the mens rea required for accessories under the F.P.C.
is not the same as the principals. The difference is that under the F.P.C. there must be
intention to instigate, conspire or assist the principal in committing the offence.
The derivative nature of accessorial liability: This is a fundamental part of
accessorial liability and it is similar to the English law.
Attempt: the same discussion under English law is relevant here.
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Jurisdiction: It is generally acknowledged that a person who instigates, conspires,
or assists a crime committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of UAE may not be
charged of being an accessory unless it is indicated otherwise. By comparison,
accessorial actions committed outside the UAE but linked to a crime committed in
the UAE are subject to the jurisdiction of the F.P.C. However, the F.P.C. departs
from this general rule in some other express articles.94
Punishment: Article (47) of the F.P.C. indicates that:
"Any person who participates in an offence, whether a principal or accessory,
shall receive the same penalty unless the law provides otherwise."
This is, in fact, a very strict article, which suggests that all parties are subject to the
same penalty. However, it must be noted that in relation to the offences of Islamic
Sharia, only the principal offenders are subject to the fixed punishment while
accessories are punished with less severity.9^ In addition, the F.P.C. recognise a
94 Article (19) indicates that: "This Code applies to any one who commits an act outside the UAE,
which makes him a principal or accessory to a crime committed entirely or partly in the UAE." Article
(20) indicates that the territorial jurisdiction of the F.P.C. is extended to be applied to any one,
whether a principal or accessory, who commits an act outside the UAE of the following examples:
crimes affecting the external or internal security of the State, its constitutional system, (ss.(l)); the
protection of the of the currency of the State against forgery, falsification, or counterfeit (ss. (2)); the
protection of the of the currency of another country, but is used in the State, against forgery,
falsification, or counterfeit (ss. (3)). Moreover, according to article (21) any person, found in the
UAE, can be brought to trial according to the F.P.C. if he committed a crime or crimes of: destroying
or interfering with an international communication system, drug trafficking, trafficking in women or
children, slavery, 'sea' piracy, or terrorism. Likewise, the F.P.C. can be extended to cover crimes
committed outside the UAE by a citizen, whether a principal or accessory, provided that he or she
committed an act or omission that amounts to be a crime in both the UAE and the place of its
commission, and that he returns to the UAE. Such extension of the territorial jurisdiction, according to
article (24), requires consent to prosecute from the Director of the Public Prosecution. It worth noting
that the domestic Penal Code of Dubai in article (42) punishes instigation to commit a crime and
conspiracy even though it is intended that the principal crime is to be committed outside the State of
Dubai.
93
It should be noted that that under the criminal jurisdiction of Dubai, Sharia is not applied. However,
it seems that Dubai's courts, even by applying secular laws, moves towards such distinction. For
example, the offence of trading in drags: the principal was sentenced to life imprisonment and the
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distinction between the following: material circumstances (those related to the actus
reus of an offence such as coercion, carrying weapons in burglary) that either can
aggravate or reduce the punishment are applied on all accomplices without requiring
knowledge of such circumstances (article 49). In relation to personal circumstance
(such as infancy), the situation is rather different. For example, personal
circumstances that intensify punishment for an accomplice shall not apply on other
accomplices unless they have knowledge of them. Such circumstances that reduce
the punishment shall apply only In relation to the concerned accomplice (article 49).
Moreover, the mens rea circumstances shall apply only on the concerned accomplice
(article 48). It should be noted that these circumstances are not easy to identify and
cause a great amount of uncertainty. Perhaps the courts should elaborate the ambit of
this category to clear any doubts.
It is clear that this area shares a similarity with English law in this regard. Possibly
the difference is that the F.P.C. does not recognise vicarious liability in criminal law
and that omission has a minimal bearing on accessorial liability, and third that the
causation discussion in relation to accessories is similar to the required standard in
the case of the principal offender. Thus, I shall point out other important legal
distinctions below.
other accessories with only 3 years, www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/2000/03/19/mhl/10.htm [Arabic]. Cf.
in robbery: the principal was convicted with three years and the accessory with also three years.
www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/1998/09/17/mhl/13.htm [Arabic],
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Hudoud crimes, operating under Sharia, are applied only to
principal offenders:96
This above rule does not apply to nearly all other Arabic jurisprudence, especially
Egypt, because Sharia does not form part of their criminal law. The situation in the
UAE is rather different; apart from the jurisdiction of Dubai, other emirates of the
UAE apply Islamic Sharia to criminal law matters. D. Wiechman, et al. indicate that
Hudoud crimes are those that are punishable by a pre-established and fixed
Q7
punishment as found in the holy texts. This means that these crimes have no
minimum or maximum punishments attached to them, and if proved under its very
strict standard of proof, no one can change or reduce the punishment applied because
it is assumed that they are set by God and are considered as crimes against God's
law.98
It is safe to say that the liability for above type of crimes is applied only to the
principal offenders, which means that accessories are not liable to conviction of these
offences. Abuduall-Quader Ouda (a well known commentator on Sharia and law)
96
Properly Qisas and Diyah crimes are also only applied on the principal offender.
97 Dennis J. Wiechman, Jerry D. Kendall, and Mohammad K. Azarian "Islamic Law: Myths and
Realities" http://www.ummah.net/bicnews/Articles/law.htm..
98 The required standard of proof in these offences is best described by D. Wiechman, et al.:
"There are some safeguards for Had crimes that many in the media fail to mention. Some in the media
only mention that if you steal, your hand is cut off. The Islamic judge must look at a higher level of
proof and reasons why the person committed the crime. A judge can only impose the Had punishment
when a person confesses to the crime or there are enough witnesses to the crime. The usual number of
witnesses is two, but in the case of adultery, four witnesses are required. The media often leaves the
public with the impression that all are punished with flimsy evidence or limited proof. Islamic law has
a very high level of proof for the most serious crimes and punishments. When there is doubt about the
guilt of a Had crime, the judge must treat the crime as a lesser Ta 'zir crime (means crimes against
society as it is understood in modern legal jurisprudence). If there is no confession to a crime or not
enough witnesses to the crime, Islamic law requires the Had crime to be punished as a Ta 'zir crime."
ibid.
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indicates that accessorial liability did not receive much attention from Islamic jurists;
instead their attention has been focused on the liability of the principal offenders
because it was generally assumed that only the principal and co-principals are liable
for these strict Hudoud punishments. These crimes have a specific punishment and
must be applied regardless of time or place, while the punishment for accessorial
activity changes form time to time, place to place, and is not governed by strict sense
of authority as of HudoudThus, as stated above, Hudoud crimes focus on the
liability of the principal and this leaves accessorial liability free from such
punishment which means at the same time, as Ouda suggests, that there is no
contradiction or disharmony between the secular discussion of accessorial liability
(as it is the case in the F.P.C.) and Islamic Sharia.
(B) The derivative theory
As in English law, accessorial liability under the F.P.C. requires the derivative theory
to operate which means, unless indicated otherwise, that the principal offender needs
to commit or attempt to commit an offence, before any discussion of the liability of
any other secondary parties.100 It has been pointed out that there is no general
99
Ouda, A., Altshrea Aljenai Alislami Muqrana bel Alqanon Alwadai, Alguza Alawal (Arabic. Islamic
Sharia Criminal Law Compared with Secular Law, Part One) (11th ed. 1992), Beirut: Dar Alrisala. pp.
358-377.
100 There are some offences, similar to accessorial liability, under the F.P.C. which do not require the
derivative theory. It must be noted that such offences are classified in terms of the liability of the
principal offender. These offences are: Offences against the external & internal security of the State:
articles (150, b, c), (152), (153), (158), (160), (166), (169), (171), (197). Offences against transport:
article (296). Offences against the religion and religious practice: articles (312), (313). Instigating or
assisting suicide: article (335). For example: Article (188) treats an accessory as a principal offender
in knowingly assisting gangs. It indicates: "Life or temporary imprisonment shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly supplies or give the gang mentioned in previous article [article 187]
weapons, tools, equipment, tools to assets them in reaching their aim, sends them aid, raise funds for
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liability in respect of the inchoate offences of incitement and conspiracy, which
means that the derivative theory plays a major role under the F.P.C. in comparison
with the situation of English law. The question should be asked is there any criminal
liability of assisting crimes under the F.P.C. or a domestic penal code? I have already
stated that the F.P.C. does not adopt general liability in respect of the inchoate
offences of conspiracy and incitement but exceptionally chooses such forms in
relation to certain crimes only. Moreover, on the same policy basis, the F.P.C.
penalises some forms of assistance without any need of the derivative theory. An
example of this is in article (335) which punishes anyone who either instigates or
helps another to commit suicide. Apart from this article there might be no other
express discussion of assisting crimes (Cf. see footnote 100 and article 225 of
F.P.C.). This seems to be the same in relation to other domestic codes except the
domestic Penal Code of Abu Dhabi in articles (15, 64) which make it a crime to
assist another to commit murder or manslaughter (One might observes that this Code
is broadly written and extremely vague and needs to be abandoned in favour of a
more clear new code.)
One might inquire whether the F.P.C. could be interpreted to include a general
inchoate liability under such terms but with a different heading that might
incriminate some serious act of assistance to crime without any need for derivative
theory. Let us consider the crime of exposure to danger provided for in article (348).
This article states:
them, or involves in any kind of criminal communication with the leaders or directors of the gang, or
by knowing their aim and character provides them with houses or places ofmeetings." Article (150):
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"A punishment of detention and fine or one of these shall be imposed on any
person who intentionally commits an act which exposes the life, health,
security, or freedom of people to danger. If a harm is resulted from the action,
the punishment shall be a detention without any prejudice to any other
severer punishment indicated by the law."
One might suggest that the above article might deal with situations where one
intentionally assists others to commit crimes which means that it can stand and relied
upon if the trial of an accessory fails by some reasons to establish the derivative
theory of complicity, or even before the principal's offence is committed. However,
some points need to be addressed:
The above article was drafted under 'offences against the person', which denotes that
it is only applied to this type of liability. The question is: can such an article include
both instigation and assistance (despite the fact that the F.P.C. does not include a
general inchoate offence of instigation and conspiracy except in relation to certain
offences). No clear answer is available. However, the above article clearly shows that
it is based on the theory of danger rather than of harm and that punishment is to be
more severe if harm follows. This means that the aim of this article is to embrace
both danger and harm. Inchoate offences are based on danger rationale, and it is
appropriate that one should ask what would prevent the application of this article to
actions of instigation, conspiracy, and assistance to a crime against the person, which
is not eventually committed. There are two possible objections:
facilitation: "A death penalty shall be imposed on: ...B) any one who, at the time of war, instigate
soldiers to join the service of any foreign state or facilitate such an action."
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First: Arabic jurisprudence does not approve of such a solution. I have already
established that one country is different from another and that if legal authorities in
the UAE take a contrary view they would be entitled to make their choice. Second:
the F.P.C. does not deal with inchoate offences under a norm of general liability but
only in relation to certain offences. This might be the main objection, however,
because, under the broad application and function of article (348), mentioned above,
one cannot exclude a behaviour that is a dangerous in itself, such as selling or
providing guns or other dangerous materials to others. However, one might enquire
about the reason why article (348) was included in the F.P.C. No clear answer
follows. However, because there is of no explanation for the drafting of the above
article and because of its broad application, the prosecution can charge, at least in a
case of assisting a crime against the person, those who manifest dangerous attitudes
that might cause harm to others. One should wait and see how UAE courts will react
in either accepting or rejecting its application as a substitute to inchoate crimes. It
must be noted that what has been said should not be taken as full support for the idea
of penalising assistance as a way dealing with inchoate offence. One can agree that
the F.P.C. needs to provide general liability for encouragement and conspiracy; this
is, at least, an attempt to avoid applying those vague and outdated domestic codes
which are causing disharmony in the general shape of criminal law especially
regarding conspiracy (under the domestic Penal Code of Dubai 1970 conspiracy is a
crime either to commit an offence or to breach civil law obligation. The latter is, in
fact, inappropriate and needs to be omitted). Thus, encouragement and conspiracy
should be included in any amendment of the F.P.C. This leaves us with assistance,
which is not part of inchoate liability. If the legal authorities in the UAE feel the need
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to punish the assisting of crimes, liability under article (348) might be a substitute for
any culpability not included in the F.P.C. or, in certain crimes such as murder,
robbery, or any grave offence, such liability might be required by the law. Otherwise,
the structure of the F.P.C. would still need to depend on the derivative theory.
The problem of identifying accomplices:
It has been pointed out that accessorial liability is derivative in nature, so that if the
principal offender did not commit the crime, then no accessorial liability should
follow. However, one needs to ask whether the discussion of English law is relevant
when the identity of the principal is not known. The F.P.C. does not directly answer
this and the legal commentary is similar. I think that a distinction should be made
between the Sharia crimes ofHudoud, and those crimes expressly mentioned by the
F.P.C. In the case of the former, it seems that the courts must require the prosecution
to distinguish between accomplices on the basis of whether they are principals or
accessories because the fixed punishments of such crimes are only applied on the
principal offenders. In the case of the latter, apart from the punishments of Hudoud
crimes, article (47) enables a court to punish an accessory with a similar punishment
to that of the principal. I believe that the flexible approach or method adopted by
English law in this area should be followed by the UAE courts regarding those
crimes mentioned by the F.P.C., especially where the prosecution shows good reason
why the identity of the principal cannot be established. Moreover, I think that such
an approach should be available to the prosecution regarding accessorial liability,
which currently requires, in the charge list, the identification of which form of such
liability the defendant committed. The prosecution only has to prove that each
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accomplice instigated, conspired or assisted the commission of the crime. It must be
noted that in the light of the principle of fair labelling, the prosecution, when it is
possible, should distinguish accomplices according to their roles when they are
charged with an offence. However, there should be an exception to this rule when the
prosecution shows that such a distinction, depending on the facts of each case, is
very difficult and that the defendants are actually accomplices to a crime that was
committed. To avoid any conflict that might arise, it would be better for the F.P.C. to
be amended to include a provision to cover such situations, even if the courts can
currently use such a flexible method.
(C) Innocent Agency
As in English law, but unlike the Egyptian Penal Code (which does not include this
type of liability), the F.P.C. applies the doctrine of innocent agency under the
discussion of the liability of the principal offender. Article (44) indicates that a
principal offender amongst others is, one who:
"... utilises another by any means to commit the actus reus of the crime, and
that the latter person is not criminally responsible for any reason."
Again, our discussion of the English law is relevant here. However, some points need
further discussion. As in English law, one can not offer a clear definition of this
doctrine in relation to its scope because the above article was set out in a general
terms and the UAE courts have not addressed such an issue.
One might interpret the ambit of the above article to cover situations where a person
instigates or assists another who lacks the required mens rea to commit an offence by
reasons of being under seven years of age, insane, or where the act is done with good
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faith. This means that the ambit of this doctrine is restricted to situations where the
innocent agent lacks the required mens rea, as it set out in English case law.
Consequently, one might conclude that this doctrine is not extended to cover
situations when the actual principal has to have a particular characteristic, such as
being a man in a rape or an official person in bribery charge; thus such a person is to
be labelled as an accessory rather than a principal offender. However, the F.P.C. does
not expressly suggest this, but another article in the Code might do so. Article (48)
states that:
"If an accomplice is not punished for an offence by reason that his action is
excused, for lack of intention or any other reason related to him, the other
accomplices shall not benefit from such exemption."
One might suggest that the drafting of this article might cover such situations where
it is inappropriate to address the accused as principal (as the case of a woman in a
rape charge). Moreover one might conclude here that the F.P.C. in article (44) is
similar either to the English Draft Criminal Code which connects such doctrine to
reasons of incapacity, lack of mens rea or where the principal has a defence, or
according to article (48) as to English case law which appears to restrict the ambit of
this doctrine to reasons of lack of mens rea, treating other examples as accessories.
The UAE courts should perhaps clarify which approach is to be taken.
(D) Defences available to accessories
This is a rather uncertain area and neither the F.P.C., the cases, nor legal commentary




Nothing in the F.P.C. distinguishes between accessories and principals in relation to
the general defences.101 Again, as the drafters of the English criminal Code have
suggested, although it is not totally clear, that an accessory can claim on one or more
102of the general defences, if he thinks that such a defence fits his case.
Causation:
Causation does not appear in Arabic legal commentary as a defence to accessorial
liability. However, UAE law is rather different from other Arabic criminal systems in
this respect. One might note that in the discussion in chapter 2 (causation &
omission) it was not clear how does the F.P.C. treats causation as an element of
101 The defences mentioned by the F.P.C. are: mistake, error of fact (article 39); performance of a duty
by the law and superior order (articles 54-55); self defence of self, property and others (article 56);
unwilful actions: involuntary intoxication, insanity (articles 60-1); infancy: a child under seven years
of age is incapable of committing crime (article 62); juvenility 'defendants between seven to eighteen
years of age are governed by Federal Juvenile Code No. 9 1976' (article 63); duress & necessity
(article 64); motive is not a defence unless the law indicates otherwise (article 40); ignorance of law is
not a defence (article 42); The F.P.C., in relation to criminal complicity, indicates in article (52) that:
"If the classification of a crime or penalty changes in relation to the intent of an offender or as a result
of his knowledge, accomplice whether principal or accessory to the crime shall be punished in
accordance with his intent or knowledge." It must be noted that almost all these general defences are
covered with uncertainty which makes it more difficult to examine it in relation to accessories. For
example, it might be true to say that Islamic Sharia does not allow coercion or duress to be a defence
in murder to principal and accessory. It is not clear how UAE courts would address this issue.
102 I think that defences provided by the domestic penal codes should be available to accessories.
However, I notice that courts, especially Dubai's courts, seem to ignore such defences because, as it
appears, these domestic penal codes were drafted in accordance to Anglo-Indian jurisprudence, which
are not totally understood by many foreign judges. For example, according to article (16) of Dubai
Penal Code the defence of provocation might be used to reduce punishment. Cf. the Dubai Cassation
Court has ruled that provocation is not a defence to murder (contrary to the above article of Dubai
Domestic Penal Code of 1970) www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/2000/04/06/mhl/10.htm [Arabic].
Moreover, according to article (20) of Dubai Penal Code, consent of the victim might constitute a
defence in, probably, all offences covered by the Code, except in homicide, grievous bodily harm,
where duress or mistake exists, when a victim was intoxicated or could not fully understand the nature
of the action of the defendant, or when the victim was under fourteen years of age. The F.P.C. is silent
in this regard, which might implicitly suggests that the above article, in the jurisdiction ofDubai only,
a defendant has the chance to avoid punishment in terms ofjustification. Apparently, such exemption,
has not yet been brought to the attention of Dubai's courts. The situation is not clear whether Dubai'
courts will apply article (20) or try to find a justification not to apply it by reference to the Egyptian
and other Arabic criminal laws, which do not recognise consent as part of their general defences.
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accessorial liability. The reason for this is that the F.P.C., unlike other Arabic
criminal codes, uses the term accessory by causation as a label attached to
accessorial liability, which indicates that a casual link is required between the
accessory's actus reus and the crime committed. I have already suggested that
causation should not be regarded as an element of accessorial liability, and any future
amendment of the F.P.C. should take this into consideration. Flowever, as far as the
current situation is concerned, the problem is whether such a requirement requires
the accessory's action to be responsible for bringing about the perpetrator's offence,
or to be only influential in bringing it about. It has been pointed out that Arabic legal
commentary prefers a modified sort of causation applied only to accessories. This
requires some sort of causal link based on the notion ofmaking the difference rather
than being butfor causation.103 There is no reliable discussion to explain how this
works, although it is possible that it might have been taken from an unknown legal
system and applied in Egyptian law.104 It seems that that the F.P.C. is rather different
in this regard, in which requires causation to be based on the notion of sine qua non,
which seems to be the required test under the general provision of causation in article
(32).105 A defendant might claim this defence if he believes that his action falls short
103 This test is based on an answer to the following: did the accessory's action matter? Did it make
any difference? If so, then there is causal link even if it does not amount to cause a sine qua non, and
this differs from case to case. See: Chapter 2: UAE law.
104 Even major source books in this regard provides little assistance. For example M. Husni in his
book Causation in Penal Code, which is a source book in causation in general, does not explain in
definite terms how one can apply this sort of causation in deciding accessorial liability. Husni, M.,
Ilakat Alsababia fee Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. Causation in Penal Code) (1983), Egypt: Dar Alnhda
Alarabia. A similar conclusion is reached by reading Rauof Obaid's book on causation, which is the
second major book on the subject. Obaid, R., Alsababia Aljenaia bean Alfekh wal Alqda, (Arabic.
Criminal Causation in Legal Commentaries and Courts) (4th ed. 1984) Cairo.
103 Article (32) of the F.P.C. indicates that: "A person shall not responsible for a crime if it is not a
result of his own criminal activity: however, he may be responsible for a crime even if his criminal
activity and another preceding, contemporary or subsequent cause have contributed to it occurrence,
where such a cause is expected or likely to happen in the ordinary course of things. However, if such
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of what is required by article (32) to avoid accessorial liability. This is the only way
which might oblige UAE courts to take responsibility for explaining the law (the
judgements are limited and do not help our understanding of how legal concepts
work). It is difficult to anticipate the reaction of the courts in this regard, but the fact
that what has been suggested by legal commentary is irrelevant. Thus, causation
involves either strictly applying the general theory causation indicated in article (32),
or finding an answer in such an article. Any thing beyond this would be an
infringement of the principle of legality.
Intention:
It has already been pointed that the area of mens rea is problematic, and that legal
commentators are divided on this point. I have mentioned that foreign judges
properly prefer applying a system they know rather than searching the direct words
of the F.P.C. In order to avoid such problems I suggest the position set out in chapter
3 (the required mens rea of accessorial liability) should be taken to represent the
current situation of the F.P.C. which means that the only required mens rea is
intention. It should be the required mens rea, regardless of the mens rea of the
principal offender.
cause is sufficient to produce the result of the crime, the person shall in this case be responsible only
for the act he has committed."
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Withdrawal:
According to article (40) motive is irrelevant unless the law indicates otherwise. An
examination of the F.P.C. reveals that it adopts notion of withdrawal in some
offences. For example, article (173) (exemption from the penalties of crimes
affecting the external security of the State) states that:
"An exemption from the penalties indicated in this chapter is granted to any
offender who informs the judicial or administrative authorities with any
information he knows before the attempt to commit the crime and prior to the
investigation.
The court may grant such exemption if the information occurs after the
committing of the crime but before starting its investigation. The court may
reduce the penalty if the offender provide a helpful assistance to the
concerned authorities during the investigation, trial which facilitate arresting
any other offenders of the crime."106
By comparison, the F.P.C. does not expressly indicate that this is a defence available
to accessorial liability. Should one conclude that it should not be? The answer must
be in the negative because although the above article might implicitly suggest
otherwise, withdrawal is a defence and should be available to accessories before the
principal commits the offence. By the same token it should mitigate the sentence if it
occurs after the principal attempts in committing the offence. It is not clear how this
defence would work, but because of the causal requirement under which the F.P.C.
requires in accessorial liability the following might represent the law on this point.
106 Other similar articles are mentioned in the F.P.C.: Attempt: article (34). Offence against the
external security of the State: article (197). Offence against the internal security of the State: article
(201). Offence against the financial interest of the State: article (210). Bribery: article (239). Offence
against the religion and religious practice: article (326).
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Obviously there must be a timely communication of the intention of withdrawal to
the principal or the principals and those features which both Ashworth and Gilles
previously suggested. The possible justification for withdrawal as a defence under
the F.P.C. is the lack of actus reus, without any need that the F.P.C. should expressly
indicate this (although it is required when the law is vague as it is nearly always the
case of the F.P.C.). I believe that the discussion of this subject of English law is
relevant under the UAE law with the exception that the causal requirement suggests
that more is required from accessories to avoid punishment. Second, I think that the
UAE courts have a responsibility in explaining how such a defence might work and
if there is any need to distinguish it from one form to another.
(E) Other related issues:
Victims:
There is a broad agreement that unwilling victims are not parties to crimes
committed upon them. Thus, the discussion should focus on willing victims in order
to ascertain whether they should be considered as parties to the crime. There is no
clear authority on this point, either in the F.P.C. or in cases; moreover, this subject is
not discussed by Arabic legal commentary. It possible to say that the consent of the
victims would either constitute a justification for an act (e.g. theft) or that it changes
the classification of an offence (e.g. rape to adultery or fornication). However, one
should ask whether there is there a slight possibility that English law discussion of
the subject is relevant regarding crimes such as some sexual offences. Article (354)
of the F.P.C., under the heading 'rape and indecent acts' states that:
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"...Whoever resorts to coercion in unlawful sexual intercourse with a female
or a male shall be punished by the death penalty. A case of coercion shall
arise if the victim at the time of the crime was under fourteen years of age."
Here, the F.P.C. has expressly excluded the victim under fourteen from any penalty
and no weight has been given to the victim's consent. At the same time, the situation
remains vague. It must be noted that there is no counterpart in the F.P.C. to the
discussion of victims as in English law, which might suggest that that all victims,
1 07
whether willing or unwilling, are exempt from accessorial liability.
107 In the English case Sockett (1908) 1 Cr. App. Rep. 101, it was held that a woman can be convicted
as an accomplice to unlawful abortion on herself. I shall discuss below whether the F.P.C. takes a
similar position. For example, article (340) of the F.P.C. indicates that: "Whoever wilfully aborts a
pregnant woman by giving her drugs or by applying any other means which leads to abortion, shall be
punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. Punishment by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding seven years shall be inflicted if the crime is committed without her consent." As
it appears, abortion is not a criminal offence if committed by a pregnant woman on herself, only the
person who aborts her is penalised. However, is there a possibility that accessorial liability plays some
part here. The answer should be in negative because of the following: The important question is that
who is protected by the above article: the foetus or the mother? In the former, one can possibly
conclude that the mother is an accessory to abortion while if she is the protected one, then, no
accessorial liability would follow. It is not clear what the drafters of the F.P.C. had in mind, but it
possible to say that the willing mother is not a victim if she commits the crime against the foetus's
right to be delivered and she should be treated as an accessory. Having said that there is one major
dilemma here, which is related to the activity of the pregnant mother in the offence whether she was a
principal or accessory by means of assistance, encouragement, or conspiracy. In fact because of the
nature of abortion, the pregnant woman is to be considered as a principal to that crime and this
logically suggests that the legislator, according to the rule of legality, have to expressly provide a
special provision or article for convicting the mother as a principal offender. Thus, the subject of





The discussion of secondary partnership in crime has been the subject of
considerable debate and is still controversial in both case law and legal commentary.
This is a clear sign that shows the amount of uncertainty and vagueness that
surrounds nearly every aspect of this subject, which has been labelled as the worst
feature ofEnglish criminal law because its relative incoherence. A side effect of such
uncertainty of the subject is that it is almost entirely governed by precedents which
fail to deal fully with many of the problematic issues. It is because of this case law
approach that there has been no overall analysis of the issue, something which might
have been expected to be achieved in full-scale legislative reform. For this reason
one might conclude that codification of this type of liability is both necessary and
urgent in order to meet the objectives of accessibility, comprehensibility,
consistency, and certainty that criminal law requires.
Any future codification of English law might take into account the following
consideration:
1) The four words that describe the actus reus of accessorial liability 'aid, abet,
counsel, procure' should be reduced to three: encouragement, assistance and
procurement. (See: chapter 1, pp. 20-32).
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2) There are good grounds, in English law for not allowing causation, as it is required
for the liability of the principal, to be an element in accessorial liability, apart from
procurement. However, this asserts that the required mens rea should be higher than
is currently the case. (See: chapter 2, pp. 56-69).
3) Accessorial liability in omission is wide and excessive. The legislature (or case
law) should either expressly elaborate in which crimes accessorial liability is
established by omission. Or, as has been suggested by LC. No. 131, the required
mens rea should be based on criminal intention and knowledge should be considered
only as prima-facie evidence from which the jury could infer intention of accessorial
liability in omission. (See: chapter 2, pp. 76-88).
4) English law should expressly acknowledge that, currently, apart from in the case
of procurement, case law has shifted the mens rea required for accessorial liability
from specific intention to a basic intention, which means that the mens rea can be
located either in intention or subjective recklessness. In this regard, it is inappropriate
to use of what is called a dual mens rea requirement (intention to aid, abet, counsel
and knowledge that principal might commit the offence) because it is vague and does
not have any clear connection with the general requirement of mens rea under
English law. (See: chapter 3, pp. 103-146).
5) The current level of mens rea required is very low, uncontrolled, and brings
normal activities into the net of incrimination, a situation intended by the policy
makers to give English criminal law wider power to control many secondary
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activities which support the commission of crime. English law has shifted the
required mens rea to recklessness in order to fight crime but has not addressed the
position of the principal offender; it is even possible that recklessness might at some
future stage be inferred from mere suspicion. Because of the actual and theoretical
differences between a principal and an accessory, and in order to establish a balance
between applying both intention and knowledge, the required mens rea should be
based on intention according to the English Draft Code in cl. 18 (b) (ii) (purpose and
knowledge that the crime is virtually certain to follow). This can encompass
willingness and indifference. Any other form, if sufficient, should be a crime on its
own outside the net of accessorial liability. Exceptionally, purpose should be
required for encouragement and procurement, while knowledge should be enough for
assistance. However, in this case, there should be an investigation of new possible
defences to limit the broadness of the mens rea in this regard. (See: chapter 3, pp.
109-146).
6) Because of the wider and floating mens rea of accessorial liability, knowledge of
the future crime of the principal is problematic and raises many doubts, confusing the
term knowledge with other related concepts such as suspicion that the principal will
commit the actus reus. English law shifted this concept of knowledge of the future
crime of the principal from unspecified discussion of knowledge of essential matters,
(Johnson v. Youden) which required full knowledge, to an objective standard that
required knowledge of the principal's intention to commit a crime of the type which
was committed (Bainbridge). It then returned to a subjective standard that stresses
that it is enough that accessories contemplate the range of offences that might be
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likely to be committed by the principal {Maxwell). If the required mens rea is not
connected to a "higher" state of mind, proposition no. 10 of English Law
Commission No. 43 should be taken into consideration to solve the problem of
possibly endless convictions that could result from applying knowledge broadly.1
(See: chapter 3, pp. 131-146).
7) Although English law has turned recently to focus on contemplation (subjective
recklessness) as the required mens rea for accessorial liability for the additional
offences (doctrine of common purpose), there is room to allow tacit/express
agreement to play a role in deciding the required mens rea with contemplation. It has
been pointed out that there are some problems in adopting the both tests together.
English law should expressly state which is to be taken and if both applied it should
state how it could possibly work. Because of the low mens rea in this regard, English
law should take into consideration whether or not to require a higher state of mind
for both the main and the additional offence. Alternatively, it could require intention
(purpose and oblique) for the main offence and keep using subjective recklessness
for the additional offence. (See: chapter 4, pp. 205-243).
8) Derivative theory should not be abandoned for a risk-based theory as suggested by
English Law Commission No. 131. The Law Commission might instead then discuss
whether there is a need to create an inchoate offence of assisting crimes, an offence
with its own punishment. It might also take into consideration the ambit of such a
1 "Where a principal is helped in the commission ofmore than one offence by a single act of help, the
accessory who afforded that help shall not, after having been convicted of one or more of such
offences, be convicted of another of such offences of equal or lesser gravity."
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new offence and the required mens rea in comparison with other inchoate offences.
(See: chapter 5, pp. 284-295).
9) English law should clarify the ambit of the doctrine of innocent agency. (See:
chapter 5, pp. 295-299).
10) The defence of withdrawal is vague especially in relation to the time factor in
which withdrawal can be established. Any future codification, or even case law
development, should use simple terms to describe such a defence and clarify what
amounts to a sufficient withdrawal. (See: chapter 5, pp. 302-309).
11) English law should seriously consider employing cl. 27. (6) of the English Draft
Criminal Code 1989, and to provide other possible defences to the current low mens
rea. (See: chapter 5, pp. 311-314).
UAE Law
This study shows that the subject of accessorial liability is ambiguous, defective, and
ill-structured. It reveals an example of many vague areas of the F.P.C. Many
mistakenly believe that such law is to be interpreted and examined exclusively by
reference to a particular jurisprudence, however, as has been argued above, there is
clear evidence that this is a misleading and inaccurate idea. In fact UAE criminal law
is a combination of Islamic Sharia, French-Egyptian, Anglo-Indian sets of
jurisprudential inference, and is quite capable of employing other legal concepts
from different legal systems. Neither legislation, courts, nor legal education take this
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into consideration, which causes a lack of cohesion to the overall shape of the UAE
criminal system putting it under a form of house arrest and inhibiting legal
development and reform.
The following is recommended:
1) To avoid, or at least to limit the uncertainty that currently surrounds almost every
aspect of the F.P.C. and other related codes, there must be a draft memorandum to
explain the codes. The UAE courts should take a responsibility in explaining the law.
(See: introduction, pp. 2-12).
2) The legislation or courts should clarify the meaning of instigation. As it appears it
is currently defined to only include the liability of the prime instigator or the one who
puts the idea for a crime into the mind of the principal offender. The definition
should encompass the state of collective instigation or supportive instigation of the
principal offender and not only "initiative instigation." (See: chapter 1, pp. 37-42).
3) It is arguable that the F.P.C. requires causation to be an essential part of the
required actus reus of accessorial liability. Causation must be investigated then, or
charges of accessorial involvement may collapse. Unfortunately, neither Arabic
commentary nor domestic judicial opinion offers any answer as to how causation
should operate. Thus the concept of causation should be governed by article (32) and
similarly should be applied to both the principal offender and the accessory.
Otherwise, the rule of legality and even the principle of common sense, suggest that
an accessory is entitled to have a defence of causation. Although it is evident that
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causation should not be regarded as element of accessorial liability, any future
amendment of the F.P.C. should seriously take this into consideration. Currently,
UAE courts have a major responsibility in interpreting article (32), which is actually
vague, to decide how both of the principle and the accessory are subject to it. (See:
chapter 2, pp. 70-75; chapter 5, pp. 327-329).
4) Although that the F.P.C. is vague as to whether omission can constitute an actus
reus of accessorial liability, this should not be taken as conclusive evidence to
exclude omission where there is a duty to act. To avoid such uncertainty, the F.P.C.
should expressly state that omission is sufficient to be regarded as an aspect of the
required actus reus for accessorial liability. (See: chapter 2, pp. 89-100).
5) Under the F.P.C., there is doubt as to what accessorial mens rea requires, whether
intention, fault or both. Furthermore, the requirement of the coincidence ofmens rea
between accomplices is neither expressly nor implicitly stated. This means that under
the F.P.C. the required mens rea of accessorial liability is intention, otherwise an
accessory is entitled to have a defence. Moreover, further investigation might suggest
that intention should be required, regardless of the mens rea of the principal offender.
In order to have a norm of flexibility, the legal authorities in the UAE, when
amending the F.P.C., should take into consideration that in order to capture many
activities which probably now are outside the net of accessorial liability, knowledge
of virtual certainty should be adopted within the required mens rea by adopting either
the approaches of M.P.C. or the English Draft Code which both treats knowledge of
virtual certainty as close to intention. This requirement would be considered in the
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light of the fact of each case. If this approach is not taken, the required mens rea
should be based on intention, and fault should be adopted where the principal acts
with a similar state of mind only in relation to some serious fault crimes. (See:
chapter 3, pp. 162-204).
6) UAE courts should understand that the essence of accessorial liability under the
F.P.C. is not the depiction of joint intention as dealt with by the Arabic
commentators, but rather it lies in the accessory's willingness to contribute to the
offence of the principal offender, based on his intention to participate. The essence of
the subject can be extended to include both willingness and a high degree of
knowledge of a crime if oblique intention is accepted to be within the range of
accessorial mens rea. . (See: chapter 3, pp. 186-204).
7) Under article (51), in respect of liability for an additional offence, the liability of
accessories is judged by an exceptional form of responsibility, which links their guilt
to crimes outside the scope of their agreement by means of a vague theory called the
probable consequence test. Intensive interpretation of the above article indicates that
the issue ofmens rea is not even related to the notion of a reasonable man, which by
the same token, suggests that there is no mens rea required for such liability. The
amendment of the F.P.C. should abandon the use of the vague probable test and
expressly state that the required mens rea is intention (purpose or oblique), fault
(subjective recklessness, or objective recklessness), both of which insist on
evaluating the whole facts of the case before conviction. Until such an amendment
UAE courts should require fault (objective recklessness) based on the notion of a
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reasonable man as the only means to preventing the harsh application of the imputed
liability of article (51). (See: chapter 4, pp. 247-274).
8) To take into consideration that there is a need to have a general inchoate liability
for instigation and conspiracy and also to consider having an inchoate liability for
assisting crimes. (See: chapter 5, pp. 320-325).
9) The F.P.C. should be amended to include a provision to indicate that when it is
very difficult to distinguish the principal from the accessory, all should be tried for
the same crime provided that they are accomplices to each other. However, a
distinction should be made between Islamic Sharia crimes and those crimes
expressly mentioned by the F.P.C. For the first, it seems that the courts must require
prosecution to distinguish between accomplices into principals and accessories
because the fixed punishments of such crimes are only applied to the principal
offenders, otherwise all accomplices should be subject to lesser punishments. For the
second, for indictment on a crime mentioned by the F.P.C. article (47) enables a
court to penalise an accessory with similar punishment to that imposed upon the
principal. (See: introduction, pp. 7-8; chapter 5, pp. 319-320, pp. 324-325).
10) Legislation and courts should distinguish between a principal and an accessory in
response to their different type of liability and to their different roles in a crime. (See:
chapter 5, pp. 278-284, pp. 316-320 and article 47 of the F.P.C.).
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11) Both lack of causation and lack of intention should be a defence if the courts
continue to give weight to the view of Arabic jurisprudence which has been set out
above. (See: chapter 5, pp. 327-329).
12) Although withdrawal is possibly a defence under the current situation, the F.P.C.
should expressly state this to avoid any vagueness. Also, the F.P.C. should clarify the
circumstances in which such a defence is a full defence or merely a mitigation of
punishment, and to explain the time factor within which withdrawal can be effective.
(See: chapter 5, pp. 330-331).
13) The F.P.C. should include the defences of the English Draft Criminal Code 1989,
in cl. 27. (6), and discuss other possible defences, if knowledge of virtual certainty is
accepted to be the minimum required mens rea. (See: chapter 5, pp. 311-314).
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Appendix
Selected articles from the F.P.C., which have been used in the thesis.1
Article (1) of the Presidential Order to issue the F.P.C.:
" The law attached here on crimes and penalties shall be enforced, and any provision
contrary to its provision shall be repealed."
Article (1):
"Islamic Sharia shall apply to the crimes of Hudoud, Qisas, and Diyah. Tazia 'ar
crimes and its punishments shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of
this Code and other penal codes."
Article (19):
"This Code applies to any one who commits an act outside the UAE, which makes
him a principal or accessory to a crime committed entirely or partly in the UAE."
Article (26):
"Crimes are divided into the following:
(1) Hudoud,
(2) Qisas and Diyah crimes,
(3) Tazia 'ar crimes are of three types: felonies, misdemeanours, and contraventions.
This classification is determined in accordance with the punishment mentioned
by the Code..."
Article (28):
"A felony is a crime punishable by any of the following:
(1) any punishment of Hudoud crimes, and Qisas crimes except of Shurb al-Khamr
(drinking alcohol) and al-Qadhf(false accusation of illicit sexual intercourse),
(2) death penalty,
(3) life imprisonment,
(4) temporary imprisonment (imprisonment of not less than three years and not
exceeding fifteen years)."
Article (29):
"A misdemeanour is a crime punishable by one or more of the following:
(1) detention (of not less than one month and not exceeding three years),
(2) a fine exceeding 1000 Dirhams,
(3) Diyah,
1 UAE Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 on Penal Code (in Arabic), published in the UAE Official Gazette
No. 182, 20/12/1987, pp. 7-226; Abdo, D., UAE Law No. 3 of 1987 on Penal Code, (Unofficial
Translation), (1995), Jordan: Amin Abdo Publication. I have translated the above articles from the
above two sources; some amendments however, were necessarily required.
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(4) lashes (whipping) for Shurb al-Khamr (drinking alcohol) and al-Qadhf
(accusation of illicit sexual intercourse)."
Article (30):
"A contravention is any act or omission punishable by the codes or regulations by
one or both of the following:
(1) custody for a period not less than 24 hours and not exceeding 10 days in any of
the places designated for that purpose,
(2) a fine not exceeding 1000 Dirhams."
Article (32):
"A person shall not be responsible for a crime if it is not a result of his own criminal
activity: however, he may be responsible for a crime even if his criminal activity and
another preceding, contemporary or subsequent cause have contributed to its
occurrence, where such a cause is expected or likely to happen in the ordinary course
of things. However, if such cause is sufficient to produce the result of the crime, the
person shall in this case be responsible only for the act he has committed."
Article (38):
"The mens rea of a crime consists of intention or fault. Intention arises when the
accused's will moves towards the commission or omission of an act, where such
commission or omission is legally defined as a crime, for the purpose of producing a
direct effect or any other criminal result which the offender has expected.
Fault arises if a criminal result occurs by reasons of the defendant's fault, whether
such a fault is negligence, indifference, carelessness, recklessness, imprudence or
non-compliance with laws, regulations rules or orders."
Article (41):
"A defendant who is ignorant of the aggravating circumstances that change the
classification of a crime, shall not be responsible accordingly; however, he may
benefit from the mitigating factor although he is ignorant thereof."
Article (43):
"An offender shall be responsible for a crime whether he has committed it with
intention or fault, unless the law explicitly provides for intention."
Article (44):
"A principal of a crime is the one who either commits it by himself or is a direct
accomplice in its commission. A person shall be a direct accomplice to a crime in the
following instances:
First: where he joins another in the committing of an offence.
Second: where he takes part in the committing of an offence that consists of several
acts, and he intentionally commits any such act.
Third: where he utilises another person by any means to commit an offence, and that
the latter is not responsible, for any reason, under criminal law."
Article (45):
"A person shall be considered as an accessory to a crime by causation:
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First: if he instigates a crime, and it occurs in accordance with such instigation.
Second: if he conspires with others to commit a crime, and it occurs in accordance
with such conspiracy.
Third: if he gives the perpetrator a weapon, tools or any other item which he knows
will be used in committing the crime, or if he wilfully aids the perpetrator by any
other means or actions which can pave the way for the committing or completion of a
crime."
Article (46):
"An accessory by causation shall be considered as a direct accomplice (a principal),
provided that he is found at the scene of an offence with intention to commit it if it is
not committed by another person."
Article (47):
"Any person who participates in an offence, whether a principal or accessory, shall
receive the same penalty unless the law provides otherwise."
Article (48):
"If an accomplice is not punished for an offence by reason that his action is excused,
for lack of intention or any other reason related to him, the other accomplices shall
not benefit from such exemption."
Article (51):
"An accomplice (co-principal and accessory by causation) to an offence shall receive
the penalty of the offence which has been committed, notwithstanding that it is
different from that intended to be committed, whenever the offence which took place
is a probable result of the participation."
Article (52):
"If the classification of a crime or penalty changes in relation to the intent of an
offender or as a result of his knowledge, an accomplice whether principal or
accessory to the crime shall be punished be punished in accordance with his intent or
knowledge."
Article (102):
"Without prejudice to the cases in which the law states special causes for severity,
the following shall, inter alia, be considered to be aggravating circumstances:
(1) commitment of a crime for a vicious motive,
(2) commitment of a crime, by exploiting the victims mental element weakness or
his inability to resist, or circumstances where are unable to defend himself,
(3) commitment of a crime in a savage way or by mutilating a victim,
(4) commitment of a crime by a public official, by taking advantage of his official
authorities or his capacity, unless the law provides a certain punishment, owing
to such a capacity."
Article (103):
"Where there is an aggravating circumstance, the court may impose penalty as
follows:
346
(1) if the principal penalty for a crime is a fine, its maximum limit may be doubled or
a judgement of detention may be awarded,
(2) if the principal penalty for a crime is detention, its maximum may be doubled,
(3) if the principal penalty is imprisonment with a maximum period of less than
fifteen years, the penalty may be imposed to such an extent,
(4) if the principal penalty for a crime is temporary imprisonment with a maximum
period, it may be commuted to life imprisonment."
Article (150):
"A death penalty shall be imposed on...
B) any one who, at the time of war, instigate soldiers to join the service of any
foreign state or facilitate such an action."
Article (171):
"A person is considered as an accessory by causation in crimes indicated in this
chapter (Chapter One, crimes affecting the external security of the State, articles:
149- 173) if he:
1) is aware of the criminal offender's intention and supplies him with aid, means of
subsistence, accommodation, shelter, a meeting place or other facilities, carries
his letters, facilitate his search for the subject of the crime, concealed; transport;
or provide him with information,
2) is knowingly conceals things used, or to be used in the crimes, or resulted from it,
3) destroys, steals, conceals, or purposely change the facts of a document which
helps to detect the crime, evidence, or punish the offender."
Article (173):
"An exemption from the penalties indicated in this chapter (Chapter One, crimes
affecting the external security of the State, articles: 149- 173) is granted to any
offender who informs the judicial or administrative authorities with any information
he knows before the attempt to commit the crime and prior to the investigation.
The court may grant such exemption if the information occurs after the committing
of the crime but before starting its investigation. The court may reduce the penalty if
the offender provide a helpful assistance to the concerned authorities during the
investigation, trial which facilitate arresting any other offenders of the crime."
Article (187):
"A death penalty or life imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who
commands an armed gang, takes the gang charge, or manages its movement; system
for the purpose of capturing, plundering territories, or properties owned by the State
or any group of people, or for the purpose of resisting the military force ordered to
capture the offenders of these crimes. Other members of such a gang shall be
punished by temporary imprisonment."
Article (188):
"Life or temporary imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
supplies or give the gang mentioned in previous article [article 187] weapons, tools,
equipment, tools to help them in reaching their aim, sends them aid, raise funds for
them, or involves in any kind of criminal communication with the leaders or
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directors of the gang, or by knowing their aim and character provides them with
houses or places ofmeetings."
Article (242):
" A prison term shall be imposed upon any public office holder who uses torture,
force or threat, by himself or by another, against a defendant, witness or an expert,
causing him to confess to a crime or to make statement or give information in respect
thereof, or to suppress any such matters."
Article (272):
"Any public official or person in charge of detecting crimes and arresting the
accused, who fails or defers to inform about a crime within his knowledge shall be
punished by detention or fine.
A fine shall be imposed upon any official who is not in charge of detecting or seizing
crimes, and who neglect or delays to inform the concerned authorities of a crimes
within his knowledge, in the course of or in respect of his duty job.
There shall be no punishment in the above two paragraphs if the legal action of the
crime requires a complaint.
Exemption from the penalty of the second paragraph may be granted if the official is
a spouse of the defendant, one of his descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters or
having the same degree of relationship by marriage."
Article (274):
"A fine not exceeding 1000 Dirhams shall be imposed on whoever becomes aware of
a crime and abstains from informing the concerned authorities. Exemption from the
penalty may be granted if such person is a spouse of the defendant, one of his
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters or in laws having the same degree of
relationship by marriage."
Article (336):
"Whoever assaults another person physically in any manner without intending
murder, but the assault leads to death, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a
period not exceeding ten years."
Article (340):
"Whoever wilfully aborts a pregnant woman by giving her drugs or by applying any
other means which leads to abortion, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period
not exceeding five years. Punishment by imprisonment for a period not exceeding
seven years shall be inflicted if the crime is committed without her consent."
Article (348):
"A punishment of detention and fine or one of these shall be imposed on any person
who intentionally commits an act which exposes the life, health, security, or freedom
of people to danger. If a harm is resulted from the action, the punishment shall be a




"...Whoever resorts to coercion in unlawful sexual intercourse with a female or a
male shall be punished by the death penalty. A case of coercion shall arise if the
victim at the time of the crime was under fourteen years of age."
Article (388):
"... Punishment by imprisonment for at least five years and at most seven years shall
be inflicted for an act of theft if it is committed by a workman at his place of work or
it causes damage to his employer."
349
Bibliography
Books and articles in Arabic:
Aboeila Akida, M., Altaujihat Alhaditha le Qanon Alokobat Alfranci Algadeed:
Qanon Alokobat Alfranci le 1992, (Arabic. The Modern Trends in the New French
Penal Code: French Penal Code of1992) (1997), Egypt: Dar Alfikar.
Abu Aniair, M. Z., Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The
General Part) (1986), Egypt.
Abu Khatwa, A. S., Sharh Alahkam Alama le Qanon Alokobat le Alemarat Alcirbia
Almutheda: Alguza Alawal, Alnadaria Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of
the General Part of UAE Penal Code: Part One, The General Principles of Crime)
(1989), Dubai: Albayan Press.
Qanon Aligrat Algzaia le Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda: Qanon
35/1992, Alguza Alawal, (Arabic. Explanation of the UAE Penal Procedures Law:
Code No. 35/1992, Part One) (2nd ed. 1993), Dubai: Albayan Press.
Alkullaly, M. M., Almasulia Aljenaia, (Arabic. Criminal Responsibility) (1948),
Egypt.
Ali, Y.A., Sharh Qanon Alokobat: Alnadariat Alama, Alkitab Althani, (Arabic.
Explanation of the Penal Code: The General Theories, Book Two) (1987), Egypt:
Dar Alnhda Alarabia.
Alia, S., Sharh Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam (Arabic. Explanation of the Penal
Code: The General Part) (1998), Beirut.
Alojy, M., Alqanon Aljenai Alam: Alguza Alawal, Alnadaria Alama le Aljarima,
(Arabic. Public Criminal Law: Part One, The General Theory of Crime) (2nd ed.
1992), Lebanon: Nofal Publication.
Alqanon Aljenai Alam: Alguza Althani, Almasulia Aljenaia, (Arabic.
Public Criminal Law: Part Two, Criminal Responsibility) (2nd ed. 1992), Lebanon:
Nofal Publication.
Alsabhan, F., "Dirasa hoal Altadilat Almuktraha ala Qanon Alokobat Alemarat
Alarbia Almutheda le 1987, (Arabic. "Suggested Proposal on Amending the F.P.C.
For 1987") (1996), Dubai: unpublished memo.
Al-Saeed, K., Almbadee Alama le Almusharka Aligramia fee Qanon Alokobat
Alordony, (Arabic. The General Provisions ofCriminal Complicity in Jordan Penal
Code) (1983), Jordan: Majedlawy Publication.
350
Alsaeed, M. A., Almbcidee Alama le Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. The General
Principles ofPenal Law) (1962), Egypt.
A1 Shinaway, S., Alnadaria Alama fee Algarema wal Alikab fee Qanon Alokobat Al
Kuwaiti, (Arabic. The General Theory of Crime and Punishment in Kuwait Penal
Code) (2nd ed. 1992). Egypt
Awad, Muhidain. M., Almbadee Alasasia wa Alnadaria Alama le Alqanon Aljenai
fee Alsharia Alislamia, (Arabic. The Basic Elements and General Theories of
Criminal Law in Islamic Jurisprudence) (1986), Cairo: Cairo University Publication.
Bhanam, R., Alnadaria Alama le Alqanon Aljenai, (Arabic. The General Doctrine of
Criminal Law) (1995), Egypt: Almareaf Publication.
Gihad, Gouda. H., Alwageez fee Sharh Qanon Aligrat Algzaia le Alemarat Alarbia
Almutheda: Qanon 35/1992, Alguza Althanil, (Arabic. Explanation ofthe UAE Penal
Procedures Law: Code No. 35/1992, Part Two) (1994), Dubai: Albayan Press.
Qanon Alokobat Alittihadi: Jaraem Alashkhas, Alguza Alawal, (Arabic.
The Federal Penal Code: Crimes Against the Person, Part one) (2nd ed. 1998),
Dubai: Albayan Press.
Qanon Alokobat Alittihadi: Jaraem Alamwal, Alguza Althani, (Arabic.
The Federal Penal Code: Crimes Against the Property, Part Two) (1996), Dubai:
Albayan Press.
Hummad, A., Alwaseet fee Sharh Qanon Algaza Al Kuwaiti: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic.
Explanation ofKuwait Penal Law: The General Part) (3ld ed. 1983), Kuwait: Kuwait
University Publication.
Husni, M., Alnadaria Alama le Alkasd Aljenai, (Arabic. The General Theory of
Criminal Intention) (3rd ed. 1988), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia.
Almushraka Aligramia fee Altashreat Alarabia, (Arabic. Criminal
Complicity in Arab Codes) (2nd ed. 1992), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia.
Ilakat Alsababia fee Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. Causation in Penal
Code) (1983), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia.
Sharh Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of the
Penal Code: The General Part) (6th ed. 1989), Egypt.
Ismaeel, M. A., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. Explanation of
the General Provisions ofthe Penal Code) (1951), Egypt.
Kamel Obaid, M., Nudom Alhukom wa Dostoor Alemarat, (Arabic. The Forms of
Governments and the UAE Constitution) (3rd ed. 1998), Dubai: Albayan Press.
351
Kera, H., "Muqdima", Majalt Alqcla wa Altashria (Arabic. "Introduction" (January
1993) Court & Legislation Journal pp. 6-7.
Mahdi, A., Shark Alquaed Alama le Qanon Alokobat: Dirash Muqarana bean Qanon
Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, wa Mashrua Alqanon Alithadi) wa
Alqanon Almassri, (Arabic. Explanation of the General Rules of the Penal Law: A
Comparative Study between UAE Laws (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and the Draft Federal
Penal Code) and the Egyptian Law) (1983), Cairo: Atlas Publication.
Mahmood, J. M., Aldoula Alislamia Almuasera: Alfekra wa Altatbek, (Arabic. The
Contemporary Islamic State: the Idea & the Practice) (1992), Egypt: Dar Alkitab
Almassri.
Mohammed A., Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The General
Part) (nd.), Egypt: Dar Almatboaat Algamaia.
Mustafa, M. M., Sharli Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of the
Penal Code: The General Part) (10th ed. 1983), Cairo: Cairo University Press.
Obaid, R., Mbadee Alkesm Alam menn Alqanon Alikabi, (Arabic. Principles of the
General Part ofthe Penal Code) (4th ed. 1979), Cairo: Dar Alfeker Alarabi.
Alsababia Aljenaia bean Alfekh wal Alqda, (Arabic. Criminal
Causation in Legal Commentaries and Courts) (4th ed. 1984) Cairo.
Ouda, A., Altshrea Aljenai Alislami Muqrana bel Alqanon Alwadai, Alguza Alawal,
(Arabic. Islamic Sharia Criminal Law Compared with Secular Law, Part One) (11th
ed. 1992), Beirut: Dar Alrisala.
Altshrea Aljenai Alislami Muqrana bel Alqanon Alwadai, Alguza
Althani, (Arabic. Islamic Sharia Criminal Law Compared with Secular Law, Part
Two) (11th ed. 1992), Beirut: Dar Alrisala.
Rabia, H., Sharh Alquaed Alama le Qanon Okobat Alemarat Alarbia Almutheda:
Alguza Alawal, Almbadee Alama le Aljarima, (Arabic. Explanation of the General
Part ofUAE Penal Code: Part One, The General Principles of Crime) (1993), Dubai:
Albayan Press.
Rashid, A., Muqdima le Mbadee Alnadaria Alama, (Arabic. Introduction to the
Principles ofthe General Theory) (1974), Egypt.
Salama, M., Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Penal Code: The General Part)
(3rd ed. 1990), Cairo: Dar Alfekar Alarabi.
Sidki, A., Alwageez fee Al Qanon Aljenai, (Arabic. Criminal Law) (1986), Egypt:
Dar Almarif.
352
Sorror, A., Alwaseet fee Qanon Alokobat: Alkesm Alam, (Arabic. Explanation of
Penal Code: The General Part) (6th ed. 1986), Egypt: Dar Alnhda Alarabia.
Books and articles in English:
Al-Alkim, H., The Foreign Policy ofthe U.A.E. (1989), London: Saqi Books.
Al-Bharna, H., The Arab Gulf States: Their Political, Legal Status and Their
International Problems (1975), Beirut: Librairie du Liban.
Al-Mawardi, Abu'l-Hasan., Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah: The Laws of Islamic
Governance, trans. Yate., A., (1996), London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd.
Al-Muhairi, B.S., " Conclusion to the Series of Articles on the UAE Penal
Law"[1997] Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.12, Part 4. p. 384.
Allen, M., Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1995), London: Blackstone Press Ltd.
Ashworth, A., Principles ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1995), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Principles ofCriminal Law (3rd ed. 1999), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
The Criminal Process: an Evaluation Study (2nd ed. 1998), Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
"Defences of General Application: Entrapment" [1978] Crirn. LR 137-
140.
"The Making of English Criminal Law: Blackstone, Foster and East "
[1978] Crim. LR 389.
"Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen Consequences",
in Glazebrook, P. R., (ed.) Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), London: Sweet &
Maxwell, p. 77.
"Sharpening the Subjective Element in Criminal Liability", in Duff, R.
A. and Simmonds, N., (eds.) Philosophy and the Criminal Law (1984), Wiesbaden,
p. 79.
"The Draft Code, Complicity and Inchoate Offences" [1986] Crim. LR
303-314.
" The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions" (1989) 105 L.Q.R.
424.
353
Steiner, E., "Criminal Omission and Public Duties: The French
Experience" (1990) 10 Legal Studies 153.
"Criminal Liability in a Medical Context: the Treatment of Good
Intentions", in Simester, A. and Smith, A.T.H., (eds.) Harm and Culpability (1996),
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bell, J. Boyron, S. & Whittaker, S., Principles of French Law (1998), Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Beynon, H., "Causation, Omission and Complicity" [1987] Crim. LR 539.
Bronitt, S., " Defending Giorgianni- Part One: The Fault Required for Complicity"
(1993) 17 Criminal Law Journal 242-263.
"Defending Giorgianni- Part Two: New Solutions for Old Problems in
Complicity" (1993) 17 Criminal Law Journal 305-318.
Brown, J., The Rule ofLaw in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (1997),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buxton, R. J., "Complicity in the Criminal Code" (1969) 85 L.Q.R. 252.
"Complicity and the Law Commission" [1973] Crim. LR 223-230.
"The Extent of Criminal Complicity" (1970) 42 Modern Law Review
315-318.
Card, R., Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (13th ed. 1995), London:
Butterworths.
Carpenter, C., "Should the Court Aid and Abet the Unintended Accomplice: The
Status of Complicity in California" (1984) Santa Clara Law Review Vol. 24, Spring
343-370.
Childs, P., Nutcases: Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1999), London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Clarkson C. Keating, H., Criminal Law: Texts and Materials (4th ed. 1998), London:
Sweet & Maxwell.
Clarkson, C. M., "Complicity, Powell and Manslaughter" [August 1998] Crim. LR
556.
Cross, R., "The Making of English Criminal Law: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen"
[1978] Crim. LR 652.
Curzon, L. B., Criminal Law (8th ed. 1997), M&E Pitman Publishing.
354
Darsh, S. M., "The Islamic Sharia and its Significance for the Islamic Society"
(1996) 'InterAlia' University ofDurham Student Law Journal vol.1 issue 5, p. 30.
Dawkins, K., "The Unknown Look-Out and Liability for 'Aiding' an Offence"
(January 1989) The New Zealand Law Journal 30.
Dennis, I.H., Sweet & Maxwell's Criminal Law Statutes (3rd ed. 1995), London:
Sweet & Maxwell.
Dennis, I. H., "Intention and Complicity: a Reply" [1988] Crim. LR 649, [1989]
Crim. LR 168.
"The Mental Element for Accessories" in Smith, P., (ed.), Criminal
Law: Essays in Honour ofJ.C. Smith (1987), London: Butterworths. p. 40.
Dressier, J., "Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem" (1985) 37 Hasting Law Journal 91-140.
Duff, R. A., Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990), Oxford: Blackwell.
"Can I help you?" (1990) 10 Legal Studies 165.
Dutton, Y., The Origins of Islamic Law: The Quran, the 'Muwatta and Madinan
Amal' (1999), UK: Curzon Press.
Elliot, C & Quinn, F., Criminal Law (1st ed. 1996), Longman.
Criminal Law (3,d ed. 2000), Longman.
Esposito, J., Islam: The Straight Path (3rd ed. 1998), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Ferguson, P. W., "Jurisdiction and Criminal Law in Scotland and England", in
Hunter, R., (ed.) Justice and Crime (1993), Edinburgh: T&T Clark, p. 97.
Finn, J., " Culpable Non-intervention: Reconsidering the Basis for Party Liability by
Omission" (1994) Criminal Law Journal Vol. 18, p.106.
Fisse, B., Howard's Criminal Law (4th ed. 1990), Australia: The Law Book
Company Ltd.
Fletcher, G., Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), Boston: Little Brown.
Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (1998), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Giles, M., "Complicity: The Problems of Joint Enterprise" [1990] Crime LR 383.
355
Gillies, P., The Law of Criminal Complicity (1980), Australia: The Law Book
Company Ltd.
Criminal Law (3ld ed. 1993), Australia: The Law Book Company Ltd.
Glazebrook, P. R., (ed.) Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), London: Sweet &
Maxwell.
"Structuring the Criminal Code: Functional Approaches to Complicity,
Incomplete Offences and General Defences", in Simester, A. P., & Smith A. T. H.,
(eds.), Harm and Culpability;(1996), Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 195.
Gledhill, A., The Penal Codes ofNorthern Nigeria and the Sudan (1963), London:
Sweet & Maxwell.
Gordon. G., Criminal Law ofScotland (2nd ed. 1978) Edinburgh.
Griew, E., "It Must Have Been One of Them" [1989] Crim. LR. 129.
Hill, E., "Comparative and Historical Study ofModern Middle Eastern Law" (1978)
26 American Journal ofComparative Law 279.
Hogan, B., "Victims as Parties to Crime" (1962) Crim. LR 683-695.
Hooper, A., Harris's Criminal Law (21st ed. 1968), London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Hussain, J., Islamic Law and Society: An Introduction (1999), Sydney (Australia):
The Federation Press.
Irving, T. B. Ahmad, K. & Ahsan, M., The Quran: Basic Teachings (Revised edtion,
1992), Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
Jones, T.H. & Christie, M.G.A., Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1996), Edinburgh: W.
Green/Sweet & Maxwell.
Kadish, S., Blame and Punishment (1987), New York: Macmillan.
"Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine" (1985) 73 California Law Review 324.
Lafave, W. Scott, A., Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1986) West Group Publication.
Lanham D., "Accomplices and Constructive Liability" (1980) 4 Criminal Law
Journal 78.
"Complicity Concert and Conspiracy" (1980) 4 Criminal Law Journal
276.
356
"Accomplices and Transferred Malice" (1980) 96 L.Q.R. 110.
"
Drivers, Control And Accomplices" [1982] Crim. LR 419.
"Felony Murder-Ancient and Modern" (1983) 7 Criminal Law Journal
90.
Lombardi, C. B., "Islamic law as Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The
Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State" (1998) Columbia
Journal ofTransnational Law Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 81.
McCall Smith, R.A. & Sheldon, D., Scots Criminal Law (1992), Edinburgh:
Butterworths.
Mitchell, B., "In Defence of a Principle of Correspondence" [1999] Crim. LR 195.
Molan, M. T., (ed.), Criminal Law: 150 Leading Cases (1999), London: Old Bailey
Press.
Orchard, G., "Agreement in Criminal Conspiracy", [1974] Crim. LR 297.
Robinson, P. H., "Imputed Criminal Liability" (March 1984) The Yale Law Journal
Vol. 93, No. 4. 609.
Robinson, P. H. &. Darley, J. M., "Objectivist Versus Subjectivist Views of
Criminality Role of Social Science in Criminal Law Theory" (1998), 18 Oxford
Journal ofLegal Studies, Vol. 18 Autumn, p. 409.
Rt. Hon. Lord Bingham of Cornhill., " A Criminal Code: Must We Wait For Ever?"
[October 1998] Crim. LR 694.
Rugh, W., "The United Arab Emirates: What are the Sources of its Stability?"
(September 1997) Middle East Policy Vol. V, No. 3. pp. 14-24.
Russell on Crime, (3rd ed. 1843 and 4th ed. 1865 by Greaves, C.), (5th ed. 1877 by
Prentice, S.), (10th -12th ed. 1950-64 by Turner J).
Slapper, G., " Case Notes: A Curious Branch of the Law" May 23 2000 The Times:
Law p. 51.
Simester, A. P. and Smith, A. T.H., (eds.) Harm and Culpability (1996), Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Simpson, F., Blackstone's Police Manual: Crime 1998/99 (1998), London:
Blackstone Press Limited.
Smith, J. & Hogan, B., Smith & Hogan Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, (6th ed.
1996) London: Butterworths.
357
Smith, J. C., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (1989), (The Hamlyn
Lectures Fortieth Series), London: Stevens & Sons.
Smith cincl Hogan Criminal Law, (18th ed. 1996), London:
Butterworths.
"Aid, Abet Counsel, or Procure" in Glazebrook, P. R., (ed.) Reshaping
the Criminal Law (1978), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp.120-137.
"Secondary Participation and Inchoate Offences" in Tapper, C, (ed.)
Crime, Proofand Punishment (1981), London: Butterworths. pp. 21-44.
"Criminal Law of Accessories: Law and Law Reform" (1997) 113
L.Q.R. 453.
" Case & Comments: Accessories, Blakely and Sutton v. D.P.P. [1991]
Crim. LR 763-7.
"A Note on Intention" (1990) Crim. LR 85.
"
Commentary on R v. Reardon", (May 1999) Crim. LR, 392.
Smith, K. J., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991), Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
"Complicity and Causation" [1986] Crim. LR 663-676.
"The Law Commission Consultation Paper On Complicity: A
Blueprint for Rationalism" [1994] Crim. LR 239.
Smith, P., (ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith (1987), London:
Butterworths.
Spencer, J. R., "Trying to Help Another Person to Commit a Crime" in Smith, P.,
(ed.), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour ofJ.C. Smith (1987), London: Butterworths.
pp. 148-169.
Stephen, Jim., "Criminal Law" (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 63.
Sullivan, G.R., "Intent, Purpose and Complicity"[1988] Crim. LR 641, [1989] Crim.
LR 166.
"The Law Commission Consultation Paper on Complicity" [1994]
Crim. LR 252.
Tapper, C, (ed.) Crime, Proofand Punishment (1981), London: Butterworths.
358
Taylor, R. D., "Complicity and Excuses" [1983] Crim. LR 656.
Thakker, C.K., Ratanlal & Dhirajal's Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian
Penal Code 1860, Vol. One (24th ed. 1997) New Delhi: Bharat Law House.
Wasik, M., "Abandoning Criminal Intent" [1980] Crim. LR 785.
Westerfield, L., "The Mens Rea requirement of Accomplice Liability in American
Criminal Law: Knowledge or Intent" (1980) Missipi Law Journal, Vol. 51 June/Sept
p.155.
Williams, G., Criminal Law: The General Pari (2nd ed. 1961), London.
Textbook ofCriminal Law (2nd ed. 1983), London: Stevens and Sons.
th
Learning the Law (11 ed. 1982) London: Stevens & Sons.
"Convictions and Fair Labelling" [1983] 42 Cambridge Law Journal
85.
"What Should the Code Do about Omissions?" (1987) 7 Legal Studies
92.
"Oblique Intent" [1987] Cambridge Law Journal p. 417.
"Which ofYou Did it?" (1989) 52 Modern Law Review p. 179.
"Victims and Other Exempt Parties in Crime" (1990) 10 Legal Studies
245-257.
"Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code" [1990] Crim. LR 4 and 98.
"Letting Offences Happen" [1990] Crim. LR 780.
"Criminal Omissions- The Conventional View" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 86.
"Letters to the Editor: Criminal Complicity" [1991] Crim. LR 930-1.
Wilson, W., Criminal Law (1998), London: Longman.
"Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin" [1999] 62 Modern Law Review
448.
Yeager, D., "Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity" (1996) Criminal
Justice Ethics Winter/ Spring 25.
Youngs, R., English, French & German Comparative Law (1998), London:
Cavendish Publishing Limited.
359
Ziadeh, F., Lawyers, the Rule of Law, and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (1968),
Hoover Institution: Stanford California.
PhD dissertations:
A1 Mansoori, A. E. M., The Law ofArrest and Similar Procedures: A Comparative
Study, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University ofEdinburgh 1997.
Al- Muhairi, B. S., Conflict and Continuity: Islamization and Modernization within
the U.A.E. Penal Law, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Kent at
Canterbury, January 1994.
Al-Owais, H., The Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional System of the
UAE: A Comparative Study, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University ofDurham 1989.
Mhabis, Abed J., Almohared Alsoury, (Arabic. The Agent Provocateur, unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, the University of Cairo 1989.
Zuhair, N., Almasualia Aljinaia Almuftrda, (Arabic. Imputed Criminal
Responsibility) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, The University of Cairo. (nd.)
Miscellaneous:
Abdo, D., UAE Law No. 3 of 1987 on Penal Code, (Unofficial Translation), (1995),
Jordan: Amin Abdo Publication.
UAE Law No. 21 of 1995 on Traffic, (Unofficial Translation), (1996),
Jordan: Amin Abdo Publication.
UAE Law No. 14 of 1995 on Fighting Narcotics & Psychotropic
Substances, (Unofficial Translation), (1997), Jordan: Amin Abdo Publication.
UAE Law No. 35 of 1992 on Penal Procedures Law & Federal Law
No. 36 of 1992 on Rehabilitation, (Unofficial Translation), (1997), Jordan: Amin
Abdo Publication.
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, (Revised edn. with commentaries),
Philadelphia American Law Institute, (1962) commentaries (1953-85).
Bronitt, S., "Parties to a Crime" http://law.anu.edu.au/criminet/notes.html/
Dennis J. Wiechman, Jerry D. Kendall, and Mohammad K. Azarian "Islamic Law:
Myths and Realities" http://www.ummah.net/bicnews/Articles/law.htm.
360
Dubai Cassation Court., Majalt Alqda wa Altashria (Arabic. Court & Legislation
Journal), Dubai.
Egyptian Cassation Court, Majmuat Ahka 'am Mahkama 'at Alnaqad (Arabic.
Decisions of the Egyptian Cassation Court), Egypt.
Faruqi, EL, Faruqi's Law Dictionary: English-Arabic (3,d revised ed. 1991), Beirut:
Librairie du Liban.
Eialsbury's Laws of England (4th ed. 1990) Vol. II (I), London: Butterworths.
Ivamy, EL, Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 1993), Butterworths.
Law Commission Working Paper No. 43, Parties, Complicity and Liability for the
Act ofAnother (1972).
Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 131, Assisting and Encouraging Crime
(1993).
Law Commission Report No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989).
Longman Dictionary ofContemporary English (1992), London: Longman.
Ministry of Justice & Islamic Affairs, Allgnah Aloulia le Altashriat: Almudakera
Aledahia le Mashru 'a Qanon Alokobat, (Arabic. The Higher Committee of
Legislation: Draft Memorandum of the Draft Federal Penal Code) (nd.), Unofficial
Draft Memorandum.
Oxford University., 'Oxford Reference-shelf CD-ROM: Law Dictionary' Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
UAE Codes (in Arabic):
Abu-Dhabi Penal Code of 1970.
Dubai Penal Code of 1970.
UAE Constitution of 1971.
Federal Law No. 5 of 1985 on Civil Transaction Code (Amended by
Federal Law No. 1 of 1987).
Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 on Penal Code.
Federal Law No. 35 of 1992 on Penal Procedures Code.
UAE Lawyers Association., Aham Alhakam wa Almbadee Algazaiah le Almhakamat
Alittihadia Alulia: mn Alsana Aluala le Altasiah, (Arabic. The Fediral Supreme
Court: The Important Decision and Principles, from Year One to Year Nine) (nd.),
Dubai: Almatba Aliktesadia Publication.
UAE University., Mgmuat Alhakam Algazaiah le Almhakamat Alittihadia Alulia,
(Arabic. Criminal Rulings ofthe Fediral Supreme Court), UAE: UAE University.
361
UAE University, Faculty of Sharia & Law., (Arabic. Towards Combined Knowledge
ofSharia and Law) Special Edition of a Seminar held at Alain City in March 20-22
1994, UAE.
www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/1998/09/17/mhl/13.htm [Arabic],
www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/1999/04/07/sya/5.html. [Arabic],
www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/2000/03/19/mhl/10.htm [Arabic].
www.albayan.co.ae/albayan/2000/04/06/mhl/lO.htm [Arabic],
362
